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Abstract
East or West?
Understanding Strategic Alignment in the Post-Soviet Space

John A. Mowchan
This comparative foreign policy dissertation examines small state alignment in the postSoviet space. Specifically, I ask what explains change and continuity in the strategic alignment
patterns of former Soviet states with the United States and Russian Federation since the end of
the Cold War? To answer this question, I analyze the alignment trajectories of ruling
governments in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine from 1995 to 2015. While
neorealists expect these materially weak states to bandwagon with Russia because of threat or
power considerations, the empirical reality does not consistently support these theoretical
expectations. What has occurred is that at different times since the demise of the Soviet Union,
ruling governments in Baku, Tbilisi, Chisinau, and Kiev have operated in a gray zone, sometimes
pursing a closer alignment with either Moscow, Washington, or both.
By collecting data via elite interviews, a scenario-based experiment, and archival research of
primary and secondary sources, this study takes a constructivist approach that employs
qualitative and quantitative techniques to conclude three ideational factorsa political leader’s
ideas about the state’s identity, his/her threat perceptions, and foreign policy orientation as
conditioned by domestic politicsmore so than the balance of threat or power, independently
shape the alignment patterns of former Soviet states. This is not to say systemic and other unitlevel factors are of little consequence. On the contrary, these considerations help condition the
preferences and actions of leading political elites in the ruling government moving them along a
non-static continuum towards one of two forms of small state alignment: positive bandwagoning
or great power bridging. It is through a multi-level analysis this study garners a more holistic
understanding of the alignment tendencies of ruling governments in countries along Russia’s
geographical periphery since the end of the Cold War.
This research project advances our cumulative knowledge on small state alignment by
developing a model that shows how and why ruling governments in former Soviet states will
align with one regional great power over another. Using social identity and self-categorization
theory as touchstones, this study looks beyond Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory to
advance an ideational-based model where the predominate alignment preferences and strategies
of political leaders in Russia’s borderlands is best understood as positive bandwagoning or great
power bridging. Knowledge from this research project responds directly to research priorities
established by the United States Army. Additionally, this dissertation can assist academics and
practitioners alike by improving their understanding of small state alignment leading to new
research and viable policies that advance U.S. interests in the 21st century.
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“In political, economic, and military terms, the European continent is again divided—with
Russia to the east, NATO and the EU to the west, and the “lands in between” of Ukraine,
Moldova, and the countries of the South Caucasus as the battleground.” – Dmitry Trenin,
Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, 14 July 2014.1
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION

Background of the Problem
The dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in December 1991 created
a global shock to the international system that resulted in the creation of 15 newly-independent
states (Map 1). This historic event also set in motion a series of positive and negative secondorder effects that would serve to reshape the crumbling bipolar world order. For many academics
and practitioners, the end of Soviet totalitarianism was viewed as a positive development. Gone
were the days of an East-West rivalry, which frequently walked the razor’s edge of nuclear war
and the end of humankind. In its place, there emerged what appeared to be a system dominated
by the unparalleled military and economic power of the United States. This system promised to
deliver a global collective good in terms of higher levels of peace, stability, and economic
prosperity. From one perspective, the days of great power conflict were at an end leading Francis
Fukuyama to conclude, “what we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the
passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end
point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy
as the final form of human government.”2

Dmitri Trenin Dmitri. 2014. “The Ukraine Crisis and the Resumption of Great-Power Rivalry.” Carnegie Moscow
Center 9 (7), 9.
2
Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. “The End of History?” The National Interest 16, 4.
1

1

Beyond a marked decrease in the possibility of a large-scale armed conflict between the
world’s top superpowers, the demise of the ‘evil empire’3 also served as a catalyst for a myriad
of other positive developments. These included the reunification of East and West Germany, the
spread of market-based capitalism and fledgling democracies throughout Eastern/Southeastern
Europe, an increased emphasis on human rights and rule of law, and an end to U.S.-Soviet
competition in the developing world, which had frequently manifested itself in a series of proxy
wars. Clearly, from one perspective the breakup of the Soviet Union and “the end of the cold
war... [was] ...a victory for all humanity.”4
Perhaps the most significant development, and of interest for this dissertation, was that for the
very first time newly-elected political leaders in the countries and former Soviet republics behind
the ‘Iron Curtain’ acquired a newfound ability to decide their respective country’s domestic and
foreign policies. In the domestic realm, presidents in the newly-independent states quickly
enacted wide-scale institutional reforms designed to improve governance and bolster economic
productivity. Such efforts were heralded by the international community leading Samuel
Huntington and others, to conclude that the decisions by many former Soviet states to embrace
the tenets of Western liberalism and capitalism represented the death knell for the communist
ideology. As a result, their actions helped usher in what has become known as the third wave of
democratization with ground zero centered in eastern and southeastern Europe.5 This project
examines whether or not this wave of democratization also brought into being a new strategic
alignment for former Soviet states.

President Ronald Regan is attributed with calling the Soviet Union an ‘evil empire.’ See Regan, Ronald. 1983.
“‘Evil Empire’ Speech, 08 March 1983.” The Miller Center, University of Virginia. http://millercenter.org/president/
speeches/speech-3409. Accessed 01 May 2016.
4
Bush, George H.W. 1991. “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 29 January
1991.” The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19253. Accessed 01 July 2016.
5
Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. “Democracy's Third Wave.” Journal of Democracy 2 (2): 12-34.
3
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Although domestic issues initially dominated the policy agenda for many of the post-Soviet
states, developing an effective set of foreign policies that would help ensure the long-term
security of the state quickly became a central point of discussion among ruling elites. First, on a
theoretical level, the breakup of the Soviet Union did not bring an end to the anarchic
international system filled with multiple regional great powers. Although the West6 had won the
Cold War, no countrynot even the United Statesor international organization could assume
the role of an omnipotent global hegemon capable of providing an enduring peaceful and stable
world order. Whether it was a lack of political resolve, domestic political opposition, public
opinion, or geography, U.S. power projection proved problematic in the post-Cold War era.
Given this reality, a system of ‘self-help’ continued to flourish where states had to act in their
best interests to ensure survival because there was still no higher governing body to intervene on
their behalf in the event of war.7 As a result, the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous
nature of the international system endured, creating a sense of vulnerability among many leading
political leaders, especially those in the newly-independent states.
Second, the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces, intelligence officials, and gendarmerie
personnel from the outer rim of the newly-established Russian Federation created a security
vacuum that could not be filled by each countries’ remaining organic military-security
capabilities. Furthermore, material, technological, or budgetary shortfalls prevented ruling
governments from building-up the country’s armed forces as a way to deter armed attacks from
neighboring countries. As a result, most former Soviet states found themselves in a precarious
situation; vulnerable to external attack, but helpless to do anything about it on their own.

In this dissertation, I broadly use the term ‘West’ to mean the United States and its European allies in NATO and
the European Union.
7
Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
6
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This sense of vulnerability was amplified by the fact that even though the Russian Federation
was but a fragment of the Soviet monolith in terms of military power, Moscow still retained a
formidable nuclear arsenal and a conventional force capable of conducting limited, but sustained,
regional military operations.8 Additionally, Russia’s historical and often confrontational political
and cultural ties with its former Soviet satellites created a sense of fear and uncertainty about the
Kremlin’s future intentions.9 Political elite concerns and the shadow of the future were
confirmed as early as 1992 when President Boris Yeltsin, during a speech to senior generals of
the Russian Armed Forces stated, “Russia always was and remains a great world power. Such is
its geopolitical position and its potential.”10 From Yeltsin’s words, it became clear that despite
the country’s diminished power position in the international system, Moscow would not yield to
being anything less than a regional great power, capable of directly shaping the geostrategic
events in Russia’s historical sphere of influence in line with Kremlin interests.
These theoretical propositions and empirical realities served to shape what would become a
new round of strategic competition between the United States and Russia for influence in
countries occupying the post-Soviet space. Beginning in 1992, the United States via the Freedom
Support Act and in concert with its European allies, began pouring millions of dollars into the
former Soviet states to support a wide array of foreign policy objectives. By 2007, the United
States had allocated over $28 billion to countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States

8

For an assessment on Russian military capabilities in the post-Cold War era, see Steve Millar and Dmitri Trenin as
well as Marcel de Haas. Miller, Steven E. and Dmitri Trenin (eds.). 2004. The Russian Military: Power and Policy.
Cambridge: MIT Press; Haas, de Marcel. 2011. “Russia’s Military Reform: Victory After 20 Years of Failure.”
Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael Paper No. 5.
9
One must certainly recognize that geopolitics is an important factor driving political elite threat perceptions in the
newly independent states. John Vasquez argues that states in close geographical proximity are more likely to enter
into war, while states that are located in distant corners of the world do not go to war as frequently. See Vasquez,
John. 1995. “Why Do Neighbors Fight? Proximity, Interaction, or Territoriality.” Journal of Peace Research 32 (3).
10
Yeltsin, Boris. 1992. Cited in Ambrosio, Thomas. 2006. “The Geopolitics of Demographic Decay: HIV/AIDS and
Russia's Great-Power Status.” Post-Soviet Affairs 22 (1), 4; emphasis added.

4

(CIS) for humanitarian relief, internal security, anti-terrorism efforts, and the promotion of
economic and democratic reforms.11 Robert Keohane captures the overarching objective of this
effort noting, “the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 made the U.S. and liberal democratic
states elsewhere believe that they could construct ‘a new world order’ more consistent with the
values and practices of liberal domestic politics.”12 By pursing such an approach, the West hoped
that these actions would subsequently facilitate increased global stability and economic
prosperity for all. However, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder remind us that there were also
corresponding negative effects from the process of democratization.13 In this case, the efforts of
liberal internationalists helped facilitate another round of great power competition in Russia’s
borderlands as Dmitry Trenin’s quote at the beginning of this chapter so poignantly captures.
Initially, Moscow’s response to the West’s efforts were muted as Kremlin leaders mapped out
foreign policies grounded in cooperation with the West. This strategic approach was advanced by
the appointment of several key liberal Atlanticists14 including Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev
and Deputy Prime Minister Egor Gaidar, who believed that integration into Euro-Atlantic
structures and institutions would allow Russia to assume a “fitting place that has been
predetermined for...[them] by history and geography.”15 Initially, the former Cold War rivals

Tarnoff, Curt. 2007. “US Assistance to the Former Soviet Union.” Congressional Information Service, Library of
Congress.
12
Keohane, Robert O. 2012. “Twenty Years of Institutional Liberalism.” International Relations 26 (2), 129.
13
Mansfield and Snyder find that democratization increased the war proneness of states. See Mansfield, Edward D.,
and Jack Snyder. 1995. “Democratization and the Danger of War.” International Security 20 (1).
14
Numerous academics and Russian area specialists have advanced different classifications of Russian foreign
policy schools of thought. This study follows Ilya Prizel’s conceptualization: Liberal Atlanticists, pragmatists, and
fundamentalists. See Prizel, Ilya. 1998. National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in
Poland Russia and Ukraine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 240. For similar categorizations, see Margot
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made some progress on the security and economic fronts with Russia joining NATO’s
Cooperation Council in 1991 and the Partnership for Peace (PFP) Program in 1994. In the
economic sphere, in 1994 Russia and the European Union (EU) signed the Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) setting the stage for closer economic and political relations.
Despite this progress, by late 1995 the strategic situation changed dramatically when Russia’s
relations with the West transitioned from integration and cooperation to a new round of great
power competition.16 Although there are a multitude of underlying factors driving Russia’s
foreign policy volte face,17 this study singles out two key events: NATO-EU eastward expansion
and political opposition by former Soviet states to Kremlin demands in the CIS. Boris Yeltsin’s
September 1995 presidential edict on “The Establishment of the Strategic Course of the Russian
Federation with Member States of the CIS” became a major turning point by which the nature of
this new strategic competition would be defined in the years to come. According to Kathleen
Mihalisko, this decree “crystallize[d] Russia’s response to the prospect of NATO expansion
and... [gave] credence to recent warnings from Yeltsin and his officials about the reemergence of
two rival military blocs in Europe.”18
Residing in the shadow of an emerging new great power competition, the question for ruling
elites in the newly-independent states turned to security choices and how best to ensure their
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long-term survival. Kenneth Waltz notes that states can pursue one of two broad strategies:
internal or external balancing.19 Internal balancing focuses on how a state can use its own
domestic resources (population, budgetary allocations, technological innovations, industrial
capacity, etc.) to build-up the country’s organic military capabilities to improve its power
position vis-à-vis other states. External balancing focuses on banding together with other likeminded states. The underlying logic here is that strength and security come from numbers.
While internal balancing may be a viable option for some states, this was not the case for the
transitioning countries in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. According to
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’s
dissolution, the elimination of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and ensuing trade
disruption generated a high degree of economic dislocation leading to plummeting gross
domestic product (GDP) rates, rising unemployment, and high inflation during the early and
mid-1990s in the newly-independent states.20 Clearly, these countries were in no position to
devote precious resources for defense purposes at this time. Furthermore, even as economic
conditions improved during the late 1990s and early 2000s, expending those scarce, albeit
available resources may have not yielded the desired outcome. As Michael N. Barnett and Jack
S. Levy remind us, “even if a country does have the necessary resources, extraction of them may
provide short-term military security at the cost of weakening the long-term strength of the
economy and therefore the long-term military potential and security of the state.”21
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A second option for former Soviet states was external balancing. Countries pursing this
strategy seek to band with a more powerful country or group of countries. Typically, this is
accomplished by joining a military alliance or signing a formal treaty of security or defense
cooperation. By entering into these official arrangements, a state anticipates the collective
actions of other like-minded countries will restore the power imbalance that can deter the present
(or future) hostile actions of stronger states.
There are two key advantages with an external balancing strategy. First, external balancing
costs less because collective security is spread across multiple countries. Second, external
balancing via an alliance allows countries the strategic latitude to play on their inherent
strengths. Whether it is geographical location, technological expertise, or access to resources,
each member brings to the table a different set of capabilities that in one way or another can
benefit the entire group. Of the two strategies, external balancing represents the best ‘way ahead’
for former Soviet states because ruling governments are afforded access to economic and
military resources or political backing that may help them ensure the state’s long-term survival.
Statement of the Research Problem
In sketching the broad contours of the alignment tendencies of former Soviet states, one can
discern several distinct alignment patterns since the mid-1990s. On one hand, some countries
like Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have opted to develop closer
foreign ties with their former imperial center quickly gaining membership in the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) by 1994. On the other hand, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
charted a different path, pursuing a Westward course by fostering strong military, economic, and
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political ties with the United States and Western Europe. These efforts culminated in their
accession into the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) in 2004.
This divergence in state alignment in some ways reflect a wicked problem22 or puzzle that
frames the general research question of this study: what are the key determinants of change and
continuity in the strategic alignment patterns of former Soviet states? With the post-Soviet
space becoming an epicenter for a new strategic competition between United States and the
Russia Federation, contemporary theoretical explanations appear deficient to explain small state
alignment. This empirical reality demands a fresh approach.
Any attempt to understand why, when, and how states will align is no doubt a complex
scholarly endeavor. This challenge is made even more difficult when examining the alignment
tendencies of countries in the post-Soviet space. Here, the independent theoretical propositions
as espoused by realists are cast into doubt as they collide with the geostrategic realties and
foreign policy autonomy of political elites across space and time; all of which, is wrapped in a
veneer of strategic competition between the U.S. and the Russian Federation for influence in a
multipolar world. From one perspective, understanding small state alignment in the post-Soviet
space is like an attempt to solve “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.”23 This
dissertation seeks to address this challenge by positing the following primary research question:
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why do similarly placed, small states in the post-Soviet space opt to pursue a closer alignment
with one regional great power over another?
Over the last 50 years, scholars have attempted to explain the alignment tendencies of states
by employing a variety of different theoretical approaches. Although some of the dominant
alignment theories that have pervaded the literature have been helpful in selected ways, they
remain largely deficient for several key reasons. First, most alignment studies focus their
analysis on the great powers, giving little attention to small states. Second, scholars have
erroneously viewed alignment and alliance as the same political phenomenon making it difficult
to truly understand the alignment outcomes of small states.
Third, many studies attempt to explain alignment and/or alliance formation my examining
state actions prior to, during, or immediately after great power conflicts. Noticeably absent from
the literature is an analysis of state alignment when great powers are engaged in strategic
competition during the interwar years. Fourth, many scholars give emphasis to systemic drivers
of state action because such an approach is parsimonious and easy to apply. This is particularly
true when examining the alignment tendencies of former Soviet states. For example, Waltz
asserts that in an anarchic system states seek to survive by balancing against power. Specifically,
when a state occupies a lower power position in the international system, they will tend to align
with other weaker states so that their aggregate power can balance against the most powerful
state, thus helping ensure their collective survival.
With the demise of the Soviet Union, one can assume that the United States was, and has
been, the most powerful country in the world. For some scholars viewing the global power
structure in material terms, the passing of the ‘Evil Empire’ into the annals of history represented
a decisive transition point moving the United States to the position as the most powerful country
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in the world. If this is true, then Waltz’s neorealist argument appears to have some merit in
explaining the alignment of Armenia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan with a weaker Russia by gaining
formal membership in Russian-led CSTO and/or the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). As Waltz
notes, “secondary states, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side, for it is the stronger
side that threatens them.”24 However, Waltz’s theoretical assertions appear deficient given the
existence of contradictory empirical evidence. For example, the Baltics, Poland, and the Czech
Republic have followed an alignment azimuth towards the United States and its Western
European allies, eventually acquiring formal membership in NATO and the EU.
While Stephen Walt agrees with Waltz’s balancing hypothesis, he argues states tend to
balance not because of power considerations but because of the threat exhibited by a more
powerful state.25 Given Russia’s geographical proximity, aggregate power, continued possession
of nuclear weapons, and Moscow’s historical tendency to inject itself in the internal affairs of
countries along its geographical periphery, one can argue the Russian Federation represents the
greatest threat to former Soviet states. However, Walt’s balance of threat theory, like Waltz’s
balance of power theory primarily applies to countries in the upper end of the international
hierarchy. According to Walt, weak states owing to their geographical location and disregard by
the most powerful states will kowtow, appease, and ultimately bandwagon with a threatening
great power because they are unable to do little else.26 As Walt notes “…. balancing may seem
unwise because one’s allies may not be able to provide assistance quickly enough…States that
are close to a country with large offensive capabilities (and far from potential allies) may be
forced to bandwagon because balancing alliances are simply not viable.”27 If this is the case, then
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a majority of the newly-independent states should have bandwagoned with Russia since there
was no great power to offer cart blanche immediate and enduring protection. While Belarus,
Armenia, Kazakhstan did just that, the Baltics charted a Westward course that eventually
resulted in their accession into Euro-Atlantic structures.
In contrast to systemic-level theories, some scholars have attempted to explain state alignment
by focusing on domestic-level variables; however, on their own, they too suffer from a unique
set of shortcomings leading to new set of anomalies. For example, Stephen David and Deborah
Larson assert the necessity to consider the internal threats to a ruling government and how they
shape alignment politics.28 In advancing his omnibalancing theory, David notes “the most
powerful determinant of Third World alignment behavior is the rational calculation of Third
World leaders as to which outside power is most likely to do what is necessary to keep them in
power.”29 David and Larson’s focus on political elite decision-making does well to move away
from system-based explanations on alignment; however, another puzzle emerges if one attempts
to apply David’s omnibalancing thesis to the post-Soviet space. Specifically, this approach does
little to explain why the Baltic States, for example, with low or no internal threats decided to
pursue NATO membership. Separately, while David’s theory appears to garner some traction in
Georgia with President Shevardnadze’s decisions in the early 1990s to keep Russian military
forces in the country and to sign the Collective Security Treaty (CST) to quell a raging civil war,
why did President Saakashvili, facing the same domestic threat, opt to accept U.S. support under
the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) and pursue a pro-West alignment trajectory?
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Finally, some scholars have opted to apply a constructivist framework to explain state
alignment. In the post-Soviet space, Giorgi Gvalia and his colleagues argue political elite ideas
about the state’s identity and strategies are critical factors explaining the alignment trajectory of
some former Soviet states.30 Although the external strategic environment is important, the beliefs
and ideas of ruling political leaders are more important. By considering both, one can better
understand that “while Azerbaijan and most of the other small post-Soviet states have pursued a
cautious bandwagoning policy toward Russia, post-Soviet Georgia has been consistently edging
westward since the ‘Rose Revolution,’ despite its contiguity with Russia and vulnerability to
economic and military threats.”31 Gvalia’s study provides a sense of optimism on how scholars
can better explain alignment outcomes in the post-Soviet space; however, their effort falls short
because they only focus on Georgian President Saakashvili with no effort to examine the ideas
from previous or subsequent administrations or in other former Soviet states.
This review of the dominant theoretical approaches to explaining alignment reveals several
important takeaways. First, in general, systemic approaches are deficient because they do not, on
their own, consistently explain why states sometimes balance against a more powerful or
threatening regional great power, but then in other instances pursue a bandwagoning strategy.
Second, domestic-level explanations may potentially offer a higher degree of analytical
granularity on the alignment tendencies of states; however, on their own they create a new set of
problems since they are again too narrowly focused and because they do not account for other
potential systemic- or individual-level factors. Third, a constructivist approach to alignment
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offers a potential opportunity to better understand why, when, and how states may balance
against a regional great power because it is individuals who ultimately make the state’s foreign
decisions based on their independent assessments of the strategic environment. According to
Fareed Zakaria, “a good account of a nation’s foreign policy should include systemic, domestic,
and other influences, specifying what aspects of the policy can be explained by what factors.”32
Taken together, it becomes clear that to achieve a more holistic understanding of small state
alignment, an eclectic theoretical approach is in order. By first viewing alignment through a
constructivist lens that is responsive to systemic and domestic-level pressures, this study can
potentially help fill this gap in the literature and add to our cumulative knowledge on this topic.
My Argument
The inherent weaknesses associated with each of the dominant theories on alignment make
them less relevant when examining the post-Soviet space. As a result, this study sees high value
in a multi-level theoretical approach that begins with a close examination of the belief systems of
the leading political leaders comprising the state’s foreign policy executive (FPE). It is through a
leader-centric approach one can better understand the alignment trajectories of ruling
governments in former Soviet states. The validity of a leader-centric analysis takes its lead from
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, who notes “leaders, not states, choose actions. Leaders and their
subjects enjoy the fruits and suffer the ills that follow from their decisions.”33 More specifically
for this study, Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack also conclude that all too often, “scholars fail
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to acknowledge that common international behavior—balancing against a threat, choosing a
grand strategy, or marching off to war—results from decisions made by individuals.”34
Looking beyond Walt’s balance of threat theory, this dissertation advances a markedly
different approach to small state alignment since other alignment theories are not relevant owing
to their focus on the great powers or inapplicability to countries in the post-Soviet space.
Specifically, under conditions of great power competition, small states will tend to exhibit one of
two forms of alignment: positive bandwagoning and great power bridging.
Positive Bandwagoning. In marked contrast to some scholars, who view bandwagoning as a
negative action, this study argues this political phenomenon should be understood as a positive
endeavor. Specifically, small states will not bandwagon with a more threatening or powerful
state because ruling governments are forced to choose sides as war looms or because they
anticipate material gains in the near- or long-term. On the contrary, positive bandwagoning
occurs because leading elites in a ruling government believe an alignment with a particular
regional great power is in the best, long-term good of the state and their interests. In this case,
ruling governments in small states will prefer and often adopt more cooperative foreign policies
with one regional great power over another. Of significance, this form of alignment occurs even
when there are no guarantees a small state’s alignment with a regional great power will lead to
the country’s accession into a military alliance or regional economic grouping in the short- or
mid-term. However, if consistently applied by multiple, like-minded ruling governments over
time, consistent positive bandwagoning could lead to the country entering into a formal military
alliance or economic bloc with that regional great power.
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Great Power Bridging. Great power bridging occurs when political leaders opt to equally
cooperate with two or more regional great powers in the diplomatic, economic, and military
realms. Unlike positive bandwagoning, political leaders following a great power bridging
strategy eschew taking sides. The underlying logic here is that by cooperating with two or more
regional great powers on an almost equal basis, the ruling government will likely realize more
long-term economic, political, or military benefits. Furthermore, this alignment approach helps
to stave-off any political, economic, or military backlash by various regional great powers, which
are themselves in competition with each other in different regions of the world.
By first conceptualizing small state alignment as positive bandwagoning and great power
bridging, it now becomes necessary to identity the key factors that independently influence these
outcomes. By leveraging aspects of social identity theory35 and self-categorization theory,36 it is
argued a political leader’s ideas about the state’s identity, his/her37 threat perceptions, and foreign
policy orientation as conditioned by domestic politics are the primary explanatory variables
independently shaping Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine’s alignment trajectory with
the United States and Russia from 1995-2015. From one perspective, a political leader’s beliefs
about world politics represent a center of gravity38 for understanding the state’s alignment with
one regional great power over another. Furthermore, small state alignment can vary over time
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owing to changes in the national political leadership. The key takeaway here is that small state
alignment is not an enduring “either-or” characterization, but rather an “adaptive” process
subject to the dynamic interplay of ideational and material considerations, which in turn changes
as new political leaders come to power.39
To more fully capture the relevance of these variables, this study sees value in using multiple
methods to analyze how a ruling leader’s political ideas and beliefs independently and
collectively lead to positive bandwagoning or great power bridging. As depicted in Figure 1
below with the large bold arrows, this study’s primary focus is on an examination of how each of
the three independent variables (state identity, threat perceptions, and foreign policy orientation
as conditioned by domestic politics) on their own, can exert a direct influence on a small state’s
alignment trajectory with different regional great powers. A broad-brush effort is also made to
examine the interaction of the three independent variables and the dependent variable. A
summary of these efforts is presented in the proceeding paragraphs.
Figure 1: Small State Alignment
President’s Belief System

State
Identity

Alignment

Threat
Perceptions

• Positive Bandwagoning
• Great Power Bridging
Domestic
Politics

Foreign Policy
Orientation
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To begin, the primary focus of this study centers on how the three primary independent
variables (state identity, threat perceptions, and foreign policy orientation as conditioned by
domestic politics) can lead ruling governments to follow a positive bandwagoning or great power
bridging alignment. First, these three variables can help explain positive bandwagoning under
certain conditions. For the explanatory variable on state identity, it is posited that when a
political leader envisages the state as having a similar state identity to a particular regional great
power, higher levels of verbal cooperation will follow, which will be associated with a
preference for a positive bandwagoning alignment.
Next, for the independent variable on threat perceptions, it is anticipated that a president who
perceives a high threat from one regional great power is expected to espouse higher levels of
verbal confrontation with this country and higher levels of verbal cooperation with a different
regional great power. When this occurs, one should observe a preference for a positive
bandwagoning alignment with the latter. Of note, it is here this study recognizes how Walt’s
balance of threat theory has some applicability in the post-Soviet space. But, unlike Walt, who
primarily focuses on material factors, this study posits ideational factors take precedence and that
there are gradations of threat perceptions leading to different alignment outcomes.
Finally, one must take an accounting of strategy and the ability of a ruling elites to translate
their alignment preferences into action. For this variable, the central focus is on a president’s
foreign policy orientation. Specifically, when a head of state exhibits an accommodative foreign
policy orientation with a particular regional great power, one should expect a positive
bandwagoning alignment. As a corollary, a president who retains a confrontational foreign policy
orientation with one regional great power is more apt to follow a positive bandwagoning
alignment with a different regional great power. However! Because presidents cannot act in the

18

foreign policy realm without impunity, domestic politics represents a conditioning factor in this
process. Specifically, varying levels of issue polarization over the head of state’s alignment
preferences and government fragmentation may constrain or enable the chief executive’s ability
to transform his/her words into material cooperation. If there are low levels of government
fragmentation and issue polarization, domestic politics may than serve as enabler allowing a
president to more easily translate his alignment preferences into material action. Alternatively,
when there are high levels of government fragmentation and issue polarization, domestic politics
may serve as a constraint on the head of state’s ability to realize his/her alignment preferences.
Of note, while a small state may follow a positive bandwagoning alignment with a particular
regional great power, routine interstate activities such as cross-border trade, tourism, cultural
exchanges, etc. continue, which reflect how all states pursue multi-vector foreign policies.
Second, these three independent variables (IVs) may also explain why small states may
follow a great power bridging alignment. For the IV on state identity, this dissertation postulates
that when leading elites in the FPE primarily conceptualize the state as an independent actor in
world politics, equal or almost equal levels of verbal cooperation with multiple regional great
powers will occur. As will be discussed in the theory chapter (Chapter 3), political leaders can
retain multiple conceptions of the state’s identity; however, it is posited that the most important
state identity conception will exert the greatest influence on a political leader’s alignment
preferences.
Next, for the IV on threat perceptions, it is hypothesized a political leader who perceives a
particular regional great power as a moderate threat will still align with that country. Here, one
can expect to see almost equal levels of verbal confrontation and cooperation with that regional
great power and others. Finally, when considering alignment strategy, it is expected a president
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with a pragmatic foreign policy orientation will tend to follow a great power bridging alignment.
In this case, a president is able to successfully transform his/her alignment preferences into
action. In this process, domestic politics can be an enabler or constraint. Specifically, changing
levels of issue polarization and government fragmentation can restrain or facilitate the head of
state’s capacity to convert his/her preferences into action. When government fragmentation and
issue polarization are low, domestic politics may function as an enabler. When government
fragmentation and issue polarization are high, domestic politics may represent a constraint on the
head of state’s ability to realize his/her alignment preferences.
In line with Timothy Colton and his research on the voting tendencies of Russian citizens
since the end of the Cold War, this study recognizes how each of three independent variables
may also exert an indirect influence on the alignment tendencies of political leaders.40 Although
not examined in detail owing to time and space constraints, it is posited that a political leader’s
ideas about the state’s identity can influence his/her ideas about external threats, which in turn
frame his/her foreign policy orientation with other states in the international system. The
prediction here is that a shared sense of state identity with a particular regional great power
reduces a political leader’s threat perceptions, which is then associated with an accommodative
foreign policy orientation and positive bandwagoning. When state identities diverge, threat
perceptions of a target state increase leading to a pragmatic foreign policy orientation and great
power bridging or a confrontational orientation and positive bandwagoning with another regional
great power.
For clarity, the examination of the interaction of state identity, threat perceptions, and foreign
policy orientation is a distant secondary effort that will only analyze the findings from the
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relationship of these three IVs with the dependent variable as outlined in the three substantive
chapters of this dissertation (Chapters Five to Seven). This analysis will be presented in the
concluding chapter of this dissertation and will serve as a point of departure for future research.
Key Findings
An examination of the alignment trajectories of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine
between 1995 and 2015 yielded several key findings. First, ideational factors, more so than
material consideration better explain the alignment of small states along Russia’s geographical
periphery. With Russia consistently maintaining a favorable balance of military power, each of
the president’s ideas about state identity, threat perceptions, and accompanying foreign policy
orientation as conditioned by domestic politics better explained why one state would adopt a
positive bandwagoning or great power bridging alignment. Second, in the post-Soviet space,
great power bridging was the dominant alignment tendency. Of the ruling governments under
examination, seven presidents preferred great power bridging as compared to five, who preferred
to follow a positive bandwagoning alignment with the U.S. or Russia.
Third, when examining the relationship between a political leader’s ideas about the state’s
identity and his/her alignment preferences, this study found a correlation between those
presidents, who primarily viewed the state as independent and a tendency to follow a great power
bridging alignment. This was the case with Azeri Presidents Heydar and Ilham Aliyev, Georgian
President Eduard Shevardnadze, Moldovan Presidents Petru Lucinschi and Vladimir Voronin
(2003-2009), and Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma. Those presidents conceptualizing the
state as one based on democracy, freedom, or as Western-European was associated with a
president’s proclivity to prefer a positive bandwagoning alignment with the United States. These
presidents included Georgian Presidents Mikheil Saakashvili and Giorgi Margvelashvili,
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Moldovan President Nicolae Timofti, and Ukrainian Presidents Viktor Yushchenko and Petro
Poroshenko. Vladimir Voronin (2001-2002) and Viktor Yanukovych viewed the state primarily
Eastern and Eurasian, which was correlated with positive bandwagoning with Russia.
Fourth, this dissertation determined all the governments in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova,
and Ukraine viewed Russia as the primary existential threat to the state’s security and the
country’s territorial sovereignty. Despite this reality and in contradiction to realist expectations,
these presidents did not outright bandwagon with the most threatening or powerful state (i.e.
Russia) as realists predict. On the contrary, there was significant variation in the intensity of each
president’s perception of the Russian threat, which was subsequently correlated with a different
alignment tendency. When a president perceived Russia as a moderate threat, great power
bridging was observed. This was the case with Heydar and Ilham Aliyev, Petru Lucinschi,
Vladimir Voronin, Eduard Shevardnadze, Giorgi Margvelashvili (only during his first year in
office), and Leonid Kuchma. A president with high threat perceptions of Russia was correlated
with a positive bandwagoning alignment with the United States. Presidents falling into this
category included Mikheil Saakashvili, Giorgi Margvelashvili (2014-2015), Nicolae Timofti,
Viktor Yushchenko, and Petro Poroshenko. Finally, Viktor Yanukovych’s low threat perceptions
of Russia were associated with a preference for positive bandwagoning with Moscow.
Fifth, when examining each president’s foreign policy orientation and ideas about strategy, a
majority of presidents viewed pragmatism as an optimal approach to interstate relations, which
was associated with a great power bridging alignment. This pragmatic approach was associated
with Heydar Aliyev, Ilham Aliyev, Eduard Shevardnadze, Giorgi Margvelashvili (before 2014),
Petru Lucinschi, Vladimir Voronin (after 2003), and Leonid Kuchma, who all implemented a
great power bridging alignment with Russia and the United States. When presidents
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simultaneously exhibited an accommodative orientation with Washington and a confrontational
one with Moscow, positive bandwagoning with the U.S. was observed. Mikheil Saakashvili,
Nicolae Timofti, Viktor Yushchenko, and Petro Poroshenko fell into this category. Only
Vladimir Voronin from 2001-2003 and Viktor Yanukovych’s accommodative foreign policy
orientations with Moscow were associated with a positive bandwagoning alignment with Russia.
Domestic politics (i.e. issue polarization and government fragmentation) did not appear to be
a decisive conditioning variable impacting a president’s ability to translate his alignment
preferences into action. Frequently, a president’s strategic leadership skills and his ability to
build a supporting coalition across the state’s bureaucratic organizations for his alignment
preferences helped to minimize the impact of domestic politics. Additionally, presidential
appointees, the election of like-minded political figures, and/or coercive tactics helped the
president overcome domestic political opposition to his alignment preferences. There were two
instances where domestic politics was of consequence; in Moldova under Vladimir Voronin with
the Kozak Memorandum and in Ukraine under Viktor Yanukovych following his decision to not
sign the EU Association Agreement. Although issue polarization helped fuel political opposition,
the role of domestic politics remained secondary to the importance of a president’s ideas and
beliefs about the state’s alignment.
Finally, in the concluding chapter of this study, the indirect influence of the three independent
variables was considered. The overarching finding is that when a president’s primary ideas about
the state’s identity were similar to either the U.S. or Russia, he/she perceived the target country
as less of a threat. Low threat perceptions were subsequently associated with an accommodative
foreign policy orientation and a tendency for positive bandwagoning. When state identity
similarities were less pronounced, threat perceptions would increase. Presidents, who primarily
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perceived the state as independent generally viewed Russia as a moderate threat and had a
pragmatic foreign policy orientation. In this case, presidents gravitated toward great power
bridging. When a president perceived Russia as a high threat, a confrontational foreign policy
orientation was observed and a preference for positive bandwagoning with the United States.
Purpose and Significance of this Study
This dissertation is a comparative foreign policy study of the alignment trajectories of
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine with the United States and Russia from 1995-2015.
The overarching purpose of this study is to flesh out the key determinants of change and
continuity in the strategic alignment patterns of former Soviet states. To accomplish this task,
this dissertation asks: why do similarly placed, small states opt to pursue a closer alignment with
one regional great power over another? From this purpose flows three key objectives of this
dissertation. First, the primary theoretical purpose of this study is to develop a fresh approach for
understanding change and continuity in the alignment patterns of small states. Second, this
project seeks to understand the influence of elite belief systems on the alignment behavior of
countries occupying the lower tiers of the international hierarchy. Third, this dissertation aims to
discern the relevance of domestic pressures on alignment outcomes.
Understanding the alignment patterns of small states in the post-Soviet space with Russia and
the United States is an important topic that is of high interest for the United States Army as well
as academics, foreign policy practitioners, and intelligence professionals. First, this dissertation
is a direct response to a priority research request from the Department of the Army (DA) to
“assess Russia’s relationships with Europe and the United States.”41 From an academic
perspective, this dissertation adds to our cumulative knowledge on strategic alignment outcomes
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in three ways. First, through the development of a more nuanced framework on alignment, this
study makes a key theoretical contribution to understanding foreign policy change in small
states. Specifically, with its focus on explaining alignment outcomes in the post-Soviet space,
this dissertation is both theoretically and empirically significant because the case studies under
consideration can serve as plausibility probes in which long-standing theories on alliance
formation could be modified to address more specific questions.
Second, this dissertation advances analytical “eclecticism” to understand complex political
phenomena. By using multiple methods, one can acquire a deeper understanding of state
alignment stemming from the complex interaction between ideational and material factors.42 As
noted by Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein,
Eclectic explanations highlight the causal importance of social facts such as power status and
threat perceptions, in addition to the material facts and efficiency considerations stressed by
rationalist approaches. Eclectic explanations also undercut reifications such as the distinction
between domestic and international levels of analysis.43

Additionally, the use of multiple methods to examine state alignment bridges the work of
scholars, who opt to pursue purely qualitative or quantitative approaches in their work. As
Alexander George and Andrew Bennett remind us, “the increasingly evident complementarity of
case studies, statistical methods, and formal models is likely to lead toward more collaborative
work by scholars using these various methods.”44 Taken together, the findings from this research
project can help refine our understanding of the most important factors affecting small state
foreign policy decisions. By examining the post-Soviet space, these findings may be
generalizable to other small states near other regional great powers such as China or India.
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For practitioners such as policymakers and strategists, understanding when and why small
states decide to align with one regional great power over another may allow the U.S. government
to develop more proactive foreign policies and military strategies that deter great power military
adventurism, while also advancing American vital interests in the region. As was the case during
the Cold War when U.S. policymakers and “...strategists understood that shoring up allies and
ensuring the vitality of free-market democracies was at least as important as defending against
military provocations,”45 this situation endures today where Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and
Ukraine have become a “...battleground in the U.S.-Russian fight for influence that will be the
essence of the new Great Game.”46
Finally, this dissertation is of value for intelligence professionals because it highlights the
necessity to give increased focused to non-material factors shaping small state foreign policies.
By focusing on the political leader ideas about the state’s identity and external state-based
threats, intelligence analysts can improve strategic warning or provide more accurate
assessments to U.S. policymakers. With this study’s emphasis on of the role of state identity,
intelligence professionals may also be able to garner new insight into the creation and longevity
of contemporary security alliances. For instance, this study can be used as a springboard to
further investigate the relationship between identity politics and national security matters. This
study and subsequent similar endeavors may then be able to provide intelligence officials critical
information that allow them to better support the strategy formulation process at the highest
levels of the U.S. government.
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Organization of the Dissertation
To acquire a more comprehensive understanding of small state alignment in the post-Soviet
space, this dissertation is divided into eight chapters.
Chapter 1 – Introduction. As detailed above, this chapter provided a macro-overview of the
research project. Key topics of discussion included the background and statement of the problem,
a brief review of the relevant literature, a summary of this study’s argument, a presentation of the
key findings, and a rationale as to why this topic is important for academics and practitioners.
Chapter 2 – Literature Review. In the second chapter, an extensive review and assessment of
the theoretical literature reveals that traditional approaches for explaining state alignment are
deficient when applied to Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. As part of this literature
review, various levels of analysis are considered (e.g. systemic, domestic, and ideational). At the
systemic level, this review takes note of the potential relevance of system polarity finding that
while the global power structure is an important consideration, it is not decisive in explaining
state alignment outcomes. By taking account of the different levels of analysis, one can more
easily discern how alignment may vary over time.
Chapter 3 – Theory. Chapter Three introduces the study’s model explaining small state
alignment. In contradiction to parsimonious systemic theories, explaining small state alignment
requires an approach that begins with an accounting of the ideas held by those political leaders
charged with developing and executing the state’s foreign policies. While material factors like
the balance of power are important, the political leader’s ideas about the state’s identity, his
threat perceptions, and foreign policy orientation (as conditioned by domestic politics), do the
heavy lifting in explaining each state’s alignment with the United States or Russia.
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Chapter 4 – Methods and Analysis. The fourth chapter provides the methodological
foundation from which to explain small state alignment. In the first section, the concepts of
alliance and alignment are examined in detail to establish definitions that can facilitate a more
nuanced understanding of the empirical realities associated with both of these political
phenomena. The second section focuses on case selection. Here, a series of alignment indicators
as developed by Henry Teune and Sig Synnestvedt are applied to all 14 former Soviet states.
Conducting this analysis identifies four outliers,Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and
Ukrainewhich become the cases for this study.
Chapter 5 – State Identity and Small State Alignment. This chapter examines the relationship
between a president’s ideas about state identity and his alignment preferences. An automated
content analysis and elite interviews are used to discern the primary state identity narratives for
Azeri, Georgian, Moldovan and Ukrainian presidents from 1995 to 2015. Large-n event data on
each president’s level of verbal cooperation with the U.S. and Russia is used to discern their
alignment preferences.
Chapter 6 - Threat Perceptions and Small State Alignment. This chapter focuses on the
relationship between a president’s threat perceptions and his alignment preferences with the U.S.
and/or Russia. An operational code analysis of Azeri, Georgian, Moldovan, and Ukrainian
presidents’ philosophical beliefs orients a qualitative analysis on each president’s threat
perceptions of external states.
Chapter 7 - Foreign Policy Orientation, Domestic Politics and Small State Alignment. This
chapter focuses on the relationship between a president’s ideas about strategy and the state’s
alignment with the United States and/or Russia. An operational code analysis of Azeri, Georgian,
Moldovan, and Ukrainian presidents is used to orient a qualitative analysis of each state’s
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material cooperation with the United States and Russia. This chapter also takes into account how
issue polarization and government fragmentation may constrain or enable a president’s ability to
transform his verbal pronouncements into policies that support his alignment preferences.
Chapter 8 - Conclusion. The final chapter of this dissertation begins with a review of the
puzzle driving this research endeavor. The major empirical findings are then presented followed
by an examination of the sequential relationship of three independent variables and how they
may potentially indirectly influence the dependent variable. Next, a summary of the implications
for theory, methods, and U.S. policy are presented. Finally, areas of future research are
recommended.

Map 1 – The Post-Soviet Space.47
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“History suggest[s] that it was usually more advantageous to align oneself with the
weaker of two antagonistic partners, because this acted as a restraint on the stronger.” – Henry
Kissinger, 2011. 48

CHAPTER TWO – LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to review the dominant theories on state alignment and to
assess their relevance for understanding this political phenomenon in the post-Soviet space. For
decades, legions of IR scholars, foreign policy analysts, and practitioners have advanced a
plethora of theoretical approaches grounded in a particular level of analysis to explain the
alignment tendencies of states. As a result, their combined work has produced a disparate body
of literature that fails to adequately explain why small states, such as those that reside in Russia’s
borderlands, may align with one regional great power over another.
In order to illuminate the shortcomings of the various theoretical approaches on alignment,
there is high utility in surveying the extant literature on this topic. To accomplish this task, this
chapter proceeds in six sections. First, of high importance for this study, the concepts of alliance
and alignment are differentiated in order to achieve a clearer understanding of the empirical
realities associated with these political phenomena. The second section considers systemic
theories of alignment. As a part of this review, this section conducts a multi-stage and exhaustive
review of the potential relevance and impact of the global power structure on a state’s foreign
policy behavior. The overarching finding is that while system polarity is an important
consideration, its impact on the alignment of small states with the great powers is largely
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indeterminate because there will always exist a multitude of more powerful states thereby
making the system multipolar at least from the vantage point of small states. Section three turns
attention to domestic-level explanations, while section four details a series of alignment
typologies that scholars have developed in recent years. In section five a brief discussion on nonalignment strategies is presented followed by a conclusion in section six.
Alliance versus Alignment
The concept of an alliance has been an enduring and fundamental aspect of the political
relations between states for thousands of years. Whether it was the alliance between Sparta and
Persia against Athens during the Peloponnesian War, the Triple Entente during World War I, or
the 26-member countries of NATO today, states have used military alliances to ensure their
security and an equitable balance of power in an anarchic international system.49 The extent to
which alliances have played a central role in world politics is captured by George Liska, who
notes. “it is impossible to speak of international relations without referring to alliances; the two
often merge in all but name.”50 Similarly, Ole Holsti and his colleagues assert that alliances are a
“universal component of relations between political units, irrespective of time or place,”51 while
Ken Booth concludes, “alliances have been pervasive features in both the theory of international
politics and in the practice of foreign policy.”52
From an etymological standpoint, the terms alignment and alliance have historically conveyed
distinct meanings and thus should be treated in that way in any scholarly undertaking. As a noun,
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alliance is derived from the French words ‘aliance’ and ‘allier,’ which mean ‘to connect or unite
or combine.’ The French derived these terms from the Latin word ‘alligare,’ which meant ‘to
bind.’ As a verb, alignment is derived from the French words ‘alignier’ and ‘aligner,’ which
mean ‘to line or to range into a line.”53 These points lead Collen Chidley to conclude that
These terms, although related, originate indifferent understandings and is derived from different
verbs where ‘alignment’ is the more generic term for things being in line or in agreement whereas
‘alliance’ is more value-laden being derived from the verb ‘to ally’ which connotes unity based
on similarity.54

Given the central role of alliances in world politics, scholars in many cases have erroneously
used the terms alliance and alignment as synonyms in their research forgetting Glenn Snyder’s
sage words that “the protean character of alliances and alignments makes a clear definition
essential”55 where alignment is a broader concept encompassing several facets of interstate
relations (e.g. diplomatic, economic, military, etc.) of which alliance is a more precise sub-class
grounded exclusively in the security realm.56 For example, in his seminal work on alliances,
Stephen Walt uses the terms alignment and alliance interchangeably in order to increase the
number of relevant cases for his analysis.57 Separately, Eric Miller and Arkady Toritsyn view
alignment and alliance as synonyms to explain the alignment tendencies of former Soviet states
but then focus much of their analysis on multilateral and bilateral security agreements.58 Of

Bergsmann, Stefan. 2001. “The Concept of Military Alliance.” In Erich Reiter and Heinz Gärtner (eds.) Small
States and Alliances. Physica-Verlag, 7.
54
Chidley, Colleen. 2014. “Towards a Framework of Alignment in International Relations.” Politikon: South
African Journal of Political Studies 41 (1), 7.
55
Snyder, Glenn H. 1997. Alliance Politics. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 3.
56
Scholars noting the marked differences between alignment and alliance include Modelski, George, 1963. “The
Study of Alliances; a Review.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 7 (4); Ward, Michael Don. 1982. Research Gaps
in Alliance Dynamics Vol. 19. Graduate School of International Studies. University of Denver; Wilkins, Thomas S.
2012. “‘Alignment’, not ‘Alliance’–the Shifting Paradigm of International Security Cooperation: Toward a
Conceptual Taxonomy of Alignment.” Review of International Studies 38 (1).
57
Walt 1987, 12.
58
Miller, Eric A., and Arkady Toritsyn. 2005. “Bringing the Leader Back In: Internal Threats and Alignment Theory
in the Commonwealth of Independent States.” Security Studies 14 (2), 333-337.
53

32

particular concern here is how both inaccurately reference Walt’s 1987 definition of an alliance,
which these scholars mistake for alignment.
This scholarly tendency to view alliances and alignments as one in the same stems from what
Giovanni Sartori calls conceptual stretching, where scholars attempt to extend their analysis to a
larger number of cases in order to achieve a higher level of external validity.59 At issue is how
conceptual stretching may extend a theory and set of hypotheses too far in such a way that the
original concepts and definitions no longer validly fit new empirical observations or cases. As
Sartori notes, this ‘double-fitting’ results in “vague and amorphous conceptualizations”60 that fit
observations because they are simply defined in broad generalities. For example, political
scientists focusing on democratization have put forward a variety of different definitions for
democracy over the years; however, some of these studies have come under criticism for
stretching this concept too far to achieve higher levels of external validity.61 This was the case
with Darius Rejali and his examination of torture in democracies. In this project, Rejali defines
democracy so broadly that some authoritarian governments are deemed democratic.62 This
example also illuminate how “without clear concepts…, scholars are apt to talk past each other,
and policy-makers find it difficult to distinguish between alternative policies.”63
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A second methodological issue centers on case selection in small-n, qualitative studies such
as this one. Following Sartori, Charles Ragin raises a concern over what he labels “double
fitting” where a concept’s definition causes a change in the domain of cases and vice versa. In
this situation, the problem arises whereby simply broadening the definition of a concept in order
to harvest more cases that support a theory erodes the precision of the findings, while also
preventing an accumulation of knowledge on the topic.64 As David Collier notes, “this process of
double fitting should be used appropriately to refine concepts, and not inappropriately to come
up with a set of cases that conveniently confirms the researcher’s preferred hypothesis.”65
The scholarly tendency to use alliance and alignment interchangeably stems in part from the
ambiguous and amorphous nature of what an alliance is and is not in international relations.66 As
a result, there exists a lack of consensus on how best to conceptualize an alliance, which has led
to the proliferation of a large number of definitions. For example, in his examination of the
alliance literature, Stefan Bergsmann finds there are over 35 different definitions of an alliance.
In reviewing the myriad of studies on this topic, he delineates three broad categories on the
definition of an alliance: formal agreements, formal-informal agreements, and institutional.67
In the first category, scholars narrowly define an alliance as a formal agreement (e.g. a signed
treaty) that binds two or more countries to act in a certain way on national security or military
matters.68 For example, Holsti and his colleagues delineate three criteria for the existence of an
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alliance between states. First, the actors must be nation-states. Second, there must be a formal,
open, or secret treaty between each of the parties. Finally, the treaty must focus exclusively on
security issues. These criteria allow them to subsequently define an alliance as a “formal
agreement between two or more nations to collaborate on national security issues.”69 Similarly,
Snyder defines an alliance as a “formal association of states for the use (or non-use) of military
force, intended for the security or the aggrandizement of their members against specific other
states, whether or not these others are explicitly identified.”70
A second category builds upon the first where some scholars advance the proposition on how
alliances can also come into existence based on informal agreements that encompass military
and/or non-military matters. For example, Robert Osgood defines an alliance as a “latent war
community based on general cooperation that goes beyond formal provisions and that the
signatories must continually cultivate in order to preserve mutual confidence in each other’s
fidelity to specified obligations.” 71 Separately, Walt defines an alliance as a “formal or informal
relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states.”72 For these scholars,
actions among alliance members is based on a set of mutual expectations.73
There are two major issues with this second conceptualization. First, by including informal
agreements, almost any security arrangement between states may now qualify as an alliance
making it difficult to theorize about this concept. For example, when considering the 2014
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Russia-Ukraine crisis, a non-binding verbal statement by the United States to provide non-lethal
support to Kiev could have been potentially viewed on the same level as a binding requirement
for NATO countries to use military force if a member comes under attack from a hostile country.
Second, including informal arrangements broadens the definition of alliance so much that there is
increased risk that scholars will fall victim to conceptual stretching mistaking how an alliance is
a markedly different concept from alignment. Recognizing these shortfalls, Walt in his later
work refined his definition of alliance as “a cooperative security relationship between two or
more states, usually taking the form of a written military commitment.”74
Finally, using a neoliberal institutionalist lens, other scholars have developed a third set of
definitions of an alliance. Robert Keohane asserts “alliances are institutions, and both their
durability and strength (the degree to which states are committed to an alliance, even when costs
are entailed) may depend in part on their institutional characteristics.”75 This definition allows
Keohane to subsequently advance the argument that neoliberalism, more so than neorealism, can
provide a better explanation about why states formed or joined an alliance during the Cold War.
Beyond alliance formation, neoliberals have used an institutionalist approach to explain alliance
durability. This is the case with Celeste Wallander and Robert Keohane, who define an alliance
as a set of “institutions that combine risk-directed management functions with threat-directed
power aggregation functions.”76 This definition serves as a foundation from which they proceed
to explain NATO’s continued existence (and expansion) after the demise of the Soviet Union.
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With the myriad of definitions in place, it becomes clear how alliance and alignment may come
to incorrectly mean the same thing.
To mitigate the risk that alliance and alignment will be used as interchangeable terms, various
scholars have offered up different criteria to guide the research endeavors for those examining
these concepts. This study argues that taking account of these perspectives will lead to more
precise definitions of what an alignment and alliances are or are not. The starting point for this
analysis begins with George Modelski, who notes that all forms of diplomatic, economic and
military cooperation between states should not be classified as an alliance. On the contrary, these
international acts of cooperation should be viewed as alignments with an alliance as a sub-class.
Modelski offers up three ways to differentiate between alliances and alignment.
First, an alliance represents interstate cooperation in the military sphere whereas alignments
cover all types of cooperation between states in the international system. In his words, “alliances
connote military collaboration concerned with a third power; ‘alignments’ can be regarded as a
blanket term referring to all types of international political cooperation (that is also specific and
particularistic).”77 The underlying logic here is that a state’s entry into a war in support of
another state is a serious matter that requires a high-level of precision (e.g. a signed, formal
treaty). Failure to specify triggers for action risks the unnecessary loss of blood and treasure.
Second, alignments are generally shorter in duration, whereas alliances tend to last for longer
periods of time. For example, the NATO alliance has endured for over 67 years while the U.S.Soviet alignment against France and Britain on the resolution of the 1956 Suez Crisis lasted only
several months. A third way to differentiate between an alliance or alignment is to focus on a
state’s status as it relates to international cooperation. Using these criteria, an alliance is reserved
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for states on an equal footing in terms of reciprocal contributions. When there is an absence of
equal reciprocity such as a great power’s unilateral declaration to protect or a small state’s
acquiescence to the leadership role of that great power, then there exists an alignment
This third approach is problematic in two ways. First, member input does not necessarily have
to be equal in terms of total contributions for an alliance to exist. For example, although the
United States provides the lion’s share of manpower, money, and materiel for NATO
(approximately 75 percent), each member’s defense budget, as a percent of GDP is about the
same.78 Second, using this criterion implies only the great powers are able to establish an
alliance, which is not the case. For example, in December 2000 Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain,
Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates signed the “Defense Pact among the Gulf
Cooperation Council.” By signing this defense pact, member states agreed to come to each
other’s assistance in case of attack.79 In the post-Soviet space, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and
Moldova have come together to form GUAM.
Following Modelski, Patrick McGowan and Robert Rood also view alliances as a subclass of
alignments defining them as a military commitment between at least two states to go to war (or
remain neutral) against a third state or group of states. An alliance is different from alignment in
several ways. First, states entering into an alliance have identified an enemy or potential future
enemy. Second, member states have a mutual interest in either maintaining or revising the
international status quo through the possible use of the military instrument of national power.
Third, unlike other scholars, McGowan and Rood argue alliances may be formal or informal.
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Walt follows this approach by identifying the relationship between the U.S. and Israel as an
informal alliance. For Walt, although there is no signed treaty between both states, the U.S. has
always been an ardent defender of Israel’s sovereignty. McGowan and Rood specify several
areas of overlap between alliances and alignments. These include, but are not limited to pooling
state resources, providing each other economic, military or diplomatic support, and interstate
cooperation on topics of mutual interest.80
Michael Ward differentiates between alliances and alignment on two levels. First, alliances
are more formal in nature since they are based on a written agreement that binds states to act
under certain conditions. Alignments are more informal and reflect the behavioral tendencies of
the political leaders in power. Second, Ward notes that alliances are predominately formed for
military purposes whereas interstate alignment may occur along multiple lines of cooperation. In
his words…
Alignment is not signified by formal treaties but is delineated by a variety of behavioral actions.
It is a more extensive concept than alliance since it does not focus solely upon the military
dimension of international politics. Degrees of alignments in political, economic, military, and
cultural spheres present a multifaceted sculpture of national and supranational postures.81

Following suit, Glenn Snyder notes “alliances, however, are only the formal subset of a
broader and more basic phenomenon, that of ‘alignment.’ Alignment amounts to a set of mutual
expectations between two or more states that they will have each other’s support in disputes or
wars with particular other states.”82 Snyder subsequently refines his definition to include nonmilitary matters noting how alignment is best understood as,
“...expectations of states about whether they will be supported or opposed in future interactions.
Such interactions may arise from a variety of specific sources, but in general they stem from the
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perceived interests, capabilities, and observed behavior of other states, including their alliance
pledges.”83

Snyder’s revised definition does well to expand alignment beyond the military realm; however, it
is still flawed because he fails to specify the most important strategic interactions between states.
As a result, almost any form of interstate cooperation (military, economic, technical, diplomatic,
religious, social, etc.) may be viewed as an alignment.
The preceding discussion and analysis illuminates several key takeaways. First, because there
are no universally accepted definitions for the terms alliance and alignment owing to their
ambiguous nature, it becomes extremely important to develop useful conceptualizations of these
concepts in order to avoid several theoretical and methodological missteps. For example,
blurring the lines that separate alignment from alliance makes theorizing extremely difficult
because conflating any conceptualization of an alliance to include a broad array of activities
outside formal military arrangements erodes our ability to understand how political elites may
pursue broader alignment strategies designed to realize their non-security preferences. This was
the case in Ukraine in November 2013 when President Viktor Yanukovych decided not to sign a
political association and free trade agreement with the EU opting instead to accept a $15 billion
Russian economic aid package and lower natural gas prices.84 Yanukovych’s actions represent
one way a statesman may pursue formal economic agreements as part of a broader alignment
strategy to advance the ruling government’s ideas about what is in the best interest of the state.
Second, while the blending of the terms alliance and alignment under a rigid bipolar system
during the Cold War may have proved useful during this time, such an approach is no longer
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compatible in an international system dominated by multiple regional great powers. This new
reality is captured by Bruno Tertrais, who asserts, “the very term ‘alliance’ may be a growing
source of strategic misunderstanding”85 in the post-Cold War era, while Stewart Woodman finds
that since the demise of the Soviet monolith, “there has been a shift away from formal alliance
structures based on military force to more transient marriages of convenience on specific
issues.”86 Because states now operate “in a world of alignments, not alliances”87 there exists a
need for increased specificity of these terms in order to develop new theoretical approaches,
which can adequately reflect the evolution of how states will align with one another in the 21st
century. Taken together, this study advances an argument on the necessity to advance a more
holistic, yet specific conception of alignment in the 21st century.
Given the preceding, alignment is defined as an informal or less-binding formal set of
expectations between a small state and a regional great power. An alliance is then best
understood as a formal written agreement or treaty between two or more sovereign states to take
some form of military or economic-related action based on established protocols and provisions.
Systemic Theories
Structuralists attempt to explain state alignment by proceeding on the assumption that
variables in the system, not domestic-level factors, best explain state action in a competitive
global arena characterized by anarchy. While structuralists may agree on the centrality of
systemic-based factors, they are at odds over which variable is more relevant than another. Four
of the primary points of divergence center on whether states align with other states because of
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power imbalances, the level of threat, or for profit. A fourth point of divergence relevant to this
study centers on whether the global power structure, as a systemic condition, has any impact on a
small state’s actions to align with a regional great power.
Balance of Power Theory
The overarching argument for balance of power theorists is that states balance against power,
particularly military power, more than any other systemic factor.88 Although there are different
versions of balance of power theory, most scholars incorporate realist assumptions into their
theoretical frameworks. First, the primary shape agent for international outcomes is the
distribution of power among states. Second, anarchy establishes a permissive environment for
alignment by framing interstate relations in terms of fear, insecurity, competition, and conflicts
of interest. Third, these conditions (anarchy, fear, uncertainty, etc.) drive states to take protective
actions against more powerful states.
It is from these assumptions that states will attempt to balance against a more powerful state.
Balancing can occur in two ways. The first option for states is that they can internally balance by
using domestic resources to build-up the country’s military capabilities that improve its position
vis-à-vis a more powerful state. In essence, states pursuing a strategy of internal balancing have
entered into a de facto arms race that may contribute to a ‘slow’ conflict spiral, which could then
lead to war. As Mark Brawley notes, “whereas external balancing alters the distribution of power
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quickly (and less permanently, since alliances can shift with the stroke of a pen), internal
balancing is a way to alter the distribution of power over the long term.”89
On the other hand, states can externally balance by entering into a formal military alliance or
signing a formal agreement with other like-minded states. Waltz specifically details the
underlying logic of external balancing. In his words,
Secondary states, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side, for it is the stronger side that
threatens them. On the weaker side, they are both more appreciated and safer, provided, of
course, that the coalition they join achieves enough defensive or deterrent strength to dissuade
adversaries from attacking.90

However, Jack Levy attempts to offer a theoretical point of clarification with Waltz’s assertion.
According to Levy, scholars should understand that Waltz is referring to great power balancing
as was the case in the run-up to World War I where the United Kingdom, France, and Russia
balanced against a powerful Germany, whereas “weaker states [such as Armenia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, etc.] in the [geographical] proximity of stronger states [like Russia] do what is
necessary to survive . . . bandwagoning with the strong instead of balancing against them.”91
Annett Fox, Michael Handel, and Robert Rothstein find similar conclusions that small states
gravitate towards bandwagoning with a threatening great power.92 For example, at the beginning
of World War II, Romania and Bulgaria opted to align with Nazi Germany in 1940 and 1941 but
then aligned with the Soviet Union at the conclusion of war. In this case, weak states tend to
bandwagon with a great power because of the country’s location, its military power, or the
likelihood of future conflict that would threaten the small state’s survival.
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Contradicting the findings of Levy and others, Eric Labs, in his examination of the wars of
German unification (1860-1866) finds weak states are more likely to balance against a great
power. In fleshing out the alignment tendencies of small states caught between an imminent or
ongoing conflict between great powers, small states could choose from six strategies. In order of
preference, they are neutrality; bandwagon with an aggressive regional hegemon; balance and
not fight or fight against the aggressive hegemon, respectively; in the absence of great power
opposition to the aggressive hegemon, band together in an alliance with other similarly placed
states; or fight alone.
Of these available options, Labs concludes that, just like the most powerful states in the
international system, weak states also have a proclivity to balance against an aggressive, rising
hegemon. Furthermore, when there is a readily available third-party great power, the tendency to
balance is even more pronounced.93 However, Lab’s work has several shortcomings. First, he
exclusively focuses his analysis on small states that are caught in the midst of a great power
conflict. Noticeably absent is how these small states may align under conditions of great power
competition where war is not imminent. Furthermore, realizing the limits of his argument, Labs
subsequently acknowledges that history is replete with examples of small states bandwagoning
with a threatening great power citing Czechoslovakia’s 1938 decision to peacefully accept Nazi
domination and Jordan’s 1990 decision to back Iraq during the First Gulf War.
A contributing factor to this indeterminacy of when states may balance or bandwagon stems
from how scholars have defined these concepts. Inis Claude and Jack Levy note some studies use
the term balancing to mean a strategy. Others use the phrase ‘balance of power’ as a synonym for
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high politics. And still others use it to denote the distribution of material power in the system.94
Writing in the early 1900s, Richard Cobden notes the concept of balance of power is like “a
chimera—an undescribed, indescribable, incomprehensible nothing.”95
Balance of Threat Theory
In similar systemic fashion, but in opposition to Waltz, Stephen Walt argues states do not
balance against the most powerful state, but against the most threatening one. At issue for Walt is
how Waltz proceeds on an erroneous assumption that the most powerful states are also the most
threatening. As Walt notes, “although power is an important part of the equation, it is not the
only one. It is more accurate to say that states tend to ally with or against the foreign power that
poses the greatest threat.”96 To garner a more realistic appraisal of balancing, Walt believes state
alignment rests on four factors: a state’s aggregate power, the proximity of the more powerful
state, its offensive [military] power, and intentions. The first three elements relate to structural
conditions but the fourth captures a political leader’s understanding of the external threat based
on the actions of a more powerful state. This approach allows Walt to conclude that states are
more likely to balance against rather than bandwagon with a threatening power. For Walt,
An alignment that preserves most of a state’s freedom of action is preferable to accepting
subordination under a potential hegemon. Because intentions can change and perceptions are
unreliable, it is safer to balance against potential threats than to hope that strong states will remain
benevolent.97

The sage insight of Winston Churchill serves as an excellent illustration of Walt’s assertion.
For four hundred years the foreign policy of England has been to oppose the strongest, most
aggressive, most dominating power on the Continent. ... it would have been easy ... and tempting
to join with the stronger and share the fruits of his conquest. However, we always took the harder
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course, joined with the less strong Powers,… and thus defeated the Continental military tyrant
whoever he was.98

Churchill’s words and Walt’s scholarly assertion on the rarity of state bandwagoning are
poignant because it allows for the differentiation between the broad strategies of external
balancing and bandwagoning. If balancing is defined as joining with like-minded, less powerful
states, then bandwagoning, according to Walt, is best understood as “alignment with the source
of danger.”99 States that bandwagon with a more threatening state do so to as a form of
appeasement to stave off an imminent or future armed attack. Whether the threat of attack is
short- or long-term in nature, a state attempts to extend its survival by trading some of its
political autonomy for security that is provided at the leisure of the most threatening power.
However, the epistemological assertions of Walt and the example from Churchill must be
placed in their proper context. While Churchill’s words may exemplify the balancing tendencies
of most states, one must not forget he is a political elite speaking about the actions of a great
power, not a small state. Furthermore, like many structuralists, Walt exhibits a great power bias
in his analysis and that the tendency for states to balance is more applicable to top-tier states.
Walt subsequently clarifies his assertion, noting that some weak states will bandwagon with a
threatening power. In his words, “weak states can do little to affect the outcome (and may suffer
grievously in the process), they must choose the winning side. Only when they can affect the
outcome is it rational for them to join the weaker alliance.”100
Walt’s balance of threat theory, which integrates ideational factors (i.e. threat perceptions),
represents a marked improvement over Waltz and other balance of power scholars, who simply
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focus on power to understand state alignment. In terms of shortcomings, Walt fails to elaborate
on what constitutes “aggressive intentions” opting instead to list acts of aggression by Nazi
Germany or Libya. The issue here is the concept of “aggressive intentions” is undertheorized and
underspecified leading one to ask what constitutes a state threat and how does one adequately
determine intent, especially since political leaders routinely make statements that are for
domestic consumption but are also heard by other actors in the international system.
Additionally, Walt’s focus on bandwagoning as a negative action blinds him to the possibility of
how small state alignment can be viewed positively. That is, the extent to which one regional
great power is considered a threat is in the eye of the beholder. For example, in the run-up to the
First Gulf War, Jordan opted to align with Iraq. In this case, a small state may bandwagon with a
regional great power because it is not considered foreboding and that such action carries an
advantage to ruling elites (e.g. security, economic prosperity, political power, etc.).
Another weakness is that Walt’s theory does not hold up in the post-Soviet space. When
applying Walt’s criteria, Russia is clearly the most threatening state to its former satellites given
its location and marked advantage in terms of aggregate power and offensive military
capabilities. The argument for intentions rests on four assertions. First, over the last 25 years,
Russia has conducted military operations in (or against) adversarial forces in Moldova, Georgia
and Ukraine. Second, Moscow has had, at different times, military bases and personnel in
Armenia, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Next,
the Kremlin has provided military and financial support to a wide array of militant proxy groups
and non-state cyber actors to destabilize the ruling governments from the Baltics to Georgia to
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Ukraine to name a few.101 Finally, since 1997 Russian defense spending has continued to rise at a
rate and amount that far exceeds the defense budgets of countries along its periphery.102
Clearly, the preceding points demonstrate Russia has been, and will remain, the primary
military threat to former Soviet states. As such, one would expect the newly-independent states
to bandwagon with Russia. The empirical reality however, is that small state bandwagoning has
not consistently been the case. For example, while Armenia, Belarus and Kazakhstan opted to
bandwagon with Russia by joining the CSTO, the Baltic States pursued a balancing strategy by
acquiring membership in NATO. There are two takeaways here. First, any theory that attempts to
explain alignment patterns must take account of material and non-material factors. Second, while
the external threat is an important consideration shaping a ruling government’s alignment
strategy, a more comprehensive conceptualization of state threat perception is needed; one this
study finds begins with examining the ideas and beliefs of the leading political figures charged
with making the foreign policy decisions for the state.
Balance of Interest Theory
Randall Schweller is critical of Walt noting how a balance of threat approach assumes
alignment tendencies are based exclusively on security. On the contrary, Schweller argues profit,
rewards, and gains are the primary factors driving alignment decisions to bandwagon with a
more powerful state. As Schweller notes, “when profit rather than security drives alliance
choices, there is no reason to expect that states will be threatened or cajoled to climb aboard the
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bandwagon; they do so willingly.”103 In advancing his balance of interest theory, Schweller
concludes balancing and bandwagoning are not opposite behaviors as Walt and Waltz assert, but
opposite systemic conditions where security drives cost-sensitive states to pay the high costs to
maintain the status quo by balancing against revisionist states. When the status quo is in flux,
states that care little about the costs, align with a revisionist state in anticipation of sharing in the
gains. At issue however, is that Schweller suffers from a great power bias as well. Schweller
explicitly admits this shortfall noting how his “bandwagoning argument and… cases focused on
great powers, not weak ones.”104 This weakness proves true in the post-Soviet space where
Belarus has consistently bandwagoned with Russia by joining the EEU when deeper integration
with the EU may have proven more worthwhile.
Despite the shortcomings of Schweller’s theory, his approach has two notable strengths. First,
his theory takes account of systemic (balance of power) and state-level factors (domestic costs
and interstate political goal compatibility) to understand alignment patterns. It is from this multilevel analysis that Schweller is able to develop an alignment typology to understand when and
why states will balance or bandwagon. Second, his theory calls our attention to how alignment
decisions are shaped by other factors than the external threat. As Schweller asserts, “…the most
important determinant of alignment decisions is the compatibility of political goals, not
imbalances of power or threat.”105 This is a critically important assertion that Schweller uses to
advance a material-based theory of alignment that focuses on profit and rewards. Less
developed, however, is how ideational factors may drive a state to align with a regional great
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power for something more than material profit.
The Relevance of the Global Power Structure
Schweller’s assertion that balancing and bandwagoning behaviors should be regarded as
opposite systemic conditions calls our attention to the necessity to examine other conditions in
the international system and how they may potentially impact state alignment. Given this study’s
aim to develop a more nuanced explanation of small state alignment in the post-Cold War era, it
is useful to consider how the polarity of the international system may potentially affect the
behavior of states. This is especially important because just as the Soviet Union ceased to exist in
1991, so did the bipolar configuration of the international system. What replaced this bipolar
system now represents another point divergence among IR scholars. On one side, there are those
who advance a notion that with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States with its
omnipotent military and unmatched economic capacity became the world’s unipole.
Oppositionists to this assertion advance a contradicting position that the world is multipolar with
power defused across the system. Acknowledging the U.S. possesses a marked advantage over
other countries in terms of military and economic power, this group highlights how geography,
globalization, the presence of other nuclear-armed countries, or domestic constraints (e.g. public
opinion or political opposition) are shape agents for a multipolar world.
With these points in mind, this section takes a full accounting of the relevance of the global
power structure by positing four questions: What is the concept of polarity and how has this
theoretical construct evolved in the IR literature? What is the relationship between the global
power structure and system (in)stability? Is a unipolar system more stable than a world defined
by two or more great powers? What is the relationship between system polarity and state
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alignment? Answers to these questions serve as a foundation from which to detail some of the
alignment typologies that have been developed in the last several decades.
The Evolution of Polarity as a Theoretical Construct. The concept of polarity is by no means
a new topic in IR, stretching back to the bipolar system of Ancient Greece and Thucydides’
accounting of the Peloponnesian War. In the Melian Dialogue, polarity, power, and the prelude
to war are on full display when the small state of Melos refuses to align with Athens in its
conflict with Sparta. In response, the Athenians tell their Melian interlocutors that “right, as the
world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and
the weak suffer what they must.”106 While the concept of polarity has been either implicitly or
explicitly a part of world politics for over two thousand years, it was only after World War II did
this theoretical construct emerge in the IR literature.
With the advent of the Cold War, academics, security experts, and statesmen began to
characterize the international system as bipolar with the Soviet Union in one corner and the
United States in the other. During this time, scholars such as Morton Kaplan, Stanley Hoffmann,
and Richard Rosecrance developed a framework for analysis that would become known as a
systemic approach to IR.107 Criticizing Hans Morgenthau, who saw human nature and man’s
malicious tendencies as the source of state behavior, these individuals argued the structure of the
international system better explained political outcomes like peace and war.108 Although these
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and other early structuralists did well to highlight the impact of systemic factors on state
behavior, the concept of polarity in most instances remained underspecified.
Building on Kaplan, Hoffman, and others, it was the seminal works of Waltz, who in
advancing his neorealist approach to interstate politics gave increased specificity to polarity by
articulating three key attributes of the international system. Through the first two attributes
(ordering principle and differentiation), it becomes clear how in an anarchic, self-help system a
state’s number one priority is survival because there is no higher authority to ensure its safety.
However, it is the differences in the distribution of capabilities among states that serves as a
foundation for articulating system polarity where disparities in the material means of states
establishes a pecking order that separates the strong from the weak.109
From Waltz, scholars have come to a consensus that polarity can generally be defined as “the
distribution of capabilities among the major structure-producing states.”110 At the center of
attention here is power, particularly material (e.g. military) power, which subsequently becomes
a reference point from which to determine system polarity and its impact on the behavior of
states.111 Given this focus on power, structuralists focus exclusively on how the number of
‘great’ powers determine the polarity of the international system.
In his analysis, Waltz differentiates states between ‘great’ and ‘secondary’ powers arguing it
is the former that gives a system its polarity.112 Those states at the top of the international
hierarchy are seen as a ‘pole’ in the global arena because they meet two key criteria: possession
of a large proportion of global resources and a marked advantage in terms of capabilities (e.g.
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military troops and weapons, economic productivity, population, natural resources, land area,
economic productivity, and political-social stability).113 For Waltz, focusing on the great powers
as a determinant of system polarity is warranted because they possess the capacity to influence
events in the system. Barry Buzan captures this point succinctly noting,
Great powers control most of the material resources (military capability, production capacity,
wealth, technology) in the system. Because of this, their activities, and of their ideas, dominate
the international system, and their interests are sufficiently wide ranging to give them a strong
interest in international order.114

More recently, Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth also define the global power structure
in material terms noting that a unipole exists when the system “contains one state whose share of
capabilities place it in a class by itself compared to all other states.”115 Brooks and Wohlforth are
highly critical of other scholars, who attempt to view a unipole as a global hegemon or
misconstrue the real meaning of what a unipole is (or is not) by developing alternative
definitions. Their central point is that the concept of unipolarity is not about state influence or
political outcomes, but material power and where it resides in the international system.116 By
counting poles, Greece in the 5th century BC and the decades spanning the Cold War can then be
viewed as bipolar, while the late 1800s and early 1900s were multipolar. In the post-Cold War
era, Brooks and Wohlforth have defined the global power structure as unipolar; however, Buzan
notes that given the material capabilities of other states, the current system is best viewed as one
superpower and several great powers.117
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But what makes a great power different from a superpower or a middle power from a small
power? The answer to this question resides at the center of another scholarly disagreement over
how to define, operationalize, and measure power. In 1950, Robert Bierstedt did well to
characterize this challenge noting that...
Few problems in political science are more perplexing than the problem of power… yet, despite
widespread use, power remains a slippery and problematic concept. There is little agreement
upon basic definitions, individual theorists proposing their own more or less idiosyncratic
terminology, and surprisingly little consideration of the implications of alternative usages.118

Since then, there has been little to no scholarly progress on how best to define power and
measure it in a definitive and widely accepted way that allows for the accumulation of
knowledge on a wide array of puzzles. As Wohlforth notes…
The problem for anyone who wishes to dismiss the importance of power is that the evidence
consistently indicates that statesmen attach immense importance to it. The problem for anyone
who wishes to establish the importance of power is that the concept is ambiguous enough to
support seemingly contradictory generalizations. Statesmen can perceive equilibrium and
hegemony simultaneously.119

Realists frequently focus on material matters from which to evaluate power between states in
the international system. For example, Waltz, in advancing his parsimonious approach to power
balancing, focuses on the distribution of capabilities (military strength, economic capability,
resource endowment, etc.) to derive a ranking of states.120 As Brian Schmidt notes,
[Waltz’s] commitment to parsimony necessitates he define power in terms of resources and,
furthermore, that he assumes these resources are highly fungible. Waltz is most interested in
providing a rank ordering of states so that he can ascertain the number of great powers in any
given international system.”121
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While realists may agree on the necessity to fixate on material capabilities, they disagree over
which elements are the most important.122 For example, John Mearsheimer views power as “a
reasonable prospect of defending itself against the leading state in the system by its own
efforts.”123 If one follows Mearsheimer’s view of power, then a second problem arises for
balance of power theory where there may exist multiple great powers with similar power
capabilities. For example, countries with nuclear weapons would then be categorized in the same
power band. If this were true, then discerning state alignment based on the balance of power
thesis becomes an extremely difficult endeavor because less powerful states now have a variety
of options to choose from.
Separately, other scholars argue that economic or ideational factors determine power
relations. For example, Stephen Krasner and Robert Keohane note that although the United
States is the only remaining superpower, its position in the system is almost exclusively based on
its military prowess. On the economic and technological planes, the U.S. has perhaps lost ground
to Germany, Japan, and China to name a few in the post-Cold War era.124 Separately, Richard
Rosecrance fixates on ideational considerations arguing that the international system from 18221848 and from 1918-1945 were comprised of two power blocs based on divisions between
liberalism and conservatism and between fascism and democracy respectively. Rosecrance then
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notes that during the period 1945-1960, there were three power blocs owing to the struggle
between the democracy, communism, and those states seeking a neutral course.125
The preceding paragraphs allow one to infer that the conceptualization of power frequently
depends upon the specific theoretical context in which it is utilized, where usefulness is
evaluated based on how well it “accomplishes the task the theorists set for themselves.”126 If
scholars are defining power in different ways, then the way they differentiate a great power from
a major power or a middle power becomes extremely difficult. Buzan captures the challenges of
analytical assessments based on system polarity:
Like most other attempts to turn IR into a hard science, polarity theory largely failed to fulfill the
ambitions of those who tried to correlate it formally with war, peace, and system stability. The
longstanding inability to quantify power in its international relations sense was one obstacle.
Without such a measure, how can one reliably identify which states are, and which are not great
powers? If the classification of great power is indeterminate, then so is the specification of
polarity and the ability to know when or if polarity is undergoing change.127

System Polarity and State Behavior. Structuralists posit that the relational dynamics between
state actors will vary based on the number of great powers in the system at any particular time.128
According to John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth, the polarity of
the international system “...structures the horizon of states' probable actions and reactions,
narrowing the range of choice and providing subtle incentives and disincentives for certain types
of behavior.”129 If this is indeed the case, then understanding how state behavior varies under
different configurations of the global power structure may help us to understand why small states
align with one regional great power over another.
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When examining the stability of a multipolar or bipolar system, Waltz, Mearsheimer, and
other structuralists find the latter tends to exhibit lower levels of conflict and are more stable than
a world with multiple great powers.130 Mearsheimer offers a particularly poignant summary on
this argument. First, in a multipolar system, there are numerous conflict dyads that create more
opportunities for war. Second, power imbalances are more common in a multipolar world
thereby making conventional deterrence problematic. Third, there is a higher potential for
strategic miscalculation since one state may think it has the capacity to win a war when it
actually does not. Alternatively, bipolar systems are more stable for three reasons. First, there are
relatively few opportunities for conflict given the fewer number of major power dyads. Second,
there is more likely an equal distribution of power. Third, bipolarity discourages strategic
miscalculation. While fear is constant, bipolarity does not magnify those fears.131
Contradicting these assertions and accompanying rationale, Karl Deutsch, Richard Singer,
and Edward Mansfield find that a multipolar system exhibits higher levels of stability.132 The
logic here is that as the number of great power dyads rise, there is an increased probability for
the formation of a larger number of coalitions against any aggressive state(s), thus serving as a
deterrent to belligerent behavior. Under a bipolar system, great power allies were usually too
weak to play any meaningful balancing role vis-à-vis aggressive, more powerful states. Recalling
Richard Grieco, this point seems valid in that as the number of great powers increase, so does the
possibility for cooperation. In his words…
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A state may believe that it might do better than some partners in a proposed arrangement but not
as well as others. If it is uncertain about which partners would do relatively better, the state will
prefer more partners, for larger numbers would enhance the likelihood that the relative
achievements of gains advantaging (what turn out to be) better-positioned partners could be
offset by more favorable sharings arising from interactions with (as matters develop) weaker
partners.133

Additionally, given the prospect for increased cooperation among the great powers, in multipolar systems these states are linked together via multiple channels of interaction along military,
cultural, or economic lines, which subsequently creates cross-cutting cleavages that can stave off
crises that could lead to armed conflict. In a bipolar system, the number of links are limited and
when an issue becomes polarizing (e.g. Soviet placement of nuclear missiles in Cuba) there is an
increased potential for a disagreement to escalate into a crisis.134
If scholars and practitioners are at odds over the stability of the international system under
conditions of bipolarity or multipolarity, then the demise of the Soviet Union and the emergence
of the U.S. as a purported ‘unipole’ became a harbinger for system stability in the post-Cold War
era. Neorealists posited the system would experience high levels of instability because the
concentration of power in one state would represent a clear and present danger to all states
leading them to pursue various actions designed to reestablish an equitable balance of power.135
Writing in 2000, Waltz noted,
Throughout the Cold War, what the United States and the Soviet Union did, and how they
interacted, were dominant factors in international politics. The two countries, however,
constrained each other. Now the United States is alone in the world. As nature abhors a vacuum,
so international politics abhors unbalanced power.136
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destabilizing condition, which would make the system fundamentally more volatile, uncertain,
complex, and ambiguous. Although there have been no great power wars over the last 25 years, a
U.S. decision to initiate a preventative war against Iraq in 2003, coupled with an unwillingness to
ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, its renunciation of the 1972 AntiBallistic Missile Treaty, and most recently Washington’s withdrawal from the Paris Climate
Agreement serve as just a few points of light that illuminate how the unrestrained actions of a
purported unipolar power may serve as a catalyst for regional or global instability. Such actions
moved Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2007 to sound the alarm over the relationship
between U.S. actions and system instability stating, “unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions
[by the United States] have not resolved any problems. Moreover, they have caused new human
tragedies and created new centres of tension.”137 Beyond the actions of the U.S., scholars have
also pointed to the rise of China and a resurgent Russia along with two major wars in the Middle
East, civil wars in southeastern Europe and Africa, and a host of unconventional (e.g. counterterrorism and/or counter-insurgency) operations as key indicators of system instability in the
post-Cold War era.
The uneasiness exhibited by political leaders in other developed countries over U.S.
unilateralism and their concerns about the negative impacts of unipolarity on system stability set
in motion diplomatic calls for the establishment of a multipolar world order beginning as early as
the mid 1990s. For example, in 1995 as NATO’s eastward expansion was beginning, Russian
Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev stated, “Russia is a great power, and it is my conviction that its
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position in the world now is more stable and dignified than that of the former Soviet Union.”138
Following Russia, in 1999 French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine stated, “we cannot accept
a world that is politically unipolar or culturally uniform. Nor can we accept the unilateralism of
the single hyperpower. That is why we are fighting for a multipolar, diversified and multilateral
world.”139 By 2001, spurred on by the continuing efforts of the United States to develop a
national missile defense system, China and Russia signed a friendship treaty. Viewing U.S.
unilateral actions as a threat to global stability, Chinese President Jiang Zemin stated,
We believe that more active cooperation between our countries [China and Russia] in discussing
missile defenses and disarmament will enhance our efforts in building a multipolar world and
establish a fair, rational [stable] international order.140

While these comments and actions have not put the major powers on a war footing with the
United States, they are reflective of an international system characterized by regional great
power competition in a system that exhibits various levels of instability.
In contrast to those taking a pessimistic view on the impact of unipolarity on system stability,
others view this systemic condition positively arguing U.S. global dominance is a stabilizing
factor in world affairs. In this case, the generally peaceful nature of the international system, as
defined by the absence of great power wars, can be attributed to U.S. efforts to build or sustain
mutually beneficial international institutions and organizations, America’s benevolent nature or
Washington’s general proclivity to employ armed forced in a limited, non-threatening manner.141
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These empirical realities allow Wohlforth to conclude that a unipolar system is more stable than
a bipolar or multipolar configuration because, “the leading state’s power advantage removes the
problem of hegemonic rivalry from world politics, and it reduces the salience and stakes of
balance-of-power politics among the major states.”142
The preceding discussion points to two key takeaways. First, there is no scholarly consensus
on the relationship between system polarity and system stability. For every argument that a
unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar system is more stable than the other, there exists a corresponding
valid counterargument. For example, over a thousand years ago Thucydides argued Sparta’s fear
about Greece’s growing military and political power and the uncertainty of its impacts to the
stability of the bipolar system became the primary causes of war. According to Thucydides, “the
growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made war
inevitable.”143 Fast forward to the multipolar world of the early 20th century, the current balance
of power was not enough to prevent war as it had done in the first and second Balkan Wars.144
Again, uncertainty created fear and when states are faced with a threat of physical destruction,
they resort to war, which was the case in August 1914 with the outbreak of a great power war.
Taken together, state actions in response to uncertainty can potentially be seen as an intervening
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variable between polarity and the stability of system.145
This leads to a second important takeaway where if fear and uncertainty are key drivers of
state action, then the primary point of departure for understanding political outcomes must begin
at the individual-level of analysis. In this case, taking account of the ideas, beliefs, and
perceptions of ruling political elites can help us to understand their strategic calculations as they
relate to war, peace, and for this study... alignment. This does not mean that systemic- and statelevel factors are not important. Rather they are secondary. Recalling Levy and Thompson, “a
theoretically complete explanation of polarity and stability thus requires the incorporation of
responses to uncertainty, which derives from the individual or possibly state level of analysis.”146
As will be discussed in the next chapter, Levy and Thompson’s sage insight become one of the
many points of light guiding this study’s theoretical model that focuses on the ideas and beliefs
of political leaders and domestic politics.
System Polarity and State Alignment. The preceding discussion serves as a foundation from
which to examine the scholarly assertions of how the global power structure may potentially
shape the alignment tendencies of states under different system configurations. In line with the
conclusions noted above, there is again no clear and unambiguous causal relationship between
changes in the polarity of the international system and the alignment tendencies of states. Two
points support this assertion.
First, like other efforts to develop a causal relationship between system polarity and various
political outcomes, there is a high degree of ambiguity on the relationship between the global
power structure and state alignment. One point of ambiguity centers on exactly when states will
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opt to pursue an external or internal balancing strategy. For example, Kenneth Waltz, Michael
Barnett, Jack Levy, and William Thompson assert external balancing occurs more frequently in
multipolar systems because the pooling of resources is a more effective cost option than
independently allocating large sums of monies for a wide array of defense programs. Separately,
internal balancing occurs more frequently in bipolar systems because there are no other great
powers to align with via formal or informal treaties or agreements.147 However, there is little
‘hard’ empirical evidence to support the preceding assertions as both types of balancing can
occur together in a complementary fashion. This was the case prior to the outbreak of the First
World War when the major powers pursued internal and external balancing by engaging in an
arms race (e.g. the naval arms race between Germany and Great Britain) and creating two
alliances. Separately, during the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union internally and
externally balanced against each other by allocating billions of dollars to build-up their
respective militaries and by creating NATO and the WARSAW Pact.
A second point of ambiguity focuses on the process by which states align themselves under
different systemic configurations. Defensive realists tend to view alliances as an intervening
variable between polarity and the overall stability of the system. When the system is bipolar,
alignment activities do not create system-wide shocks leading to conflict because the two most
powerful states can still act unilaterally to realize their long-term strategic objectives owing to
their superior material capabilities or access to resources. As such, the interest of allies and their
impact on the strategic calculus of the great powers is of little to no importance. In multi-polar
systems, alliance formation has the potential to create high levels of instability. In this case,
given the difficulty of acquiring timely and relevant intelligence on the activities of other states
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and the potential for like-minded great powers to band together in opposition to an aggressive
pole, multi-polar systems are considered to be more conflict prone.148
Summary. The preceding discussion on system polarity yields several key insights. First,
although there is a scholarly disagreement over the extent to which the global power structure
may play a key role affecting a state’s foreign policy behavior, the literature on polarity is a
strong reminder for scholars to consider the state’s material power capabilities. Specifically,
material power should be viewed as an enabler of state action. For instance, U.S. power
capabilities allow Washington to act across multiple fronts (e.g. diplomatic, military,
information, economic) at an intensity level that exceeds other states. Despite this reality, other
regional great powers can and will act on par with the United States and that these actions and
the accompanying second- and third-order effects are what matters most; not whether the system
is unipolar, bipolar, or multi-polar. For example, the actions of one of the many nuclear-armed
countries in the world will certainly elicit a response from all states, regardless of their position
in the international system. North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile tests in late 2017
and early 2018 are an excellent example of this strategic reality.
Second, although material considerations matter, focusing exclusively on the materialisticbased elements of system polarity is problematic because this concept fails to take a full
accounting of how non-material factors may affect the behavior of states. For example, even
though the United States possesses the most powerful military and largest economy in the world,
this power is held in check by long-standing domestic institutions and political leader beliefs on
its application in international affairs. According to Barry Buzan,
Polarity is essentially a material view of the system, resting on the relative accumulations of
capability. Such an approach discounts the whole social side of life. It assumes that the actors in
the system are at best rivals, at worst enemies, and never friends. It assumes that the drive for
148
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power to preserve security always trumps other, more potentially collaborative motives, such as
desire to increase wealth, welfare, and knowledge. Analyzing international relations in terms of
power politics risks increasing the possibility that actors will behave in that way.149

Finally, due consideration should be given to how similarly placed states behave in the
international system. Theories that attempt to explain the alignment patterns of a unipole or
group of regional great powers may not adequately explain the behavior of small states. In his
examination of how systemic conditions impact state behavior, Michael Mandelbaum concludes,
Similar security policies recur throughout history and across the international system in states
that, whatever their differences, occupy similar positions in the system… The security policies of
very strong states are different from those of very weak ones, and both differ from those of states
that are neither very strong nor very weak.150

With respect to small state alignment, Levy provides additional emphasis to this point noting
how small states can at best only generate minimal impacts on the system and because their
actions are tied to the near-term, “they will sometimes balance and sometimes bandwagon,
depending on the context.”151 Levy’s point on context is important; however, what is more
important is how different political leaders view the strategic environment in which they reside.
State-Level Theories
A second group of scholars argue that domestic-level variables can markedly improve our
understanding of small state alignment. The leading theorists at this level argue internal threats to
the ruling government, institutions that make up the state’s apparatus, and identity best explain
why a small state may align with one regional great power over another. In many cases, these
research efforts have also integrated system-level variables to garner increased clarity on a small
state’s alignment tendencies. Although these efforts represent a marked improvement over a
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purely systemic explanation, on their own they too suffer from a unique set of shortcomings
leading to a new set of anomalies.
Internal Threats.
Building on Walt’s balance of threat theory, some scholars posit that while the aggressive
intentions of states are an important consideration shaping a small state’s alignment with a
regional great power, one must also consider domestic internal threats to the ruling government.
In general, internal threats to the state include, but are not limited to insurgencies, separatist
movements, domestic political opposition, or social unrest stemming from ethnic or religious
divisions. Beginning with Stephen David, he argues small states will ‘omnibalance’ because they
must account for internal threats and external threats in deciding the state’s alignment with one
regional great power over another. Specifically, David asserts that political leaders are more apt
to appease a less threatening great power in order to concentrate on more threatening domestic
challenges to their rule.152 In David’s words,
Third World leaders, too, seek to appease secondary threats in order to counter those that are
more pressing. But in the Third World, this often means appeasing other states (which often pose
less pressing threats) to counter the more immediate and dangerous domestic threats. They seek
to split the alignment against them and focus their energies on their most dangerous (domestic)
opponents. To do this they appease the international allies of their domestic opponents.153

One of the central propositions of David’s omnibalancing theory is that systemic-based
theories (e.g. balance of power or threat) of state alignment only get us so far. In this case, the
strategic decisions made by political leaders are the cornerstone for alignment outcomes.
However, systemic and domestic-level variables are also a part of the strategic calculus leading
foreign policy elites to align the state with one regional great power over another. David
subsequently applies his theory to Ethiopia. Facing a rebellion in 1974, ruling leaders in Addis
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Ababa changed the state’s alignment from Washington to Moscow because the Kremlin was
prepared to provide more military assistance to help the ruling government more effectively deal
with this internal threat. Similarly, David argues Egypt’s volte-face from the Soviet Union to the
U.S. after the 1973 war with Israel was the result of government opposition and public
displeasure over the stalemate with Tel Aviv on the occupied territories. By aligning with the
United States, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat sought to balance against this internal opposition
by pressing Washington to advance a peace deal with Tel Aviv. In the end, political leaders in
small states are more apt to align with regional great powers that will help them remain in
power.154
There are several positive and negative takeaways from David’s omnibalancing theory worth
emphasizing. First, David garners increased analytical leverage to explain small state alignment
outcomes by focusing the primary unit analysis at the individual-level. For David, once must first
understand political leaders ultimately make the foreign policy choices of the state. Second, any
attempt to understand why one small state aligns with one regional great power over another
must also incorporate systemic and domestic-level variables. Events or conditions at each of
these levels ultimately shape the strategic decision-making of ruling elites. Finally, given their
materially weak condition, small states are more apt to bandwagon with a regional great power in
order to achieve a particular strategic goal because they have the necessary resources.
Despite these notable strengths, David’s theory suffers from two shortcomings. One of the
primary weaknesses of David’s theory is that he assumes internal and external threats are
omnipresent. That is, because small states lack material power to defend themselves from
external attack or because ruling leaders lack political legitimacy, they must continuously deal
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with both internal and external threats. Applying the omnibalancing thesis to the post-Soviet
space does little to explain why the Baltic States, which experienced low or no internal threats
decided to pursue a pro-West course that resulted in their accession in NATO. Beyond the
Baltics, if one follows David’s argument on Ethiopia with the Soviet Union’s provision of
military assistance, what explains Ukraine and Georgia’s alignment with the U.S. under Petro
Poroshenko and Mikheil Saakashvili respectively even when Washington refused to provide
adequate levels of military assistance to resolve each country’s separatist problems?
Meanwhile, other scholars have sought to explain alignment by integrating economic and
threat considerations into the equation of small state alignment as was the case with Barnett and
Levy in their examination of the alignment tendencies of countries in the Middle East. For both
scholars, a combination of external threats, the condition of the country’s economy, and domestic
threats to the ruling government explain the alignment tendencies of small states. Focusing their
analysis on Egypt’s alignment with the Soviet Union from 1962-1973, Barnett and Levy find that
Cairo tended to eschew a strong alignment with the Soviet Union when the following three
conditions were present: a weak economy, low presidential threat perceptions (e.g. no attack
from Israel), and the absence of domestic challenges to Sadat’s rule. As Sadat’s threat
perceptions increased, the economy grew worse, and the number of domestic challenges
multiplied, Cairo subsequently attempted to strengthen its alignment with Moscow.155
In the post-Soviet space, Eric Miller argues that when domestic threats and economic
dependence are high, political elites tend to establish strong pro-Russian policies and strategies.
To test his theory, Miller focuses his examination on Ukraine and Uzbekistan finding that these
variables (internal threat and economic dependence with Russia) explain why each ruling
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government at different times opted to pursue a strong pro-Russian, a moderately pro-Russian or
an independent alignment trajectory. Furthermore, even when internal threats are low and
economic dependence is high, political elites, while devoting less emphasis to establishing strong
relations with Russia, will still bandwagon because “anti-Russian foreign policies would hamper
access to the hegemon’s market and its energy resources.”156
Miller’s study contains several substantial positives and negatives. In terms of positives, the
strength of Miller’s theory centers on his ability to incorporate unit- and system-level variables in
his analysis with each on their own not fully explaining why Kiev and Tashkent would align with
their former imperial center. Another positive from Miller’s study is how he assesses the change
in the state’s alignment over a long period of time (1994-2004). Finally, Miller’s assertion on
political elite aversion to crafting anti-Russian policies highlights the possibility that while one
state may attempt to align with one regional great power, cooperation with other great powers
continues. This conclusion is significant and can serve as a point of departure for a small state’s
alignment with more than one regional great power.
With respect to negatives, Miller’s operationalization of alignment is too ambiguous because
it is unclear where the dividing line is between a pro- or moderately-aligned former Soviet state.
This is partly the result from a problem with measurement. According to Andrei Tsygankov,
Miller “... is also not always rigorous in following his own coding of alignments, including
attitudes toward the Russia-controlled CIS, Russia's military presence, and strength of bilateral
security ties with Russia.”157 A second negative is how Miller limits his cases to only two
countries making it unlikely his theory will convey equally across all former Soviet states. For
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example, it is questionable if Miller’s theory would hold water in Georgia where despite a large
internal threat from the separatist provinces and the country’s economic reliance on Russia, one
can argue Georgia under President Mikheil Saakashvili pursued a strong pro-West alignment.
Institutions.
In line with David’s focus on internal threats as a primary driver for small state alignment,
Deborah Larson and Miriam Fendius Elman takes a similar track arguing the institutional makeup of the state apparatus best explains small state alignment outcomes. Of particular relevance
for Larson is how domestic opposition may act as a constraint affecting the strategic decisionmaking process of foreign policy elites to align with one regional great power over another. For
Larson, the source of this conflict emanates from diverging conceptions of national identity
between the state and society owing to ethnic, religious, or other cultural differences. According
to Larson, “when domestic institutions are incongruent with the national identity, individuals do
not identify with the state, but with their ethnic group, class, or political party.”158 When this
occurs, societal elements use their networks to engage regional great powers with the hopes of
garnering support for their cause. If these opposition elements are successful, the state, fearing
subversion, yields some concessions to the group by pursing a bandwagoning strategy with the
targeted state in the hopes of checking the internal threat. According to Larson,
...political leaders' diplomatic strategies are constrained by their need to remain in office.
Domestic structures vary, however, in their propensity to select and reward elites who will place
the state's interests above those of class, ethnic group, or religion. It follows, then, that states that
have similar capabilities may react differently to outside threats or opportunities for expansion.
Elites bandwagon not to protect their state's territorial integrity or to enhance its power, but to
preserve their rule. 159
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Larson stresses the validity of her theory by pointing to the strategic situation in Central
Europe in the decades between World Wars I and II. Here, the establishment of artificial borders
by the Allied powers created a disparity in the location of wide array of different ethnic and
religious groups in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Yugoslavia. Many of the groups
in each of these countries held a perspective on the nation’s identity that differed markedly from
the state’s vision. When the ruling government implemented policies that did not advance their
best interests, these groups sought external support from like-minded regional great powers such
as Nazi Germany or fascist Italy. This led ruling elites in countries like Czechoslovakia to
appease Germany by signing a non-aggression treaty in return for Berlin’s commitment not to
foment political instability in the country.160
In a similar vein, Elman finds that domestic institutions constrain or enable political elite
decisions on cooperation or confrontation with more powerful states. Viewing the U.S. as a small
state in the early 1800s, she concludes, “US foreign-policy making prior to the Quasi War, the
War of 1812 and the Mexican-American War reveals that pre-established domestic institutions
affected both the timing and substance of subsequent U.S. military strategy.”161 This is an
important finding because whether political leaders in one administration maintain or change the
state’s institutions, future political leaders must operate within this domestic-political context
giving light to how domestic politics could become an important foreign policy shape agent.
Larson and Elman’s work carry several strengths and shortfalls. A notable strength of
Elman’s work is her extended time horizon looking at several presidential administrations and a
consideration of a political leader’s perceptions of the external threat. As a result, one can better
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understand the underlying domestic factors affecting the strategic calculus of foreign policy
elites over time. Larson’s study is also useful because it calls our attention to the importance of
considering identity and its impact on the institutional make-up of a state’s bureaucratic
apparatus with respect to alignment outcomes. A key takeaway in this case is that there exists a
finite set of political leaders within a ruling government that have the power and influence to
articulate their narrow conception of the state’s identity vis-à-vis other states in the international
system. Finally, Elman’s work reminds us of the value from a multi-level analysis. In her words,
Any generalized claim for the causal priority of international or domestic explanations of small
state behavior is unwarranted. Both levels of analysis matter because while the international
environment influences domestic political choices, these institutional decisions shape foreign
policies in later periods.162

A major shortfall in Larson’s work is that she fails to articulate the alignment activities of a
small state with other regional great powers. The problem here is how Larson narrowly focuses
her analysis on the reactive efforts of the state to appease external states based on pressures from
domestic groups with different conceptions of the national identity. What she does not consider
is how the ruling governments in central Europe may have attempted to align with other regional
great powers based on a similar state identity. Furthermore, not answered is to what extent did
other domestic and systemic-level factors enable or constrain the alignment activities of foreign
policy elites. One could argue domestic politics was also a key factor driving Czechoslovakia’s
appeasement strategy with Nazi Germany given the existence of opposition figures within the
ruling government who were sympathetic to the cause of domestic groups that were themselves
seeking external assistance from Berlin.
Further eroding the strength of her argument, Larson does not adequately define the concepts
of state and national identity. Although both forms of identity overlap to some extent, state
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identity is best understood as a social construction in the context of inter-state relations while
national identity is best described at a societal level and the extent to which individuals may
exhibit a shared sense of history, language, culture, etc. Masahiro Matsumura offers a clear
explanation of both of these concepts noting how state identity,
... is the state’s perception of what role it should play and what status it should enjoy in
international relations...[while] national identity... implies a sense of unity among a population
that shares common historical experiences, ethnic backgrounds, cultural heritages, languages,
creedal commitments and/or other characteristics. Certainly, national identity may be closely
related to state identity, due to the former’s implications for the latter. Yet the two concepts are
distinct.163

The implication here is that by viewing state and national identity as one in the same potentially
skews Larson’s findings on why some small states may bandwagon with a regional great power.
In the post-Soviet space, Larson’s theory fails to hold water. In Ukraine, the presence of a
large Russian population in the eastern provinces and its generally weak institutions have not
forced Kiev to cede to Moscow’s preferences for Ukraine to join the CSTO or the EEU. In
Georgia, the separatist movements in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, while garnering Russian
support and armed intervention, have also not been enough for Tbilisi to acquiesce to Moscow’s
demands, despite the state’s spotty record on human rights, less than transparent elections, and
history of government corruption.
Identity.
In recent years, scholars have attempted to understand foreign policy outcomes by viewing
world politics through a constructivist lens. Peering deep inside the ‘black box,’ it is the ideas,164

163

Matsumura 2008, 4.
Goldstein, Judith, and Robert Owen Keohane, eds. 1993. Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and
Political Change. Cornell University Press; Tannenwald, Nina. 2005. “Ideas and Explanation: Advancing the
Theoretical Agenda.” Journal of Cold War Studies 7 (2); Yee, Albert. 1996. “The Causal Effect of Ideas on
Policies.” International Organization 50 (1).
164

73

ideological beliefs,165 perceptions,166 and images,167 held by political leaders that do the heavy
lifting in shaping the strategic interactions between states. Although each of these approaches
may provide increased leverage to understand state foreign policies, only a narrow band of
constructivists have attempted to tackle the challenge of decrypting when, why, and how one
state may align with another state by focusing on the concept of identity.
In line with Larson’s study, Christopher Hemmer, Peter Katzenstein and Michael Barnett
closely examine the relationship between identity and alignment outcomes. First, Hemmer and
Katzenstein analyze U.S. alliance patterns following World War II arguing racial, historical,
political, and cultural factors, more so than material and efficiency considerations, affected
political elite perceptions on collective identity that led them to develop a multilateral alliance
with European countries and bilateral security arrangements with Asian countries. In their words,
“explicitly considering the role collective identities play in world politics can help advance our
theoretical and empirical understanding of international relations.”168 Separately, Michael
Barnett finds a shared sense of state identity was a key factor affecting political elite threat
perceptions and alignment outcomes in the Middle East. For Barnett, “it is the politics of identity
rather than the logic of anarchy that often provides a better understanding of which states are
viewed as potential or immediate threat to state security.”169
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The work of Hemmer, Katzenstein, and Barnett represent a marked improvement over
Larson’s work because they more precisely differentiate between the concepts of national and
state identity and how the level of threat, either internally or externally is of secondary
importance. In Hemmer and Katzenstein’s paper, this is important because collective identities
between states can potentially help advance our theoretical and empirical understanding of state
alignment. This reality is made clear with a comment from Undersecretary of State Robert
Lovett who notes that, “the ‘cement’ of the [North Atlantic] treaty was not the Soviet threat, but
the common Western approach and that Western attachment to the worth of the individual.”170
Barnett’s work also offers a marked improvement on how scholars can conceptualize threat
perceptions by calling our attention to the importance of state identity to understand how ruling
elites define a threat and their options for alignment. His study potentially offers a window from
which to understand alignment volatility where changes in state identity can potentially change
alignment patterns. As Barnett notes, “identity is not a static concept but rather is socially
constructed, and this social construction process can be used to for understanding alliance
dynamics and changes in security patterns.”171
In the post-Soviet space, Giorgi Gvalia and his colleagues specifically set out to explain
change and continuity in small state alignment in their study on Georgia and Azerbaijan. Using
data collected from elite interviews, Gvalia argues systemic explanations fall short and that
individual-level variables best explain the foreign policy behavior of small states in their
decision to balance or bandwagon. For Gvalia, political elite ideas about the identity and purpose
of the state are critical factors that affect the formulation and implementation of a ruling
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government’s foreign policies. Although elite ideas and state identity are the most important
variables, their analysis also takes into consideration secondary factors such as geography,
economic dependence and the regional balance of power.172 Testing their theory on Georgia and
Azerbaijan, Gvalia and his colleagues conclude,
Although a state’s external environment is certainly important for understanding its foreign
policy, variations in an external threat environment are filtered through elite ideas. States
therefore choose international alliances according to the compatibility of their social orders and
ideas about state identity and not solely in response to changes in the balance of power. Material
factors matter, but ideas often determine how (and how much) they matter.173

From these conclusions, it becomes clear why, despite systemic events (e.g. 2008 RussiaGeorgia War), Georgian President Saakashvili consistently followed a pro-West alignment and
why Azeri President Ilham Aliyev tended to pursue a more pro-Russian course.
Gvalia’s study is not without a series of flaws. First, in Georgia there is little analytical
attention devoted to the state’s alignment tendencies under President Eduard Shevardnadze.
Rather than applying the theory to his administration, Gvalia advances an unsupported
conclusion that while Shevardnadze espoused a pro-West alignment, he never aggressively
pursued this course. As result, Georgia is best viewed in a conventional way as a small state that
bandwagons with Russia under Shevardnadze.174 Second, Gvalia used elite interviews in his
examination of Georgia, the findings on Azerbaijan’s alignment rested on secondary sources
alone. Although Azerbaijan under Ilham Aliyev had increased its cooperation with Moscow,
relations with ruling government in the West remained stable indicating Baku’s alignment with
other regional great powers like the U.S. should be more accurately viewed as pragmatic.
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Finally, Gvalia’s operationalization of state alignment (pro-West or pro-Russian), like many
of the scholarly studies in this literature review, is too ambiguous and subject to different
interpretations. It is on this point that is becomes necessary to understand some of the general
categorizations scholars have developed to differentiate the alignment tendencies of states in the
post-Cold War era. Although many of these typologies have been applied to the most powerful
states in the system, their applicability to small states should not be discounted.
Alignment Typologies in the Post-Cold War Era
Just as scholars differ on the impact of systemic and unit-level variables leading one state to
align or enter into an alliance with another, they are also at odds over the concepts that best
define these political phenomena. One set of academics and practitioners initially put forward an
argument that existing alliances in the post-Cold War era would become less important or would
cease to exist with some predicting NATO’s dissolution or at least a marked decline in this
organization’s military capabilities.175 For example, Thomas Mowle and David Sacko argue
alliances for the United States since the end of the Cold War are less important because
Washington has employed a “coalition of the willing” approach to military operations while
allowing the EU to create a new military organization (the European Common Security and
Defense Policy) independent of NATO. As a result, alliance formation has become more fluid
over the past several decades.176
Despite these proclamations, the reality however is that after 25 years NATO remains intact
adding 12 new members through 2009 and expanding the alliance’s defensive capabilities, which
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as of May 2016 included a regional ballistic missile system.177 In a similar, albeit less intense
manner, the Russian-led CSTO has also endured with the EEU coming into existence in 2015.
What is still not known is exactly when, how, and why states will opt to align with one of these
regional military or economic blocs reminding us that alignment politics remains a challenging
and complicated endeavor in the post-Cold War era. Despite these challenges, one can discern
how some states have pursued one of six alignment strategies over the last several decades: hard
balancing, regional balancing, soft balancing, ‘leash slipping,’ bandwagoning, and bridging178
Hard Balancing.
In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, neorealists argued that balancing, as
originally envisioned by Waltz, would remain the predominate tendency of states in the
international system.179 For example, Christopher Layne and Kenneth Waltz were quick to note
how states would aggressively pursue balancing (internal and external) strategies to offset U.S.
material power dominance with the intent of reestablishing an international system with more
than one great power.180 By the end of the century however, structuralists were perplexed by the
lack of great power balancing in system. Such a situation represented a puzzle for neorealists,
who then attempted to qualify their assertions on hard balancing by extending the timing of when
this would actually occur. In the words of Waltz, “realist theory predicts that balances disrupted
will one day be restored. A limitation of the theory, a limitation common to social science
theories, is that it cannot say when.”181
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Although hard balancing against the United States may not have manifested itself in a
pronounced manner over a short-period of time, some neorealists have continued to highlight
how balancing is ongoing albeit at lower levels of intensity. Recalling Waltz’s two forms of
balancing, there is some evidence several states are either adopting an internal balancing or
external balancing strategy. With respect to internal balancing, both Russia and China have
implemented a wide array of defense modernization programs that represent a first step in what
will be a long-term endeavor to balance against the United States.182 Separately, countries such
as North Korea and potentially Iran see the viability in an internal balancing strategy by
acquiring nuclear weapons and conducting provocative military operations as a way to resist
what they perceive to be U.S. unilateralism. For these countries, weapons of mass destruction
can deter U.S. military actions (e.g. Iraq 2003) designed to remove hostile foreign governments
from power. In the words of Iranian politician Mostafa Tajazadeh during a March 2003 interview
with the Washington Post, “it is basically a matter of equilibrium… If I don't have a nuclear
bomb, I don't have security.”183
States are also externally balancing against the United States. Beginning in 1996, Russia and
China, in concert with Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan formed the “Shanghai Five,”
which was transformed into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001 adding
Uzbekistan into the collective. Although the alliance’s primary security objective focuses on
terrorism, separatism, and extremism, Ariel Cohen asserts Beijing considers the SCO “as a
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means of creating a new Eurasian order to reduce U.S. military power and limit America's
democracy promotion.”184
Separately, Russia has aggressively pursued its own balancing agenda against the United
States bringing along some of the former Soviet states in the process. In 1992, Russia in concert
with Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan entered into a formal alliance by
signing the CST with Belarus, Azerbaijan and Georgia joining in 1993. By 2002, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, and Uzbekistan opted not to renew their membership setting in motion what is known
today as the CSTO with five member countries including Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan. Of note, although Uzbekistan left the CST in 2002, Tashkent rejoined in
2006 only to leave once more in 2012.185 Working within their means, political leaders in Beijing
and Moscow are proceeding on an aggressive balancing course, even though “they [China and
Russia] lack the capabilities necessary to create a true counterpoise to...”186 the United States.
There are two important takeaways to note with respect to the balancing behavior of states in
the post-Cold War era. In most cases, countries residing near the top of the international
hierarchy based on military power (e.g. Russia and China) are the ones conducting a majority of
the hard balancing in the contemporary system. It is in this case, Walter Lippmann’s assertion
from 1943 as to which states are more likely to pursue a balancing strategy appears valid. In his
words, “only a great power can resist a great power. Only a great power can defeat a great
power.”187 Second, if one posits that Russia is balancing against the United States, how can one
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best characterize the alignment activities of the smaller states in the CSTO? Is it balancing or is it
bandwagoning? This study argues the former because it represents the first step in a strategic
process that is subject to a wide array of domestic and systemic pressures.
Regional Balancing.
Proceeding on the assumption that hard balancing is for only the most powerful states in the
international system, some academics and practitioners have attempted to capture when this form
of alignment may apply to small states. Remaining true to structuralist assumptions, a small state
may balance against an aspiring regional hegemon by aligning with a competing power from a
different region of the world. Although on the surface this may appear as bandwagoning, in
reality a small state will align with an extra-regional power as a way to balance against the
closer, more powerful state.188 As such, the key driver moving small states is geography.
Walt applies this approach to explain why some former Soviet states and countries including
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Hungary aligned with the U.S. and its Western European
allies as a way to increase their material power and guarantee their security against a historically
aggressive Russia. As Walt notes, “a desire to enhance their security against regional threats [like
Russia] explains why East European states.... were so eager to join NATO and so willing to curry
favor with Washington by backing the Iraq war.”189 Mearsheimer advances a similar argument
with his ‘offshore balancing’ hypothesis. For Mearsheimer, weak states in close proximity to a
regional hegemon seek out an external great power because “offshore balancers do not provoke
balancing coalitions against themselves.”190
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In terms of strengths, Walt and Mearsheimer do well on several levels. First, they highlight
the importance of injecting geopolitics into analyses on the balancing and bandwagoning
behavior of states in a particular region. Second, both either directly or indirectly extend their
analysis beyond the major secondary powers by considering the actions of smaller states. With
respect to shortfalls, while Walt is quick to point out the cases of Poland, Hungary, and the Baltic
states, no reference is made to Belarus, Armenia, or Ukraine. Certainly, one can argue close
historical and/or cultural ties explain the alignment patterns of former Soviet states; however,
these explanations fall short in Ukraine where at times the country has sought closer ties with the
West under Presidents Viktor Yushchenko and Petro Poroshenko, but under Viktor Yanukovych,
the ruling government aggressively pursued closer economic and security relations with Russia.
Furthermore, systemic explanations fall short since over the course of all three presidencies in
Ukraine, the regional balance of power essentially remained the same.
Soft Balancing.
In contrast to hard or regional balancing, states may also “soft balance” against a regional
great power.191 For states pursing this alignment strategy, Walt helps us to understand this
activity by narrowly defining soft balancing as “the conscious coordination of diplomatic action
in order to obtain outcomes contrary to U.S. preferences; outcomes that could not be gained if
the balancers did not give each other some degree of mutual support.”192 Randall Schweller and
Xiaoyu Pu take issue with his limited conception though, viewing soft balancing as a general
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form of relations of domination and resistance between powerful and less powerful actors. They
develop this approach based on the work of James Scott, who notes, “most of the political life of
subordinate groups is to be found neither in overt collective defiance of powerholders nor in
complete hegemonic compliance, but in the vast territory between these two polar opposites,”193
Schweller and Pu draw a parallel where secondary states, although lacking the material capacity
to balance will pursue relations of resistance to delegitimize or impose a cost on the most
powerful state in the political universe.194
Josef Joffe provides a more nuanced definition of soft balancing arguing there exists two
distinct forms: politico-diplomatic and psycho-social.195 States engaging in politico-diplomatic
balancing will withhold political support for U.S.-led endeavors on the global stage. For
example, in 2001 Germany and France strongly resisted a U.S. decision to withdraw from the
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty and pursue a national missile defense program. If this were to
occur, French President Jacques Chirac concluded that it would serve as a “fantastic incentive to
proliferate”196 conventional and/or nuclear weapons to overcome this new defensive system.
Separately, in March 2003 France, Russia, and Germany collectively opposed a U.S.-sponsored
draft resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq. These “soft balancing” actions were not
designed to change the distribution of power in the system but to facilitate a better outcome on a
specific issue. The net result for the Iraq example was “these states denied [more or less] the
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United States the legitimacy it had sought and thereby imposed significantly greater political and
economic costs”197 on its unilateral actions to remove Saddam Hussein from power.
Separately, states may employ psycho-social balancing against the United States. Countries
pursing this course of action attempt to stave off U.S. soft power activities by arguing the
‘American way’ is morally, culturally, and socially bankrupt. For example, in 1993, France
convinced the EU to implement what was called a ‘cultural exception’ policy that would exclude
select products (e.g. audio-video products) from the free trade rules under the General
Agreements on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). According to Joffe, “the purpose of this balance of
power policy… [was] to contain American cultural cloutto erect trade walls instead of real
turrets and battlements. The enemy is not America the Conqueror not the ‘Imperial
Republic’but America the Beguiling.”198
The concept of soft balancing is, however, plagued by several shortcomings. First, on one
level soft balancing can be considered nothing more than routine diplomatic bargaining as it
relates to high politics.199 In their analysis of the run-up to the 2003 Iraq War, Brooks and
Wohlforth offer up a strong example of this reality noting the actions of Germany and Turkey.
Using the term "balancing" to describe bargaining amounts in practice to equating balancing with
international relations writ large. If it becomes another word for bargaining, balancing is
meaningless as an analytical concept-something that describes a constant, rather than a variable; a
mundane rather than noteworthy development in international politics.200

In this case, it was domestic political constraints not directly related to power asymmetries that
drove Berlin and Ankara to challenge the unilateral actions of the United States. An important
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point here is that in addition to not preventing the United States from acting anyway, soft
balancing frequently occurs in the realm of “low politics” where there may exist a plethora of
causes behind the counter actions of lesser states such as domestic preferences, economic
statecraft, or simple cases of anti-Americanism. According to some, “the events used to detect
the presence of soft balancing are so typical in history that they are not, and perhaps cannot be,
distinguished from routine diplomatic friction between countries, even between allies.”201
Another problem with “soft balancing” is that the scholarly emphasis on this alignment
strategy often focuses on top-tier states or those that are already in a formal military alliance.
Little scholarly examination is given to the actions of smaller, weaker states. Schweller and Pu
fall into this trap as both focus their analysis on rising great powers such as China. Similarly,
Walt gives precedence to the major powers over smaller states noting that opposition from
Berlin, Paris and Moscow to oppose Washington’s Iraq war plans paved the way for countries
such as Cameroon and Mexico to more easily soft balance against the United States and to resist
pressure to align with the coalition of the willing during the debate in the United Nations.202
Such a conclusion may be short-sighted because it excludes the extent to which the belief
systems of ruling leaders are a primary driver impacting interstate relations.
On a positive note, several scholars have discerned soft bandwagoning tendencies by some
former Soviet states. For example, Cristian Cantir and Ryan Kennedy provide a plausible
explanation of variation in Moldova’s alignment with Russia. Like David, Cantir and Kennedy
focus on domestic and systemic factors; however, Chisinau did not appease Moscow in order to
focus on the more pressing challenge of separatism. Rather, ruling elites opted to pursue a soft
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bandwagoning strategy203 vis-à-vis Russia to achieve the government’s long-term goals of
security and economic prosperity. The key takeaway here is that small state alignment is more
complex than simply accounting for internal threats. In their analysis, three systemic-level
factors (disparities in power, external threat intensity, and permissiveness of the international
environment) and two domestic-level variables (internal threat intensity and permissiveness of
the domestic environment) best explain variation in Moldova’s alignment trajectories.204
Leash-Slipping.
Leash-slipping is a fourth alignment option available to states that are in an alliance and have
a well-established cooperative relationship with a regional great power. In this case, political
leaders in a ruling government decide to independently pool the state’s resources to offset their
respective dependencies on the leading country.205 In 2006, Layne first coined the term leashslipping, noting how some states that are facing an immediate threat from the most powerful
state in an alliance will still build up their internal (i.e. military) capabilities as a way to acquire a
degree of foreign policy autonomy. In essence, leash-slipping “is a form of insurance against a
hegemon that might someday exercise its power in a predatory and menacing fashion.”206 Kai He
adds clarity to this form of alignment noting how leash-slipping falls into the “negative balancing
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category since it mainly aims at undermining domination …without a direct confrontation...”
with a target state.207 For example, the EU’s efforts to establish a common and distinct set of
foreign and security policies through the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CDSP) is
one attempt by European countries to lessen their dependence on U.S. military support.
There are several inherent problems with a leash-slipping strategy as it relates to small state
alignment patterns. First, the EU’s effort to form its own security forces should not be taken as
an effort to free itself from the U.S.-led NATO alliance but rather as a move designed to
complement existing power relations. According to the EU…
The CSDP enables the Union to take a leading role in peace-keeping operations, conflict
prevention and in the strengthening of the international security. It is an integral part of the EU's
comprehensive approach towards crisis management, drawing on civilian and military assets.
Since 2003 the EU has launched some 30 peace missions and operations contributing to
stabilization and security in Europe and beyond.208

This point is not missed by Brooks and Wohlforth, who assert “the forces that the Europeans
are actually seeking to create complement, rather than compete with, U.S. capabilities because
they provide additional units for dealing with Balkans-style contingencies or peacekeeping
missions abroad.”209 The key takeaway here is that just because secondary states formally or
informally pursue enhanced military capabilities does not mean they are doing so as a way to
hedge against the unipole in an uncertain future. Second, analyses on instances of leash-slipping
tend to consider only major world powers...again. Beyond the EU, Layne uses Britain in the mid
to late 1940s and France in the early 1960s as examples of how these nuclear-armed countries
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attempted to slip the leash of U.S. domination. As such, leash-slipping appears on the surface to
have little applicability to small states and their alignment tendencies.
Bandwagoning.
Although regarded as the least likely course of action by many scholars, states may
bandwagon with a more powerful (or threatening) state. This strategic approach can manifest
itself in several ways. First, as conceptualized by Randall Schweller, states may bandwagon with
a larger regional great power because ruling elites view such a course of action as the ‘wave of
the future’. In this case, ideology is the primary driver moving states along an alignment
trajectory towards a regional great power. During the Cold War, many ruling governments in the
developing world willingly aligned with the Moscow because of its communist ideology. One
requirement outlined by Schweller is that ‘wave of the future’ bandwagoning requires the larger
power to have a charismatic leader as was the case with Adolf Hitler in Nazi Germany, Joseph
Stalin in the Soviet Union, and Mao Tse-tung in China. Furthermore, there exists a near
continuous stream of propaganda or demonstrations of success either during war or in times of
economic growth.210
Schweller makes a brief reference to how this form of bandwagoning can be applied to
former Soviet states noting how countries behind the ‘Iron Curtain’ have turned from
communism to liberal democracy; however, he fails to elaborate or adequately support this
assertion. The issue here is that if ideology is the primary driver of alignment for newlyindependent states, then why didn’t Belarus or Armenia or Uzbekistan opt to catch this wave?
‘Piling-on’ bandwagoning is a second form of bandwagoning detailed by Schweller where
non-aligned small states at the end of a great power war will side with one regional great power

210

Schweller 1994, 96-97.

88

over another because they want to be on the winning team. Whether it is a desire to share in the
spoils of war or fear of great power retribution for not supporting the cause, Schweller
categorized this form of bandwagoning as “predatory buck-passing with regard to the winning
coalition.”211 In the absence of great power conflict in the post-Cold War era however, piling-on
bandwagoning appears to have little applicability.
In the absence of an East-West armed confrontation closing out the Cold War, in the years
that followed some scholars have argued secondary states would bandwagon with the United
States, not for ideological considerations, but because of America’s general benevolent nature
and disinclination for world conquest. As a result, political leaders would tend to view the U.S.
and its liberal allies with less fear because these top-tier powers did not represent a clear and
present danger to their survival interests. This was particularly true at the turn of the century
where Kier Lieber and Gerard Alexander note how…
The past few years have certainly witnessed a surge in resentment and criticism of specific U.S.
policies. But great power balancing against the United States has yet to occur... because the post–
September 11 grand strategy designed by the George W. Bush administration… poses a threat
only to a very limited number of regimes and terrorist groups.212

Part of their argument rests on the premise that balance of power theory is deficient because it
only focuses on top-tier states. According to Brooks and Wohlforth, balancing only occurs
against a rising great power, not against a well-established and dominant global state actor. Both
scholars point to a second underlying consideration where because regional great powers like the
United States possess such a marked advantage over secondary powers in terms of material
resources and capabilities, pursuing a balancing strategy to offset this power differential would
be too costly.213 Specifically, they assert, “counterbalancing is and will long remain prohibitively
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costly for the other major powers… [and] the variables that drive balance-of-power theory itself
are now configured so as to render the balancing constraint so improbable as to render it
inoperative.”214
Levy and Thompson take issue with Brooks and Wohlforth’s explanation by qualifying how
the development of balance of power theory is only reflective of Western military thinking for
land-based powers close to each other.215 When the balance of power model is applied to the
maritime realmwhere states are separated by large bodies of waterthis theory does not
convey the same level of explanatory power. Citing the lack of balancing against two maritime
superpowersthe Dutch in the 17th century and Britain in the 19th centurybalancing against
the U.S. will not occur because states with large land-based armies represent a higher threat than
those with large navies. Using quantitative techniques, Levy and Thompson conclude...
The strategic dynamics of behavior in the European system have differed sharply from the
strategic dynamics of behavior in the global maritime system. Counterhegemonic balancing has
been common in the European system, but it is relatively rare in the global maritime system.216

The next form of bandwagoning takes its cue from Walt, who focuses his analysis on what
can be best termed as ‘shadow of the future threat.’217 Although rare according to Walt, in some
instances, a state may bandwagon with a regional great power to stave off the potential for a
future armed attack that would threaten the country’s survival. According to Walt,
The decision to bandwagon requires the weaker side to put its fate in the hands of a more
powerful state whom it suspects (usually with good reason) of harboring hostile intentions. By
bandwagoning with the main source of danger, a threatened state accepts greater vulnerability in
the hope that the dominant power's appetites are sated or diverted.218
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Additionally, when small states have no other options for allies, this will accelerate the tendency
to bandwagon with a threatening great power. In Mearsheimer’s words, “bandwagoning is
employed mainly by minor powers that stand alone against hostile great powers. They have no
choice but to give in to the enemy because they are weak and isolated.”219
In the post-Soviet space, a close examination of the alignment patterns of states in the South
Caucasus do not support Walt and Mearsheimer’s assertions. If one proceeds on the assumption
that Russia is the most threatening great power in the region, then the bandwagoning thesis for
small states is valid given how Armenia has consistently aligned with its former imperial center.
However, the same cannot be said for Georgia, which even after the 2008 Russia-Georgia War
continued to pursue membership in Euro-Atlantic security and economic structures. Furthermore,
Uzbekistan’s on-again-off-again membership in the CSTO demonstrates there is more to
consider than threat and power in understanding change and continuity in a small state’s
alignment patterns.
In contrast to Walt and Mearsheimer, Mowle and Sacko filter their analysis through a
unipolar lens finding bandwagoning with the U.S. to be a common and more beneficial option
for most states, not just the isolated ones. In their words...
...a strategy of bandwagoning, or sharing in the unipolar power’s gains, is more beneficial. States
have not formed military alliances that exclude the United States; their military spending has not
kept pace with the United States, expect in the case of China…; states have not been developing
weapon systems that target the United States, except for North Korea and Iran; and states have
not physically blocked American power. Instead they have joined alliances with the United States
and have often cooperated in its military missions.220

The weakness of Mowle and Sacko’s argument is that they attempt to advance a key finding
while simultaneously conditioning their conclusions with a list of exceptions. These outliers,
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from one perspective, erode the external validity of their central thesis and calls into question the
generalizability of their research when there exist numerous examples of balancing behavior.
Bridging.
Finally, a highly underdeveloped and less explored alignment strategy for states is bridging.
Political elites opting to employ this strategic approach walk a fine line in their bifurcated
foreign policies, which are designed to develop cooperative relations between two or more
regional great powers. According to Mathew Rhodes, “rather than cast its lot unambiguously
with or against one side, a bridging state seeks to maintain good relations with both in order to
narrow differences, minimize conflict, and promote cooperation between them.”221 For example,
following 9/11, Great Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blair acted as a mediator between the
United States and other European countries on Washington’s policies in the Middle East.222
Although Rhodes focus his analysis on top tier states, a bridging strategy could also be applied to
a research project designed to understand the alignment tendencies of small states.
Non-Alignment Strategies
Finally, some scholars have attempted to provide an explanation of state inaction with respect
to strategies of non-alignment. Again, focusing on the great powers, some states can either buckpass or pursue a distancing strategy. First, structuralists posit that the second-best choice to
balancing is buck-passing. In this case, a vulnerable state attempts to shift the burden of
balancing against the most powerful or threatening power by having another state(s) take on this
costly task. Mearsheimer notes that states will buck-pass for three reasons. First, it is less
expensive in that other states expend limited resources to balance against an aggressive state.
Second, in the event of war and after its conclusion, the buck-passer could be in a position where
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it is stronger than both powers. Finally, if there are multiple threatening states, buck-passing
allows the weaker state to handle each in sequence.223
In lieu of buck-passing, balancing, or bandwagoning, Schweller notes that weaker top-tier
states may pursue a distancing strategy vis-a-vis a threatening great power. In this case, the
threatened state attempts to distance itself from all parties. There are two reasons for this
approach. First, while political elites in the threatened state would prefer to balance against a
threatening power state by entering into an alliance with weaker states, there is a realization that
such an effort would still not generate enough deterrence to ensure their collective survival. As
Rothstein notes,
An alliance of small powers is an instrument of limited utility. It neither can nor is designed to
handle major military threats. When small powers are threatened by great powers, they must turn
to other powers for support... Statesmen are wrong in assuming that a combination of small
powers is equivalent to a great power.224

Second, if this coalition is formed it would send a signal to the threating power that a balancing
effort was underway, which in turn, could elicit a political, economic, or military backlash. With
no other choices, political leaders avoid cooperation with all states opting for isolation as a way
to extend its survival.225 Given globalization’s impact on making the world more interconnected,
such a strategy does not appear possible in current times.
Beyond these alternative strategies, which focus on the more powerful states in the
international system, other scholars have attempted to tease out other strategic options. Robert
Rothstein argues small states can choose from three strategies: isolation, nonalignment, and
neutrality.226 Isolation follows Schweller’s notion of distancing where a small state attempts to
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avoid engagement with the top-tier countries by going it alone. States following a strategy of
nonalignment eschew membership in a military bloc opting, in some cases, to chart a new course
independent of the ideological views of the leading great powers. Rothstein does note that
nonalignment is more often than not an aberration because this strategy only applies to states that
are not strategically important and politically unprovocative to the system’s leading powers.
Finally, a small state may declare itself neutral in world affairs dominated by regional great
powers. Rothstein explains the logic of this course of action stating that small states, “...hope that
they can be protected by their own insignificance. If they can appear detached enough, and
disinterested enough, and if they can convincingly indicate that they are too powerless to affect
the issue, they hope the storm will pass them by.”227
Finally, Mark Webber asserts states can pursue three non-alignment choices: isolation, selfreliance, neutrality. Webber’s notion of isolation follows Karl Deutsch’s conception, but is also
like Schweller and Rothstein, where a state decreases contact with a threatening power in order
to minimize disagreements that could lead to war.228 An argument can be made that a strategy of
self-reliance mirrors Waltz’s internal balancing thesis. For Webber, a less powerful state will
build-up its internal military capabilities to deter an attack from a threatening power. A state
opting for neutrality attempts to avoid placing itself in the middle of a conflict between larger,
more powerful states. This is accomplished by not signing formal military commitments,
avoiding all forms of military cooperation, and disallowing the stationing of forces on the
country’s sovereign territory by any regional great power.229
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The preceding strategies while potentially applicable to some states, do not convey to those in
the post-Soviet space for several reasons. First, a strategy of isolation (or distancing) is nearly
impossible for the newly-independent states given their geographical location and historical
economic and social links to Russia. For example, many of the newly-independent states still
rely heavily on Russia for trade and investment. Furthermore, Webber identifies a risk with this
course noting how a strategy of “...isolation would be no guarantee against [Russian] interference
and might, in fact encourage it, if withdrawal was taken as a sign of passivity.”230
Next, neutrality and non-alignment are also not a viable option for most former Soviet states
for two reasons. One, following the criteria set by Rothstein, former Soviet states must be viewed
as strategically important. From Moscow’s perspective, these countries have historically
represented a buffer zone from foreign invaders. Additionally, most of the newly-independent
states are key links in the web of oil and natural gas pipelines leading to countries throughout
Eurasia. Two, a small state’s capacity to maintain a position of neutrality is ultimately
determined by the great powers. Allen Sens and Annette Fox help us to understand this situation.
In their words...
Neutrality requires the tolerance, agreement, or approval of the great powersat least those in the
immediate vicinityto underwrite or guarantee the neutrality of the small state, as in the case of
Belgium and the Treaty of London. Several neutrality policies adopted in the interwar period
were rendered superfluous when Nazi Germany simply chose not to honor them. Neutrality
arrangements are usually founded on the mutual self-interest principle, and if this mutual selfinterest on the part of the great powers breaks down, so too does the viability of the neutrality
policy.231

Fox comes to the same conclusion noting,
...[success] depended on convincing the power pressing the small state that its continued
neutrality was advantageous to the great power too. The small state's leaders had to make clear
that the belligerent's major requirements could be satisfied without the use of force or that the use
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of force would be too expensive in terms of the benefits sought and the larger dividends available
if applied elsewhere.232

Finally, like-minded small states, even if they pool their resources, are unlikely to make any
significant headway in charting their own independent, non-aligned position in world politics.
This was the case with Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova’s efforts to form the
Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (GUAM). According to Tomas
Valasjek, “the scarce resources of the member states will limit the depth of their cooperation,”233
in this organization. Furthermore, the formation of this collective has an implicit mission of
aligning with the United States and its Western European allies; a point not missed by Valasjek,
who concludes this collective “...was established with the express purpose of forging close
institutional ties with the West, which, in the military realm, means NATO.”234
Conclusion
The preceding literature review reveals the dominant theories to explain state alignment are
deficient in many ways and that there is no scholarly consensus on why and when a small state
may opt to align with one regional great power over another. In contrast to Jack Levy’s assertion
about the democratic peace thesis,235 there is by no means anything close to an empirical law on
state alignment. Clearly, this political phenomenon is a complicated endeavor fraught with many
pitfalls, especially as it applies to lesser powers. Given the preceding, one can discern several
key takeaways that may serve as guideposts for the development of a fresh approach to
understanding small state alignment in the post-Cold War era.
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Over Emphasis on Systemic Factors to Explain State Alignment. Because many of the
dominant alignment theories have their roots in a neorealist approach to international relations,
scholarly writings on when, why, and how one state may align with another has proceeded on the
assumption that systemic factors (e.g. balance of power, balance of threat, etc.) are the most
important variables explaining this political outcome. At issue here is how Waltz, Walt, and
other structuralists fail to consider the relevancy (or supremacy) of domestic-level variables and
how they may be able to offer a more nuanced explanation of why countries sometimes balance
against or bandwagon with a particular great power.
Although neorealism carries a high degree of parsimony, such an approach on its own does
not adequately account for the full range of state alignment options in the post-Cold War era. In
some studies, scholars have attempted to integrate domestic-level variables; however, in nearly
all cases they did not adequately capture the alignment tendencies of small states. For example,
Franklin Weinstein is highly critical of scholars, who focus on systemic factors. From his
perspective, greater emphasis should be given to small, transitioning states and how ruling elites
in these countries use foreign policy to advance their political agenda. In his words…
A focus on the uses of foreign policy makes it possible to develop a framework in which the
relationships among the [domestic] variables that determine policy are illuminated. Both
attitudinal and historical data can be incorporated within that framework to yield propositions
about the relation between foreign policy and the political and economic problems associated
with the state of underdevelopment.236

For Weinstein, political elites in developing states like Indonesia use foreign policy as a tool to
ensure the country’s independence, facilitate economic development, and maintain an upper
hand in domestic political affairs. A similar approach to alignment politics in the post-Soviet
space could help narrow the field of independent variables.
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Additionally, when one attempts to apply a purely systemic model of alignment to former
Soviet states, the theory at hand routinely does not convey. Furthermore, focusing just on
systemic conditions to explain state alignment is problematic because “foreign policy choices are
made by actual political leaders and elites, and so it is their perceptions of relative power that
matter, not simply relative quantities of physical resources or forces in being.”237 Similarly,
Michael Fortman and his colleagues find that regardless of the number of perceived great powers
in the system, the process by which balancing occurs is not mechanistic and that political elites
are the ones to set in motion this action. In their words...
“...decision makers intervene in several ways in the working of the balance of power mechanics.
They perceive (or not) a growing power differential, they define it (or not) as a threat, and they
chose to act on it (or abstain from doing so).238

There are two lessons observed here. First, future studies on state alignment should
incorporate variables that span different levels of analysis. By pursing a multi-level analytical
approach, one can potentially achieve a more complete explanation of why countries sometimes
balance against or bandwagon with a more powerful state. Additionally, such an approach can
help fill the gap in our knowledge about small state alignment. If power or threat on their own
can explain the alignment tendencies of some states, then integrating select domestic factors into
the equation may be able to potentially yield a more powerful elucidation of alignment in which
we come to understand why more states align with another state over another. Second, the
inability of previous theoretical models to convey to other cases may stem, in part, to case
selection bias. If a researcher selects cases based on the dependent variable, then the theory’s
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external validity will be significantly impaired. With this point in mind, Chapter Four conducts a
painstaking analysis of former Soviet state alignment in order to understand variation in this
political phenomenon and to identify optimal cases worthy of further research.
System Polarity is an Important, but not Necessarily Decisive Factor in Determining State
Alignment Outcomes. Without a doubt, the demise of the Soviet Union was perhaps one of the
most important systemic events of the 20th Century. Because this dissertation attempts to unravel
the puzzle of small state alignment in the post-Cold War era, considering the relevance of the
global power structure was a prudent step. But, just as scholars have disagreed over when and
how states will align with each other, there was also no clear scholarly consensus on how the
configuration of the global power structure may impact the alignment tendencies of small states.
The overarching conclusion from the discussion above is that while system polarity is an
important consideration, it is not the most important given the inherent problems associated with
defining, operationalizing, and measuring power. If the concept of power is indeterminate,
attempting to establish clear relationships between system polarity and various political
outcomes such as war, peace, alliance formation, and alignment is problematic for two reasons.
First, most studies give precedence to material factors (size of population, land area,
economic indicators, and military capabilities) as a way to determine whether a country is a
‘pole’ in the system or simply a secondary state. This creates another problem where scholars
may pick and choose from a menu of power-defining categories based on their specific research
interests. When this occurs, the findings from one study may not necessarily support or
adequately refute the results of another research project thereby preventing the timely
accumulation of knowledge. Schweller notes the challenges associated with material-based
calculations for system polarity where…
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This type of calculus is often misleading, especially when economic, military, and diplomatic
resources are not integrally related—when a state can achieve military power without economic
power, or economic and political power without military power, and so on.”239

A second reason relates to the arbitrary assignment of thresholds that differentiate what is, or
is not, a unipole, a great power, or a secondary state. What one study may define as a great
power, others may view the same country as a secondary state. Even if one follows Waltz’s
formula for defining a great power, there is no agreement as to how secondary states may differ
in terms of their actions in an anarchic system. Does Fiji respond to systemic factors in the same
way as Germany? Probably not. But certainly, one can argue that Germany is a regional great
power in Europe whereas Fiji is just simply another small country in the Pacific.
This does not mean that material power is not an important consideration. As noted above, a
state’s material power provides a basis for action in the political universe. With that, this study
recognizes the United States is the most powerful country in the world in military and economic
terms; however, there also exists a growing number of regional great powers that have the
capacity to meet or exceed U.S. material power in select geographical spaces around the world.
Because the U.S. continues to operate on a global scale, regional great powers routinely possess
a local area power advantage and escalation dominance in the event of a crisis. This is clearly the
case in Ukraine where Russia has a favorable balance of power over Ukraine and escalation
dominance over the United States.
Beyond U.S. power dispersion to hundreds of locations around the world, geographical
challenges (e.g. large oceans, rough terrain, improved anti-access/area denial capabilities, etc.)
can also erode U.S. power projection.240 Separately, political will, budgetary limitations, or
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public opinion may serve as constraints on the application of U.S. power. Given this reality, this
study concludes the contemporary international system is best characterized in a manner that
mirrors Schweller’s conceptualization of a “chandelier-type” construct comprised of “loosely
coupled, regional constellations.” In the end, while differences in each country’s material power
are important, they are not decisive in determining what a regional great power is or is not, its
impact on system stability, and the (re)actions of other states.
The Neglect of Small States. Working in the shadow of Waltz, scholars have exhibited a great
power bias in their research on state alignment giving little emphasis to small states. This
tendency to focus on top-tier powers stems, in part, from an assumption that only the most
powerful states are the primary shape agents in the international system owing to their economic
prowess, sizable populations, or large armies. For many of these scholars, small states lack the
material capabilities to have any meaningful impact on world politics. What is missed however,
is that in many cases, a small state’s geographical location, access to resources, and independent
actions can make it an important and relevant actor in the international system.
First, geography can elevate the strategic importance of a small state. For example, Panama,
Oman, Egypt, and Malaysia can exert some degree of control over the sea lines of
communications for the world’s supply of oil given the transit routes lay in close proximity to
their territorial waters. In Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus, many of Russia’s oil and
natural gas pipelines transit through several former Soviet states on their way to customers in
Western Europe.241 Second, some small states may have access to strategic natural resources that
are of high value to the great powers. For example, many small countries in Africa and Southeast
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Asia have access to rare earth minerals that are used by developed states for defense purposes or
to produce high-tech devices. Similarly, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan’s access and production of
oil and natural gas elevate the strategic importance of both countries.
Finally, the actions of a small state can also increase its relevance in international affairs. In
the UN, the ten non-permanent members of the Security Council are frequently filled by small
states, whose votes can sometimes steer the actions of this organization on a variety of issues. At
the regional level, a majority of NATO and EU members are small states, which have been given
an equal voice in the decisions made by each organization. Christo Kassimeris provides a strong
rationale for more closely examining the role of small states in international relations.
In an ever-globalized international community, the role of small powers has been magnified to an
extent where their number along may come to signify powerful coalitions capable of resisting and
even curbing the influence of what are traditionally perceived as larger powers.242

While some scholars have heeded Kassimeris’ call, others have not focused their examination on
former Soviet states. This reality represents a gap in the literature that this study seeks to fill.
Viewing Bandwagoning as Just a Negative State Endeavour. The preceding literature review
also highlighted how there is a lack of scholarly agreement as to which alignment tendency (hard
balancing, bandwagoning, soft balancing, etc.) states will pursue under differing system and
domestic-level conditions. If scholars are at odds with one another over which alignment strategy
states will pursue, they are in agreement that bandwagoning behavior is best viewed as a
negative endeavor. In nearly all cases, scholars define bandwagoning as a form of appeasement,
kowtowing, or ceding autonomy in exchange for long-term survival. Additionally, it appears that
in most instances, support for state bandwagoning is derived from examples immediately prior
to, during or just after the international system experienced a great power conflict.
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Schweller’s reference to wave of the future bandwagoning represents one notable exception
to this scholarly trend. Another positive with Schweller’s approach is how he supports his
assertions with examples from the Cold War when the system was characterized by great power
competition. While Schweller grounded his argument in ideological considerations, his approach
represents an opportunity from which this study seeks to build upon in the next chapter.
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Giants still walk the earth. International relations cannot be understood if the role of the
individual is ignored – Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, 2001.243

CHAPTER THREE – THEORY

Introduction
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the establishment of 15 newly-independent
states was arguably one of the most significant events of the late 20th century. As the ‘Iron
Curtain’ closed, gone were the days when Soviet republics received and directly implemented
explicit foreign policy guidance from the Kremlin. In the post-Cold War era, political leaders in
the new republics now have the authority to individually direct interstate relations with some
former Soviet states reinforcing cooperative relations with Moscow, while others charting a new
course with countries in the West. The questions of when, why, and how former Soviet states
would attempt to align with one regional great power over another subsequently took on
increased importance with the emergence of a new round of strategic competition between
Russia and the U.S. for influence in the post-Soviet space.
As the preceding literature review demonstrated, the dominant theories on state alignment do
not, on their own, adequately explain small state alignment. At issue is their focus on the great
powers and a failure to account for the geostrategic realities in the post-Soviet space. These
shortcomings in the literature demands a fresh approach; one that begins, as Byman and Pollack
reminds us, with the political leaders charged with making the state’s foreign policy decisions.
To fill this gap in the literature, this study leverages the explanatory power of social identity
theory (SIT) and social categorization theory (SCT) as a way to develop a more nuanced

243

Byman and Pollack 2001, 145.

104

approach for small state alignment.244 This model is comprised of five conceptual components,
which include three primary independent variables, one intervening variable, and one dependent
variable. The dependent variable in this study is a small state’s alignment with a regional great
power. Small state alignment manifests itself in two distinct forms: positive bandwagoning and
great power bridging. The three primary independent variables are political elite ideas about the
state’s identity, his/her threat perceptions, and foreign policy orientation vis-à-vis different
regional great powers. Additionally, domestic politics conditions the ability of a political leader
to translate his/her alignment preferences into concrete foreign policy actions.
As a point of emphasis, each of the three primary independent variables will be examined
separately in different chapters of this dissertation. This is done for several reasons. First, with
respect to this study’s theoretical contribution, this approach illuminates the reality on how
multiple factors will simultaneously impact the alignment trajectories of former Soviet states.
Second, this model of small state alignment allows this study to advance several general
arguments. One. It is argued that to understand change and continuity in a small state’s
alignment with a regional great power, scholars must fixate on ideational factors, giving due
consideration to political elite ideas, perceptions, and how they may impact their material actions
in world affairs. While material factors like the balance of power or threat are important, political
leader ideas and perceptions about the nature of the external threat and the state’s purpose do the
heavy lifting in alignment politics. Two. Although ideational factors are important, alignment
politics is not “ideas all the way down.”245 Here, due consideration must be given to domestic
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and systemic-level conditions, with emphasis on the former. Specifically, just because a ruling
leader possesses a pre-established set of ideas and beliefs about aligning with a particular
regional great power, his/her ability to do so is influenced first and foremost by domestic
politics, which can constrain or enable a ruling government’s foreign policy orientation
potentially leading to a different alignment outcome.246
Separately, given the nature of the independent variables under examination, this study
recognizes how these factors may interact with one another and thus indirectly influence the
dependent variable. This potentiality is accounted for by comparing the findings from the
examination on the relationships between each of the three independent variables and the
dependent variable. The overarching purpose here is to establish a foundation for future research,
which cannot be adequately attended to in this research project owing to time, space, and scope.
This chapter is organized into three sections. Section one provides a baseline overview of
social identity theory and social categorization theory and their applicability to understanding
small state alignment. In section two, the independent and dependent variables are discussed, and
hypotheses presented. This section also includes a graphic depiction of this study’s
conceptualization of small state alignment, which was presented in Chapter One. Section three
offers a brief conclusion.
Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory
This dissertation draws on social identity theory (SIT) and self-categorization theory (SCT) to
explain political leader tendencies to align the state with one regional great power over another.
The basis of SIT and SCT is developed on a key assumption that an individual’s social identity is
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derived from his/her cognitive and motivational processes.247 As originally developed by Henry
Tajfel and Robert Turner in the late 1970’s and early 1980s, SIT posits that there exists three key
cognitive processes that allow an individual to associate or disassociate with an ‘in-group’ or
‘out-group’ respectively: social categorization, social identification, and social comparison.
Social categorization is the process by which an individual places ‘others’ into a series of
categories as a way to simplify the complex world and to structure social interactions. According
to Tajfel and Turner, “social categorizations are conceived as cognitive tools that segment,
classify, and order the social environment, and thus enable the individual to undertake many
forms of social action...They create and define the individual’s place in society.”248 For example,
the process of social categorization allows one to place himself/herself and others into different
groups based on language, dress, employment, or religion. A key point here is that the ‘self’ and
‘others’ can simultaneously hold descriptors that place them into more than one group.
Social identification is a second cognitive process where an individual more strongly
identifies with a particular in-group. In Tajfel’s words, social identification is “that part of an
individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group
(or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership.”249
A key point here is that the process of social identification can change over time owing to a
variety of different factors. Hogg and Abrams capture this point noting,
Categories come and go (prior to the mid-twentieth century there was not such occupational
category as ‘computer programmer’), their defining features alter (historical modifications of
stereotypes of North American Blacks), their relations with other categories change (inter-group
relations between the sexes), and so on.250
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Finally, based on the first two cognitive processes, an individual’s actions are derived from
the process of social comparison, which is guided by three premises. First, an individual must
have internalized his/her affiliation or membership with an in-group. Second, the environment in
which an individual resides must allow for a social comparison. Finally, an in-group will
compare themselves to only a finite number of out-groups based on what the in-group perceives
to be a relevant comparison. For example, an in-group may focus on education and gender but
not skin color or age. The ultimate goal in this process is “to maintain or achieve superiority over
an out-group on some dimensions.”251
SCT builds on many of the attributes of SIT but differs in that the focus transitions from
personal identity to a collective social identity. While SIT attempts to explain inter-group
discrimination based on the requirement for the development of a positive social identity, SCT
shifts the focus from a self-categorization at the individual level to a social identity level at the
group level. This allows one to explain higher order group behavior processes. According to
Michael Hogg and Deborah Terry, “...targets are no longer represented as unique individuals but,
rather, as embodiments of the relevant in-group prototype (cognitive representation of features
that describe and prescribe attributes of the group).”252 Put another way...
Personal identity refers to self-categories which define the individual as a unique person in terms
of his or her individual differences from other (in-group) persons. Social identity refers to social
categorizations of self and others, self-categories which define the individual in terms of his or
her shared similarities with members of certain social categories in contrast to other social
categories. Social identity refers to the social categorical self (e.g., “us” versus “them,” in-group
versus outgroup, us women, us men, etc.)253

This transition from the individual- to the collective-level subsequently gives greater
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specificity to the dynamics of group cohesion and in-group/out-group differentiation.
Furthermore, through the process of depersonalization, a group is then able to exhibit various
internal and external normative behaviors such as empathy, enmity, ethnocentrism, cooperation,
confrontation, inter and intra-group cohesion, etc.254 For example, one can argue that within the
Chinese Communist Party, there is a high degree of cohesion over security issues in the South
China Sea where the United States is viewed as the out-group because of its opposition to
Beijing’s territorial claims in the Spratly Islands. As a result, China often takes a more
confrontational approach to U.S. military actions in the region and its support for other regional
countries and their territorial claims in the South China Sea.
As a final point of emphasis, some SIT and SCT scholars have concluded individual and
group identities may vary over time for several reasons. First, social identities may vary based on
the salience of the select social categories that are in play at a particular moment in time for an
individual or group. At the individual level for example, William McGuire and his colleagues
find that children in a family with more siblings of the opposite sex are more likely to describe
themselves in gender terms, while minority children in a classroom view themselves based on
ethnicity.255 Second, the attributes of the members of a group and the social context in which
they reside can affect variation in social identities. According to Hogg and his colleagues,
“...social identity is highly dynamic: it is responsive, in both type and content, to intergroup
dimensions of immediate social comparative contexts.”256
As previously noted in this study’s literature review, Hemmer and Katzenstein have
Hogg and Terry note that depersonalization is defined as “...a change in self-conceptualization and the basis of
perception of others; it does not have the negative connotations of such terms as deindividuation or dehumanization;
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demonstrated the applicability of using SIT to understand state alignment and alliance formation.
In their study, SIT was applied to understand why the United States after World War II opted to
create a multi-lateral alliance in Western Europe and only bilateral arrangements with countries
in Asia. The centrality of pursing an ideational approach to unravel the ‘Gordian Knot’ of
alignment is made clear with their conclusion that, “...identification is the mechanism that helps
connect the construction of specific regional groupings in Europe and Asia to particular
institutional features—multilateral or bilateral—of particular military alliances.”257 Although
Hemmer and Katzenstein’s study focused on a regional great power in a top-down way, this
study argues that the same framework can be applied to small states in a bottom-up manner.
Leveraging key aspects of SIT and SCT offers several advantages. First, unlike a pure realist
approach that uses the state as the primary unit of analysis, a social identity approach allows one
to capture the impact of political elite ideas in order to develop an alternative accounting of state
interests that drive foreign policy outcomes. A social identity-based model is particularly useful
when it explains state foreign policies that are inconsistent with neorealist conceptions of state
action and how their activities are exogenously driven or determined. Second, when balance of
power between states remains constant, as is the case with Russia and the countries on its
geographical periphery, integrating elements of SIT and SCT into a multi-level model can help
explain different alignment outcomes. This is especially true when the internal composition of
ruling government shifts from one political group to another. It is on this last point that the next
section details the two primary alignment outcomes for small states in the post-Soviet space.
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Small State Alignment: A New Conceptual Framework
As just discussed in the previous chapter, Stephen Walt does well to call our attention, albeit
marginally, to the importance of considering ideational factors (e.g. aggressive intentions) to
understand alliance formation; however, much of Walt’s balance of threat theory is still based on
material considerations. As such, this study seeks to go beyond Walt’s model through the
introduction of a new conceptual framework to understand small state alignment. To accomplish
this task, this research project leverages the scholarly insights of Randall Schweller.
In his ground-breaking study on state alignment, Randall Schweller argued alignment is best
understood in terms of a positive endeavor where states bandwagon with a larger power not
because of power or threat, but for profit. Although Schweller does well to expand our
understanding of when and how one state attempts to align with another, his explication of the
bandwagoning tendency is highly underspecified. To garner increased fidelity on the meaning
and variation of the dependent variable (alignment), this study builds on select elements of
Schweller’s balance of interest theory as a way to articulate two new forms of state alignment:
positive bandwagoning and great power bridging. The explanatory variables leading to positive
bandwagoning or great power bridging are based on a political leader’s ideas about the state’s
identity, his/her threat perceptions of regional great powers, and his/her accompanying foreign
policy orientation as conditioned by domestic politics. (See Figure 1 on the next page).
A few points of emphasis are in order here. First, this study focuses on two new forms of
small state alignment for several reasons. First, the alignment theories presented in the previous
chapter are not relevant because they do not sufficiently explain the alignment patterns of those
states along Russia’s geographical periphery. At issue is how many alignment theories tend to
only focus on the great powers. Additionally, many of the major alignment theories give too
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much emphasis to material considerations over ideational factors. When ideational variables are
introduced, they are routinely underspecified. Finally, this study sees high value in a
dichotomous dependent variable as a way to discern alignment granularity in the context of the
real world. It is through this parsimonious operationalization of alignment that future research
can incrementally build a more complex conceptualization of this political phenomenon.
Figure 2: Small State Alignment
President’s Belief System

State
Identity

Alignment

Threat
Perceptions

• Positive Bandwagoning
• Great Power Bridging
Domestic
Politics

Foreign Policy
Orientation

Second, the primary focus of this dissertation, as depicted by the bold arrows in the figure
above, centers on the relationship between each of the three primary independent variables (state
identity, threat perceptions, and foreign policy orientation as conditioned by domestic politics)
and the dependent variable (alignment). The relationship between each of the three IVs and the
dependent variable will be presented in three standalone chapters. Additionally, this study also
examines how the three IVs may interact in a sequential manner (state identitythreat
perceptionsforeign policy orientation) and their indirect influence on the dependent variable.
Although a more detailed analysis of the interactions of the IVs is beyond the scope of this
research project, this comparative analysis will help orient future research on this topic.
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Third, this study recognizes the pervasiveness of domestic politics in nearly all aspects of the
state’s foreign policy processes. One can look to Ukraine to see how domestic politics can be a
reflection of a cultural divide affecting all three of the IVs in this study. Despite the omnipresent
nature of domestic politics in the state and society, its applicability in this study is confined to a
political leader’s foreign policy orientation for two reasons. First, the relevance of state identity
and threat perceptions in this study is considered in terms of their impact on a political leader’s
alignment preferences. However, a political leader’s foreign policy orientation is best understood
as his/her ideas about strategy and how to translate his/her alignment preferences into material
action. As such, of the three independent variables under examination, domestic politics would
be the most relevant to a political leader’s foreign policy orientation because it is at this point
like-minded and opposing political forces are the most active in enabling or constraining the
ability of a political leader to implement policies to realize his/her alignment preferences.
Second, capturing the relevance of domestic politics as it relates to a political leader’s ideas
about the state’s identity, his/her threat perceptions and corresponding alignment preferences is a
very challenging empirical endeavor. At issue is discerning the extent to which domestic politics
actually created a conflict in a political leader’s belief systems. That is, prior to any effort to
translate his/her preferences into action, it is unlikely one would be able to observe empirical
evidence on how domestic politics may have changed a political leader’s alignment preferences.
More realistically, researchers would be able to gauge the impact of domestic politics by
assessing the overt actions of different political groups prior to and after a political leader’s
efforts to transform his/her alignment preferences into material actions. The application of
domestic politics to a political leader’s foreign policy orientation appears to be the best course of
action for this study.

113

Positive Bandwagoning.
This study’s conception of positive bandwagoning builds on two important aspects of
Schweller’s balance of interest theory. First, small states are best viewed as actors operating in
the shadows of two or more powerful status quo and/or revisionist states that are engaging in a
strategic competition with one another; not a conflict. In this case, political leaders in small states
have time to act on their own to realize their primary long-term goals of security, economic
prosperity, and re-election; however, they cannot do it on their own because of material
deficiencies (e.g. lack of natural, technical know-how, large army, etc.) and/or internal
constraints (ineffective institutions, social instability, etc.). For example, in defense matters, a
small state “...cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely
fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so...”258
Robert Keohane also comes to a similar conclusion noting how in nearly all instances, small
states consider their position in the international system as unalterable, which drives them to seek
out external assistance.259 Given this reality, the shadow of the future energizes political leaders
in small states to pursue proactive foreign policies with larger powers that have the capacity to
provide them the necessary political, economic, and military support to survive.
Second, unlike Schweller, this study posits bandwagoning should not be viewed exclusively
as a negative state action, where political leaders appease, give-in, kowtow, or give up a slice of
their political autonomy to achieve a greater good. In Schweller’s words “lambs [small states]
often bandwagon, as Walt implies, to divert and appease threats,”260 On the contrary, this
political phenomenon should also be viewed as a positive endeavor, where small states may
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engage in a series of cooperative military, diplomatic, and economic activities with a regional
great power to achieve what ruling political leaders believe to be in the best, long-term good of
the state or their political interests.261 This is what this dissertation calls positive bandwagoning.
To Schweller’s credit, he does advance a specific positive form of small state bandwagoning
referring to this activity as ‘wave of the future’ bandwagoning. However, positive
bandwagoning, as conceptualized in this study, differs from how Schweller views ‘wave of the
future’ bandwagoning, which he borrows from Larson’s work.262 Like ‘wave of the future’
bandwagoning, small states that follow a positive bandwagoning strategy do so voluntarily based
on the belief system of the lead actor in the foreign policy executive. Unlike ‘wave of the future’
bandwagoning, the inducements to pursue this strategy are different in two ways. First, positive
bandwagoning does not occur as a response to the latest ideological fad as was the case for some
small states during the 1950s and 60s to align with the Soviet Union and its model of
communism. Second, positive bandwagoning does not occur in response to the presence of a
charismatic leader. Schweller posits that it is because of this enigmatic leader’s use of
propaganda and messaging campaigns, small states are enticed to bandwagon.
Finally, and of particular significance, positive bandwagoning can occur even when there are
no guarantees a small state’s alignment with a regional great power will lead to the country’s
accession into a military alliance or regional economic grouping in the short- or mid-term. As
previously noted, most small states lack the economic capacity and military wherewithal to
independently act in a meaningful manner in the international system. In some cases, these
deficiencies have helped bring about instances of domestic instability that may manifest
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themselves in separatist movements or various forms of intrastate conflict. As a result, leading
political elites in small states realize these shortfalls will take time to remedy and that these
conditions may preclude them from following a shortened path into a formal economic grouping
or military alliance. However, if positive bandwagoning is consistently applied by multiple, likeminded ruling governments over time, these leaders believe those shortfalls will be overcome
thus setting conditions for the country’s entry into alliances led by a target regional great power.
Great Power Bridging.
A second alignment strategy available to small states is great power bridging. Political leaders
in a small state that pursue this strategy attempt to, on average, cooperate with two or more
regional great powers to the extent that such efforts do not cross a tipping point of membership
in a formal military alliance or economic union. When a small state follows a great power
bridging alignment ruling elites exhibit higher levels of verbal and material cooperation with
several regional great powers. Cooperation can occur across multiple lines of operation including
political/diplomatic, economic, and military activities designed to align the small state with both
regional great powers. It should be understood that a small state does not have to necessarily
cooperate with a regional great power along all three lines of engagement. For example, a small
state may eschew military cooperation focusing more on economic relations with both regional
great powers and vice-versa. Furthermore, the levels of verbal and material cooperation can
oscillate between both regional great powers over time.
Additionally, unlike positive bandwagoning, which has a higher potential for leading to
membership in a military alliance or economic bloc with a reginal great power, foreign policy
elites pursing this alignment strategy perceive binding economic or military commitments may
produce negative second- or third-order effects. For example, accession into a regional economic
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union could undermine lucrative trade relations with non-member countries. Separately, when
two regional great powers are engaged in a strategic competition, signing a defense pact with one
regional great power may elicit a political, economic, or military backlash from the other.
If the two major alignment outcomes for a small state are positive bandwagoning and great
power bridging, it now becomes necessary to discuss the three key factors leading to these two
political outcomes. Again, as a reminder, this research project dedicates a separate chapter to an
examination on the relationship of each of these three variables with the dependent variable.
Determinants of Small State Alignment.
The quintessential theoretical proposition in this research project is that ideas and beliefs of
the leading political figure in a state’s foreign policy executive are central to the study of small
state alignment in the post-Cold war era. Specifically, it is posited that the president’s ideas and
beliefs about the nature of the political universe are a reflection of his/her life-long political
experiences and expectations. It is these beliefs and expectations that subsequently play an
important role in establishing a foundation for his/her decision-making process and actions as
he/she leverages his/her influence inside the government to achieve his/her alignment preference.
Although a myriad of factors can directly or indirectly impact the state’s established foreign
policy decision making process, this study argues that to better understand the alignment
trajectories of small states, one must take a leader-centric approach grounded in the ideas and
beliefs of ruling elites. A leader-centric approach is warranted because government officials,
especially those occupying positions within the foreign policy executive are the vanguard
element responsible for developing and implementing foreign policies. These individuals
establish the country’s national interests and are charged with deciding when and how to use
state resources to realize a wide array of strategic objectives. According to Hans Morgenthau,
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political leaders “speak for it [the state], negotiate treaties in its name, define objectives, choose
the means of achieving them, and try to maintain, increase, and demonstrate power.”263
It is from this leader-centric approach one must focus on a political leader’s ideas and beliefs
about the nature of the political universe and the viable strategic approaches within it. Following
Goldstein and Keohane,
...ideas influence policy when the principled or causal beliefs they embody provide road maps
that increase actors’ clarity about goals or end-means relationships, when the affect outcomes of
strategic in which there is no unique equilibrium...264

However, the question at hand is which ideas matter the most? In this study, it is argued a
political leader’s ideas about the state’s identity, his/her threat perceptions, and foreign policy
orientation as conditioned by domestic politics are central to understanding the alignment
tendencies of states along Russia’s geographical periphery.
The selection of these three variables are based on the following rationale. First, this study
takes its lead from the constructivist assumption that state identity can be an important shape
agent for a political leader’s preferences and subsequent actions.265 Second, because “social
threats are constructed, not natural,”266 an argument can be made that a political leader’s affinity
for other states as defined by his/her ideas about the state’s identity can affect his/her threat
perceptions, which then impact his/her general foreign policy orientation and foreign policy
actions. Finally, these constructivist-based determinants take their cue from SIT and SCT, which
posit that groups with similar identities will tend to cooperate with one another more often than
those in an out-group.267
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Beyond the preceding rationale, a multi-faceted empirical probe using interviews and an
experiment helped validate the necessity to focus on these ideational variables over public
opinion, domestic politics, and the balance of power.268 See Appendix C for a detailed analysis
of the findings from this empirical probe. Furthermore, as was noted in the introductory section
of this chapter, this dissertation devotes a chapter each to an examination on the relationship of
these three independent variables with the dependent variable.
Ideas about State Identity.
The first determinant of alignment for countries occupying the post-Soviet space is the state’s
identity as defined by the leading actor in the ruling government’s FPE. As Jeffrey Mankoff
reminds us, “…[a state’s] international behavior is above all a function of [its] self-perception
and the identity constructed by their elites.”269 State identity is best understood as the public
articulation of ruling group’s ideas of the country’s purpose in international affairs.270 Political
elite ideas about the purpose of the state in world politics represent a quintessential touchstone
that lead members of the FPE to identify and prioritize the national interests of the country.271 It
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is from these national interests political elites develop foreign policies that define the state’s
actions in world affairs. The key takeaway here is that the actions of the state are first determined
by the decisions of those occupying the highest levels of a ruling government. The importance of
political elite ideas and national interests is a point not lost to Jutta Weldes, who notes,
State officials do not approach international politics with a blank slate on to which meanings are
written only as a result of interactions among other states. Instead, they approach international
politics with an already quite comprehensive and elaborate appreciation of the world, of the
international system and of the place of their state within it.272

Weldes’ sage insight subsequently becomes a foundational stone for this study’s focus on the
relevance of the state’s identity as constructed by leading figures in the foreign policy executive.
For this research effort, political elite ideas about the state’s identity rests on five key premises.
First, following Alexander Wendt, a state’s identity is socially constructed by political leaders,
especially those that occupy the highest positions in the ruling government (e.g. president, prime
minister, foreign minister).273 As the vanguard representatives of the state, ruling elites possess
the power within the bureaucratic apparatus to exert varying levels of influence on foreign policy
issues and outcomes.274 Second, state identities are social identities in that they are relational in
nature, containing references between the “self” and “others” in the international system. The
interaction of individual political elites in the FPE leads to the creation of a group with a shared
social (i.e. state) identity, which in turn allows them to delineate a boundary that differentiates
members from non-members. This state identity takes account of national values and
international status, which serve as a roadmap to guide political elite decisions on which external
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states to cooperate with on a particular foreign policy issue.275
Third, state identities have a discursive narrative structure that serves as a signaling
mechanism to internal and external actors on how ruling elites view various external threats and
the country’s purpose in world politics.276 This discursive narrative reflects the beliefs, attitudes,
values, norms, and perceptions of the leading political leaders in the ruling government. Each of
these five sub-elements warrant a brief synopsis.
Beliefs are perhaps the most important factor shaping political elite ideas. In this study,
beliefs are best understood as a political leader’s subjective interpretation of the strategic
environment.277 For example, Georgia’s prime minister may believe Russian military support for
separatists in South Ossetia is a major source of domestic instability in the country. Separately,
Ukraine’s president may believe Russia’s annexation of Crimea represents a threat to the
country’s sovereignty. However, Azeri presidents may not believe any of these actions are a
challenge to their established national interests. For simplicity, this study follows Alexander
George and his argument that there exists two primary dimensions to a political leader’s beliefs:
philosophical and instrumental. Philosophical beliefs focus on how political elites view world
politics, political conflict, and the nature of the international system. Instrumental beliefs focus
on strategy and how to achieve a particular end given available means.278
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Attitudes are those beliefs held by political leaders that have an evaluative component of the
strategic environment.279 For example, many Kremlin leaders retain a suspicious attitude toward
Western intentions in the post-Soviet space owing to their political and economic support for
non-governmental organizations. Values reflect a political leader’s ordering of material and
immaterial objects based on its utility, goodness, or social desirability.280 The president of
Estonia values increased economic cooperation with countries that have an open market system
over those with a closed economic system. Following Robert Jackson, norms are “a legal or
moral obligation or requirement or expectation, a standard of human conduct.”281 Finally,
perceptions are the publicly articulated verbal or written statements of a political leader’s beliefs,
attitudes, values, and norms.282
Fourth, in line with SIT and SCT, state identities are temporal and capable of changing in the
short term based on the strategic context.283 It is on this premise that this study slightly diverges
from the general constructivist notion that identities are “a relatively stable, role-specific
understandings and expectations about self.”284 On the contrary, this study acknowledges how
state identities are more malleable and subject to change over short periods of time. In this case,
ruling elites are in an optimal position to construct or manipulate a state’s identity by
strengthening or undermining existing “self-other” narratives based on changes in the domestic
and international realms. From Barnett, a state “identity is not a static concept but rather is
socially constructed, and that this social construction process can be used to good effect for
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understanding alliance dynamics and changes in security patterns.”285 Such an assertion has
merit, given how Karl Deutsch and his colleagues, in examining the formation of the NATO
alliance after World War II find, “large numbers of people changed their political outlook and
acquired new political loyalties in a very short time.”286 At a minimum, even if a political
leader’s ideas about the state’s identity does not vary, when he/she is removed from office, there
is a high probability that incoming leaders will have a different set of state identity narratives.
There is however, a lack of consensus among political scientists on identity formation with
many at odds over process and determinants. Some IR scholars emphasize systemic-level
conditions, while others focus on domestic-level factors.287 In contrast to these singular
arguments that place one level of analysis over another, I assert the necessity to consider both,
where ruling elite ideas are under near continuous influence from pressures from above and
below. From this supposition, it is plausible that system-level events or domestic conditions can
then serve as ‘shape agents’ for a political leader’s state identity discourse. Examples of events
and conditions include, but are not limited to, changes in the political leadership of foreign states,
interstate war, economic downturns, technology, and domestic political opposition.288
Fifth, political leaders may hold multiple identities about the state at the same time.289 In the
Middle East, some scholars have found that ruling elites have advanced a variety of different
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labels for the state such as Arab, Islamic, Palestinian, conservative, radical-Arabism, etc.290
Ronald Suny also notes that, “within limits elites can choose among the repertoire of available
identities and discourses to promote interethnic peace or exacerbate conflict.”291 For example, a
Ukrainian president may characterize the state as independent and Slavic with a command
oriented economy. After the next national election, the new president may articulate a state
identity narrative using the terms independent and European, with a market-oriented economy.
Given the preceding, state identity represents the chief variable from which to first understand
alignment politics in small states.
As conceptualized in this study, positive bandwagoning can occur when the heads of state in
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine view the state’s identity as being similar to either
the historical state identity narratives associated with the U.S. and Russia since the end of the
Cold War. Based on interviews with area specialists and online surveys, enduring state identity
narratives associated with the United States include, but are not limited to democratic, modern,
free, independent, and Western.292 With Russia, the state identity narratives of Presidents
Yeltsin, Putin, and Medvedev is somewhat of a contested concept where, according to one area
specialist, the “state is the nation...it’s imperial if you will.”293 Another factor in play is the sheer
size of the country. Despite these challenges, regional specialists assessed political elite state
identity narratives may include Russian, Slavic, Eastern, Eurasian, and independent.294
Based on SIT/SCT, we should then see political leaders exhibit higher levels of verbal
cooperation with a specific regional great that move the state’s strategic alignment in that
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direction. Here, ideology is not the only element of consideration as political, economic, and
cultural factors are taken into account as well. This is an important theoretical point, where
different political leaders may conceptualize the state’s identity in different ways giving
emphasis to one or more facets, which then become the basis of the state’s alignment. Political
leaders following a positive bandwagoning alignment have as a long-term goal, formal
membership in a military alliance or economic bloc that the target regional great power is
directly or indirectly associated with. Alternatively, as state identities diverge or overlap with
multiple great powers, a small state is more apt to align with more than one regional great power.
The underlying logic here is that ruling elites can simultaneously hold multiple conceptions of
the state’s identity. When these narratives cross-cut more than one regional great power, there is
an increased possibility the small state will follow a great power bridging alignment. This leads
to the following hypotheses:
H1a: Presidents in small states prefer a positive bandwagoning alignment with a regional
great power with a similar state identity.
H1b: When state identities diverge or overlap, presidents in a small state prefer a great power
bridging alignment with multiple regional great powers.
Ideas about Threats.
If political elite ideas about the state’s identity can help us to understand alignment outcomes,
it becomes necessary to articulate how other ideas may exert a similar influence on the alignment
policies of a small state with a particular regional great power. Moving from state identity, a
political leader’s ideas about threats emanating from the strategic environment is another key
factor shaping alignment outcomes for small states in the post-Cold War era.
The merits for an analysis of a political leader’s threat perceptions originate with the seminal
work of Robert Jervis, who demonstrated the validity of examining leader perceptions and threat
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images as a way to explain foreign policy decisions. A key finding advanced by Jervis is that
individual decision makers holding the same perceptions about actors in the political world will
frequently act in a similar manner.295 Following Jervis and building on the work of David Singer,
Raymond Cohen also finds an actor’s threat perceptions is an instrumental variable shaping
political outcomes. Of particular relevance, Cohen identifies a series of background factors that
may contribute to an individual’s threat perceptions of other actors in the system. These include
previous interstate relations and historical experiences, the balance of national capabilities across
all elements of power (diplomatic, information, military, etc.), and international institutional
arrangements (i.e. international laws and norms).296
Given the central role of a political leader’s threat perceptions in shaping the state’s alignment
trajectory, it may also be useful at this point to elaborate on the concept of national security to
garner a better understanding of alignment politics. The starting point for this elaboration begins
with how scholars have defined threats to the state. Neorealists like Waltz, Walt, and
Mearsheimer typically define threats in two ways. First, threats are systemic in nature, emanating
from outside the state, frequently from a more powerful or threatening country. Second, the
threat is characterized in military terms based on an analysis of the ratio of combat forces and
weapons systems, or a state’s intentions to use armed force against other states.
This conceptualization of a national security based on military threats alone is problematic
because it does not account for non-military challenges. Arnold Wolfers was one of the several
early scholars in the post-World War II era to challenge how national security should be viewed
in a more expansive way stating,
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… together with the extent of the external threats, numerous domestic factors such as national
character, tradition, preferences and prejudices will influence the level of security which a nation
chooses to make its target.297

Following Wolfers, other scholars have argued the necessity for expanding our conceptualization
of security to include non-military threats such as the environment, drugs, or poverty to name a
few.298 The underlying rationale for considering these non-military threats is that they can
equally create unstable domestic and international conditions, which could then topple a ruling
government or bring harm to the citizens of a country.
There is, however, some scholarly opposition to this line of thinking. Walt is particularly
critical of any scholarly endeavor to expand the concept of national security beyond military
threats. Although Walt accepts that there are certainly other dangers to the state, military threats
are frequently the most serious. Walt goes on to argue that conceptualizing threats to national
security beyond the military realm is foolhardy in that,
Such proposals remind us that nonmilitary issues deserve sustained attention from scholars and
policymakers, and that military power does not guarantee well-being. But this prescription runs
the risk of expanding" security studies" excessively; by this logic, issues such as pollution,
disease, child abuse, or economic recessions could all be viewed as threats to "security." Defining
the field in this way would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise
solutions to any of these important problems.299

On one hand, Walt’s point about conceptualizing threats to national security beyond military
dangers is valid to the extent that developing a laundry list of threats could undermine any
attempt to understand alignment politics. On the other hand, this dissertation posits any theory of
small state alignment that simply focuses on external military threats fails to capture how other
dangers may affect the strategic calculus of ruling elites in their development and
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implementation of foreign policies. For example, Stephen Brooks argues ruling leaders may
sometimes place economic considerations ahead of military power at least in the short term.
According to Brooks, when security competition in the international system is low, “rational
policymakers may trade off a degree of military preparedness if the potential net gains in
economic capacity are substantial relative to the probability of security losses.”300
The interconnectivity of economics and security demand that we take an accounting of both
in a leader’s perceptions of threats in the external environment where a ruling group’s threat
perception of other states can be based on a variety of different indicators. These indicators of
external pressure include belligerent foreign policy statements, energy blackmail, and instances
of military adventurism (e.g. troop deployments and exercises, intentional violations of a state’s
sovereign territory, or an armed attack).
Given the preceding, the theory advanced in this study considers a political leader’s threat
perceptions of the nearest regional great power as another important factor shaping the state’s
alignment. Following Walt, this study posits a political leader’s threat perceptions are an
important factor shaping foreign policy outcomes. But, because the focus of this study is
grounded in a leader-centric approach, one cannot assume all presidents will view a particular
threatening regional great power in the same way. For example, one president may perceive a
nearby regional great power is a high threat to the state’s security based on past or recent events.
Contrary to Walt’s prediction that small state’s will bandwagon with the most threatening
regional great power, this study predicts former Soviet states will attempt a positive
bandwagoning alignment with another regional great power. Such an alignment can occur even
when there are no guarantees that such actions may not lead to entry into a formal alliance with
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the target regional great power.
Separately, a president in a neighboring country may view the same regional great power in a
different light perceiving its past and/or current actions as a moderate threat to the state. As a
result, ruling elites may believe an alignment with this regional great power remains possible in
the short-term; however, they will also attempt align the state with other regional great powers as
a way to maximize political, economic, or military returns that benefit the country, the ruling
government, and/or individual elites. Finally, a different president may perceive the same nearby
regional great power as a low threat believing the actions of this regional great power do not
represent a clear and present (or future) danger to the state’s security. As a result, it is highly
plausible that a positive bandwagoning alignment with this state will occur. The preceding
discussion generates three hypotheses:
H2a. When a president in a small state perceives a nearby regional great power as a high
threat, he/she will prefer a positive bandwagoning with a different regional great power.
H2b. When a president in a small state perceives a nearby regional great power as a moderate
threat, a great power bridging alignment preference is more likely.
H2c. When a president in a small state perceives a nearby regional great power as a low
threat, a positive bandwagoning preference with that power is more likely.
Foreign Policy Orientation and Domestic Politics.
A core premise of the political psychology literature is that political elite perceptions, as
framed by his/her ideas and beliefs, shape the broad contours of the state’s national strategies
with foreign states across different ruling governments.301 For example, John Lewis Gaddis
argues the ideas and perceptions held by U.S. political leaders in different administrations during
the Cold War resulted in alternative strategies of containment.302 Although Gaddis, like other IR
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scholars, falls into the ‘great power bias trap,’ this study believes his analytical approach has
applicability to small states. As such, a third determinant of a small state’s alignment with a
regional great power is a political leader’s foreign policy orientation, which is best understood as
his/her ideas about strategy and policy vis-à-vis external states.
According to Joe D. Hagan, a ruling elite’s foreign policy orientation towards the
international system has the potential to vary based on his/her ranking of external state threats,
their perceptions of the intensity of those threats, and a set of strategies to counter these
threats.303 A political leader’s foreign policy orientation can manifest itself in three distinct ways:
cooperative, pragmatic, and confrontational. First, a political leader with a cooperative foreign
policy orientation does not regard a regional great power as fundamentally hostile or directly
threatening to the state’s national security. Cooperative ruling leaders tend to see a wide array of
important strategic issues in the international system that requires constructive engagement and
collaboration in order to find mutually beneficial resolutions. As a result, this leader may view a
particular regional great power in a positive light and will then attempt to develop and implement
a wide array of mutually beneficial foreign policies with this state.
A political leader with a pragmatic foreign policy orientation perceives a regional great power
to be a potential national security threat; however, this threat is manageable and does not require
immediate consideration. Pragmatic rulers generally maintain restrained foreign policies vis-àvis a regional great power since this country is viewed as having limited goals that are frequently
materially constrained thus making it difficult to exert excessive, consistent pressure. While
confrontation is still possible, because this regional great power does not pose an immediate
threat, pragmatic leaders have time to exercise diplomacy and engage in bargaining and mutually
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beneficial cooperation. Pragmatic elites often espouse positive or mixed verbal statements about
two or more regional great powers. Finally, these pragmatic political leaders routinely are able to
translate their levels of verbal cooperation with multiple great powers into foreign policies that
that place both regional great powers on the same level.
A political leader with a confrontational foreign policy orientation perceives a regional great
power to be inherently dangerous where strategic interactions are almost always a zero-sum
game. Political leaders with a confrontational foreign policy orientation believe a regional great
power is pursuing a set of strategic objectives that are (or will be) detrimental to the small state’s
long-term good. This confrontational approach is exacerbated by the fact the regional great
power has access to adequate material resources, political support, or public backing to realize its
goals. Under these conditions, ruling elites in a small state frequently use negative statements
about this regional great power as a threat to national security and regional stability.
While a president’s foreign policy orientation may be a catalyst moving a state to implement a
particular set of foreign policies with other actors in the international system, he/she does not
operate in a political vacuum that would allow him to translate his/her ideas about strategy into
action unhindered. With this point in mind, one must now ask: what are the major internal factors
affecting the ability of a ruling group to align with one regional great power over another? While
a plethora of internal factors such as public opinion, special interest groups, and the media can
constrain the ruling group’s public foreign policy actions, it becomes necessary to narrow the
range of potential variables. Although each domestic factor on its own may be a viable constraint
or enabler of state action, this study argues internal political opposition is the most important for
two reasons.304 First, since the FPE is but one component of the state’s bureaucratic apparatus,
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the first line of resistance to decisions from this element will likely occur from oppositionist
elements within the state’s bureaucracy. Second, in most instances, the elected representatives
offering opposition or support to the leaders in the FPE to some extent represent the views held
by various societal groups.
Separately, as noted above, this study recognizes how domestic politics can exert various
levels of influence on all three of the explanatory variables under examination. However, given
the structure of this study where state identity and threat perceptions help frame a political
leader’s alignment preferences and his/her foreign policy orientation represents a conduit for
translating those preferences into action, the relevance of domestic politics is more applicable to
the latter. The underlying logic here is that when ruling elites attempt to translate their alignment
preferences into action, it is at this point domestic politics become the most relevant since likeminded and competing political groups are more likely to demonstrate their support or
opposition for these leading political figures.
In this study, internal opposition is defined as the extent to which the chief executive is
politically able to implement and maintain his/her preferred set of alignment policies. Internal
opposition is comprised of two key elements: issue polarization and government fragmentation.
Issue polarization refers to the level of consensus within the ruling government on the lead
foreign policy executive’s ideas about an alignment with a particular regional great power.
Government fragmentation focuses on the characteristics of the state’s bureaucracy and whether
the power to implement strategy and policy is (de)centralized in the ruling government.305
Because ruling elites operate in a competitive domestic political environment comprised of
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groups with differing conceptions of the state’s foreign policy priorities, each of these groups
compete for position, power, and influence as a way to advance their own political agenda. When
a foreign policy issue such as security cooperation becomes a polarizing topic across the state
apparatus, the leading member in the FPE (e.g. the president) must form viable coalitions that
ensure his/her preferred national security and economic preferences are implemented and
sustained; however, this may become more challenging if the political system is fragmented or if
there are other vital national interests such as the economic well-being of the country are at risk.
A primary factor reinforcing or constraining political polarization is the structure of the
existing political system within a country. Recognizing the scholarly debate over the freedom of
action of ruling elites in different regimes, a premise advanced in this study is that regardless of
the type of the government (democracy, anocracy, or autocracy), all political leaders operate
under a set of structural constraints, which can influence the state’s foreign policies and
alignment trajectory with regional great powers. For example, Hagan finds that in a fragmented
government comprised of multiple autonomous political groups with various levels of power, the
ability of ruling elites to realize their preferences becomes difficult unless these leaders build a
political coalition without disenfranchising members from their political base.306
Beyond fragmentation, a variety of factors can intensify or temper polarization. For example,
second to security, a country’s economic standing is critically important. A variety of scholars
have noted the centrality of economic factors in government and the relations between domestic
political groups.307 On one hand, domestic economic prosperity can facilitate the stable
functioning of the state’s bureaucratic organizations thus allowing ruling elites to politicize the
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merits of their policies, while undermining the rhetoric of political opposition groups and the
potential for defectors. Under deteriorating economic conditions, political opposition groups gain
allies and the support of various societal elements (e.g. business groups) that allow them to exert
increased pressure on the ruling group to change an alignment trajectory. For example, Kevin
Narizny argues the involvement of domestic groups in the international economy determined
British preferences over alignment in the early first half of the 20th century. In his words…
When domestic groups with different alignment interests separate into opposing coalitions,
societal debates over international strategy will become polarized along party lines. Each side will
view “national interests” through the prism of its own economic interests, believing that what is
best for itself is best for the country as a whole.308

This leads me to advance the following hypotheses:
H3a: A president who retains an accommodative foreign policy orientation with a regional
great power is more likely to follow a positive bandwagoning with that target state.
H3b: A president who retains a pragmatic foreign policy orientation is more likely to
pursue a great power bridging alignment.
H3c: (Corollary): A confrontational foreign policy orientation with one regional great
power accelerates positive bandwagoning with a different regional great power.
H3d: Higher or lower levels of government fragmentation and issue polarization will
constrain or enable respectively a president’s preferred alignment strategy.
To recap, the preceding sections highlighted how a political leader’s ideas about the state’s
identity, his/her threat perceptions of external regional great powers, and his/her accompanying
foreign policy orientation as conditioned by domestic politics are the three primary variables
explaining small state alignment in the post-Soviet space. As noted in the introductory section of
this chapter, the primary focus of this dissertation is to examine the relationship between each of
these three factors and the dependent variable (alignment). To accomplish this task, this study
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will devote a separate chapter to each explanatory variable. By doing so will also help facilitate a
more holistic understanding of this political phenomenon and how one factor, on its own, cannot
adequately explain small state alignment in the post-Soviet space.
Accounting for the Indirect Influence of the Independent Variables
The preceding discussion and hypotheses represent a center of gravity for this study’s crossnational comparison on the relationship between a president’s ideas about the state’s identity,
his/her threat perceptions, and foreign policy orientation as conditioned by domestic politics.
However, it is plausible each of these three independent variables may also influence one another
and in doing so, convey an indirect influence on the dependent variable. Although beyond the
scope of this dissertation, a comparison of the findings on the direct influence of the three IVs on
the dependent variable should also be undertaken in order to orient future research.
As noted above, this study’s conceptual model noted how the three IVs may interact in a
sequential manner: state identitythreat perceptionsforeign policy orientation. The foundation
for this sequential relationship can again be derived from SIT and SCT. Here, how political
leaders identify which states as threats or as friendly cannot occur unless the “self” is set in
relation to “others” in the international system. A key point here is threat perceptions are
fundamentally relational in nature and that there exists a two-way process that through “the
identity/difference nexus” the ‘self’ is set apart from the ‘other.’309 An important corollary here
is that a political leader’s ideas about the state’s identity can, in itself, affect his/her threat
perceptions about different regional great powers. In this case, a shared sense of state-identity
can serve as a demarcation for the identification of a regional great power as a friend or foe. For
example, one could advance a general hypothesis that the more a ruling group perceives the state
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to be Pan-Islamic, the more antagonistic it may be towards Israel. Another general example is as
follows: the more a ruling group espouses a revisionist state identity the more competitive and
hostile it will be with status-quo states.
Subsequently, a political leader’s threat perceptions may also be a shape agent for this foreign
policy orientations with different regional great powers. In this case, a president who perceives a
regional great power as a low threat, may then exhibit a more accommodative foreign policy
orientation and a tendency for positive bandwagoning with this target state. Simultaneously,
when a president’s ideas about the state’s identity are not as similar with a particular regional
great power, there may be a tendency to view this state as more of a threat. When threat
perceptions of a particular regional great power increase, a pragmatic orientation and great power
bridging will follow. Finally, when a president’s threat perceptions become so high, he/she may
adopt a confrontational foreign policy orientation with that target country. This may then spur a
president to prefer a positive bandwagoning alignment with a different regional great power.
Conclusion.
This chapter detailed a new approach to understanding small state alignment in the post-Cold
War era. Leveraging aspects of SIT and SCT, this study posits that political leader ideas and their
belief systems represent a center of gravity driving a ruling government to align with one
regional great power over another. Specifically, a political leader’s ideas about the state’s
identity, his/her threat perceptions, and foreign policy orientation as conditioned by domestic
politics can independently impact the alignment trajectory of the state with different regional
great powers. Building on Schweller’s balance of interest theory, small state alignment can occur
in two ways: positive bandwagoning or great power bridging.
As detailed in the graphic depicting the conceptual framework above, this study narrows the
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scope of research to an in-depth examination of the relationship between each of the explanatory
variables (state identity, threat perceptions, and foreign policy orientation as conditioned by
domestic politics) and the dependent variable (alignment). These examinations represent the
main effort of this research project. Chapter Five will focus on the relationship between a
political leader’s ideas about state identity and his/her alignment preferences with the U.S. and
Russia. Chapter Six then delves into an examination of how a political leader’s threat perceptions
may influence his/her alignment preferences. Finally, in Chapter Seven as assessment between a
political leader’s foreign policy orientation, as conditioned by domestic politics is undertaken.
Separately, a superficial analysis of the findings from each of these investigations is made in
order to discern how the independent variables may sequentially interact with one another. Since
this assessment, while important, is of secondary importance in this study owing to time, space,
and scope, the findings of this endeavor are discussed in a separate section found in the
concluding chapter of this dissertation. As will be discussed there, the conclusions derived from
this effort can serve as a foundation for future research.
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“Treat your friend as if he will one day be your enemy, and your enemy as if he will one
day be your friend.” – Decimus Laberius, First Century B.C.310

CHAPTER FOUR – METHODS AND ANALYSIS

Introduction
This dissertation is a structured focused comparison that uses multiple methods to examine
the alignment tendencies of former Soviet states with the United States and Russian Federation
between 1995 and 2015. To better understand small state alignment in the post-Cold War era,
one must conduct a multi-level analysis, which begins with an examination of the ideas and
beliefs of the lead actor in the state’s foreign policy executive. Here, the locus of analysis centers
on a president’s conceptions about the state’s identity and his/her threat perceptions of different
regional great powers. While this examination provides insight into a president’s alignment
preferences, to more fully understand the state’s alignment trajectory, one must also consider a
president’s ideas about strategy and how domestic politics may condition the ability of the
president to translate his/her alignment preferences into action.
The purpose of this chapter is to detail the methods and the critically important preliminarily
analyses guiding this study. In the first section, the key terms used in this study are defined in
order to provide increased clarity on their usage. In section two, this study’s research design is
detailed. Specific topics include the qualitative and quantitative methods employed, the
operationalization of variables, measurement, and case selection. With regard to case selection,
to prevent selecting cases based on the dependent variable or other associated case-selection
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biases, this study applied a series of alignment indicators developed by Henry Teune and Sig
Synnestvedt to identify four outlier casesAzerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraineworthy
of a more in-depth investigation.
Definition of Key Terms
To adequately understand the alignment tendencies of small states requires a clear and
succinct set of definitions of the key terms associated with this study.
Small State. Various scholars have advanced several hierarchical schemes to differentiate
between great and small powers in the international system; however, most of these
classifications focus exclusively on material factors.311 Given this study’s emphasis on political
elite ideas, beliefs, and perceptions, a psychological dimension to differentiate a hierarchy of
states is warranted and not unprecedented given past scholarly efforts to do so.312 For simplicity,
this dissertation follows Robert Keohane by defining a small state as a “...state whose leaders
consider that it can never, acting alone or in a small group, make a significant impact on the
system.”313 From this conceptualization, small states are best understood as materially and/or
institutionally weak in nature lacking the necessary resources or knowledge to act in an
autonomously beneficial way in the international system.
Alliance versus Alignment. It is also very important to differentiate between the concepts of
alliance and alignment. Recalling Teune and Synnestvedt’s sage advice, “as a first step in
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developing a theory as to why countries are aligned, or establishing the factors pre-disposing
them to align, the concept of alignment must be clarified.”314 Because there are no universally
accepted definitions of alliance and alignment owing to their ambiguous nature, it becomes
extremely important to develop useful conceptualizations of these concepts to avoid theoretical
and methodological missteps. With these points in mind, this study conceptually defines
alignment as an informal or less-binding formal set of expectations between a small state and a
regional great power. This definition is grounded in Ward’s notion of how alignment is a broadbased endeavor that is reflective of the ruling elites’ beliefs and ideas about world politics.315
Unlike Modelski, who refers to alignment as an all-encompassing term that refers to all forms of
international cooperation, this definition narrows the phenomenon to three vitally critical areas
including political/diplomatic, economic, and military activities.
An alliance represents the cumulative alignment activities of a small state that results in its
accession into a formal security or economic bloc. When political leaders sign a formal
agreement, their act represents an unambiguous commitment to adhere to the protocols
governing member behavior in a military alliance or economic union. An alliance is thus defined
as a formal written agreement or treaty between two or more sovereign states to take some form
of military or economic-related action based on established protocols and provisions.
Foreign Policy Executive. This dissertation adopts Norrin Ripsman’s conception on the
existence of a foreign policy executive (FPE) inside the state’s bureaucratic apparatus. Following
his lead, a state’s FPE is defined as a decision-making unit comprised of the most senior political
and military members of the state. This decision-making unit resides within the ruling
government, which is subsequently defined as the set of mandated governmental organizations
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that have legal control over the policymaking entities of the state’s institutions. Individuals in the
FPE are responsible for developing, approving, and directing the implementation of the state’s
foreign policies with other states. Individuals in this group also have the de facto authority to
commit or withhold resources of the state as it relates to a particular foreign policy decision.
Individuals comprising the FPE may include the president, prime minister, national security
advisor, or the ministers of state and defense.316 In this study, the focus will be on the lead actor
in the FPE, which is the president.
State Identity. To understand change and continuity in the alignment patterns of small states,
this study advances an argument on the necessity to examine political elite ideas317 about the
state’s identity in world affairs. State identity is best understood as the public articulation of the
foreign policy executive’s ideas about the country’s purpose in international affairs.318 As a key
determinant of alignment, state identity serves as the primary point of departure from which to
understand the why political elites prefer to align with one regional great power over another.
For the purpose of this study, state identity is differentiated from national identity in several
ways; however, both overlap to some extent. First, from one perspective national identity is
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determined internally by societal actors, who share a sense of communal unity and distinctness
based on a historical myths, territory, language, norms, and religion.319 As Tsygankov notes,
“national identity is a cultural norm that reflects emotional or affective orientation of individuals
toward their nation and national political system.”320 Second, internal and external factors (i.e.
the strategic context) determine how a ruling government defines the state’s identity. Internally,
ruling elites can be a reflection of the shared national identity narratives that form the “imagined
community;”321 however, a state identity is also relational in nature where the state understands
itself in terms of purpose or function vis-à-vis the significant ‘others’ in the international system.
According to Dovile Jakniunaite, “[state] identities are not defined and supported one-way, just
by the self. How the other thinks about us influences our own identity constructions.”322 Given
the preceding, while there may be one national identity in most cases, ruling elites may
simultaneously hold several conceptions of the state’s identity in world affairs.
Threat Perceptions. If political elite ideas about the state’s identity can help us to understand
a political leader’s alignment preferences, it becomes necessary to articulate how these ideas
influence policy. Another key mechanism by which a political leader’s ideas may impact policy
is through his/her perceptions of the strategic environment.323 Building on Randall Schweller’s
work, I conceptually define threat perceptions as a political leader’s anticipation of military,
diplomatic, and/or economic harm from other states in the international system that pose a risk to
the security and economic well-being of the country, its citizens, and/or the ruling government.
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Political leader threat perceptions can be actual (e.g. armed attack), potential (e.g. coercive
diplomacy, the massing of military forces, etc.), or imagined (i.e. no valid empirical evidence to
support an objective assessment of the situation).324
Foreign Policy Orientation. Foreign policy orientation is defined as those beliefs held by
leading actors in the foreign policy executive about the optimal strategic approaches to achieve a
pre-determined set of strategic objectives or preferences with respect to other states in the
international system. In essence, a political leader’s foreign policy orientation is all about
strategy and how best to achieve a goal given available tangible (military capabilities, economic
capacities, etc.) and intangible (political will, public support, etc.) resources. Additionally,
political leaders are able to simultaneously hold multiple foreign policy orientations about
different states in the system. For example, a president may view a strategy of cooperation with
one regional great power but with another, confrontation is a more optimal approach.
The Research Design
The sections below detail the various facets of this project’s research design.
Unit of Analysis
The lead actor (e.g. the president) in the state’s foreign policy executive is the primary unit of
analysis for this project.325 As noted above, the foreign policy executive is comprised of a set of
senior political elites, who have the authority to develop and implement the state’s foreign
policies. The lead actor in this group, is assumed to have the most influence in the decisionmaking process to commit or withhold state resources to align with external powers. State-level
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factors (e.g. domestic politics) are also integrated into an analysis of the relationship between a
president’s foreign policy orientation and the state’s alignment trajectory.
Assumptions
This dissertation makes several key assumptions. First, foreign policy elites are rational
actors, who want to stay in office or move into positions of increased power. As such, this study
assumes the words spoken by a president are related to his/her ideas and beliefs about foreign
policies, and that these ideas and beliefs are subsequently linked to his/her actions.326 Second, the
head of state (e.g. president) is one of the most influential actor(s) in the FPE because he/she sets
the state’s foreign policy agenda and priorities. Third, although the head of state sets the foreign
policy agenda, other domestic political actors can exert varying levels of direct or indirect
influence on different foreign policy outcomes.
Fourth, this dissertation assumes the international system since the end of the Cold War is
best characterized as multipolar.327 Two reasons support this assumption. First, the five
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to include the United
States, Great Britain, France, China, and Russia still retained the ability via the ballot in the
United Nations (UN) to shape world affairs on a variety of issues. Second, countries such as
India, Pakistan, and North Korea have a nuclear weapons capability.328 This reality allows these
counties a marked advantage in shaping the actions of other states in a regional or global context.

Suedfeld, Peter, Karen Guttieri, and Philip E. Tetlock. 2003. “Assessing Integrative Complexity at a Distance:
Archival Analyses of Thinking and Decision Making.” In Jerrold M. Post (ed.) The Psychological Assessment of
Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press,
246-270.
327
I define a multipolar system as an international system comprised of three or more countries that either regard
themselves or are regarded by other states as being a regional center of power.
328
Margaret Gowing and Arnold Lorna argue that France and Great Britain acquired nuclear weapons after World
War II as a way to offset their loss of conventional military or economic prowess. See Gowing, Margaret, and Lorna
Arnold. 1974. Independence and Deterrence. Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952. Volume I. Policy Making.
Palgrave Macmillan.
326

144

Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques
This dissertation uses multiple methods to understand the alignment tendencies of political
leaders in small states since the end of the Cold War. Following Michael Coppedge’s sage
insight on the utility of multi-methods, one can potentially acquire a more holistic understanding
of complex political phenomena by combining qualitative and quantitative methods into a
research project. While small-n studies provide ‘thick’ (i.e. complex and/or multidimensional)
concepts and theories that produce in-depth description for making analytical inferences, they
routinely are not easily generalized to other cases. Separately, econometric techniques frequently
generate ‘thin’ (i.e. reductionist and/or simplistic) concepts and theories; however, they are wellsuited for testing hypotheses for a large number of cases and for making broad generalizations on
causation.329 When combined, a multi-method approach allows scholars to bridge the various
levels of analysis thereby providing a more comprehensive understanding of complex topics.
Qualitative Techniques. The qualitative component of this dissertation is best understood as a
longitudinal structured focused comparison that uses case studies and process-tracing to
understand a president’s alignment tendencies. Charles Ragin asserts scholars can use cross-case
comparisons to effectively examine complex conjunctural causation, where not one single factor
on its own is responsible for a political outcome.330 Additionally, because this dissertation does
not seek to create an all-encompassing, universal IR theory on small state alignment, a case study
approach is also appropriate. According to John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, “grand theories
such as realism or liberalism purport to explain broad patterns of state behavior, while so-called
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middle-range theories focus on more narrowly defined phenomena like economic sanctions,
coercion, and deterrence,”331 and in the case of this dissertation, alignment.
This dissertation also employs process-tracing, which allows for an in-depth examination of
the cases to explore the relationships between the independent and dependent variables. Again,
George and Bennett reminds us, “process-tracing can strengthen the comparison by helping to
assess whether differences other than those in the main variable of interest might account for the
differences in outcomes.”332 Furthermore, because this study seeks to understand change and
continuity in the alignment trajectories of former Soviet states, using process-tracing can reveal
why a small state may attempt to align with one regional great power at one particular time, but
then at a different time and under a different set of ruling elites align with a different regional
great power. Taken together, this qualitative technique is well suited for this dissertation because
it allows for an enhanced ability to determine the relevance of the factors affecting alignment
while bolstering the validity of the analytical conclusions.
Quantitative and Statistical Techniques. This dissertation also uses various quantitative and
statistical techniques as well as automated social analytical programs to better understand the
relationship between the independent and dependent variables. First, this study used the
MaxQDA software program to conduct an automated content analysis of each president’s state
identity narratives. To analyze a president’s belief system, Social Science Automation’s Profiler
Plus was used to code the Verb in Context System (VICS) indices of all presidents from 19952015. Profiler Plus is a computerized content analysis software program that allows academics to
identify the operational code of individuals by drawing inferences about his/her political beliefs
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from their verbal or written statements. There are several advantages to using MaxQDA and
Profiler Plus: expediency and efficiency. In terms of speed, these automated systems allow
scholars to quickly process a large number of a president’s speeches, interviews, or remarks.
Second, Profiler Plus boasts 100 percent coder reliability.333
This study also uses R to conduct analysis of variance (ANOVA) and Tukey’s Honest
Significant Difference (HSD) tests.334 A One-way ANOVA will be used to make some general
inferences about a president’s operational code indices. As will be discussed below, there is
value in using an operational code analysis of ruling elites as a way to establish a baseline
understanding of their various beliefs about world politics and the strategies to realize their
goals. In this study, ANOVA tests will only be applied when there are more than two presidential
groups to be compared. As such, ANOVA test will be used to determine whether there are
statistically significant differences in the operational codes for the three presidents in Georgia
and Moldova, as well as the four presidents in Ukraine. The independent variable in this Oneway ANOVA is a categorical variable: president. The dependent variable is the mean of each
president’s master philosophical (P-1) or master instrumental beliefs (I-1) while in office.
While a One-way ANOVA can let us know if there are statistically differences in the
operational codes of presidents, this test does not reveal where those differentiations exist. To
achieve this level of granularity, a Tukey’s HSD test is used as a post-hoc test to determine
which presidents are the most similar and different in their operational codes for the P-1 and I-1
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indices. Finally, descriptive statistics provided insight and perspective on various topics or
events.
Measurement
State Identity. To measure each president’s ideas about the state’s identity, this study used
the MaxQDA analytical software program.335 In this study, a conceptual analysis is employed to
understand the level of significance each president gave to a specific state identity concept. The
methods employed in this conceptual analysis follows the steps outlined by Kathleen Clary in her
1993 article “Coding Choices for Textual Analysis: A Comparison of Content Analysis and Map
Analysis.” The level of analysis is the single word in each president’s speeches, addresses, and
interviews for each year in office.
Based on input from area specialists and a review of the literature, state identity was
operationalized into 18 concepts under five general categories: political (independent, former
Soviet, freedom, liberty), ideological (democracy, liberal and communism), economic (market
and modern), cultural (European, Slavic, Western, Eastern, Eurasian), religious (Orthodox,
Christian, Islamic, secular). The scale of measurement employed for state identity is an ordinal
measurement. Specifically, this effort seeks to identify an order of magnitude for each of the
state identity concepts by tabulating the frequency these concepts appear in the speeches of each
president on an annual basis. Because the number of speeches will vary from year to year, the
by-year order of magnitude of each concept will be divided by the total number of words in all
the speeches for that year. Irrelevant words (e.g. ‘a,’ ‘and,’ ‘with,’ ‘the’, etc.) are not included in
the word count.336
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Threat Perceptions. Measuring a president’s threat perceptions can be a challenging and
complicated endeavor for many reasons. In many instances, a country’s head of state will never
consent to a request by an academic for an elite interview. Even if a researcher is granted access,
a high-level political figure may not disclose his/her true perceptions owing to political
sensitivities or his/her knowledge of classified information. Despite these challenges, various
research institutes like the Pew Research Center337 have used interviews with policy analysts and
polls as one way to measure an individual or groups’ ideas about the nature of various external
threats. This study mirrors such an effort by interviewing area specialists and regional experts to
garner their professional assessment of how each president in this study perceived the primary
external threats to the state’s security. Additionally, a content analysis of a president’s public
speeches helped derive empirical observations on how each president perceived the intensity of
these external, state-based threats. Where this study diverges from others is in the incorporation
of an operational code analysis for each president during his/her time in office. The rationale for
undertaking this step is explained in the paragraphs below.338
A president’s operational code will be used as a tool to establish a baseline of how each
president views the nature of world politics. Introduced by Nathan Leites and subsequently
enhanced by Alexander George and more recently reinvigorated by Mark Schafer and Stephen
Walker, an operational code analysis is one way to understand a political leader’s beliefs and

337

The Pew Research Center routinely uses poll data as a way to discern how various individuals perceived different
external threats to their country’s national security. For example, see Poushter, Jacob and Dorothy Manevich.
“Globally, People Point to ISIS and Climate Change as Leading Security Threats.” The Pew Research Center, 01
August 2017. http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/08/01/ globally-people-point-to-isis-and-climate-change-as-leadingsecurity-threats/. Accessed 02 September 2017.
338
Many thanks to Dr. Michael Young for all of his time, insight, and assistance with this part of my research
project. Dr. Young is an Assistant Professor at the University of Albany and President of Social Science
Automation, Inc. It is through his work and direct assistance on using the Profiler Plus program that I have come to
appreciate the value in integrating an operational code analysis of political leaders into any leader-centric scholarly
research effort.

149

their potential impact on foreign policy.339 Using an operational code analysis can reveal the kind
of president or prime minister in power, which in turn can directly or indirectly establish the
nature of the state’s actions in world politics. Of particular relevance is how this “at-distance”
method can illuminate the extent to which beliefs may “steer the decisions of leaders by shaping
the leaders’ perceptions of reality, acting as mechanisms of cognitive and motivated bias that
distort, block, and recast incoming information from the environment.”340 As a point of clarity, a
president’s operational code is by no means deterministic. Alexander George poignantly reminds
us that an operational code is best understood as a “set of guidelines-heuristical aids to decision,
that essentially frame’s a political leader’s bounded rationality.”341 Put another way, an
operational code analysis will not provide the necessary specificity on a president’s alignment
preferences with a specific regional great power. For this, a qualitative analysis will be utilized.
As an analytical touchstone, a political leader’s operational code is scaled along two master
indices: philosophical (denoted as P-1) and instrumental (denoted at I-1) beliefs. To establish a
baseline on a political leader’s beliefs about threats in the international system, the focus of
analysis centers on his/her philosophical beliefs (P-1), which detail his/her view of world
politics, political conflict, and the nature of the international system. A key assumption with the
master philosophical beliefs is that, “... beliefs about how others approach and pursue their goals
in the political universe define the nature of politics, political conflict, and the image of the
opponent for the leader.”342 While a president’s master philosophical beliefs are the main focus
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of this study, there are four other categories all related, in part, to the P-1 category: P-2:
Prospects for Realizing Fundamental Values; P-3: Predictability of the Political Universe; P-4:
Control Over Historical Development; P-5: Role of Chance. The category description,
measurement, and accompany questions related to a political leader’s philosophical beliefs are as
follows:343
P-1: The Nature of the Political Universe. This all-encompassing belief captures the political
leader’s views about the nature of the international system and its actors. The index for this belief
is a frequency ratio of a political leader’s positive and negative comments about other actors. The
value for this index varies between +1 to -1 (-1 = very hostile; -.50 = definitely hostile; -.25 =
somewhat hostile; 0.0 = mixed; +.25 = somewhat friendly; +.50 = definitely friendly; +.75 =
very friendly). Beliefs P-2 to P-5 are subsequently related to the master belief (P-1) Questions in
this category: What is the ‘essential’ nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially
one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents?
P-2: Prospects for Realizing Fundamental Values. This belief measures the manner in
which a political leader perceives the intensity of another actor’s actions in the international
system. Verbs in this category are first weighted (+3 to -3) based on an intensity value. This result
is divided by the total number of coded verbs, which gives an index that ranges from -1
(pessimistic) to +1 (optimistic). The scale used in this study is as follows: (-1 = very pessimistic; .50 = definitely pessimistic; -.25 = somewhat pessimistic; 0.0 = mixed; +.25 = somewhat
optimistic; +.50 = definitely optimistic; +.75 = very optimistic. Questions in this category are as
follows: What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental values and
aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects
the one and/or the other?
P-3: Predictability of the Political Universe. This index measures the extent to which
political elites view other actors as acting in a predictable manner. This index, which varies
between 0 (political leaders view the international system as less predictable; 0 to .50) to 1
(political leaders view the international system as more predictable; .51 to 1) is calculated using
the Index of Qualitative Variation (IQV). Questions include: Is the political future predictable? In
what sense and to what extent?
P-4: Control Over Historical Development. Taking account of verbal utterances about self
and others, this index reflects the extent to which political leaders view themselves as being in
control of the situation. This index is a frequency ratio of the instances of self-attributions to the
total instances of actions a political leader attributes to other actors. The scale for this index
ranges from 0 (political leader views control over the situation resides with others; 0 to .50) to 1
(political leader views he/she has more control; .51 to 1). Questions: How much ‘control’ or
‘mastery’ can one have over historical development? What is one’s role in ‘moving’ and
‘shaping’ history in the desired direction?
P-5: Role of Chance. The role of chance is related to P-3 and P-4 in that if a political actor
believes he/she has more control in a predictable system, then there is less chance in political
outcomes. This index varies from 0 (higher role for chance; 0 to .50) to 1 (less role for chance;
.51 to 1). Questions: What is the role of ‘chance’ in human affairs and in historical development?
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While an operational code analysis helps orient this study with respect to a president’s beliefs
about the political universe, it does little to help us understand how he/she views a specific state
actor. As a result, specific measures of a president’s threat perceptions are still needed. To
operationalize and measure this variable, area specialists and regional experts were asked to
categorize the intensity of each president’s threat perceptions of Russia and the United States?
Individuals were asked to categorize them as High (1)-the president perceives some form of
military and/or economic conflict is very likely during his/her time in office; moderate (2)-a
president perceives some form of military and/or economic conflict is somewhat likely; or low
(3)-a president perceives some form of military and/or economic conflict is very unlikely.
Foreign Policy Orientation and Domestic Politics. In the first section of this chapter, foreign
policy orientation was conceptually defined as a political leader’s beliefs about the optimal
strategic ways to achieve his/her foreign policy goals or preferences. To garner a more complete
understanding of a president’s foreign policy orientation, this study first uses an operational code
analysis to measure his/her instrumental beliefs. The outcome of this broad-based measurement
serves as a sounding board from which an analysis of the professional assessments of area
experts helps to operationalize a president’s foreign policy orientation into three categories:
accommodative, pragmatic, or confrontational.
Beginning with the operational code, this study measures a political leader’s instrumental
beliefs (I-1), which focus on strategy and the “ways” by which a president can achieve his/her
foreign policy goals given available means.344 While a president’s master instrumental beliefs are
the main focus, there are also four additional categories of instrumental beliefs related to the I-1
category: I-2: Intensity of Tactics; I-3: Risk Orientation; I-4: Importance of Timing of Action; I-
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5: Utility of Means. The category description, measurement, and accompany questions related to
a political leader’s instrumental beliefs are as follows:345
I-1: Direction of Strategy. This all-encompassing belief captures the political leader’s views
about the best courses of action to follow. This index is calculated in a similar manner as P-1;
however, an actor’s utterances are aggregated based on his comments about the self and the self’s
“in-group.” The value for this index varies between +1 (a political leader views a strategy of
cooperation has more utility) to -1 (a political leader views a strategy of confrontation has more
utility). The measure for this index are as follows: (-1 = very conflictual; -.50 = definitely
conflictual; -.25 = somewhat conflictual; 0.0 = mixed; +.25 = somewhat cooperative; +.50 =
definitely cooperative; +.75 = very cooperative). Beliefs I-2 to I-5 are subsequently related to the
master belief (I-1). Questions: What is the best approach for selecting goals for political action?
I-2: Intensity of Tactics. This belief accounts for an actor’s intensity level when pursuing a
course of action. Like P-2, verbs are first weighted (+3 to -3) based on an intensity value (punish
-3, threaten -2, oppose -1, support +1, promise +2, reward +3). This result is divided by the total
number of coded verbs, which gives an index ranging from -1 (political leader believes there is
more utility in hostile tactics; -1 to 0) to +1 (political leader believes there is more utility in
cooperative tactics; 0.1 to 1). Questions: How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?
I-3: Risk Orientation. This index measures the extent to which political elites are averse or
acceptant of risk in their actions. Using IQV again, this index examines the dispersion of a
political leader’s utterances across six verb categories. The underlying logic here is that a higher
diversity of action equates to lower risk because not all eggs are in one basket. This index varies
between 0 (political leaders are more risk averse; 0 to .5) to 1 (political leaders are more risk
acceptant; .51 to 1). Questions: How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled and
accepted? The measurement variable the following coding is used: 0 to .24=very risk averse; .25
to .49=somewhat risk averse; .50 to .74=somewhat risk acceptant; .75 to 1=very risk acceptant.
I-4: Importance of Timing of Action. This belief focuses on a political leader’s timing for
his actions. This belief encompasses two indices: the diversity of a leader’s choices with respect
to conflictual and cooperation actions and the diversity of a leader’s actions based on word/deed
distribution. The scale for this index ranges from 0 (lower diversity in cooperative and
conflictual tactics or lower diversity of tactics across words/deeds categories; 0 to .5) to 1 (higher
diversity in conflictual and cooperative tactics or higher diversity of tactics across words/deeds
categories; .51 to 1). Questions: What is the best ‘timing’ of action to advance one’s interests?
I-5: Utility of Means. This category takes account of a political leader’s beliefs about the
utility of different tactics that may be employed based on his’s political power. Using six indices
(punish, threaten, oppose, appeal, promise, reward), the value for this index is calculated for each
category as a percentage of the total coded verbs when the political leader is referring to
him/herself. Each index varies from 0 (less utility; 0 to .5) to 1 (more utility; .51 to 1) for each
category. Questions: What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interests?

A president’s foreign policy orientation is operationalized in three specific ways:
accommodative, confrontational, and pragmatic. The operational definitions are as follows: A
president with an accommodative foreign policy orientation views cooperation with a particular
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regional great power as the best approach to achieve his/her foreign policy goals. A political
leader with an accommodative foreign policy orientation does not view this regional great power
as fundamentally hostile or directly threatening to the state’s security. An accommodative leader
seeks to translate his/her verbal proclamations of engagement, cooperation, and support into
material action.
Presidents exhibiting a confrontational foreign policy orientation eschew cooperation with a
regional great power they view as a high threat. In some cases, a president may attempt to enact
foreign policies that actually increase tensions with the target state. Finally, a political leader
with a pragmatic foreign policy orientation views cooperation with multiple external powers as
the best approach to achieve his/her foreign policy goals. A political leader with a pragmatic
foreign policy orientation may view a regional great power as a moderate threat; however, this is
not enough to deter cooperation. As such, pragmatic leaders seek to translate their verbal
proclamations of engagement and cooperation into material action with multiple great powers.
To measure a president’s foreign policy orientation, this study analyzes the responses from area
specialists and other primary and secondary sources including the content from each president’s
foreign policy speeches and the published works of regional experts.
In line with Joe Hagan’s typology, this study operationalizes domestic politics into two
categories: government fragmentation and issue polarization. Government fragmentation
characterizes the locus of political power in the state’s apparatus while polarization refers to the
level of consensus among political elites on the president’s alignment preferences. To measure
government fragmentation, a numerical value (1 through 5) is assigned to each ruling
government. A score of ‘one’ indicates the government is not highly fragmented meaning a
president can more easily implement his/her alignment strategy. A score of two through five
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indicate increasing levels of fragmentation. The first category is a single-party government,
which is led by one dominate leader (value = 1). In this case, a single individual overshadows all
other leading political elites and their organization. In many cases, this dominate leader is able to
solidify his/her position and power because of the constitution, access to the state’s instruments
of coercion or his/her organizational skills, charisma, and political acumen.
The second category (value = 2) is a government fragmented by the existence of autonomous
political institutions and bureaucracies. A single political party controls the government;
however, decision-making authority is decentralized in separate institutions and bureaucratic
organizations. Although power is decentralized, leading political elites in the ruling political
party are still able to ensure a high degree of cohesiveness with no major internal factions
creating undue friction. As a result, the president’s foreign policies require some consensus
among relevant players and state organizations.
A government controlled by a single party, which is internally divided by established political
factions is a third category (value = 3). Although a single political party has a majority in the
executive and legislative branches, this group lacks adequate levels of cohesion owing to the
presence of multiple factions that have divided the party. These factions are in near-continuous
competition for control of key leadership positions or the state’s foreign policy agenda. These
factions routinely have divergent policy positions, which make consensus-building on foreign
policy issues a difficult endeavor for the president. As a result, the president may not be able to
implement consistently his/her preferred foreign policies over time.
The fourth category (value = 4) is characterized by a government ruled by a coalition of
autonomous political groups in which one political leader still has a clear predominance. Here,
power is decentralized across multiple political parties; however, there exists one individual, who
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can exercise a high degree of political power to mitigate fragmentation and increase cohesion
among other elites within the government. The fifth category (value = 5) is a government ruled
by a coalition in which there is no clear, single dominant leader. In this case, there exists at least
two political leaders (or parties) with equal authority that comprise a coalition in a ruling
government. Since no single leader or group has the capacity to exert the necessary leadership,
the ruling government becomes heavily fragmented making it extremely difficult for either of the
leading political figures to implement their preferred foreign policies.346
Issue polarization focuses on the level of consensus among leading political elites about the
president’s alignment preferences with the United States or Russia. An important facet of issue
polarization is the existence of politically powerful groups or leaders, who are either supportive
of or in opposition to a president’s alignment preferences. To measure issue polarization, three
values are assigned to the level of consensus among political elites: 1 = high consensus; 2 =
moderate consensus; 3 = low consensus. When there is a high consensus, a majority of ruing
elites see high value in the president’s actions. When there is moderate consensus, there is almost
equal support or opposition to the president’s alignment preferences. In this case, political
compromises allow the president to pursue his/her preferred alignment without eliciting a violent
or non-violent political and/or societal backlash. When there is a low consensus, the president’s
actions frequently are met with verbal opposition, which may delay or even prevent the
advancement of his/her preferred alignment strategy. Under these conditions, any effort by the
president to force his/her strategy forward could spur political and/or societal upheaval.
Alignment. In this study, alignment is a dichotomous variable that manifests itself in two
ways: positive bandwagoning and great power bridging. To accurately measure the dependent
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variable requires the establishment of conceptual and operational definitions of the concepts and
a unit of measure for each. As noted above, this study conceptually defines alignment as an
informal or less-binding formal set of expectations between a small state and a regional great
power. Operationally defined, positive bandwagoning occurs when the leading actor in the
state’s foreign policy executive consistently demonstrates higher levels of political, economic, or
military cooperation with one regional great power over another while in office. Alternatively,
great power bridging occurs when a head of state displays an almost equal level of political,
economic, or military cooperation with two regional great powers.
To measure alignment, this study uses the ICEWS event dataset and qualitative analyses for
each of the three independent variables. The coding scheme for ICEWS data follows the Conflict
and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO) ontology, which was originally developed by
Deborah J. Gerner, Philip A. Schrodt, Ömür Yilmaz, and Rajaa Abu-Jabr.347 This study follows
Schrodt’s version of CAMEO, which consists of 20 top-level categories of events. These 20
categories are aggregated into four groups: verbal cooperation, material cooperation, verbal
conflict, and material conflict. A brief summary of each category follows.
Verbal Cooperation. Events in this category capture the oral statements or remarks associated with a
political leader’s intentions to pursue cooperative, friendly relations with a target actor. CAMEO
categories for these events are as follows: Statement (01); Appeal (02); Express Intent to Cooperate
(03); Consult (04); Engage in Diplomatic Cooperation (05).
Material Cooperation. Events in this category capture the physical actions of allocating or receiving
tangible assistance such as humanitarian aid, farm equipment, reducing import bans, etc. CAMEO
categories for these events are as follows: Material Cooperation (06); Provide Aid (07); Yield (08);
Investigate (09).
Verbal Conflict. Events in this category capture the verbal statements or remarks associated with a
political leader’s intentions to pursue uncooperative or adversarial relations with a target actor.
CAMEO categories for these events are as follows: Demand (10); Disapprove (11); Reject (12);
Threaten (13); Protest (14).
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Material Conflict. Events in this category capture the physical actions of confrontation including
armed attacks, sabotage, target killings, etc. CAMEO categories for these events are as follows:
Exhibit Military Posture (15); Reduce Relations (16); Coerce (17); Assault (18); Fight (19); Engage
in Unconventional Mass Violence (20).348

To measure alignment preferences with respect to a president’s ideas about the state’s
identity, this study uses the verbal cooperation subset of the ICEWS event dataset. Specifically,
descriptive statistics are used to measure the frequency and intensity of a president’s level of
verbal cooperation with the U.S. and Russia. The intensity of an ICEWS event is measured on a
cooperation-conflict continuum that mirrors the Goldstein scale used in the WEIS dataset.349
This scale runs from +10 to -10 where positive numbers from zero upwards to 10 equate to
increasingly cooperative events while observations on the negative side equate to increasingly
conflictual events. To gauge a president’s general alignment, this study tabulated the frequency
and corresponding intensity of events to find the mean based on an annual basis. A president
who prefers positive bandwagoning will consistently demonstrate higher levels of verbal
cooperation with a target state. A president who prefers great power bridging in its alignment
trajectory will either apply the same level of cooperation to both regional great powers or
oscillate between the two for varying lengths of time.
To measure a president’s alignment preferences with respect to his/her threat perceptions this
study adds the verbal conflict subset of the ICEWS event dataset. To increase specificity to this
measurement, a qualitative analysis of each president’s foreign policy speeches is undertaken to
discern their specific ideas about the primary external state-based threats. President’s
consistently exhibiting higher levels of verbal conflict (and lower levels of verbal cooperation)
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with one regional great power are more likely to prefer a positive bandwagoning alignment with
a different regional great power. When a president’s level of verbal conflict (and cooperation)
oscillates between both regional great powers, he/she is more likely to prefer great power
bridging.
Finally, to measure alignment with respect to a president’s foreign policy orientation and the
conditioning factor of domestic politics, this study examines the frequency and intensity of the
president’s (and the state’s) material cooperation with the U.S. and Russia. To add specificity to
this measurement, a qualitative analysis is undertaken to discern the extent to which a president
was able to translate his/her alignment preferences (either positive bandwagoning or great power
bridging) into material actions.
Data. Data for this project was derived from a wide array of primary and secondary sources.
To understand elite ideas on the identity of the state, their respective threat perceptions, and the
influence of domestic politics, this study acquired primary data through field research using
semi-structured interviews with over 25 U.S. and foreign government officials, area specialists,
and policy experts.350 Although interviewees opted to remain anonymous, these individuals either
had direct access to the presidents under examination or had extensive time in the country. As
part of this data collection effort, this study leveraged the keen insight of Vincent Pouliot and his
recommendations on conducting interviews.351 As a result, interviews were fruitful because I was
able to “corroborate what has been established from other sources and establish what a set of
people think,”352 while avoiding researcher bias.
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This study also collected data from a scenario-based survey to understand the relevance of
ideational factors in the foreign policy process. As an empirical probe, this effort replicated the
work of David Rousseau to test the relationship between state identity, the balance of military
power, and threat perceptions. Using Survey Monkey, four hypothetical scenarios were randomly
disseminated to nearly 1,000 senior U.S. and foreign civilian and military officers assigned to the
U.S. Army War College. Specifically, these scenarios measured three dichotomous dimensions:
state identity (similar/dissimilar), balance of military power (favorable/ unfavorable), and
government type (democratic/authoritarian).353 Appendix A contains the four scenarios and
questions used in this experiment.
Next, this study reviewed over 6,000 presidential speeches, press interviews, and public
statements of the 12 Azeri, Georgian, Moldovan, and Ukrainian presidents from official
government websites and reputable foreign and domestic news outlets. After screening,
approximately 3,300 speeches were used. The by-country breakdown is as follows: Azerbaijan
(1,600); Georgia (850); Moldova (466); and Ukraine (450). Additionally, I derived data from the
following data sets: Alliance Treaty Obligation and Provisions (http://atop.rice.edu), Third-Party
Peacekeeping Missions Data Set (http://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/dadm-data-sets/),
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (for arms transfers), and the Militarized
Interstate Dispute, and Joint Military Exercises (http://vitodorazio.weebly.com/data.html) data
sets. This study also made extensive use of the Information Crisis Early Warning System
(ICEWS) (https://dataverse.harvard.edu/ dataverse/harvard?q=ICEWS) event data set, which was
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available from Harvard's Dataverse website. In total, this study used nearly 20,000 publicly and
non-publicly available events to measure the dependent variable.354
Finally, data was collected from a variety of different primary and secondary sources. These
included, but are not limited to scholarly journals, books, monographs, and analytical papers
from various government and non-government outlets. As part of this effort, the information
harvested from these sources were used to build upon established data sets or create new ones as
was the situation with this study’s rigorous process on case selection.
Limitations
Every research project carries a set of inherent limitations. This study is no different. First,
there currently exists a deficit of available public speeches and interviews by leading members of
the foreign policy executive for the period 1991-1994 and during some periods, for select
presidents or interim presidents. To offset this limitation, this study primarily focused on a 20year period from 1995-2015. Additionally, in Moldova a dearth of public speeches and a lack of
area expert insight prevented a close examination of the alignment trajectories of President
Mircea Snegur and interim Presidents Mihai Ghimpu and Marian Lupu.
Second, although incorporating ideational considerations into a multi-level analysis on small
state alignment, this study carries several methodological and empirical challenges. First, the
concept of state identity is difficult to define and measure. According to Martha Finnemore and
Kathyrn Sinkkink,
The ongoing difficulty in identity research is that there is still no clear, agreed upon definition of
what we mean (and do not mean) by identity, how researchers can plausibly establish what state
identities are, or what range of prominent identities may exist in international politics at any
particular historical moment. Identity has become a catch-all term, helping to explain richly a
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wide variety of actions, but it does not yet permit us to suggest that states with particular types of
identities will act in particular ways.355

As a result, my conceptualization of state identity may carry a danger of false precision. To
offset this risk, this study uses elite interviews with area specialists and quantitative techniques to
garner the predominant state identity narratives for each ruling government.
Third, by using public speeches to determine a president’s ideas about state identity and their
perceptions of external threats, the validity of this study’s findings may be degraded if their
words do not reflect what they truly think. In many instances, political leaders may convey
public messages tailored for specific domestic or international audiences. Considering the target
audience can help offset this limitation. Fourth, by using secondary sources (e.g. media reports,
journal articles, etc.) it may be difficult to garner an in-depth understanding of a political leader’s
mindset if the data points are inaccurate or incomplete. Once again, interviews with area
specialists and policy experts may partially mitigate these limitations.
Fifth, while using event data is one way to increase the precision of measuring alignment, the
ICEWS scaling carries several inherent weaknesses. One. The captured event in the dataset may
not reflect all the major foreign policy actions related to the individual or state. Two, when
calculating the mean of a president’s level of verbal or material cooperation, highly violent
events may mask cooperative actions. For instance, the sum and mean of a short, but violent
three-day armed conflict between two countries could offset a series of cooperative (e.g. peace
negotiations) events for that week thereby producing a result of zero, which is the same value for
days when several neutral events were registered. Separately, it is also possible a small number
of violent events that produce a -10 score for example can offset a larger number of cooperative
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events thus skewing this study’s analysis and conclusions. Despite these potential pitfalls, this
measurement technique, coupled with the metrics from elite interviews and qualitative
assessments of the secondary literature is part of a new and innovative approach to understanding
alignment politics in the post-Soviet space.356
Finally, as an active duty U.S. Army intelligence officer, my ability to gain access and
interview foreign civilian and military leaders in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine
was highly constrained owing to various reasons. First given my career field, rank, and top-secret
security clearance, foreign government officials were routinely disinclined to meet with me to
discuss foreign policy issues associated with their government. Second, although this research
project responds directly to unclassified U.S. government research priorities, DA requirements
mandating interview questions with foreign nationals be made in their native language created
too much of a high cost for this research endeavor at this time.
Controls
This dissertation recognizes there are a plethora of factors potentially directly or indirectly
shaping the alignment preferences of political leaders in the states along Russia’s geographical
periphery. Because one cannot possibly account for each of the major factors in one study, this
research projects emplaces several controls on a variety of systemic and domestic considerations.
At the international level, this study holds constant how a president may attempt to align with
other regional great powers such as China, India, Germany, France, and Great Britain. At the
domestic level, public opinion, the influence of special interest groups, and the media are held in
check to more accurately consider the relationship between the key variables under examination.
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Alternative Explanations
From one perspective, the ideas advanced in this study about when and why a small state may
align with one regional great power over another are but trees in a forest of theories covering
alignment politics. Certainly, there are alternative explanations to the puzzle at hand. First, some
critics may view the current research endeavor as imprudent arguing the centrality of structuralist
approaches to explain small state alignment. Following Waltz, balance of power theorists may
argue power asymmetries are the primary drivers moving states to flock to a particular regional
great power. Proceeding on the assumption the U.S. is the most powerful state in the system,
these scholars expect small states to opt for positive bandwagoning with Russia.
A second plausible explanation of why small states may bandwagon with a particular regional
great power stems not from power imbalances but threat intentions. Recalling Walt’s central
proposition, a state’s alignment is based on four key variables: geographical proximity, aggregate
power, superior (offensive) military capabilities, and most importantly, the probability of future
conflict. Focusing on the fourth variable, balance of threat theorists may argue that because of
Moscow’s aggressive intentions against many of the former Soviet states since the end of the
Cold War, political leaders in the region will view Russia as the most threatening regional great
power. As a result, the threat emanating from the Kremlin is a key catalyst inducing positive
bandwagoning behavior with the United States.
Case Selection - Testing Realist Expectations
On one level, the post-Soviet space represents fertile ground for realists and their respective
theoretical propositions on small state alignment. Whether it is Waltz’s balance of power or
Walt’s balance of threat theory, realists expect former Soviet states should consistently
bandwagon with their former imperial center owing to power asymmetries or Moscow’s
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historical aggressive tendencies with countries on its geographical periphery. But do the
alignment tendencies of all former Soviet states conform to realist expectations? Are there any
outliers? If so, then these countries may qualify as potential cases for this study, which seeks an
ideational-based explanation for small state alignment. However, as has been made readily clear
over the years, the topic of case selection is perhaps one of the most challenging and contentious
facets of any research project. According to George and Bennett...
Case selection is arguably the most difficult step in developing a case study research design. It is
an opportunistic process of seeking the intersection between the extant cases that history provides
and the kind of cases and comparisons that are likely to best test or develop theories.357

In order to avoid the pitfalls associated with case selection (e.g. selecting cases based on the
dependent variable), this research project conducted an exhaustive analysis of the general
alignment tendencies of all the former Soviet states except Russia using a series of indicators
developed by Henry Teune and Sig Synnestvedt.358 Beyond case selection, this analytical
endeavor also helped sketch the broad alignment contours of former Soviet states from the early
1990s to 2015. Some of the findings from this effort were subsequently used in the substantive
chapters as a way to provide increased specificity on when and how a former Soviet state may
align with one regional great power over another.
Before proceeding, a review of Teune and Synnestvedt’s scholarly work on measuring
international alignments is in order. Writing in the 1960s, both were highly critical of academics
and practitioners, who attempted to explain state alignment without developing sound
operationalizations and measurements of this political phenomenon. In their words…
Alignment is crucial to the study of international relations. A nation’s alignment history is written
by individual scholars who evaluate the foreign policy decisions made in a country over some
specified period of years. Obviously, in the past the judgements of these scholars rested upon a
variety of factors. Yet the exact basis of judgement has never been clearly established.359
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Recognizing this methodological shortfall, Teune and Synnestvedt proposed 28 general
indicators to measure the strength of small state alignment with the Soviet Union or the United
States. These indicators include:
1. Signing a Military Commitment
2. Visits by heads of state
3. Important visitors other than heads of state
4. Protests or expulsions of diplomatic personnel
5. Diplomatic recognition of East Germany
6. Total recognition of controversial non-communist countries
7. Educational and cultural exchanges
8. U.S. or USSR military presence
9. Anti-U.S. or USSR riots
10. Number of U.S. government or communist bloc technicians
11. U.S. military aid
12. U.S. and USSR economic aid
13. Votes in the United Nations on the same side as the U.S. and USSR respectively
14. Non-military treaties and agreements with the U.S. and USSR
15. Percentage of unions affiliated with international groups other than the ICFTU or WFTU
16. Percentage of unions not affiliated with any international group
17. U.S. direct private investments
18. Total trade
19. Total trade with the U.S. and USSR
20. Total trade with OECD nations
21. Total trade with Soviet area nations
22. Professorial exchanges with U.S. and USSR
23. Student exchanges with U.S. and USSR
24. Books translated from English
25. Books translated from Russian
26. Radio broadcast hours from U.S. and USSR
27. U.S. propaganda expenditures
28. Air flights per week from U.S. and USSR
Teune and Synnestvedt subsequently refined their list through a validation process leveraging
the expertise of over 125 area specialists and IR generalists via a questionnaire. The findings
from this effort revealed the two most important indicators were military commitments (e.g.
consultation, defense treaty, etc.) and UN voting.360 Applying these two indicators to the 14
former Soviet states, realist theories on the surface appear validated with Azerbaijan, Estonia,

360

Teune and Synnestvedt 1965, 21.
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Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Turkmenistan, and Ukraine consistently aligning
against Russia.
Although all eight may merit an in-depth examination, simply applying two indicators to
understand when and why a small state aligns with one regional great power over another fails to
achieve a high level of precision on alignment variation and case selection this study seeks to
achieve. To garner increased fidelity, this study applies eight additional military (Participation in
Combined Military Exercises, Basing of Foreign Military Forces, Arms Sales), diplomatic
(Visits by Heads of State and Visits by other Country Leaders), and economic (Total Trade,
Bilateral Investment Treaties, and Tariffs) indicators to improve our understanding of alignment
variation and to better focus case selection. This second effort reveals four cases merit the most
attention: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.
Testing Realist Expectations on Alignment - Part 1
Military Commitments. Teune and Synnestvedt’s first indicator of alignment, which this
study defines as an alliance, is a small state’s willingness to sign a formal military commitment
with a regional great power. When political leaders sign a formal military commitment, they are
bound to act (or not act) in some capacity on matters of security as stipulated in the written
protocols. Military commitments include a neutrality pact, nonaggression pact, consultation
agreement, defensive pact, or an offensive pact.361 For example, NATO represents a defensive
pact where member states are bound by the principle of collective defense as detailed in Article 5

361

A neutrality pact obligates a state to not support the adversary of an ally during a war. A nonaggression pact is an
agreement between two or more states not to engage in the use of armed force against one another. A consultation
agreement directs states to communicate orally or in writing with each other during a crisis that could escalate into
armed conflict. A defensive pact requires members to provide active military support when another member is a
victim of an external armed attack. An offensive pact requires member states to provide active military support in all
other situations not related to an attack upon an ally. See Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2005. Alliance Treaty and Obligations
(ATOP) Codebook. Rice University, 3-12.
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of the treaty, where an attack on one country is considered an attack on all. When Article 5 is
invoked, member states are required to take act in some manner as was the case following the 11
September 2001 terror attacks in the United States.
By examining the number and type of military commitments former Soviet states have
become party to since the end of the Cold War may provide insight into how alignment may vary
in the post-Soviet space.362 A review of the data in Table 1 yields the following general
Table 1: Table
Total1:Number
of Military
Commitments
(1991-2015)
Total Number
of Military
Commitments
United States
Russia
Armenia
0
2
Azerbaijan
0
1
Belarus
0
2
Estonia
1
0
Georgia
0
1
Kazakhstan
0
3
Kyrgyzstan
0
3
Latvia
1
0
Lithuania
1
1
Moldova
0
1
Tajikistan
0
3
Turkmenistan
0
2
Ukraine
0
0
Uzbekistan
0
4

observations. First, on the surface, it appears
realist expectations are validated with 10 of 14
former Soviet states signing more military
commitments with Russia. To take this
observation at face value, however, is folly
because it does not consider temporal

Source: Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) database and Douglas Gibler’s International Military Alliances,

considerations of when each of these countries

1648-2008.

became a signatory to a military commitment and the longevity of these agreements. For
example, while Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan signed the CST in the early 1990s, only Armenia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are members today. In 1999, Azerbaijan and Georgia
decided not to renew their obligations under the CST. Uzbekistan followed suit but then rejoined
again in 2006 only to leave again in 2012. Additionally, although Latvia signed a non-aggression
pact with Russia in 1991, by 2004 Latvia, along with Estonia and Lithuania became NATO

362

Data for military commitments were collected from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP)
database and Douglas Gibler’s International Military Alliances, 1648-2008. Leeds, Brett Ashley, Jeffrey M. Ritter,
Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Andrew G. Long. 2002. Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 18151944. International Interactions 28: 237-260. http://atop.rice.edu. Accessed 05 August 2016; Gibler, Douglas M.
2008. International Military Alliances, 1648-2008. CQ Press.
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members. Furthermore Moldova, Ukraine, and Turkmenistan have never been party to either the
CST or the North Atlantic Treaty.
In an effort to acquire increased fidelity on the relevance of military commitments and to
identify outliers with respect to realist explanations of small state bandwagoning, this study
narrows the scope by considering former Soviet state participation in defensive pacts.
Specifically, if a former Soviet state was party to a formal military treaty with either the U.S. or
Russia for 11 or more years during the 21-year period 1995-2015, then that state is said to be
aligned with that regional great power. Using this criterion, there emerges eight outliers:
Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Turkmenistan, and Ukraine.363
United Nations Voting. The second most important indicator of alignment according to
Teune and Synnestvedt is a country’s voting tendencies in the United Nations. A country’s UN
voting record is, from one perspective, a reflection of a ruling government’s preferred foreign
policies. For decades, scholars have examined the voting tendencies of countries in the UN as
one way to understand foreign policy outcomes.364 The relevancy of focusing of UN votes is
captured by Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, who stated…
UN voting patterns provides Congress with a reliable, systematic basis for assessing the attitudes,
policies, and decisions of UN members. They provide reliable evidence of what has happened on
issues of importance [and] from this evidence, it is possible to make judgements about whose
values and views are harmonious with our own, whose policies are consistently opposed to ours,
and whose practices fall in between.365

363

From 1995-2015, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan were members of the CST for 21
years. The Baltic countries were NATO members for 12 years. Uzbekistan was a member of the CST for 12 years.
Azerbaijan and Georgia were members of the CST for six years. Moldova, Ukraine, and Turkmenistan were never a
member of NATO or CSTO.
364
See for example Hagan, Joe D. 1989. “Domestic Political Regime Changes in Third World Voting Realignments
and the United Nations, 1946 –84.” International Organization 43 (3); Kim, Soo Yeon and Bruce Russett. 1996.
“The New Politics of Voting Alignments and United Nations General Assembly.” International Organization 50
(4); Marin-Bosch, Miguel. 1987. “How Nations Vote in the General Assembly of the United Nations.” International
Organization 41 (4).
365
Kirkpatrick, Ambassador Jeane J. 1985. “Introductory Statement.” In Report to Congress on Voting Practices in
the United Nations, 20 May 1985. Washington: United States Department of State.
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In the past, some scholars have attempted to understand a state’s foreign policy behavior by
focusing on resolutions that were only unanimous or on key votes for U.S. interests.366 In this
study, maximizing the number of observations will help establish a more comprehensive
understanding of this alignment indicator. Specifically, every UN vote cast by the 14 former
Soviet state from 1992 to 2015 is considered. As such, a country is understood to align with
Russia or the U.S. if a strong majority (76
percent or higher) of their UN votes are in
line with either regional great power.367
Table 2 provides a summary of the
voting trends, by percent, of the newlyindependent states with the U.S. or Russia

TABLE Table
2: Total
Number
of UN
withwith
the the
U.S.U.S.
or Russia,
1992-2015
2: Total
Number
of Votes
UN Votes
or Russia
Votes With US / Percent
Votes With Russia / Percent
Armenia
79 / 8%
893 / 92%
Azerbaijan
71 / 7%
885 / 93%
Belarus
33 / 3%
998 / 97%
Estonia
304 / 29%
731 / 71%
Georgia
225 / 24%
702 / 76%
Kazakhstan
88 / 9%
933 / 91%
Kyrgyzstan
59 / 7%
759 / 93%
Latvia
310 / 30%
714 / 70%
Lithuania
300 / 29%
744 / 71%
Moldova
280 / 27%
740 / 73%
Tajikistan
46 / 6%
762 / 94%
Turkmenistan
34 / 6%
573 / 94%
Ukraine
223 / 22%
792 / 78%
Uzbekistan
50 / 7%
628 / 93%

from 1992 to 2015. Table 3 below

Source: Author's Analysis

provides a ‘by year’ breakdown of the actual number of times these countries voted in line with
each of the regional great powers.368 For this indicator, there were 12,956 observations where all
14 countries voted in a similar manner (yes, no, or abstain) with either the U.S. or Russia. In
total, newly-independent states cast the same vote as their former imperial center 10,950 times
(85 percent) as compared to only 2,106 votes with the U.S. (15 percent). Second, as noted in
Table 3, there was only one instance when a former Soviet state cast more similar votes with the

For studies focusing on unanimous votes see Rai, Kul B. 1980. “Foreign Aid in the U.N. General Assembly,
1967 – 1976.” Journal of Peace Research 3 (17), 589. Te-Yu Wang uses an ‘important issue’ approach to screen
voting. See Wang, Te-Yu. 1999. “US Foreign Aid and UN Voting: An Analysis of Important Issues.” International
Studies Quarterly 43 (1).
367
Because states in a similar geographical region may influence voting in the UN, stablishing the 76 percent
benchmark for an alignment with Russia was done so in order to increase the analytical precision of this indicator.
368
Data for UN voting was derived from votes levied by the 14 former Soviet states and recorded in the United
Nations Bibliographic Information System (UNBIS) database during each of the UN General Assembly sessions
from 1992 to 2015. In total, there were 1,649 resolutions during this time.
366
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United States; Georgia in 2011-2012 cast 16 votes on resolutions that were similar to the U.S.
and only 14 votes with Russia.
From these charts, several general observations can be derived. First, in line with realist
predictions that small states will bandwagon with a weaker great power, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan
overwhelmingly voted in line with the Russian Federation. The anomalies in this case include the
Baltics and Moldova. These countries tended to vote in line with the U.S. at a higher rate (27 to
30 percent) that than of the other former Soviet states.
TABLE
By Year
Voting
TendenciesofofFormer
Former Soviet
Table
3: By3:Year
Voting
Tendencies
SovietStates,
States1992-2015
92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98 98-99 99-00 00-01 01-02 02-03 03-04
US RS US RS US RS US RS US RS US RS US RS US RS US RS US RS US RS US RS
Armenia
5 12 2 28 2 21 1 26 2 30 2 32 4 29 4 35 5 41 5 39 4 44 1 46
Azerbaijan 3 26 2 19 4 18 3 21 4 29 3 36 3 30 5 32 4 37 2 40 0 46 0 45
Belarus
0 33 0 28 1 33 1 28 0 33 2 35 5 31 2 39 3 38 0 43 0 46 0 53
Estonia
4 31 3 27 4 26 5 22 11 21 12 25 9 28 11 27 13 26 12 26 12 38 11 36
Georgia
0 0
3 23 4 26 5 26 4 28 4 30 2 31 7 28 9 26 7 30 9 39 5 26
Kazakhstan 2 30 2 27 4 25 3 27 4 33 4 35 4 31 4 27 3 36 1 43 5 46 0 52
Kyrgyzstan 0 10 1 13 4 13 2 9 4 26 5 27 2 27 0 0 3 38 0 0 3 27 0 50
Latvia
4 32 4 26 6 23 7 16 10 25 12 26 9 25 11 26 13 26 12 27 10 35 11 36
Lithuania
4 33 4 28 6 21 6 25 12 22 12 26 9 27 11 28 13 28 12 28 11 36 13 34
Moldova
4 30 6 25 7 22 5 21 9 23 10 29 6 27 10 28 12 29 11 29 10 35 7 38
Tajikistan
2 13 1 11 2 26 2 12 2 16 1 21 2 19 2 37 3 20 0 0 3 30 0 47
Turkmenistan 0 9
0 15 2 15 0 3 0 0 1 11 2 8 2 12 2 10 0 15 0 15 0 43
Ukraine
4 32 1 23 4 30 1 28 5 30 5 34 4 28 4 33 8 32 7 35 7 39 4 44
Uzbekistan 0 0
0
0 3 21 4 7 9 16 6 4 2 14 4 13 3 9 0 0 2 19 0 20
TOTAL
32 291 29 293 53 320 45 271 76 332 79 371 63 355 77 365 94 396 69 355 76 495 52 570
US - United States; RS - Russia. The numbers in each row reflect the number of the same votes by year with Russia and the U.S.

04-05
US RS
3 50
1 51
0 50
15 39
9 40
1 50
6 44
17 34
15 38
9 43
1 47
0 43
6 47
0 39
83 615

05-06
US RS
8 45
7 48
8 47
20 36
18 35
8 48
7 48
20 38
19 39
18 34
7 49
5 35
15 43
6 43
166 588

06-07
US RS
2 62
2 58
0 71
16 50
16 52
4 64
1 65
17 49
17 48
18 45
2 61
0 45
17 51
0 61
112 782

07-08
US RS
2 53
1 53
0 57
16 47
12 44
1 56
0 57
16 47
16 46
14 46
0 52
0 40
14 44
0 48
92 690

08-09
US RS
4 51
2 53
1 58
16 42
15 43
4 56
2 56
16 43
16 43
14 47
2 52
3 38
17 38
1 55
113 675

09-10
US RS
6 41
3 42
1 48
20 29
18 31
5 45
2 45
19 30
20 30
19 30
2 42
1 37
19 29
1 41
136 520

10-11
US RS
2 44
1 52
1 52
18 38
15 38
3 47
2 42
18 36
18 38
16 39
1 43
1 40
16 38
1 46
113 593
S

11-12
12-13
13-14
14-15 TOTAL
US RS US RS US RS US RS
4 40 1 41 4 39 6 44
972
5 36 4 38 6 36 6 39
956
1 38 1 47 1 42 5 48 1031
22 26 16 33 18 25 20 33 1035
16 14 13 32 16 26 17 35
927
7 41 4 40 5 36 6 42 1021
3 40 3 42 4 37 5 43
818
22 26 16 31 18 26 20 33 1024
22 26 16 33 18 26 20 31 1044
22 26 16 34 18 26 19 34 1020
2 43 1 39 4 37 4 45
808
2 37 2 36 3 35 5 34
607
20 26 13 31 18 26 18 27 1015
1 44 1 43 3 41 3 44
678
149 463 107 520 136 458 154 532 12956
ource: United Nations Bibliographic Information System (UNBIS)

So, what else may explain the general tendency of these four states to note vote in line with
Russia? From one perspective, a country’s voting record in the UN is by default one expression
of a ruling government’s preferred foreign policies, which can be affected by a wide array of
domestic and systemic factors. For example, at the systems level some scholars have found trade
dependence or foreign aid affect a country’s UN voting coincidence with regional great powers.
Other scholars have noted how domestic politics and changes in the ruling government best
explain the voting tendencies of small states with larger powers.369 Separately, Arend Lijphart

For trade dependence and UN voting, see Armstrong, Adrienne. 1981. “The Political Consequences of Economic
Dependence.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 25 (3) and Richardson, Neil R., and Charles W. Kegley. 1980.
Trade Dependence and Foreign Policy Compliance. International Studies Quarterly 24 (2). For foreign aid and UN
voting, see Dreher, Axel, Peter Nunnenkamp, and Rainer Thiele. 2008. “Does U.S. Aid Buy U.N. General Assembly
Votes? A Disaggregated Analysis.” Public Choice 136 and Wang 1999. For political regimes and regime change,
see Moon, Bruce E. 1985. “Consensus or Compliance? Foreign Policy Change and External Dependence.”
International Organization 39 (2) and Hagan 1989.
369
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posits that “agreement in voting [and by extension, alignment] may be caused…by similar
attitudes”370 of political leaders, who are key figures in a country’s foreign policy executive.
The preceding points illuminate how analyzing military commitments and UN voting records
may provide a baseline to discern variation in the alignment tendencies of a small state with a
regional great power. Although this initial effort has uncovered eight possible cases worthy of
future research (Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Turkmenistan,
Ukraine and Uzbekistan), using just two major indicators may prevent the identification of the
most viable set of cases worthy of further research. This reality demands a more comprehensive
analysis using additional alignment indicators.
Testing Realist Expectations on Alignment – Part 2
To garner a more holistic understanding of variation in the alignment tendencies of all 14
former Soviet states, this study uses eight additional alignment indicators. The three military
indicators are participation in combined military exercises, arms sales, and the basing of foreign
military forces. The two additional diplomatic indicators are visits by heads of state and visits by
other key political leaders. Finally, in marked contrast to Teune and Synnestvedt, who did not
regard economic linkages as highly relevant, this study develops three new economic indicators
of alignment: total trade, foreign direct investment, and tariffs.
Participation in Combined Military Exercises. Aleksandr Vasilevich Suvorov, the famous
18th century Russian general, who supposedly never lost a battle during his career purportedly
built his success by abiding by the simple principle of “Tiazhelo v uchenii, legko v boiu,” which

Lijphart, Arend. 1963. “The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal.”
American Political Science Review 57 (4), 904.
370
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in English roughly means “train hard, fight easy.”371 Joint military exercises are but one way a
country’s armed forces can improve military readiness in the run-up to a planned or unforeseen
armed confrontation with another country. When military exercises take on a combined nature
with two or more countries participating, the concept of alignment begins to take on increased
clarity. Specifically, when military forces from different countries exercise together, we can
assume there is a distinct possibility the participants may fight together in a future conflict
against a common enemy or adversarial coalition.
To help ensure accuracy in this study’s assessment of this indicator, a combined military
exercise is defined as a strategic, operational, or tactical-level field or command post event
between select personnel, units, or organizations of the armed forces from two or more countries.
To discern state alignment for this indicator, this study examines the frequency (i.e. number of
exercise events on an annual basis) of all the combined military exercises between former Soviet
states and the United States and Russia for the period 1991-2015. As such, former Soviet
countries are considered to align with either Russia or the U.S. when the frequency of exercise
events is higher than the other.372

Norberg, Johan. 2015. Training to Fight: Russia’s Major Military Exercises 2011-2014. Swedish Ministry of
Defense, 11.
372
This study developed a new military excises data set by harvesting exercise events from a variety of existing and
new resources from Vito D’Orazio, a compendium study of military exercises by Fort Leavenworth’s Foreign
Military Studies Office, foreign and domestic media reports, foreign government announcements, and think tank
assessments. A special thanks to Vito D’Orazio, who was kind enough to email me his military exercise data set.
See D'Orazio, Vito. 2012. “Advancing Measurement of Foreign Policy Similarity.” APSA 2012 Annual Meeting
Paper. Also, special thanks to Matt Stein, whose work at FMSO was especially helpful. See Stein, Matthew. 2015.
“Compendium of Central Asian Military and Security Activity.” Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), Fort
Leavenworth, KS.
371
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As shown in Table 4, realist

Table 4:
Average
Number
of Military
Exercises
Per Year
Table
4: Average
Number
of Military
Exercises
Per(1993-2015)
Year
Country
United States
Russia
Difference
Armenia
0.88
1.52
0.64 (Russia)
Azerbaijan
1.28
0.28
1.0 (U.S.)
Belarus
0.28
2.2
1.92 (Russia)
Estonia
1.32
0.04
1.28 (U.S.)
Georgia
1.6
0.16
1.44 (U.S.)
Kazakhstan
2.52
1.48
1.04 (U.S.)
Kyrgyzstan
1.72
2.82
1.1 (Russia)
Latvia
1.16
0.04
1.12 (U.S)
Lithuania
1.44
0.08
1.36 (U.S.)
Moldova
0.96
0.2
.76 (U.S.)
Tajikistan
0.64
3.08
2.44 (Russia)
Turkmenistan
0.04
0.08
.04 (Russia)
Ukraine
1.88
0.84
1.04 (U.S.)
Uzbekistan
1.12
0.96
.16 (U.S)

expectations that former Soviet states
will bandwagon with Russia by
participating in more combined
military exercises hold for Armenia,
Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Turkmenistan. In marked contrast to

Source: Author's Analysis

realist expectations, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan and
the Baltic countries participated in more exercises with the United States. While one can derive
some general inferences from these figures, a closer examination of the exercise regimen of each
country for the period is warranted in order to understand how alignment may vary over time.
Beginning in Eastern Europe,
Chart 1: Belarus Military Exercises with the United States and Russia
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Chart 1 highlights how Belarus has
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with respect to military exercises.
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forces conducted 2.2 exercises

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

with Russia as compared to .28
exercises with the United States. From 1998-2015, Minsk participated in combined military
exercises with Russia and the United States in 1998-1999, 2001, 2006-2007, and 2012. For the
remaining years (2003-2005, 2008-2011, 2013-2015) Belarus and Russia conducted exercises
together. From 1993-1997 and in 2000, Minsk did not participate in any military exercises with
either the United States or Russia.
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In Moldova, the country

Chart 2: Moldova Military Exercises with the United States and Russia
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U.S. as compared to .20 exercises
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forces exercised with military units from the United States. It was only in 2001 did Chisinau
conduct military exercises with Russia. In 2004, 2011, and 2013 Moldova conducted combined
military exercises with both countries. For nine years (1991-1995, 1999-2000, 2008, and 2015),
Moldova did not participate in any military exercise with the United States or Russia.
Ukraine gave a 2-1 emphasis
to exercise participation with the

Chart 3: Ukraine Military Exercises with the United States and Russia
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United States (47 total exercises;
1.88 exercises/per year) over
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in Chart 3, for nine of the 20
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years (1995-1996, 2000, 2002, 2006-2009, and 2014), Kiev exercise with only the United States.
For the remaining years in which exercise activity occurred (1997-1999, 2001, 2003-2005, and
2010-2013), Ukraine trained with both regional great powers; however, during this time, there
were 21 exercises with Russia and 28 exercises with the United States. From 1991-1994 and in
2015, Ukraine did not participate in any military exercises with either regional great power.
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Turning to the South

Chart 4: Armenia Military Exercises with the United States and Russia
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average, participated in 1.52

2

Russia

Armenia (Chart 4) has, on

2015

with Russia (38 total) as compared to .88 exercises with the United States (22 total). There were
only four years (1999, 2001, 2003, 2015) in which Armenia exercised exclusively with Russia.
During 12 of the years (1998, 2004-2014), Yerevan participated in U.S. and Russian exercises.
For seven years (1993-1997, 2000, 2002) Armenia did not exercise with either country.
In Azerbaijan, Baku participated

Chart 5: Azerbaijan Military Exercises with the United States and Russia
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denotes that for 12 years (1999,
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2002-2004, 2006-2010, 2012-2014),
Azerbaijan exercised exclusively with the United States. For four years (1998, 2001, 2005,
2011), Azerbaijan exercised with both regional great powers. There was only one year (2015) in
which Azerbaijan only conducted military drills with Russia. This is an interesting finding since
Azerbaijan was a member of the CSTO from 1994-1999 where one would expect Baku to only
conduct military exercises with this military alliance. For eight years (1991-1997, 2000), Baku
did not exercise with either the United States or Russia.
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According to Chart 6, Georgian

Chart 6: Georgia Military Exercises with the United States and Russia
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years (1996-1997, 1999-2002, 2004, 2006-2014), Tbilisi participated in combined military
exercises with United States. The only year in which Georgia exercised with Russia and not the
United States was in 2003. In 1998 and 2005, Tbilisi conducted military exercises with both
countries. Georgia’s pattern of exercise participation is particularly interesting for two reasons.
First, despite being party to the CST from 1994-1999, Georgia exercised more heavily with the
United States during this time. Second, even though Georgia exhibited a proclivity to exercise
with the United States, in 2003 Georgia opted to exercise with only Russia.
In the Baltics, Estonian military

Chart 7: Estonia Military Exercises with the United States and Russia
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Estonia conducted combined military exercises with only the United States. In 2005, Tallinn
participated in one combined exercise with the United States and Russia. From 1991-1992 and
from 2006-2009, Estonia did not participate in any exercises with either regional great power.
As depicted in Chart 8 below, Latvia’s exercise preference is heavily skewed towards the
United States. During the period under examination, Riga opted to participate in military
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exercises with the United States

Chart 8: Latvia Military Exercises with the United States and Russia
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average); the same year in which the country’s armed forces also participated in a combined
military exercise with the United States. There were seven years (1991-1993, 2003, 2006, 2008,
and 2015) in which Latvia did not conduct any military exercises with either Russia or the
United States.
Following Latvia, Lithuania

Chart 9: Lithuania Military Exercises with the United States and Russia
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and from 2009 to 2014; a total of 17 years at a 25-year average of 1.44. In 2004 and 2005,
Vilnius conducted one combined exercise in each year with Russia (a .08 average) but had also
conducted exercises with the U.S. during this time. There were six years (1991-1993, 2003,
2008, and 2015) in which Lithuania did not conduct any military exercises with either of the
regional great powers.
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Turning to Central Asia, Astana’s record of a higher exercise tempo with the United States
over Russia is interesting, especially since Kazakhstan is a member of the CSTO. As Chart 10
reflects, this country participated

Chart 10: Kazakhstan Military Exercises with the United States and Russia
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States during 10 different years (1996-1997, 2002, 2006-2008, 2010-2012) while never once
participating in an exercise event where Russia was the leading regional power. Beginning in
1998, there were 11 years (1998-2001, 2003-2005, 2009, 2013-2015) in which Astana conducted
exercises with the U.S. and Russia. From 1991-1995, Kazakhstan did not participate in any
exercises with either country.
In examining

Chart 11: Kyrgyzstan Military Exercises with the United States and Russia
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with the United States. According to Chart 11, from 1998-2015 Kyrgyz troops conducted
separate exercises with military forces from Russia and the United States. For two years (19961997), Bishkek opted to participate in one military exercise in each year with the United States.
From 1991-1994, Kyrgyzstan did not participate in any exercises with either the U.S. or Russia.
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Examining Chart 12 below, Tajikistan initially demonstrated a proclivity to exercise with
Russia over the United States in 1994 and from 1999 to 2003. From 2004 onward, Dushanbe
took a more balance approach participating in combined military exercises with each country 11
of the 12 years. In 1994, 1999-2003, and in 2006 did Tajikistan gave precedence to exercising
with only Russia. This equates to an average of 3.08 and .64 exercises with Russia and the U.S.
Chart 12: Tajikistan Military Exercises with the United States and Russia
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track record in this category registering only two combined military exercises with Russia (2005
and 2007; a .08 average) and one with the United States in 1999 (a .04 average). For the
remaining 22 years, Ashgabat did not participate in any training events with either country.
Finally, in

Chart 13: Uzbekistan Military Exercises with the United States and Russia
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and 1.12 exercises with the United States in the post-Cold War era. As detailed in Chart 13,
Tashkent conducted one exercise with Russia in 1994, but then proceeded to participate in one,
two, and four exercises with the U.S. in from 1995-1997 respectively. In the period from 1998 to
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2004 (less 2002), Uzbekistan conducted exercises with both the United States (18 exercises) and
Russia (13 exercises). In 2002, Tashkent conducted four exercises with only the United States;
however, beginning in 2005 and ending in 2014, the country opted to participate in exercises
with only Russia (10 total exercises).
Basing of Foreign Military Forces. Another indicator of state alignment is the extent to
which former Soviet states have allowed the U.S. or Russia to station military forces on their
sovereign territory. The deployment of armed forces abroad can be again traced back to Ancient
Greece and the writings of Thucydides. During this time, Sparta and Athens deployed military
personnel, equipment, and supplies in a network of bases designed to defend civilian
populations, retain strategically important terrain, or ensure access to vital resources or key lines
of communication.373 In the 20th century, the Soviet Union and the United States made extensive
use of foreign military bases to project military power or maintain a high level of influence
around the world. Certainly, in many of the preceding examples, small states did not have a
choice; however, some ruling governments sought out the stationing of foreign forces as part of a
strategy to align with a particular regional great power.
Because foreign military bases carry with them political, economic, and security implications,
examining their placement in the post-Soviet space can potentially yield some additional insight
into a ruling government’s alignment preferences since the end of the Cold War. According to
Zdzislaw Lachowski, “observing changes in the way they [foreign military bases] are placed,
owned and used can provide many clues to the most significant trends of security evolution.”374
To this end, this study broadly defines a foreign military base as a permanent or semi-permanent
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physical structure located in another country whose primary purpose is to support military
operations and/or national security-related activities. This structure can be referred to as an
installation, camp, port, post, barracks, station, yard, center, compound, or facility. Although
some scholars have advanced several different typologies for characterizing a country’s foreign
military presence abroad, this definition is detailed enough to discern the extent to which former
Soviet republics have allowed the stationing of U.S. and/or Russian forces.375
With this definition in mind, this study examines the number of foreign military bases on the
sovereign soil of the 14 newly independent states from 1991-2015. The central assumption is that
former Soviet countries are considered to align with either Russia or the United States when
there are a greater number of foreign military bases from one country than the other. To
accomplish this task, this study employed a new data set of U.S. and Russian foreign military
bases for the 14 former Soviet states.376 Chart 14 provides a summary of the number of military
bases in each of the former Soviet states from 1995-2015.
Chart 14: U.S. and Russian Military Bases in Former Soviet States (1995-2015)
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The data in the chart above indicate that all newly-independent states consistently had a
higher number of foreign military bases from Russia than the United States. If these figures are
taken at face value, then one could conclude a strong majority of former Soviet states have
exhibited (or continue to exhibit) a strong alignment with Russia thereby validating realist
claims. This may be the case with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, and
Tajikistan, which have consistently allowed the stationing of Russian military forces and
facilities. In direct opposition to realist claims, the Baltic States and Uzbekistan early on avoided
the stationing of Russian personnel and facilities opting to immediately exert control over
established military bases and evict Russian military personnel. There also exists a mixed group
of states, which initially allowed Russian forces to operate within the boundaries of the country’s
sovereign territory, but then ejected themor attempted toowing to changes in the strategic
environment. Countries comprising this category include Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkmenistan,
and Ukraine.377 For the purposes of this study, it is the second and third group of countries that
require a closer examination to understand each country’s primary alignment trajectory.
Arms Purchases. The third military indicator of alignment is arms purchases. Specifically,
this study attempts to discern whether former Soviet states are buying more arms from either
Russia or the United States. The sale of military weapons, equipment, and supplies is an

377

In Azerbaijan, Russia rented the Gabala Radar Station until 2012. In 2013, the facilities at this location were
transferred to Azerbaijan and the equipment transported back to Russia. See Lachowski 2007, 46 and 57. In Georgia,
President Shevardnadze agreed to the stationing of Russian forces on Georgian territory in the early 1990s; however,
in 2005, Moscow and Tbilisi reached an agreement to close Russian bases at Akhalkalaki and Batumi by the end of
2007 following a statement by Georgian President Saakashvili that Georgia would not allow any foreign military
bases on its soil. See Kakachia, Kornely. 2008. “End of Russian military bases in Georgia: Social, Political and
Security Implications of Withdrawal.” Central Asia and the Caucasus 2 (50). In Turkmenistan, from 1992-1999,
Russian forces helped guard Turkmenistan’s border with Turkey and Iran. When Turkmenistan could conduct this
mission on their own, Russian forces left the country in 1999. See Library of Congress. 2007. “Country ProfileTurkmenistan.” https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/cs/profiles/Turkmenistan-new.pdf. Accessed 20 December 2016, 14. In
January 1992, Uzbekistan took control over all Soviet facilities and equipment in the country, less those strategic
forces under the CIS, which were quickly withdrawn. See Smith, Diane L. 1998. “Breaking Away from the Bear.”
U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 33-34.

183

important dimension of interstate relations. For political elites in small states, acquiring modern
military hardware from external powers can help ensure they are able to defend the country’s
sovereignty and remain in power. For the regional great powers of the world, arms sales
represent a tool of the state to accomplish a wide array of economic, diplomatic or security goals.
This study uses the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI’s) definition of
arms sales, which is best understood as the “sales of military goods and services to military
customers, including both sales for domestic procurement and sales for export.”378 To discern
alignment, this study assumes arms sales is a mutually beneficial endeavor. When interstate
cooperation rises, one may also assume a positive, non-statistical correlation with arms sales. As
such, a small state is said to align with one regional great power over another when the dollar
value of arms exceeds the other.
Chart 15 details the arms purchases of the 14 former Soviet states from the United States and
Russia from 1995-2015. An examination of the data yields the following general observations.
First, arms purchases by select former Soviet states from Russia consistently exceeded that of the
United States. For the period under examination, Russian arms purchases by all countries totaled
$4.93 billion as compared to the $1.76 billion from the United States. Second, former Soviet
states purchased more weapons and military equipment from Russia except for three countries;

Of note, SIPRI further defines military goods and services as resources “that are designed specifically for military
purposes and the technologies related to such goods and services. Military goods are military-specific equipment
and do not include general-purpose goods, such as oil, electricity, office computers, uniforms and boots. Military
services are also military-specific. They include technical services, such as information technology, maintenance,
repair and overhaul, and operational support; services related to the operation of the armed forces, such as
intelligence, training, logistics and facilities management; and armed security in conflict zones. They do not include
the peacetime provision of purely civilian services, such as health care, cleaning, catering and transportation, but
supply services to operationally deployed forces are included.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI). 2016. “Sources and Methods.” https://www.sipri.org/databases/armsindustry/sources-and-methods.
Accessed 03 December 2016, 2.
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Estonia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Third, on average Russia was the top arms provider to Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan.
Chart 15: Arms Purchases From the U.S. and Russia (in USD millions)
800
700
600
500
400
300
200

Azerbaijan

Belarus

Estonia

Georgia

Kazakhstan

Kyrgyzstan

Latvia

Lithuania

Moldova

Tajikistan

Turkmenistan

Ukraine

Uzbekistan

U.S.

U.S.

2014

Russia

U.S.

2013

Russia

U.S.

2012

Russia

U.S.

2011

Armenia

Russia

U.S.

2010

Russia

U.S.

2009

Russia

U.S.

2008

Russia

U.S.

2007

Russia

U.S.

2006

Russia

U.S.

2005

Russia

U.S.

2004

Russia

U.S.

2003

Russia

U.S.

2002

Russia

U.S.

2001

Russia

U.S.

2000

Russia

U.S.

1999

Russia

U.S.

1998

Russia

U.S.

1997

Russia

U.S.

1996

Russia

U.S.

1995

Russia

0

Russia

100

2015

Source: Author's Analysis

Given this reality and holding constant the assumption that arms purchases translate into
influence, then these countries should exhibit bandwagoning behavior with Russia. The
empirical world however does not support these propositions in total. While Armenia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan exhibit consistent bandwagoning behavior with Russia
by their participation in the CSTO, Turkmenistan never signed the CST, Azerbaijan left the
alliance in 1999, and Lithuania became part of NATO in 2004. Separately, with the U.S. serving
as the top arms provider to Estonia, Latvia, Georgia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, these countries
should have aligned with Washington; however, it was only Estonia and Latvia that aligned with
the United States in the years prior to their entry into the NATO alliance. Of note, Moldova was
the only country where neither the U.S. nor Russia sold arms according to SIPRI reporting.
Taken together, it appears realist propositions for this indicator have fallen short for several
reasons. First, it is often difficult to derive valid judgements on interstate relations based solely
on the transfer of arms from one state to another because not all actions are done in a transparent
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manner. Arms sales by the U.S. during the 1980s represents one of many examples of how great
powers pursue clandestine operations to achieve a political purpose.379 Second, arms sales do not
necessarily convey great power influence and a corresponding alignment of the smaller state. For
example, during the Cold War Soviet arms sales to Indonesia as well as Iraq, Syria, and Congo
did not result in these countries falling unequivocally into Moscow’s orbit.380 In the late 1970s,
Former Assistant Secretary of State Hodding Carter III emphasized this point noting, “what
nation has been brought permanently into the Soviet orbit because it could buy Soviet MiGs.”381
Similarly, the U.S. arms sales embargo on Turkey following its invasion of Cyprus created a
backlash resulting in the closure of American military bases in the country and a deterioration of
relations between Ankara and Washington.382 Taken together, one cannot definitively conclude a
decision by ruling elites in a small state to purchase military arms from a particular regional great
correlates with alignment. If some degree of alignment is observed, it may only be short in
duration since there exists a multitude of other countries willing to sell the same type of weapons
or equipment to a country so long as they pay.383
Head of State Visits. The foreign travels of a head of state represent another important
component of the ruling government’s ability to employ the diplomatic element of national
power on the world’s stage. While a visit from a head of state may serve a variety of political,
economic, or social purposes, frequently the overarching goal of these visits center on improving

Poindexter, John M. 1986. “Covert Action Finding Regarding Iran.” The White House. The National Security
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bilateral relations. Joel Krieger speaks to the importance of head of state visits to the United
States noting…
When a head of state visits the White House, it is often considered a major event. The flags of the
two countries are mounted at equal height, and a spirt of friendship reigns. Such meetings are
considered a time of conceding equality of nations, a time of recognition of the shared use of the
planet and a hope for better nation-to-nation relations in the future.384

Krieger’s notion that the meeting of two heads of state may serve as an opportunity for improved
state relations serves as another reference point for using this high-profile event as an indicator to
measure state alignment.
Defining a head of state visit can be a challenging endeavor because different states have
established different diplomatic protocols for various types of visits.385 In this dissertation, a
head of state visit can take on four different forms: state, official, working, and private. A state
visit occurs when a country’s head of state meets with the host country’s head of state at
locations in the capital city. An official visit occurs when a visiting head of state meets with
other members of the ruling government in the host country at locations in the capital city. A
working visit occurs when a head of state meets with the host country’s head of state in a less
formal albeit meeting environment anywhere in the country. Finally, a private meeting occurs
when a head of state meets with a host country’s head of state for unofficial reasons.
To understand how the number of head of state visits are potentially related to a state’s
alignment trajectory, this study examines the frequency of head of state visits from the 14 former
Soviet states on an annual basis to the United States and Russia for the period 1991-2015. When
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possible, presidential visits to a contested territorial area in another country are not counted as a
valid event. For example, presidential visits by Dmitry Medvedev or Vladimir Putin to Georgia’s
breakaway provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia are not counted because these areas are still
recognized by the international community as sovereign Georgian territory. As such, a country is
considered to be aligned with either Russia or the U.S. when the frequency of state visits is
higher than the other.
Table 5 details the total number of
head of state visits to the United States
and Russia from 1991 to 2015. An
examination of the table indicates a
majority (10 of 14) of the head of states
in the former Soviet states visited

Table 5: Head of State Visits to the U.S. and Russia (1991-2015)
Visits to US US Average Visits to Russia Russia Average
Kazakhstan
16
0.64
78
3.12
Belarus
3
0.12
76
3.04
Armenia
14
0.56
71
2.84
Ukraine
26
1.04
65
2.6
Kyrgyzstan
7
0.28
56
2.24
Tajikistan
18
0.72
46
1.84
Uzbekistan
7
0.28
39
1.56
Azerbaijan
11
0.44
35
1.4
Moldova
12
0.48
37
1.48
Turkmenistan
6
0.24
30
1.2
Georgia
27
1.08
27
1.08
Lithuania
30
1.2
10
0.4
Latvia
30
1.2
6
0.24
Estonia
27
1.98
2
0.08

Russia more frequently than the United

Source: Author's Analysis

States.386 The four outliers in this indicator are the Baltics, which made more trips to the United
States during this time and Georgia, which made an equal number of visits to each country. For
the ten countries making more trips to Russia, Kazakhstan tops the list with an average of 3.12
visits per year (78 total visits) while Turkmenistan made 1.2 visits (30 total visits). During this
25-year period, those states making more visits to Russia made less than one visit to the United
states ranging from .12 visits/year (Belarus) to .72 (Tajikistan). The only exception here is
Ukraine, which made 1.04 visits (26 total visits) to the U.S. during this time.
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This study created a new data on head of state visits to the United States and Russia by using a wide array of
primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include the official websites of the President of Russia and the U.S.
State Department’s Office of the Historian as well as the homepages for various Ministries of Foreign Affairs and
embassies of the 14 former Soviet states and the United Nations. Secondary sources include published books and
articles by area specialists and scholars and media reports.
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From one perspective, one would expect Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan to make more trips to Russia and for the Baltics to make more trips to the United
States given their membership in the CSTO or NATO respectively. But what explains why
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan made more trips to Russia while Georgia made an equal
number of trips? Certainly, geopolitics could be a factor driving these countries along a multivector foreign policy azimuth; however, simply taking the average number of visits over the 25year period fails to account for the variation in visits by each ruling government.
In Chart 16, one begins to understand that the alignment tendencies of each country vary
markedly during different years. Specifically, there appears to be a substantial amount of
variation with respect to state visits when observing these events over time. For example, in
Moldova from

Chart 16: Total Head of State Visits to the U.S. and Russia (1991-2015)
Source: Author's Analysis
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United States. Following the election of Petru Lucinschi in 1997, this head of state proceeded to
make only .5 visits to Russia during his 4 years in office as compared to .75 visits to the United
States. Similarly, in Georgia from 1993 to 2003, President Eduard Shevardnadze made an
average of 1.36 visits to Russia and .72 visits to the U.S. as compared to his successor, Mikheil
Saakashvili. Here, from 2004-2012 Saakashvili made an average of .78 visits per year to Russia
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and 1.78 visits to the United States. In Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev averaged .75 trips per year to
Russia and the U.S. from 1996 to 2003; however, his successor Ilham Aliyev averaged .25 trips
to the U.S. and 1.33 visits to Russia. These figures indicate the necessity to consider time and
how alignment patterns may vary between ruling governments.
Visits by other Country Leaders. Head of state visits provide one point of reference from
which to understand a state’s alignment trajectory since this individual is frequently the vanguard
actor in the ruling government’s foreign policy executive. In many instances, however, head of
state visits are few in number owing to a wide array of constraints (e.g. time) and the necessity
for this person to address domestic-level issues. As a result, there is value in examining the
number of foreign visits by other government and non-government leaders, who have been either
directly or indirectly tasked to represent the head of state on foreign policy matters. According
to Erika Young,
Exchange visits between dignitaries from different countries are a major part of international
relations. Meetings between… heads of government and Ministers of Foreign Affairs are an
opportunity to discuss key topics of common interest, strengthen political, economic, cultural and
social bilateral relations, establish diplomatic relations, and solve controversial issues.387

To understand how the number of visits by government and non-government officials are
potentially correlated with a state’s alignment trajectory, this study examines the frequency of
these visits by the 14 former Soviet states on an annual basis to the United States and Russia for
the period 1991-2015. A country is considered to be aligned with either Russia or the U.S. when
the frequency of exercise events is higher than the other.388

Young, Erika G. 2014. “The Diplomatic Protocol of the Republic.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy.
http://www.esteri.it/mae/cerimoniale/cerimoniale/pdf/3.%20cerimoniale% 20diplomatico%202.0%20%20versione% 20in%20inglese%20(marzo%202014).pdf, 15. Accessed 20 December 2016.
388
Data for this indicator is derived the DARPA-funded Integrated Conflict Early Warning System (ICEWS) located
at Harvard’s Dataverse website at https://dataverse.harvard.edu.
387
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Table 6 highlights the
number of visits by other
country representatives do not
parallel the visits by the
country’s head of state.
Noticeably different is how
Latvian representatives made

Table 6: Visit By Other Government Leaders to the U.S. and Russia (1995-2015)
Visits to US
US Average
Visits to Russia
Russia Average
Georgia
557
26.52
1187
56.52
Ukraine
497
23.67
898
42.76
Armenia
119
5.67
288
13.71
Kyrgyzstan
68
3.23
260
12.38
Azerbaijan
336
16
243
11.57
Belarus
49
2.33
230
10.95
Latvia
164
7.81
197
9.38
Moldova
31
1.48
189
9
Tajikistan
38
1.81
153
7.29
Kazakhstan
115
5.47
151
7.19
Lithuania
186
8.86
136
6.48
Turkmenistan
42
2
56
2.67
Estonia
52
2.48
51
2.43
Uzbekistan
40
1.9
51
2.43
Source: Author's Analysis

more trips to Russia while representatives from Azerbaijan made more visits to the United
States. In total, 11 of the 14 countries met realist expectations in this category (Armenia, Belarus,
Georgia, Latvia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and
Uzbekistan) with representatives making more trips to Russia while only three countries made
more trips to the United States (Azerbaijan, Estonia, and Lithuania). Of the 11 countries favoring
visits to Russia, Georgia and Ukraine were at the top with an average of 56.52 and 42.76 visits
per year respectively. It should also be noted that both of these countries beat out other former
Soviet states in terms of average visits with Ukraine making 26.52 trips per year to the U.S.
while Georgians made 23.67 visits during the same time period.
Trade. Table 7
summarizes trade data
between 11 former Soviet
states and the U.S. and
Russia from 1994 to 2015.
Of note, while trade data

Table 7: Total Exports-Imports to-from the U.S. and Russia (1994-2015; in 1000 USD)
Exports to US
Exports to Russia Imports from Russia Imports from U.S.
Armenia
784,710
2,403,097
9,720,316
1,958,261
Azerbaijan
15,721,041
8,234,575
14,683,433
4,506,908
Belarus
2,508,777
152,099,860
256,052,313
5,349,145
Estonia
8,679,510
26,394,297
26,574,526
4,894,285
Georgia
1,441,322
1,546,071
5,900,346
2,963,400
Kazakhstan
7,513,687
70,219,783
145,465,336
21,039,909
Kyrgyzstan
121,225
2,721,223
13,243,354
1,729,689
Latvia
2,231,238
13,247,554
17,980,228
1,878,537
Lithuania
9,424,199
48,668,667
95,220,826
5,854,666
Moldova
465,184
5,407,401
8,679,894
1,025,578
Ukraine
15,991,137
168,590,459
265,694,443
25,076,207
Source: Wolrd Bank and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
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during this time was generally robust, there were several notable gaps.389 First, there was little
data on the level of exports and imports for Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to either
the U.S. or Russia. Second, there were several years in which there were no export or import data
for select countries (Armenia, 1994-1996; Azerbaijan, 1994-1995 and 2014; Belarus, 1994-1997;
Estonia, 1994; Georgia, 1994-1995; Kazakhstan, 1994; Kyrgyzstan, 1994, 1997-1999, and 2014;
and Ukraine, 1994-1995).
A country is assessed to be aligned with the U.S. or Russia when total trade with one country
is greater than the other. Based on the figures in the table above, realists may conclude all former
Soviet states, less Azerbaijan are aligned with Russia given how this country was the number one
exporter and importer of goods to and from these countries. In the case of Azerbaijan, the United
States was the country’s top exporter delivering $15.7 billion in goods as compared to 8.2 billion
to Russia. Specifically, from 2008 to 2015, Baku exported more goods to the United States than
Russia. Given energy resources is one of Azerbaijan’s biggest export products, the completion of
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline in 2006 is one possible reason why there was an
increase in the level of exports to the United States. Beginning in 2007, U.S. oil imports from
Azerbaijan more than doubled from 10,091,000 to 22,809,000 barrels/year.390
Bilateral Investment Treaties. Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are economic agreements
that establish rules and guidelines for foreign investment between two countries. For hundreds of
years, states have entered into these type of agreements, but it was not until the 1950s when they

389

Data for these three indicators are derived from two primary sources: The World Integrated Trade Solution
(WITS) at http://wits.worldbank.org/about_wits.html is used for data on trade and tariffs. Data on bilateral
investment treaties was collected from World Bank and UNCTAD data sets at https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/
resources/Bilateral-Investment-Treaties-Database.aspx and http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA. Data
collected in March to June 2016.
390
United States Energy Information Administration (USEIA). 2016. “U.S. Imports from Azerbaijan of Crude Oil
and Petroleum Products.” https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MTTIM_NUSNAJ_1&f=M. Accessed 02 December 2016.
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made a reemergence with Pakistan and the Federal Republic of Germany signing one of the first
BITs in the post-World War II era.391 According to Mary Hallward-Driemeier, since the end of
the Cold War, “countries have increasingly turned to signing BITs as a way to entice foreign
investors to their shores. BITs are heralded by their proponents as an important means of
attracting new foreign direct investment.”392 In this study, a BIT is defined as a formal written
agreement between two countries that established the terms and conditions of how, when, and
where companies from one country may invest resources (time, money, etc.) in another country
based on pre-agreed guidelines.393
According to Table 8, it
is not clear the extent to
which realist assertions on
small state alignment holds.
In this case, former Soviet
states, on average tended to
sign a BIT with the United
States over Russia in

Table 8: Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITS), 1992-2015
Russia Year Signed Year In force U.S. Year Signed Year In force
Armenia
1
2001
2006
1
1992
1996
Azerbaijan
1
2014
1
1997
2001
Belarus
0
None
1
1994
Estonia
0
None
1
1994
1997
Georgia
0
None
1
1994
1999
Kazakhstan
1
1998
2000
1
1992
1994
Kyrgyzstan
0
None
1
1993
1994
Latvia
0
None
1
1995
1996
Lithuania
1
1999
2004
1
1998
2004
Moldova
1
1998
2001
1
1993
1994
Tajikistan
1
1999
0
None
Turkmenistan 1
2009
2010
0
None
Ukraine
1
1994
1996
1
1998
2000
Uzbekistan
2
1997/2013
/2014
1
1994
Source: Author's Analysis

contradiction to realist expectations. Those countries consistently showing a tendency to not
align with Russia include Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Latvia. Seven countries
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Moldova, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan) took a
bifurcated approach signing a BIT with both regional great powers. Only Tajikistan and

United Nations. 2007. “Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995–2006: Trends in Investment Rulemaking.” United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Geneva, February 2007.
392
Hallward-Driemeier, Mary. 2003. “Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract Foreign Direct Investment? Only a
Bit and They Could Bite.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3121, 1.
393
This definition is derived from the Legal Information Institute (LII). 2016. “Bilateral Investment Treaty.” Cornell
Law School. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/bilateral_investment_treaty. Accessed 02 December 2016.
391
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Turkmenistan did not sign a BIT with the United States indicating a stronger preference to align
with Russia. Of note however, the BITs for Belarus and Uzbekistan with Russia never entered
into force potentially supporting realist claims.
Tariffs. The implementation of tariffs is the final economic indicator used to test realist
propositions and discern alignment variation in the post-Soviet space. Examining when and to
what extent a small country levies a tariff rate on a larger regional power may provide some
insight as to whether a former Soviet state may prefer an alignment with the U.S. or Russia. A
tariff is a customs duty, which is defined as a “charge levied on imports and listed in importing
country’s tariff schedules. Duties may be specific or ad valorem or a combination of the two (ad
valorem with a specific minimum, or the greater of the two).”394
According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), there exists a variety of different types of
tariffs to include Bound, Applied, Most-Favored Nation (MFN), and Preferential with each
levying a different rate based on a variety of different factors (e.g. member of the WTO, member
of a Preferential Trade Agreement, etc.). For simplicity, this study uses MFN tariffs, which is
“what countries promise to impose on imports from other members of the WTO, unless the
country is part of a preferential trade agreement (such as a free trade area or customs union).”395
Newly-independent states are said to be more aligned with either the United States or Russia if
the MFN tariff rates are lower for one and not the other.
For the period 1992-2015, while there is generally an absence of available tariff data for all 14
countries, some general inferences can be made from the table below, which depicts those
countries that imposed a higher MFN tariff rate on the United States or Russia. To more easily

394

Azita, Amjadi, Philip Schuler, Hiroaki Kuwahara, and Susanne Quadros. 2016. World Integrated Trade Solutions
User Manual 2.01, World Bank, 216.
395
Ibid, 91.
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discern which country received a higher tariff rate, the table uses a color coding scheme. When a
block is colored either red or blue, a higher tariff rate was applied to Russia or the U.S.
Table 9: Former Soviet States MFN Tariff Rates on Russia and the U.S. (1995-2005)
1995
US RS

1996
US RS

1997
1999
2000
US RS US RS US RS

Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
11.6 11.6 12.6 12
11 10.5
Estonia
0.1 0
0.6 0.8
Georgia
9 10
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
4
3.5
Latvia
4
1.8 4.8 2.4
Lithuania 3.1 1.9
3.1 1.9
Moldova
5.7 4.1
5
4
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
2.2 3.6
Ukraine
7.4 6
8.4 7.3
Uzbekistan
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
US RS US RS US RS US RS US RS
Armenia
3.4 2.8 3.1
3
3.3 2.9 4 3 3.4 3.3
Azerbaijan
9.3 9.2 9.1 9.4 9 9
Belarus
9.4 10 9 10 7.9 8.9
Estonia
Georgia
6.9 6.8 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.8 1 1 0.5 0.7
Kazakhstan
4.9 5.4
8.2 8.6
Kyrgyzstan 3.1 3.7 3.5 3.6 4.2 3.8 4 4 3.6 3.8
Latvia
Lithuania
Moldova
5 5.1 4.4 4.3 4.9 4.5 5 5 4.8 4.6
Tajikistan 6.1 7.2
6.4 7.5
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
5.4 4.7 5.2 4.8 5.3 4.9 4 4 4.4 4.2
Uzbekistan 12 14 10.8 14.1 11.3 14 11 13
Same Tariff Rate

Higher Russia Tariff

2001
US RS
3 2.2

2002
US RS

9.6 8.7
10.4 9.9 11.2 11
0.3 0.7 0.5 0.5
9.7 9.8 9.6 10
3.7
2.7

3.6
2.7

5.2

4.4

2003
US RS
3.1 2.8

0.5
7.2

0.6
7.7

8.5

7.3

4.9

3.8

2.3

2.1

2
5

2
4.8

7.5

2004
2005
US RS US RS
3.3 3 3.6 3
9.9 9.5

7.2 7.5 6.8 6.8
2.5 2.7

5.5 4.8

5

4.9

6.8

6.1 10
2011
US RS
3.3 3.3
9.1 9.3
8 8.8

2012
US RS
4.2 4.3
8.9 9.2
8
9

2013
US RS
4.1 4.1
8.9 9.2
8
8.8

2014
2015
US RS US RS
4.2 4.2 6 6.5
8.7 9.4
7 7.5 6.2 7

1.2
8.2
3.3

1.5
8.7
3.8

1.3
8.4
3.4

1.7
8.9
3.7

1.3
8.3
3.4

1.6
8.8
3.7

1.4 1.5
7.4 7.6 6.8 7
3.5 3.7 5.5

4.5

4.5

4.4
6

4.6 10.2
7.6 6.3

9.1
7.7

4.7 4.8 4.1
6.1 7.5 6

4.4

4.1

4.3 4.1
12.5 14

4.2

4.4 4.1 4.3 3.9
11 13 12

4.4

Higher U.S. Tariff

Source: Wolrd Bank and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; author's analysis

respectively. If the blocks are yellow, both countries received the same tariff rate.
According to Table 9 above, realist expectations held for only three countries with Ukraine,
Armenia, and Moldova emplacing higher tariff rates against the U.S. than Russia. First, only
Ukraine consistently enacted higher tariff rates against the United States in all 13 years where
data is available. Following Ukraine, Armenia and Moldova emplaced higher tariff rates on the
U.S. than Russia but at a lower frequency. In Armenia, nine out of the 14 years saw higher tariff
rates levied against the U.S. as compared to two years (2012 and 2015) for Russia. In the other
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three years, tariff rates were the same. In Moldova, during ten of the 15 years, Chisinau enacted
higher tariffs against the U.S. as compared to three years (2006, 2012, 2014) where rates were
higher for Russia. In 2008 and 2011 the rates in Moldova were the same for the U.S. and Russia.
The remaining countries fell outside realist predictions where Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan registered higher tariff rates against
Russia than the United States. At the top of the list, Georgia and Kazakhstan routinely charged
Russia a higher tariff rate. Not far behind, Georgia during 12 of the 14 years charged Moscow
higher tariff rates for Russian products. In 2006, the rate was higher for the U.S. while in 2005
and 2008 tariff rates were the same for both regional great powers. Kyrgyzstan, in seven of the
13 years, charged Russia a higher tariff rate. From 2000-2003 and again in 2008, Bishkek
recorded higher tariffs for the U.S. while in 2009, both countries had the same MFN tariff rate.
Interestingly, while Belarusian tariff rates were higher for the U.S. than Russia in 1997 and
from 2001-2002, for eight years straight (2008 to 2015), Minsk opted to enact higher tariff rates
for Russian products than those from the United States. Azerbaijan’s record of tariffs was mixed
with three years (2002, 2005, 2007) of higher tariffs for the U.S. as compared to five years (2009
and 2011-2014) for Russia. Finally, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan also consistently showed a
willingness to enact a higher tariff rate against Russia. In 2006, 2010, and from 2012 to 2014,
Dushanbe enacted higher tariffs against Moscow while Tashkent followed suit levying higher
rates during all seven years in 2001, 2006-2009, 2012, and 2014.
Although the preceding analysis on tariffs provides some insight into former Soviet
alignment, the unavailability of a consistent set of data makes it difficult to draw sound
inferences on former Soviet state alignment. For example, in Moldova from 1996-2005, Chisinau
consistently enacted higher tariff rates against the United States; however, in the second 10-year
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period the situation changes. Specifically, the U.S. received higher tariffs for four years as
comparted to Russia, which received higher rates in three years. Furthermore, in two of the
years, both countries received the same tariff rate. Second, in those instances where a country
was a member of NATO or the CSTO, one might expect a lower tariff rate to the corresponding
regional great power. While this was the case with Estonia charging the U.S. lower tariff rates,
Lithuania tended to do the opposite. Similarly, a majority of the countries in the CSTO tended to
charge Russia higher tariff rates.
Striving for Precision
The preceding two-stage analysis has increased our understanding of how alignment may
vary in the post-Soviet space and which countries are worthy of further research. Despite the
progress made on case selection, this endeavor has not narrowed the potential number of cases to
a manageable level. As depicted in Table 10, the ten indicators of alignment revealed 13
different countries in one way or another did not align with Russia.
Table 10: Summary of Small State Alignment in the Post-Soviet Space
Indicator
Military Commitements
United Nations Voting
Military Exercises
Foreign Basing
Arms Sales
Head of State Visits
Other Political Leader Visits
Total Trade
Bilateral Investment Treaties
Tariffs

Country
Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Ukraine
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova
Azerbaijan, Estonia, Gerogia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Ukraine, Uzbekistan
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Uzbekistan
Estonia, Moldova, Ukraine
Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithunia
Azerbaijan, Estonia, Lithuania
Azerbaijan
Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Kyrgyzstan
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan
Source: Author's Analysis

Given this precarious situation, it becomes necessary to narrow the range of cases by
assigning a weight to each of the indicators. Following Teune and Synnestvedt’s order of priority
for the most important categories, a ‘3’ weighting was assigned to military indicators, a ‘2’
weighting to diplomatic indicators, and a ‘1’ weighting to economic indicators. When applied to
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the 13 potential cases, the rank order of outliers from low to high is as follows: Tajikistan (1),
Kyrgyzstan (2), Belarus (2), Turkmenistan (3), Kazakhstan (3), Uzbekistan (5), Georgia (6.5),
Ukraine (7), Azerbaijan (8.5), Moldova (10), Lithuania (11.5), Latvia (12.5), and Estonia (16).
Taking the mean score of the 13 countries establishes a cut line whereby Georgia, Ukraine,
Azerbaijan, Moldova, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are placed in the top 50 percent of the
group worthy of further investigation. While a scholarly investigation of these six cases is
certainly warranted, such an undertaking exceeds the boundaries of this project with regard to
time and space. As such, because Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are already members of NATO,
this study opts to focus on Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. The Baltic countries are
thus placed in the category of future research for this dissertation.
Conclusion
This chapter served two major purposes. First, through the application of ten alignment
indicators as developed by Teune and Synnestvedt, this study attempted to discern how
alignment varied in the post-Soviet space by sketching the broad contours of former Soviet state
alignment with the United States and Russia from 1991-2015. This analytical endeavor was
undertaken to identify viable cases for this study in the most regimented way possible. A part of
this effort, realist explanations were tested where small states, because they are materially weak,
will bandwagon with a more powerful or more threatening regional great power in close
proximity. The overarching conclusion is the theoretical propositions advanced by realists do not
consistently explain when and why the newly independent states will align with their former
imperial center. After applying a weighting to the military, diplomatic, and economic indicators,
the four cases for this study are Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.
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“There are associations between powers that seem to be deeper than formal alliances, to be
based on affinity and tradition as much as interest, to be not so much utilitarian as natural.”
Martin Wright, 2002.396

Chapter Five: State Identity and Small State Alignment

Introduction
This chapter explores the extent to which a president’s ideas and beliefs about the state’s
identity in world politics may contribute to his alignment preferences with the United States or
Russian Federation in the post-Cold War era. The essence of my argument follows Martin
Wright’s sage insight from above in that when ruling elites in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova,
and Ukraine conceptualize the state’s identity in ways that mirror the enduring state identities in
either the United States or Russia, these political leaders will exhibit a stronger preference to
align with one regional great power over the other. This empirical reality is what this study calls
positive bandwagoning. As state identities between a small state and a regional great power
become ambiguous or begin to diverge, political leaders in Baku, Tbilisi, Chisinau, and Kiev will
prefer a great power bridging alignment.
Although realists attempt to explain alignment outcomes by focusing on aggressive
intentions, military power balances, or other material-based systemic factors as key drivers for
threat identification and the choice of strategic partners, such approaches appear deficient when
examining the post-Soviet space. At issue is how the balance of military power between Russia
and its former Soviet satellites has consistently favored Moscow, yet the alignment tendencies of
ruling governments in these countries have oscillated over the last several decades. Take Ukraine
for example. Academics and practitioners alike have argued Leonid Kuchma was a skilled
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balancer, who preferred to align the state with Russia, the United States, and other lesser powers
in Western Europe. After his election as president in 2005, Viktor Yushchenko preferred a
Western alignment; however, his successor Viktor Yanukovych saw higher value in an
alignment with Russia.397 What explains this empirical reality in Ukraine?
In order to garner a more holistic understanding of alignment politics, this study argues one
must begin with a close examination of the president’s ideas and beliefs about the state’s identity
in world politics. As Suny reminds us, it is very important to consider “whether an elite views its
state as a democracy, a great power, an empire, the victim of others, or a carrier of
civilization...”398 Furthermore, because the presidents under examination govern in countries best
understood as anocracies, they are uniquely positioned to exert a high degree of influence on the
state’s identity. Andrei Spruds captures succinctly this situation noting,
Political elites are instrumental in the process of constructing and reconstructing identities.
Although influenced by shared societal images, symbols and historical experiences, they
simultaneously are in a position to manage these perceptions in the context of interstate relations,
as well as inadvertently or calculatingly to shape, manipulate and even create them.399

The research questions this chapter seeks to answer are as follows: to what extent does a
political leader’s ideas about the state’s identity influence his alignment preferences with the
United States and the Russian Federation? Supporting questions include: what are the state
identity narratives of the presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine from 1995 to
2015? What are the enduring state identity narratives of the United States and Russia in the postCold War era? What is the relationship between a president’s ideas about state identity and his
alignment preferences? It is hypothesized Azeri, Georgian, Moldovan, and Ukrainian presidents
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are more likely to prefer a positive bandwagoning with a regional great power they believe share
their primary state identity conceptions. When there is a lack of congruence in the primary state
identity conceptions, one is more likely to see a president prefer great power bridging.
As outlined in chapter 4, this study conducted a conceptual content analysis using available
speeches, interviews, and addresses for each president while in office. The level of analysis is the
single word, which takes an accounting of 18 state identity concepts. These concepts are then
placed under five general categories: political (independent, former Soviet, freedom, liberty),
cultural (European, Slavic, Western, Eastern, Eurasian), economic (market and modern),
ideological (democracy, liberal and communism), and religious (Orthodox, Christian, Islamic,
secular).400 Separately, interviews with area specialists and online surveys established a baseline
of the enduring state identity narratives associated with the United States and Russia. In the
United States, political leaders have historically described the state as democratic, modern,
independent, and Western.401 Russian state identity narratives are more ambiguous but in this
study are defined as Russian, Slavic, Eastern, Eurasian, and independent.402
The proceeding paragraphs provide the findings of a content analysis of each president’s ideas
about the state’s identity from 1995 to 2015. As a reminder, in Moldova, Mircea Snegur’s

These 18 concepts of a state’s identity were derived from an analysis of the secondary literature, elite interviews,
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presidency (1990-1997) and acting presidents Mihai Ghimpu and Marian Lupu (2009-2011) are
excluded owing to the lack of available data.
Findings
Through a content analysis of presidential speeches, interviews with area specialists, and the
use of online surveys and event data, this study identified several key findings. First, each
president under examination espoused multiple state identities. Second, those presidents who
gave emphasis to the state’s identity as being independent tended to prefer great power bridging.
These presidents included Heydar Aliyev, Ilham Aliyev, Eduard Shevardnadze, Petru Lucinschi,
Vladimir Voronin (after 2003), and Leonid Kuchma. Third, Mikheil Saakashvili, Giorgi
Margvelashvili, Nicolae Timofti, Viktor Yushchenko, and Petro Poroshenko viewed the state as
Western-European and/or one based on democracy and freedom. These presidents tended to
favor a positive bandwagoning with the United States. Fourth, frequently referring to Ukraine as
an eastern country, Vladimir Voronin (before 2003) and Viktor Yanukovych preferred a positive
bandwagoning alignment with Russia.
Azerbaijan
From the time when the Bolsheviks seized control of Azerbaijan in 1920 until the country’s
independence in August 1991, leading political elites in Baku followed Moscow’s direction for
the state’s actions on the world stage. Guided by Marxist-Leninist principles, Azerbaijani leaders
mirrored the Kremlin’s ideological narratives helping to establish the state’s identity as a Soviet
satellite and a cog in the international communist movement.403 To ensure the continued
advancement of a Soviet-centric state identity, Kremlin leaders began a process of indigenization

For a discussion on ideology and Soviet foreign policy, see Ulam, Adam B. 1959. “Soviet Ideology and Soviet
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(korenizatsiia) in the early 1920s to help facilitate the rise to power of loyal Azerbaijani political
figures, who would give legitimacy to a Soviet-style state identity.404
From the 1930’s through the early 1980s, Azerbaijani political leaders, who were members of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) generally adhered to the conception of a
Soviet state identity. For example, Heydar Aliyev’s communist-style political acumen and strong
leadership allowed him to achieve high prominence in Soviet Azerbaijan becoming the President
of the CPSU (1967-1987) and a full politburo member in 1982.405 Azerbaijan’s Soviet identity
was also made possible through an informal social contract whereby the republic would fall in
line with the ruling Soviet government in exchange for the populace being allowed to retain
some aspects of Azerbaijan’s culture. According to Tadeusz Swietochowski,
In return for the acceptance of and cooperation with the Soviet regime, the nationalities received
the guarantees of the right to develop their distinct cultures, to use freely and develop their
languages, and to train and employ native cadres in their republics. The legacy of the Russian rule
of the past, with its imperialism, chauvinism and Russification, was to be explicitly rejected.406

However, a turning point occurred in 1988 with the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev as the
Soviet Union’s head of state. During this time, Gorbachev’s reform efforts of glasnost
(transparency) and perestroika (restructuring) facilitated the emergence of numerous opposition
political parties, including the Azerbaijan Popular Front (APF), which reflected nationalist (e.g.
independence) and ethnic (e.g. anti-Armenian) conceptions that differed from the CPSU,
particularly in its relationship to other Soviet republics namely Armenia.407 Gorbachev’s actions
subsequently gave way to the outbreak of ethnic conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh region (1988-
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1994), Azerbaijan’s 1989 resolution of sovereignty, and large-scale protests leading to Baku’s
declaration of independence in August 1991 under communist President Ayaz Mutalibov.
In the immediate aftermath of Azerbaijan’s breakaway from the Soviet Union, political,
economic, and social chaos severely hindered Mutalibov’s political actions designed to move the
country towards complete independence from the Soviet Union and its successor, the Russian
Federation. This initial period of anarchy also inhibited Mutalibov’s ability to articulate a new
state identity and given the current state of affairs, he gravitated back to his communist roots and
a deference for an alignment with Moscow. Although independence was to be the leading
‘bumper sticker’ for the state, Mutalibov did little to transform the deeply entrenched communist
institutions or build new democratic ones. According to Svante Cornell, “...Mutalibov had
declared the independence of the country, but just like the other post-Soviet leaders, he sought to
reinvent himself as a national leader without introducing meaningful political reforms.”408 One
indicator of Mutalibov’s proclivity to align Azerbaijan with Russia was his decision to sign the
Alma-Ata Declaration for the country’s accession into the CIS in December 1991.
Mutalibov’s inactions as they related to the country’s transition and the escalating crisis in the
Nagorno-Karabakh moved political opposition groups to action resulting in his resignation in
February 1992. By June of that year, APF leader Abulfez Elcibey became Azerbaijan’s first
democratically-elected president. Elcibey’s conceptions about the state in international affairs
can be best described as independent, democratic, liberal, open market, and secular.409 While
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facing the same problems as Mutalibov, Elcibey’s ruling government achieved some limited
success in implementing reforms in Azerbaijan’s transition from Soviet rule. For example,
during Elcibey’s time in office over 30 political parties were formed and nearly 500 news or
media outlets established.410 In the foreign policy realm, Elcibey attempted to align the state with
the United States and the West through various actions, which included opening an embassy in
Washington in March 1993 and rejecting his predecessor’s decision to join the CIS.411
Despite the minimal progress made by Elcibey, he was only able to remain in power for less
than a year owing to a myriad of challenges. First, like Mutalibov, Elcibey’s inability to resolve
the crisis in the Nagorno-Karabakh elicited outcries from the public and political pressure from
political opposition elements.412 Additionally, religion began to exert an influence on the
political dynamics in both the domestic and foreign policy realms. In this case, Azerbaijan’s
Muslim population with its accompanying traditions (e.g. limited social and political rights)
served as a constraint on Elcibey’s political actions to incorporate Western ideals into the state
and society.413 Finally, Elcibey’s failure to reconfigure the state’s communist institutions
hindered his ability to advance a new state identity. In this case, domestic politics served as a
check on his alignment preferences because the ruling government was “...unable to free itself
from the formal as well as informal power brokers in the republic, or to take the initiative and lay
down new rules of the game.”414 Quickly all of these challenges would converge resulting in
Elcibey’s fall from power in 1993 and Heydar Aliyev’s rise to the presidency.
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Heydar Aliyev’s State Identity Narratives and Azerbaijan’s Alignment
The removal of Elcibey opened the door for the peaceful return of Heydar Aliyev to power in
October 1993 following a new round of elections. Within the first year of his time in office,
Aliyev’s extensive political experience and expert organizational skills allowed him to bring
order to the state apparatus, implement a series of economic reforms, and realize an armistice
with Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.415 It is from Aliyev’s early successes the
country would begin to experience a modicum of political and social stability and eventually
economic stabilization by late 1995.416 From 1995 onward, Azerbaijan began a sustained period
of stabilization that subsequently allowed Aliyev the strategic maneuver room to begin the
process of defining the state’s identity in world politics.
But what were Heydar Aliyev’s ideas about Azerbaijan’s state identity since his assent to the
presidency? As a diehard former communist, did Aliyev follow Mutalibov or as a would-be
democratic reformist did he emulate Elcibey? An examination of a small random sample of
Aliyev’s foreign policy speeches417 during the country’s most tumultuous years (1993-1994)
reveal some insight into his conceptions of Azerbaijan’s state identity in the post-Cold War era.
Aliyev’s state identity conceptions included independent, free, and democratic.
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Although this superficial review may be a good starting point, interviews with area specialists
and a content analysis of over 800 speeches reveals a more nuanced understanding of Heydar
Aliyev’s ideas about the state’s role in world affairs. Specifically, Heydar Aliyev predominantly
viewed the state in political terms as independent registering the highest frequency among the 18
state identity concepts. The average rate at which Aliyev emphasized ideas about independence
was double of what was observed by all the presidents in Moldova and three times as much as
compared to Georgia and Ukraine. The centrality of Aliyev’s independent state identity narrative
is captured during a May 1995 speech in Baku. In his words...
Now we live in an independent state. Independent Republic of Azerbaijan is our greatest
historical achievement. I am sure that we will keep the independent state of Azerbaijan live and
march forth. Our existing intellectual and economic potentials, the might and courage of our
people will keep the independent Azerbaijan live and pass from generation to generation.418

Seven years later in 2002, one can still discern Aliyev’s commitment to his ideas about
Azerbaijan as an independent state actor on the world stage.
The Azerbaijan people establishing the first democratic republic in the Moslem East in the
beginning of 20th century, has restored its independence and has entered qualitatively new stage
of the development at the end of the century. Today independent Azerbaijan is the full member
and representative of the world community, international and regional organizations.419

Heydar Aliyev’s primary emphasis on viewing the state as an independent actor appears
logical for several reasons. First, with the country’s vast supply of energy resources, an
independent Azerbaijan could avoid the external constraints that come with formal membership
in a security alliance or regional economic grouping. This would subsequently place the state in a
favorable position to align with multiple great powers to fully develop Azerbaijan’s economic
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capacities. Second, an independent state identity narrative would allow Aliyev to assume a more
proactive foreign policy to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. In this case, if Kremlin elites
were to drag their feet on an issue or topic, Aliyev could potentially use an alignment with
Washington, for example, to move Moscow to action.
The extent to which one can discern Heydar Aliyev’s bifurcated alignment trajectory with the
United States and Russia is made clear in a longitudinal analysis of event data in Chart 17 below.
Chart 17: Heydar Aliyev's Alignment Preferences with
the U.S. and Russia (1995-2003)
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Recalling SIT and SCT, Aliyev’s level of verbal cooperation with the U.S. and Russia can serve
as one indicator of his proclivity for great power bridging. In this case, the process of social
comparisons at the individual level are seen in Aliyev’s ideas about his affinity with external
states, which are then conveyed through his verbal actions. While in office, Heydar Aliyev
oscillated his level of verbal cooperation with the United States and Russia preferring to develop
an almost equal alignment with both regional great powers.
The significance of Aliyev’s ideas about independence and his alignment preferences are
relevant for three reasons. First, the centrality of Azerbaijan’s independence in Aliyev’s
conceptions of the state’s identity serves as a major point of reference from which to craft multivector foreign policies that would help ensure Azerbaijan remained independent on the world
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stage. The critical importance afforded to Aliyev’s ideas about independence and his alignment
preferences are captured perfectly in 1999 and 2001.
You can’t be friends with some countries and enemies with others despite the fact that this is the
way most countries function. Azerbaijan doesn’t want to be an enemy with any country. At the
same time, we will not become victim to another country’s policies. Azerbaijan has its own
independent policy. At the same time, we are developing good relations with Europe and America
and seek to benefit from their experiences while preserving our own national identity and our
own resources.420
Azerbaijan will never repudiate its independent foreign policy. Its independent foreign policy is a
basic symbol, a primary proof of independence of Azerbaijan. Carrying out an independent
foreign policy means further strengthening of independence. Although we face great difficulties
both in foreign relations and within Azerbaijan itself, we, protecting our own independence
pursue an independent policy in the world.421

Second, Aliyev’s ideas about the importance of independence were amplified given the country’s
access to vast amounts of energy resources. In this case, independence would be a conduit by
which the state could reap the economic benefits of exporting oil and natural gas to a variety of
different customers worldwide. Put another way, economic prosperity would help ensure
Azerbaijan would remain independent. Third, and perhaps most important, Aliyev’s conception
of independence is designed to move the state in directions that help ensure the continued
existence of the ruling government.422
Beyond Heydar’s Aliyev’s emphasis on Azerbaijan as an independent state, it is also
important to take an accounting of his supporting identity narratives, which can help us to
understand more fully his preference for great power bridging. In addition to viewing the state as
independent, Heydar Aliyev’s verbal discourse described Azerbaijan as European, Eastern,
democratic, and secular. First, Heydar Aliyev gave secondary emphasis to two cultural
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narratives: European and Eastern. This study’s content analysis indicates Heydar Aliyev viewed
the state (and Azerbaijan) as a member of Europe. Although less emphasized, Aliyev’s
references to an Eastern orientation indicated that both were of importance in his conceptions of
the state’s identity. From one perspective, Aliyev’s ideas about these state identities are
grounded in his beliefs about the country’s geographical position in the South Caucasus.
Reflecting on this reality in 1998, Aliyev noted...
We are on the European continent. But at the same time, in the intersection of Europe and Asia,
our country in the history of its people, its national culture, historical roots and mentality are the
synthesis of the East and the West, Europe and Asia.423

Heydar Aliyev’s European state identity narrative must be placed into proper context
however. While Aliyev may have espoused the merits of select aspects of ‘western’ European
values during his time in office, the country’s history, culture, and geographical location exerted
enough influence to morph the state’s identity into a different form of westernization. According
to Barry Buzan and Thomas Dietz, countries such as Azerbaijan are best regarded as
‘Westernistic’ because political leaders in Baku will “never be purely Western or European by
definition[s]”424 commonly accepted in the United States and Western Europe.
This hybrid form of Europeanism also conveys to Heydar Aliyev’s ideas about Azerbaijan as
a democracy. The results of the content analysis indicate for this ideological category, Aliyev’s
narratives of describing the state’s identity in democratic terms occurred at a level on par with
his conceptions of Azerbaijan as European. Despite Aliyev’s proclivity to frequently reference
democratic ideals in his foreign policy discourse, interviews with regional specialists and reports
from various international organizations reveals democracy in Azerbaijan does not conform to
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the mold as developed in the United States or Western Europe.425 At the direction of Heydar
Aliyev, the pillars of democracy (e.g. rule of law, a free press, respect for human rights, and
transparent elections, etc.) were micromanaged by ruling elites leading to a semi-authoritarian
state. Marina Ottaway describes Azerbaijan’s semi-authoritarian government as...
...an ambiguous system that combines rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracy, the existence of
some formal democratic institutions, and respect for a limited sphere of civil and political
liberties with essentially illiberal or even authoritarian traits.426

As such, Aliyev’s attempts to portray a democratic state identity for Azerbaijan must be placed
in its proper context. According to Turkey’s ambassador to the United States...
[Heydar] Aliyev is a remarkable man and very tough politician, he did not share his powers with
his minister or his people. There was very little opposition in the Azeri parliament which acted
mostly as his rubberstamp. He was described by a diplomat serving in Baku, who knew him as a
smooth operator... He himself made all the decisions with no power sharing. He groomed his son
to succeed him against criticism that he was creating a dynasty, which became true.427

Other regional specialists have also viewed Heydar Aliyev in a similar way. In this case,
Azerbaijan under Aliyev is best understood as an authoritarian government with a smattering of
controlled capitalism that generates economic prosperity for a select few.428
The preceding evidence leads to several key takeaways. First, on one level it appears Heydar
Aliyev may be apt to publicly articulate a state identity narrative that garners the state maximum
benefits from multiple regional great powers. For example, during his political career, Aliyev
was quick to espouse the country’s democratic principles without truly implementing the
corresponding reforms in order to gain U.S. support to build-up the country’s energy
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infrastructure.429 On another level, Heydar Aliyev may have viewed the state’s identity as an
instrument of power to secure foreign support from a regional great power to help him realize his
conceptions of the national interest.
Finally, Aliyev also tended to view the state as secular.430 Aliyev’s placement of Islam in the
development of the state’s identity was of secondary importance given its potential to exert a
high degree of influence if left unchecked as was the case in Iran during the 1970s. This is not to
say Islam did not have its place in Azerbaijani society, where many of the key tenets of this
religion remained an important part of the country’s national identity. At the state level however,
Aliyev opted to paint a secular label on the government and its identity among other states in the
international system. This reality is captured perfectly by Aliyev himself...
This is a part of my strategyto preserve the national moral values of Azerbaijan. A part of these
values is connected to Islam. We do not deny Islam. This is our religion. At the same time, I am
trying to synthesize the national moral values of Azerbaijan with European values, the values
known to the entire world. I want to see my country as a secular nation, but not separated from its
national roots.431

The solidification of the state’s secular identity under Heydar Aliyev occurred in 1995 when
the country’s constitution was formally adopted. During a meeting with Iranian foreign leaders in
2001, Aliyev adamantly stressed the secular nature of the state’s identity stating, “we are
following the path of secularism and will continue to follow that path of statehood.”432
In 2001, the relationship between Heydar Aliyev’s ideas about the state as secular and his
alignment preference with the United States was made clear when he stated, “Azerbaijan will
never become a religious state like Iran, nor will it sever relations with the United States...”433
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Finally, as late as 2003 Aliyev continued to demonstrate a stable state identity narrative with
respect to Azerbaijan’s secularism in world politics. During a meeting with Iranian leaders he
stated, “Azerbaijan is a secular state, and this is our strategic path. We will not be able to turn
from this path neither to this or the other side. We will not be able to turn away, not because we
don’t want to, but because we consider this way the most appropriate for us.”434
Ilham Aliyev’s State Identity Narratives and Azerbaijan’s Alignment
In October 2003, Ilham Aliyev succeeded his father as president in an election viewed by the
Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as not meeting internationally accepted
election standards owing to the existence of partisan election commissions, pre-election police
violence, and the absence of international observers to name a few.435 Upon entering office,
Ilham Aliyev brought with him many similar conceptions of the state’s identity held by his
father. Specifically, Ilham Aliyev primary viewed the state’s identity as independent. Secondary
conceptions included European, modern, and market-oriented.
Following in the footsteps of his father, the output of a content analysis of Ilham Aliyev’s
foreign policy speeches indicates he tended to define the Azeri state as independent above all
other characterizations. The high value afforded to this state identity narrative was immediately
seen after his election in 2004. During a press interview with a Russian news outlet, Aliyev
declared, “the greatest achievement of Azerbaijan's people is the country's independence...
Despite the difficulties, we must preserve Azerbaijan's independence, strengthen statehood, and
ensure the integrity of its territory.”436 The ‘so what’ here is that Aliyev the younger continued to
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reinforce the state’s independent identity on the world stage as a signal to other foreign powers
that Azerbaijan would not be dominated by any one country.
A longitudinal analysis of event data in Chart 18 below indicates Ilham Aliyev’s changing
level of verbal cooperation with the United States and Russia is a strong indicator of his ideas
about the merits of great power bridging. For the years under examination, Ilham Aliyev
oscillated his level of verbal cooperation with the United States and Russia seeking to develop an
almost equal alignment with both regional great powers. According to several area specialists,
Azerbaijan’s primary emphasis on independence makes the state open to dealing equally with a
variety of different regional great powers. For example, on one hand Aliyev would attempt to
align with Moscow as a way to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh stalemate. On the other hand,
Ilham pursed a Western trajectory by engaging with Washington on energy development. 437 At
times, when there was confrontation with Russia, this was followed by higher levels of verbal
cooperation with the United States and vice versa.
Chart 18: Ilham Aliyev's Alignment Preferences with
the U.S. and Russia (2004-2015)
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Furthermore, Ilham’s continuing focus on the importance of maintaining Azerbaijan’s
independence had influence on his preferences to align with multiple regional great powers. One
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example to support this observation is a decision by President Aliyev to approve the publication
of the updated national security concept in 2007. In this document, the critical importance of the
country’s independence was greatly emphasized. As explicitly noted, “the National Security
Concept... is a set of goals, principles and approaches to the policies and measures, which
underline the [country’s] independence... and multidimensional and balance foreign policy”438 in
the 21st century. The publication of state’s approach to world politics in 2007 in essence
represented the formalization of Aliyev’s enduring commitment to great power bridging where
Baku would continue to eschew formal alliances opting instead to prefer a path in which the state
would align with the United States, it allies, and Russia simultaneously.
In addition to Ilham Aliyev’s characterization of the Azeri state as independent, several
supporting state identity narratives provide a more in-depth understanding of his tendency to
follow a great power bridging alignment. As supporting state identity narratives, Ilham Aliyev
also viewed the state as European, modern, and market-oriented. After entering office, Ilham
Aliyev’s cultural views of the state’s identity slightly deviated from his predecessor, who
primarily saw the state as a gateway between the East and West. For Ilham however,
Azerbaijan’s place in the international arena gravitated towards the West and in particular
Europe. Although Azerbaijan remained at the crossroads between Europe and Asia, Ilham Aliyev
tended to view the state’s role in Western terms. In his words,
The period of independence that we have experienced has already shown that our country is
capable of having a totally independent policy. We maintain very good relations with the United
States, and we also have very good relations with Russia. But we consider ourselves part of
Europe. Azerbaijan is indeed Europe's eastern border, a country that views its future in terms of
integration into the European structures.439
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Despite this increased emphasis towards Europe, Aliyev’s adherence to multi-vectorism
remained a linchpin in his preference for great power bridging. Recalling the 2007 National
Security Concept, Azerbaijan would continue to adhere to a balanced, multidimensional foreign
policy where friendly relations with all countries was the primary goal.440
In marked contrast to Heydar Aliyev, under Ilham’s rule the state’s identity in economic
terms took on increased importance with his narratives giving increased emphasis to Azerbaijan
as a modern and market-oriented state. The driving force behind Aliyev’s beliefs about these
narratives centered on the country’s vast supply of oil for markets in the West, which would
create new revenue streams for the state. These monies would have a dual purpose of
modernizing the country (e.g. new infrastructure), while also helping Ilham to remain in
power.441 However, Aliyev’s ideas about Azerbaijan and a modern, market-oriented country did
not equate to an exclusive alignment preference for the United States. On the contrary, the Azeri
president believed an economic alignment with Russia would also be highly beneficial. For
example, in 2004 Ilham Aliyev praised the country’s economic relations with Russia noting a
myriad of accomplishments including the transport of oil through Russian ports, Russian natural
gas imports, and foreign direct invest from companies in Russia. According to Aliyev, “this
proved possible only with the help of political will and a good political basis. Our peoples are
becoming even closer. For this reason, I highly value the level of bilateral relations and can wish
only one thing: to continue developing them this way.”442
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In summary, the ideas of Heydar and Ilham Aliyev about the state’s identity as first and
foremost one that is independent, helped frame their alignment preference with both the United
States and Russia. By characterizing the Azeri state as an independent actor on the world stage,
each president was able to avoid formal entanglements in military alliances and regional
economic organizations. Such an approach produced several marked benefits. First, both
presidents acquired a high degree of strategic maneuverability that allowed them to maximize
their material returns from multiple regional great powers. Second, a preference for great power
bridging helped prevent foreign meddling in the state’s internal affairs by playing off one
regional great power over another. In essence, both presidents’ ideas about the state’s identity as
independent became a cornerstone for great power bridging. Arzu Geybullayev captures this
reality perfectly where on one hand, Azerbaijan remains a key strategic partner with Russia
given its historical ties, trade relations, and Moscow’s hand in the Nagorno-Karabakh. With
Washington, she notes...
Officially, Baku does not want to distance itself from... the US. The country’s leadership puts a
lot of effort into portraying itself as an increasingly European - culturally, economically and
politically. Whether it is succeeding at this is another question, but it is certainly trying very hard
to come across as European and yet to strike a balance between the two political powers, in the
meantime acting as an independent state.443

Georgia
In the decades preceding the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Georgia became one of the most
ardent proponents of independence, where opposition elements were able to organize quite
effectively beginning as early as the 1970s.444 Unlike other Soviet republics with the exception
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of the Baltic States, the release of Gorbachev’s policies on openness and restructuring in the late
1980s had a monumental impact on the political climate in Soviet Georgia. One of the most
immediate effects to be seen was the open establishment of political opposition groups, one of
the most prominent being the Ilia Chavchavadze Society. Established by dissident leader and
future first president Zviad Gamsakhurdia along with several other opposition figures in 1987,
the Ilia Chavchavadze Society espoused an anti-Soviet agenda that viewed nationalism and
Georgian independence as a strategic imperative for the country’s future.445
As political discord in Georgia continued to foment in 1988, the leader of Georgia’s
Communist Party, Dzhumber Patiashvili, attempted unsuccessfully to contain the rising social
opposition. As demonstrations and hunger strikes increased, in April 1989 tens of thousands of
protestors took to the streets in Tbilisi paralyzing the city. The response from Moscow was swift
when Gorbachev directed an armed response resulting in the deaths of 20 innocent civilians at
the hands of Soviet soldiers.446 According to a declassified CIA report...
For Georgians, the killing of 20 Georgian demonstrators in Tbilisi by Soviet troops on 09 April 1989
was a turning point in the recent history of their nation and the spark for a meteoric growth of modern
Georgian nationalism and the drive for independence.447

In the wake of this massacre, the Georgian Communist Party lost all of its legitimacy ceding
influence and power to a galvanized political opposition that would lead to open parliamentary
elections in October 1990, a Georgian declaration of independence on 09 April 1991, and the
election of Zviad Gamsakhurdia as Georgia’s first post-Soviet president on 11 April 1991.
Although Gamsakhurdia may have been an ardent nationalist, who could move Georgian
society to action, his political ineptness, authoritarian tactics, and gravitation towards corruption
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elicited a strong socio-political backlash. The ensuing political crisis was made even more
difficult as a result of the ethnic conflict and separatist efforts in the provinces of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. As anarchy set in, a violent revolt followed resulting in the dissolution of
parliament and Gamsakhurdia’s removal from power in early January 1992.448 An interim State
Council was established to fill the political vacuum paving the way for the return of Eduard
Shevardnadze. A highly charismatic political leader, Shevardnadze was previously the first
secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia from 1972 until 1985
before becoming President Gorbachev’s minister of foreign affairs in 1985.449
Eduard Shevardnadze’s arrival to Tbilisi brought some semblance of stability to Georgia. By
October 1992, a new round of parliamentary elections resulted in Shevarnadze becoming
Georgia’s second head of state. Once in office, Shevardnadze, with Russian backing, was able to
affect a cessation of hostilities in the restive province of South Ossetia by June 1992. Despite
these gains, domestic political issues would consume Shevardnadze over the next several years
as conflict in Abkhazia raged and political oppositionists attempted on several occasions to
assassinate the head of state. In the words of Donald Rayfield, “the year 1995 was independent
Georgia’s nadir...”450 and the primary point of departure for deciphering Shevardnadze’s ideas
and beliefs about the state’s identity in a new age. From a 1994 peace agreement halting the
conflict in Abkhazia to the implementation of a new constitution in 1995, and a fresh round of
national elections solidifying Shevardnadze’s hold on power, one can now begin to garner the
Georgian president’s ideas about state identity.
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Eduard Shevardnadze’s State Identity Narratives and Georgia’s Alignment
Interviews with regional experts, coupled with a content analysis of his foreign policy
speeches indicate Eduard Shevardnadze gave primary emphasis to one political and two cultural
state identity narratives: independent, European and Western. A distant fourth, the Georgian
president also gave some emphasis to Georgia as a democratic state. Like Heydar and Ilham
Aliyev in Azerbaijan, Eduard Shevardnadze’s tendency to define the state as an independent
actor in international affairs was correlated with a preference for great power bridging.
As depicted in Chart 19 below, President Shevardnadze’s level of verbal cooperation with
Washington and Moscow crisscrossed during his time in office. According to one regional
expert, Shevardnadze’s state identity narratives were at times contradictory. On one hand, he
believed Georgia’s independence was a catalyst for a political and economic alignment with the
West; however, Georgia’s geographical location and economic reliance on Russia demanded he
remain tethered in various fashions to the country’s former imperial center.451
Chart 19: Eduard Shevardnadze's Alignment
Preferences with the U.S. and Russia
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

Verbal Cooperation with Russia

2000

2001

2002

2003

Verbal Cooper ation with U.S.

For the nine years in office, an independent Georgia was the primary state identity narrative
espoused by Eduard Shevardnadze. The level of importance afforded to this particular concept
by the Georgian president was made clear in his 1995 inaugural address. During this speech,
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Shevardnadze promoted the qualities of an independent Georgia and its increasing political,
economic, and security relevance to the stability of the South Caucasus, the European continent,
and the global order. In his words, “the image of Georgia as an independent, sovereign, and
democratic country on the international arena will become more profound in the next few
years.”452 For Shevardnadze, the breaking of the country’s Soviet bonds represented an
opportunity to craft a new set of foreign policies that would allow Georgia to establish
productive external relations with a wide array of other countries both near and far.
Shevardnadze’s adherence to an independent state identity narrative was nearly omnipresent
throughout his time in office. In 1998 Shevardnadze proclaimed “...however difficult the
situation may be, we must always bear in mind that independence and statehood are our greatest
achievements...”453 By 2003, there was little change in his ideas about the centrality of an
independent Georgia on the world stage. For example, during a press interview Shevardnadze
asserted, “we will use all available means and we will not spare our lives to defend our country's
independence... independence should be the main proviso for the realization of individual
aspirations and the happiness of each resident of Georgia. Only in this case will people see the
true value of independence.”454 Shevardnadze’s words clearly convey his ideas about the
importance of an independent Georgia and how these ideas also came to shape the Georgian
president’s preferences to align with multiple regional great powers.
There are at least two factors helping shape Shevardnadze’s ideas about Georgia as an
independent actor in international politics and his alignment preferences. The first centers on the
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issue of separatism within Georgia. Specifically, the provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia
remained a hotbed of separatist-related activity, which frequently would erupt into political and
social violence. This was particularly true in Abkhazia when in 1992 Abkhazian Supreme Soviet
Chairman Vladislav Ardzinba led an effort to secede from Georgia. The Georgian government’s
military response led to an intense period of violence that was halted only through a Russianbrokered peace agreement in July 1993. This agreement established a ceasefire between warring
parties, created a Georgian-Abkhazian-Russian control group to enforce the peace, and
authorized the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces to Abkhazia.455
Second, with Moscow anchored as a major party to the resolution of Georgia’s separatist
problems, this reality challenged Shevardnadze’s ideas about Georgia’s independence and the
necessity to align not only with Russia, but other major powers such as the United States, as a
way to achieve an enduring resolution. For example, in the late 1990s Shevardnadze’s shuttle
diplomacy helped establish a diplomatic alignment with the U.S. but not to the extent it would
undermine Tbilisi’s alignment with Russia on the separatist issue. As noted by Shevardnadze,
Can you imagine what Georgia would have been without the great material, financial, moral, and
political support and help provided by the United States and Europe? We have to strengthen these
trends. My visits are not directed against any other party. I will be happy if I manage to make my
humble contribution to understanding among the countries of the world.456

Beyond his independent state identity narrative, two cultural (European and Western) and one
ideological (democratic) narrative helped shape Shevardnadze’s tendency to prefer a great power
bridging alignment. Beginning in 1995 Eduard Shevardnadze viewed the state in European
terms. A content analysis of his foreign policy speeches revealed Shevardnadze’s emphasized
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how Georgia was an integral part of Europe and the West. Shevardnadze’s commitment to
steering the state and country towards the West endured through much of his political career. As
late as 2000, Shevardnadze frequently made reference to state’s identity as European. As
outlined in the state’s 2000 Foreign Policy Concept, Georgia was destined “to achieve full
integration into European political, economic, and security structures, thus fulfilling the
historical aspiration of the Georgian nation to participate fully in the European community…”457
The Western narrative would, by extension, convey to the United States. A prime example of the
relevance of Shevardnadze’s ideas about Georgia’s independence and an alignment preference
with the United States was seen in a statement from 2001. According to Shevardnadze, “since
Georgia is independent, we have ideal relations with the United States. It helps us hugely.”458
Finally, following closely behind Shevardnadze’s Western narrative was his articulation of
Georgia as a burgeoning democracy. As a supporting state identity narrative, the Georgian
president frequently called attention to his efforts to implement reforms designed to bolster civil
liberties, rule of law, and a level political playing field. From his 1995 inauguration speech,
Shevardnadze emphasized his ideas about the state’s democratic identity in world affairs noting
how, “the image of Georgia as an independent, sovereign, and democratic country on the
international arena will become more profound in the next few years.”459
Shevardnadze’s ideas about Georgia’s democratic identity were brought to the fore by his
corresponding beliefs that by taking the road to democracy would bring closer engagement with
the United States, Germany, France, and Great Britain. These engagements would then bring
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him, the state, and the country much needed foreign economic and diplomatic assistance to help
Georgia’s transition from Soviet rule. The importance of external support from the United States
and its allies in Europe was made clear as early as June 1995 when Shevardnadze said...
I do not think we need to explain how important the assistance by the EU, the United States, and other
countries is. Georgia will receive further political and financial assistance provided it takes an
irreversible road toward democratization and economic reforms. I believe, an agreement on
cooperation with the European Union, which is under preparation now, will play an extremely
important role.460

As in Azerbaijan under both presidents, Shevardnadze’s ideas about the state as a beacon of
democracy must be qualified however. Specifically, although Shevardnadze may have done well
to continuously frame the state as a ‘vanguard’ of democratic ideals, little progress was actually
achieved under his leadership. According to reporting from the Polity IV project,461 Georgia
under Eduard Shevardnadze was best understood as an anocracy with a mix of democratic and
authoritarian characteristics.462 Two factors contributing to this reality included Shevardnadze’s
lack of commitment to actually affecting ‘real’ democratic reforms and domestic political
opposition. Specifically, rampant corruption and political resistance to democratic reforms
helped ensure Georgia’s post-Soviet transition would be held in check. Taken together,
“...Shevardnadze himself increasingly fell back on his instincts and skills, honed during the
Brezhnev years, of managing the myriad of conflicting personalities that surrounded him rather
than solving policy problems and implementing necessary reforms.”463
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In summary, an examination of the alignment tendencies of Eduard Shevardnadze between
1995-2003 indicates this president primary viewed Georgia’s state identity as independent. In
concert with this characterization, Shevardnadze articulated several supporting state identities for
Georgia including European, Western, and to a lesser degree, democratic. With respect to his
ideas about alignment, Shevardnadze preferred great power bridging with the United States and
the Russian Federation for his entire political career.
Mikheil Saakashvili’s State Identity Narratives and Georgia’s Alignment
Shevardnadze’s hollow words on implementing democratic reforms to match his state identity
rhetoric, coupled with unabated corruption and the government’s inability to provide basic
services and supplies to the population set the conditions for his fall from power. Shevardnadze’s
domestic missteps and preference for great power bridging gave way to a “Rose Revolution” and
the rise of Mikheil Saakashvili as Georgia’s president from 2004 until 2013. In marked contrast
to Shevardnadze, Saakashvili primarily conceived the state’s identity as Western-European, free,
and democratic, which was associated with a preference for positive bandwagoning with the
United States.
As depicted in Chart 20 below, President Saakashvili consistently devoted higher levels of
verbal cooperation with Washington over Moscow for the 10 years under examination.
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Chart 20: Mikheil Saakashvili's Alignment
Preferences with the U.S. and Russia
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With Saakashvili’s ideas about the state defined in terms of Western, European, freedom, and
democratic, his pattern of verbal cooperation, as conceptualized in this research project,
correlates with a positive bandwagoning alignment with the United States. Although Saakashvili
still believed a cooperative approach with Moscow was necessary, the intensity and persistence
of the Georgian president’s verbal pronouncements was less than what was seen with
Washington. Interviews with various regional experts and an analysis of the secondary literature
validate this qualitative correlation. According to one area specialist, Georgia’s tumultuous
history under the Soviet Union and the prospect the Kremlin would seek to reestablish its
political control and influence the South Caucasus was a primary catalyst shaping the ideas and
beliefs of President Saakashvilli.464
From the moment he entered office, Mikheil Saakashvili’s ideas about the state and country
as Western and European were reflected in many of his foreign policy speeches. For example,
during his January 2004 inaugural address, Saakashvili had both the EU and Georgian flags on
display. During his remarks, he asserted, “today, we have not raising the European flag by
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accident. This flag is a Georgian flag as well, as far as it embodies our civilization, our culture,
the essence of our history and perspective, and our vision for our future.”465 His ideas here were
meant to place Georgia in the same light as other former Soviet republics (e.g. the Baltics) that
had been welcomed into the Euro-Atlantic fold. With such an early emphasis on viewing the
state and the country as European, it is no surprise to find Saakashvili would come to prefer a
positive bandwagoning alignment with the United States.
Saakashvili’s fervent ideas about the state’s European-Western identity were instrumental in
shaping his alignment preferences; many of which were reflected in his administration’s national
security documents. In 2005, the National Security Concept of Georgia explicitly referenced the
state’s alignment aspirations with the United States.
Georgia continues to develop its strategic partnership with the United States of America. From
the very day Georgia declared independence, the United States has strongly supported
development and strengthening of Georgia’s statehood, democracy, defense capabilities and
economy. Georgia’s pledge to become a full democracy with a viable market economy, and to its
aspirations to move toward European and Euro-Atlantic integration.466

...and Western Europe, where Georgia is best understood as...
...an integral part of the European political, economic and cultural area, whose fundamental
national values are rooted in European values and traditions [with the intent of achieving] full
integration into Europe's political, economic and security systems [and a] return to its European
tradition [as] an integral part of Europe.467

Saakashvili’s state identity narrative persisted through 2012 when the Georgian president’s ideas
were reflected in an updated national security concept, which stated “Georgia is a part of the
European and Euro-Atlantic space.”468 That same year, Saakashvili’s seized the opportunity to
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emphasize his alignment preferences by explicitly referencing his European-Western ideas in a
speech to NATO’s parliamentary assembly. In his words, Georgia’s “...NATO aspiration is an
integral part of our identity... the bedrock of [our] values...”469
Following closely behind Saakashvili’s ideas about Georgia as a member of Western
civilization, the Georgian president gave emphasis to the state as a beacon of freedom in the
West’s outer rim where the ‘Russian Bear’ and its authoritarian tendencies cast a long shadow of
opposition to Tbilisi’s Western trajectory. An example of Saakashvili’s commitment to the idea
of the Georgian state as one based on freedom was seen in his May 2005 speech from ‘Freedom
Square’ during the first-ever visit by a U.S. President, George W. Bush. As Saakashvili so
eloquently stated, “...Georgians have fought everywhere for freedom... [and] George Bush's
presence here is confirmation of what unity can achieve, our common quest for freedom...”470
Saakashvili’s articulation of freedom as a key element of the Georgian state remained
generally constant from 2004 through 2013 with two notable spikes; one in 2005 and the second
in the 2011-2012. As just noted in the preceding paragraph, President Bush’s visit to Georgia
likely amplified Saakashvili’s ideas about this state identity concept. The increase in 2011 and
2012Saakashvili’s last years in officelikely reflected his frustration over his beliefs about
Russian meddling in the country’s parliamentary elections.
[Russia] ...thought that now is the right time to use [a] different approach with [the] Georgians;
they thought: “We’ve failed through economic embargos, provocations, explosions and
invasion… maybe the Georgian people are now tired and as a result of these elections…let’s
seize this beautiful country with kind words and bribes.” No. We will have freedom, we want
Europe, we want NATO, we want development and better life.471
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Given Saakashvili’s inclination to define the state as a vanguard element for freedom, it is not
surprising democracy was his third idea about the state’s identity. Saakashvili’s conceptions of
the Georgian state as democratic was made visible in his 2005 speeches about how open and free
elections were held at the national, parliamentary, and regional elections in Georgia. These
achievements moved Freedom House to improve Georgia’s freedom rating from 4 to 3 (partly
free).472 The extent to which democracy was regarded as a major thread in Saakashvili’s ideas
about the state were illuminated in a 2006 speech in response to Russian economic sanctions. In
his words, “[Georgia] cannot be broken...we want democracy and to live in a country like the
Germans, Dutch, Czechs, Poles, Estonians, Lithuanians, Latvians and other free citizens in other
free countries.”473 As a point of emphasis, democracy for Saakashvilli should not be regarded as
a bottom-up process. On the contrary, the Georgian president believed democratization must be a
top-down process. Any bottom-up approach was viewed as suspect and a potential threat to his
hold on power. Additionally, democratization took a backseat to Saakashvilli’s quest to join
NATO. For example, Saakashvilli’s 2007 heavy-handed crackdown on prison riots demonstrated
he still viewed authoritarian tactics against civilians as a useful tactic to maintain order.474
From Saakashvili’s ideas about Georgia as a democratic state, one can discern several
important points about the relationship between his ideas about the state’s identity and alignment
preferences. Under Saakashvili, the compatibility of his ideas about the state with those enduring
state identity narratives in America and Western Europe led him to prefer positive bandwagoning
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with the United States. The extent to which Saakashvili believed his ideas about an alignment
with the U.S. were made clear during his visit to Washington in February 2004.
Georgia has a special relationship with the United States of America. I make this claim that this
evaluation is based on the realization that Georgians and Americans share a common set of
values. We share common beliefs and common aspirations to make our societies more free and
more prosperous. We believe in government that serves people. We believe in the sacred
principle that the power of the State derives from its citizens and that no man is above the law.
These values, which were at the very core of the Revolution, have served to re-enforce the bonds
that unites our countries and our peoples!475

Second, the convergence of state identities was a catalyst for similar national interests
involving security and economic prosperity. According to a Georgian government official, “the
world order that the US and the EU promote is fully in the interests of Georgia.”476 Given the
preceding, one can begin to understand how the compatibility of identities between a small state
and regional great power may have a direct or indirect impact on the alignment of Georgia with
the United States. From one perspective, the intensity of Saakashvili’s conceptualizations of the
state as Western, free, and democratic exerted a direct impact on the Georgian president’s
predilection to align with the U.S. over Russia. Under Shevardnadze, his personal interests (e.g.
stay in power) and his conceptions of the national interests (domestic security and stability as
well as the removal of Russian military forces to just name a few) drove him towards a great
power bridging.477
Giorgi Margvelashvili’s State Identity Narratives and Georgia’s Alignment
In 2012, Saakashvili’s United National Movement (UNM) party suffered a defeat at the hands
of the Georgian Dream, a coalition of political parties led by Bidzina Ivanishvili. The following
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year at the end of his two terms in office, President Giorgi Margvelashvili replaced Saakashvili
in a national election that witnessed a peaceful transfer of power at the highest levels of
government. During the two years under examination, President Margvelashvili emphasized two
cultural, one political, and one ideological state identity narratives. In order of importance,
Margvelashvili viewed Georgia as European, Western, free, and democratic.
As depicted in Chart 21 below, President Margvelashvili consistently devoted higher levels of
verbal cooperation with Washington over Moscow. With Margvelashvili’s ideas about the state
defined in terms of European, Western, freedom, and democratic, his pattern of verbal
cooperation correlates with a positive bandwagoning preference with the United States.
Chart 21: Giorgi Margvelashvili’s Alignment
Preferences with the U.S. and Russia
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Margvelashvili also believed a cooperative approach with Moscow was necessary in order to
restore Georgia’s territorial integrity following South Ossetia and Abkhazia’s declaration of
independence. However, the intensity of Margvelashvili’s verbal pronouncements toward the
United Statesnearly double of what was observed with Russiapoints toward a positive
bandwagoning alignment. This finding is validated from area specialists, who note
Margvelashvili initially sought to mend relations with Moscow by tempering his and the ruling
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governments confrontational rhetoric; however, he was adamant in his ideas about Georgia’s
alignment with the U.S. and its Western European allies.478
A European-Western state identity narrative dominated Giorgi Margvelashvili’s foreign
policy discourse. The intensity of the Georgian president’s ideas about the state in these
categories were nearly 2.5 times higher than his predecessor. Margvelashvili’s fervent beliefs
about Georgia’s European-Western identity were revealed during his November 2013
inauguration. In his speech, Margvelashvili stated, “as an individual, a Georgian national is
European in terms of self-awareness and an integral part of Western civilization by nature. Until
now, however, we have failed to translate our being European into institutional dimensions.”479
For Margvelashvili, Georgia was unequivocally a Western state without few linkages to Russia.
A contributing factor to Margvelashvili’s high verbal cooperation stems, in part, from his
ideas about Westernizing the state’s institutions. In this case, Margvelashvili firmly believed
Georgia was a historical and integral part of Europe and that as president, he had a mandate to
move the country along this path. From one perspective, while Saakashvili had done rather well
to implement reform and move Georgia along a Western trajectory, much work still had to be
done in terms of setting the cultural and political conditions for an enduring presence of these
conceptions at the state level.480 Once achieved, any attempt to associate Georgia as being within
Russia’s geopolitical orbit would become null and void.
Following the pattern set by Mikheil Saakashvili, freedom was another primary state identity
narrative articulated by President Margvelashvili from 2014 to 2015. The content analysis
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revealed Margvelashvili gave emphasis to the terms free and freedom as supporting narratives in
his foreign policy discourse. In 2015, the value placed on this identity narrative was made clear
in the Georgian president’s remarks to Polish leaders. From Margvelashvili, Georgia has been
able to overcome a myriad of political and economic challenges because there were political
leaders in Western governments, who shared his same commitment and respect for upholding the
principle of freedom in world affairs.481 For Margvelashvili, freedom would become a thread
binding Georgia to the U.S. and other like-minded states
Finally, this study’s content analysis of President Margvelashvili’s speeches indicates
democracy was the third-most emphasized state identity narrative. An excellent example
illuminating the relationship between his ideas about the Georgian state as democratic and his
alignment preferences is found in the president’s November 2013 inaugural address. In this
speech, Margvelashvili states, “Georgia’s democratic and peaceful development and economic
growth constitute the cornerstone of our public policy. All this will enable us to overcome
challenges facing our country and ensure that it develops into a reliable international partner.”482
Under Margvelashvili’s rule, Georgia made substantial progress in implementing democratic
reforms, garnering a 3-ranking from Freedom House for the period 2014-2015. This was
significant because during Saakashvili’s last several years in office, Georgia’s ranking dropped
to a “4 rating” as a result of his semi-authoritarian tactics.483
In summary, in examining the alignment tendencies of Georgian presidents between 1995 and
2015, this study finds that when a president gave emphasis to an independent state identity
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narrative, the volatility of their verbal cooperation with the United States and Russian Federation
was higher indicating a proclivity for great power bridging. This was the case with Eduard
Shevardnadze. Separately, when Georgian presidents conceptualized the state in terms of
Western-European, democratic and one based on freedom, verbal cooperation with the U.S. was
consistently higher. This pattern was seen with Presidents Saakashvili and Margvelashvili, who
preferred a positive bandwagoning alignment with the United States.
Moldova
During the Soviet era, political opposition in the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic could
be best described as fragmented and unorganized given the ability of communist leaders to
successfully prevent the formation of any viable political opposition to the ruling government.484
As a result, although ethnic Moldovans occupied the highest positions in the state apparatus,
these individuals towed the party line in articulating a state identity that conformed to Kremlin
directives until the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev. In a similar manner to what occurred in
Azerbaijan and Georgia, perestroika and glasnost created an opportunity for open political
expression in Moldova by all of the country’s ethnic groups. Although slow to start, by 1989 a
collective of political and cultural groups had banded together to form the Moldovan Popular
Front (MPF). Following Moldova’s first democratic elections in February 1990, Mircea Snegur,
a communist, became the MPF’s chairman and eventually the president following the country’s
declaration of independence on 27 August 1991.485
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In parallel with Snegur’s rise to the presidency and the MPF’s radical nationalist policies,
which included a union with Romania, the permissive political environment elicited calls for
independence by various minority groups. In southern Moldova, the Turkic-speaking Orthodox
Christians, who made up the Gaguaz minority and hardline communists in the Transnistria
declared their own independence in August 1990.486 In response, Snegur’s strong-armed
response resulted in widespread violence in the separatist areas, particularly in the
Transnistria.487 The introduction of Russian military forces in June 1992 on the side of the
separatists brought a halt to the violence in the Transnistria. The following month, President
Snegur and Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed an agreement in Moscow, which established
of a formal ceasefire and a guarantee of limited autonomy for the Transnistria.488
The shock of Moldova’s transition from Soviet rule began to subside in 1995 owing to several
key events. First, in March 1994 a new round of parliamentary elections saw the exit of the MPF
and its radical nationalist members as the Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova, with its less
zealous national agenda, gained a majority in the legislature. Second, in August 1994 parliament
ratified a new constitution formalizing Transnistria and Gagauzia’s autonomy in the new
republic. Third, and perhaps the most important, in 1994 a national referendum on the country’s
statehood found nearly 98 percent of the population favored Moldova’s continued independence
and non-union with Romania.489 These factors helped establish higher levels of political stability
in the government through 1997 when Petru Lucinschi replaced Mircea Snegur as the country’s
second president.
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Petru Lucinschi’s State Identity Narratives and Moldova’s Alignment
In 1997, Petru Lucinschi assumed the presidency in Moldova after defeating incumbent
Mircea Snegur in a run-off election that saw Lucinschi receiving 54 percent of the popular vote.
Frustrated with Snegur’s inability to resolve the situation in the Trans-Dniester and a struggling
economy, Moldovans believed the best way forward was through the leadership of Petru
Lucinschi.490 For the time he was in office (1997-2000), a content analysis of his foreign policy
speeches reveal he primarily viewed the state as independent, European, and democratic.

Chart 22: Petru Lucinschi’s Alignment
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As depicted in Chart 22 above, President Lucinschi devoted varying levels of verbal
cooperation with the U.S. and Russia from 1999 to 2000; however, a lack of available event data
in 1997-1998 between Lucinschi and the U.S. prevents a more detailed analysis of this indicator.
Interviews with area specialist and an analysis of the secondary literature indicate the Lucinschi
tended to retain a multi-faceted conception of the state’s identity and a preference for great
power bridging.
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Moldova as an independent state was one of Lucinschi’s top state identity narratives while in
office. Much of Lucinschi’s oratory comments in this category focused predominately on
Romania, Russia, and the unresolved situation in the Trans-Dniester. The Moldovan president
also tended to emphasize the importance of using Moldova’s independence to establish mutually
beneficial foreign relations with other major international powers to include the United States,
Russia, and countries in Western Europe.491 Such an approach would help him to bolster the
country’s fledging economy and to re-establish the country’s territorial integrity. Lucinschi’s
ideas about the importance of the state’s independence and his preference for great power
bridging was made clear when he stated...
Small countries differ from large ones in that they may assert themselves only by pursuing an active
foreign policy. Only by making joint efforts can we overcome our uneasy transitional period. Having
done so, we shall be able to start fulfilling the main strategic task of strengthening our state system,
independence and sovereignty.492

The relationship between Lucinschi’s independent state identity narrative and his alignment
preferences were also on display in 1997. According to the Moldovan president...
In my opinion Moldova has simply begun to find its place. We do not want to move away from
Romania to an extent which would deteriorate our relations with it, but we also do not want to
approach Moscow so closely that this will evoke fears of losing our independence. We are a non-bloc
state, and we are of no a danger to anybody. All we want is respect for our independence. We have a
specific multinational population. Therefore, we have to be very careful and we cannot bend to one
side or to the other, for in such situation we will always be an instable country.493

In concert with President Lucinschi’s independent state identity narrative, he also viewed the
state and Moldova writ large as European. During a 1998 interview, Lucinschi emphasized on
how it was necessary for all Moldovans to embrace the idea of European patriotism. According
to Lucinschi, “[European] patriotism may become a unifying idea for the citizens of the country
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which means that people should be masters in their homes and citizens of Big Europe...I think
that a sense of belonging to the European civilization and culture should be common for us
despite the natural differences.”494 President Lucinschi’s ideas on Moldova as a European state
would subsequently guide his alignment preferences steering the country towards economic
integration with the EU. In 1997 Moldova petitioned to become an EU Associate member and by
1998, parliament had ratified the 1994 EU Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.495
Petru Lucinschi’s European state identity narrative had its limits however. On one hand, he
envisioned Moldova as being economically aligned with Western Europe. On the other hand,
Lucinschi did not believe Moldova should be exclusively committed to a Western alignment
with the United States and its European allies. For example, in 1999 Lucinschi noted how just
because Moldova seeks to be a part of Europe, this does not mean the state is ‘pro-Western.’ In
his words, “we [Moldova] strive for integration into Europe as an independent, sovereign state
with its own specific identity and we do not want to lose that identity...”496 While Lucinschi
placed high value on Moldova’s European identity, his ideas about the state as an independent
actor and the necessity to align with multiple regional great powers took precedence.
Finally, Petru Lucinschi’s foreign policy discourse indicated he viewed the Moldovan state as
democratic. The frequency of his usage of terms democracy, democratic, and democratization,
while important, occurred at a lower frequency than the European and independent narratives.
For example, in 1998 during his speech at the UN General Assembly, Lucinschi emphasized his
ideas about Moldova as a transitioning democratic state noting how his government was,
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“committed to the path of democracy... [and how] Moldova is steadily striving to create basic
institutions for the rule of law and the legislative framework necessary for transition to a market
economy.”497 Although plagued by many institutional and organizational challenges, Moldova
under Lucinschi continued to make progress on political reforms even eliciting the praise of
President Clinton in 1998, who referred to Moldova as a model of democracy.498
Vladimir Voronin’s State Identity Narratives and Moldova’s Alignment
Over the course of his 4-year presidential term, Petru Lucinschi attempted to bolster his
powers by aggressively pushing for a presidential republic. By 2000, frustrated MPs in
parliament had enough of Lucinschi’s political maneuvers and passed an amendment to the
constitution transforming Moldova into a parliamentary republic. According to Paul Quinlan,
parliament’s actions were not meant to further bolster Moldova’s move towards democracy, but
to simply rid themselves of Lucinschi.499 Following this change to the constitution and the
country’s continued economic decline, in February 2001 Moldovans voted overwhelmingly for
the Party of Moldovan Communists resulting in their acquisition of 71 of the 101 seats.500 By
April 2001, parliament had selected Vladimir Voronin to be Moldova’s next president.
Once in office, this study finds Vladimir Voronin exhibited the most diverse set of state
identity narratives of any president under examination. Additionally, this study finds that there
were two distinct periods in which Voronin exhibited different sets of state identity narratives.
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From 2001-2002, Voronin tended to primarily view the state in Eastern-Eurasian terms and as
communist, which was associated with a preference for positive bandwagoning with Russia.
After 2003 and until the end of his presidency, Voronin viewed the state predominately as
independent with a democratic narrative in support.
Chart 23: Vladimir Voronin’s Alignment
Preferences with the U.S. and Russia
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According to one area expert, Moldova is like a “checkerboard” when it comes to state
identity and as a result, Voronin tended to keep his narratives purposely ambiguous in order to
pursue his multi-vector foreign policies.501 As depicted in Chart 23 below, President Voronin’s
initial emphasis on defining the state as Eastern-Eurasian and communist was associated with a
markedly higher level of verbal cooperation with Russia. Beginning in 2003, Voronin’s level of
verbal cooperation with the U.S. and Russia oscillated between both regional great powers
reflecting his preference to follow a great power bridging alignment.
Vladimir Voronin’s State Identity Narratives (2001-2002). Once installed as Moldova’s third
president, Voronin immediately began framing the state’s identity in Eastern-Eurasian terms.
During this time, Voronin frequently referred to his party’s communist ideals as a basis from
which to chart a fresh approach to the country’s relations with external powers. A content
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analysis of Voronin’s foreign policy speeches during 2001 and 2002 indicate he primary viewed
the state as Eastern and/or Eurasian with a secondary emphasis defining the state as communist.
Voronin’s ideas about the state’s characterization as Eastern-Eurasian were, in part, a
reflection of his frustrations with his predecessor’s inability to resolve the country’s problems in
Transnistria and with the economy. From Voronin’s perspective, Snegur and Lucinschi had
placed too much faith in the West to help Chisinau with its socio-economic problems. In his
inaugural speech in 2001 Voronin asserted, “Moldova is now a zone of humanitarian
catastrophe, poverty and primitive state policy; the notions 'democracy, reform, rule of law' have
become synonyms of 'corruption, stagnation, poverty'.”502 For Voronin, Moldova’s road to
success lay to the east with Russia, the CIS, and their corresponding economic and political
support. For example, from an economic perspective, Chisinau remained highly reliant on
Russian energy supplies and had chalked up a significant amount of debt to Moscow over the
first decade of the country’s independence.503 On the issue of Transnistria, Voronin firmly
believed a favorable resolution could be realized by giving the Kremlin increased latitude to
solve the problem on terms favorable to his ruling government. Voronin’s ideas about Russia’s
crucial role in the country’s development and the state’s foreign affairs were made clear in 2001
when he stated...
We see Russia as a guarantor of the process of political settlement of the Trans-Dniester problem
[and] our first steps will be towards economic integration not only with the Russia-Belarus Union but
with the Eurasian community of the CIS member-states.504
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As the leader of Moldova’s Communist Party, it is not surprising Voronin’s ideas about the
state as one defined by the principles of communism was a second supporting identity narrative.
For the period 2001-2002, Voronin’s frequently gave emphasis to communist narratives during
his foreign policy speeches and interviews. Voronin’s increased emphasis on his ideas about
Moldovan communism stem in part from the country’s poor economic standing and how
previous administrations, which had emphasized a Western open market system were wrong. By
employing a discourse that reflected a theme of the state’s struggle to overcome poverty, “the
ideas of social justice, fraternity, [and] internationalism..., which existed in our communist party
under the Soviet power”505 would help Moldova to regain a respected position in world affairs
and return a sense of dignity to all Moldovans.506
Finally, during his first two years in office Vladimir Voronin sometimes viewed Moldova as
European. Although Voronin’ ideas about the state’s path lie to the east, the European facet was
not totally excluded from his conceptions of Moldova’s role in world politics. For example, in
early 2001 Voronin stated, “...as it concerns the West, as regards to integration in the European
community, we do not object to entering it, but no one is throwing the doors open to us, first of
all. Secondly, it would be great if we were able to enter it together with Russia, Belarus and other
CIS member-states, it would be more correct.”507 However, Voronin’s European narrative was
not meant to usurp his ideas about the state’s Eastern-Eurasian identity. From one perspective,
Voronin’s European narrative was a signal he was prepared to engage in routine interstate
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relations with other major powers, but his preference for a positive bandwagoning alignment
with Russia was the number one and only priority.
Vladimir Voronin’s State Identity Narratives (2003-2009). Beginning in 2003, this study’s
content analysis finds that for the remaining years in office Vladimir Voronin tended to view the
state as independent, European, and democratic. Voronin’s discourse on Moldova as an
independent state was the president’s primary state identity narrative. Voronin’s ideas about this
concept was grounded in his beliefs that only an independent Moldova would become a
prosperous country capable of promoting its own active foreign policies. For example, President
Voronin’s ideas about Moldova as an independent actor in world affairs were made explicit in
2006 when he noted,
We [Moldova] cannot endlessly give up our goals and interests in order to please someone else,
neighbors or friends, who are strategic or less strategic and who have various goals. We should think
and continue to solve strategic problems, which will indeed guarantee our country's sovereignty and
independence, not only through declarative statements, coat-of-arms, anthem and other state symbols,
but in depth, economically, socially and, last but not the least, politically.508

More so than his predecessor, the separatist issue in the Trans-Dniester was a key internalexternal factor negatively impacting Voronin’s ideas on independence.509 Additionally, the
presence of Russian military forces on sovereign Moldovan soil and Moscow’s political backing
of separatist leaders in Tiraspol were major obstacles to Voronin’s ideas of Moldova as a fully
independent actor in world politics. Although Voronin initially looked to Russia for a peaceful
resolution, Moscow’s ‘Kozak Memorandum’ put demands on Chisinau that would further erode
the country’s independence. The Kremlin’s actions subsequently reinforced Voronin’s ideas
about the merits of a great power bridging alignment with external powers.
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Voronin’s ideas about Moldova as an independent state increasingly conveyed to the United
States. For example, in 2004 Voronin sent a message to President George W. Bush’s stating,
“We [Moldova] highly assess the US support for strengthening Moldova's statehood, unity and
sovereignty, including ...the United States' involvement in finding a viable solution for the
Dniester Region conflict.”510 For Voronin, an independent Moldova would help the ruling
government to seek out the assistance of other regional great powers on all the issues pressing
the state. More importantly, emphasizing Moldovan’s independence, Voronin could avoid a
repeat of another situation similar to the Kozak Memorandum.
Although Voronin’s state identity narrative about Moldovan independence gave increased
emphasis to the United States and Europe, Russia remained an important element in his
alignment preference equation. According to Voronin, the “interests of tiny Moldova cannot
concentrate on one place only. We must be wherever our interests are. But we cannot stop our
relations with Russia, which have been developing for more than 300 years. These relations are
in Moldovans' genetic code, and I cannot break them.”511 It is from Voronin’s focus on
independence and the Trans-Dniester we are able to begin to sketch the contours of his
preference for great power bridging.
A secondary state identity helping to bring Voronin’s alignment preference for great power
bridging was his ideas that Moldova was also part of the European landscape. For example,
speaking in August 2003 Voronin proclaimed,
For Moldova, this [European integration] is also the most reliable mechanism to regain
territorial integrity, to guarantee the protection of its ethnic and cultural identity and to ensure
civil rights for all nationalities living in our country. Therefore, the program for Moldova's
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European integration is the country's main strategic document. It is a document that stands
above party programs or current tasks of all the branches of the power.512
Voronin’s European discourse continued to resonate in his foreign policy speeches through the
latter part of his presidential career when in 2007, he noted how “Moldova has proven its
capability for being a sovereign and independent nation. It has a European future it won't waive.
We have certain problems and principles, and we will seek the EU membership together with
friends.”513 For Voronin, emphasizing Moldova’s ‘Europeaness’ could help open the door to
closer relations with countries in the West, to include the United States.
President Voronin’s European narrative did not come at the exclusion of Russia however. On
an almost regular basis, Voronin reminded domestic and international audiences that just because
he believed Moldova was part of Europe’s geopolitical landscape, he remained committed to
maintaining the state’s alignment with Russia. Speaking in 2005, Voronin’s preference for a
great power bridging alignment was made clear when he stated, “we have defined Moldova's
strategic vector as European integration. But that does not mean that we are turning our back on
[Russia]. That is too primitive.”514
Finally, Voronin’s state identity discourse indicates he gave increased emphasis to the concept
of democracy and its applicability to the Moldovan state. For example, during a November 2003
Council of Europe meeting in Chisinau, Voronin underscored the state’s continuing progress on
implementing institutional reforms as a way to accelerate the country’s movement along the path
of democracy.515 While Voronin may have spoken highly of the state’s transition to democracy,
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various government and non-government agencies had mixed reviews on Moldova’s democratic
progress. For example, Moldova’s Polity scores under Lucinschi (2001-2004) rose from 7 to 8
(democracy). From 2005 until Voronin left office, Moldova’s Polity score rose to 9, reflecting
the country’s continued progress at implementing democratic reforms.516 However, the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) found Moldova’s democracy rating
during this time should be placed in proper context because too much political power still resided
with Vladimir Voronin and his inner circle. According to a USAID report,
This concentration of power in the executive branch builds on Moldova’s Soviet heritage of central
authority and citizen apathy. While somewhat constrained by their agreement with the opposition
following the 2005 elections, central authorities continue to outweigh all other voices both in the
opposition and in the wider society -- to the detriment of democratic development.517

Nicolae Timofti’s State Identity Narratives and Moldova’s Alignment
In the years between Vladimir Voronin’s downfall in 2009 and the rise of Nicolae Timofti as
president in 2012, the Moldovan state experienced a political stalemate that lasted nearly three
years in which the country witnessed the installation of two interim presidents Mihai Ghimpu
(2009-2010) and Marian Lupu (2011). In April 2009 following a contested parliamentary
election, which returned Vladimir Voronin’s Party of Communists for the Republic of Moldova
(PCRM) to power, nationwide anti-communist protests and the failure of the newly-established
legislature to elect a new president resulted in the dissolution of parliament. After a second round
of elections in July 2009, four parties (the Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova, the Liberal
Party, the Democratic Party of Moldova, and Our Moldova Alliance) formed a new
parliamentary majority under the name of the Alliance for the European Integration (AEI). With
the appointment of President Mihai Ghimpu as interim president, AEI represented the death knell
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for Vladimir Voronin and his communist party’s decisive hold on power in Moldova.518 In 2011,
as Moldova’s political turbulence continued, the Democratic Party’s Marian Lupu became
interim president. Together, both interim presidents exhibited a high degree of foreign policy
impotence owing to their inability to wield enough power to shape decisively the country’s
domestic and foreign policies amidst high levels of political opposition.
It was not until March 2013 when political elites in Moldova’s parliament would achieve a
consensus electing Nicolae Timofti, an independent and former Chairman of the Supreme
Council of Magistrates, as president. From 2012 to 2015, a content analysis of President
Timofti’s foreign policy speeches revealed he concentrated on four state identities, with
emphasis going to two cultural narratives (European and Western), one political (freedom), and
one ideological (democratic).
Overlaying Timofti’s state identity narratives with his level of verbal cooperation with Russia
and the U.S. indicates a preference by the Moldovan president to follow a positive
bandwagoning alignment with Washington. Specifically, from 2012-2015, Timofti’s alignment
preferences did not follow in the footsteps of predecessors with this Moldovan president
registering higher levels of verbal cooperation with the United States than the Russian Federation
as depicted in Chart 24 below.
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Chart 24: Nicolae Timofti’s Alignment
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One notable difference distinguishing Nicolae Timofti from Presidents Lucinschi and
Voronin was how he devoted more emphasis to a European-Western state identity narrative for
Moldova over all others. Specifically, Timofti gave emphasis to a European narrative during his
speeches and interviews at a rate five-times more than what was observed with other
narratives.519 According to Timofti, “it is obvious that Moldova belongs to the European
civilization. The EU standards are taken over and adjusted naturally by our institutions and by
entire Moldovan society. Moldova is part of the European culture...”520 The president’s ideas
about Moldova as integral part of Europe endured throughout his presidency. Speaking in 2015,
Timofti asserted, we will “...continue our European integration efforts and continue to maintain
the rhythm of the reforms in all the sectors. People need to believe in Moldova’s European future
and be sure that the chosen path is a correct one.”521
Timofti’s beliefs that Moldova should be viewed by other states in the international system as
European and Western served as a point of departure for his ideas about the high utility of an
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alignment with the United States and other countries in this regional great power’s orbit.
Speaking in 2014 about the critical importance of the United States to Moldova and how leading
powers in Europe could facilitate a closer alignment with Washington Timofti concluded...
I am firmly convinced that the friendship and cooperation relations between Moldova and the
USA will continue to develop dynamically for the benefit of both countries and nations. We are
streamlined to become part of a community of prosperous countries, relations between which are
based on observance of international law. Association with the EU allows us to contribute to
promoting peace and security at international level, to participate in preventing and settling crisis
within the UN missions, OSCE, and in partnership with NATO.522

For President Timofti, his heavy emphasis on defining the state as European were driven by his
beliefs of how closer economic integration with the West could potentially bring the country
increased political stability and economic prosperity.
Timofti’s preference for positive bandwagoning with the United States did not change his
ideas about how Moldova’s ongoing economic and political activities with Russia should still
continue unhindered. This was especially true with cross-border trade and Russia’s role with the
frozen conflict in the Trans-Dniester. According to Timofti, “... I would like to underline that
Moldova’s European choice does not mean hostility towards our partners from the
Commonwealth of Independent States, including Russia. I believe that these countries, with
which we have traditional cooperation ties, will have only to gain together with a stronger and
more prosperous Moldova.”523
Next, President Timofti’s state identity discourse indicated he held ideas about Moldova as a
democracy and one based on freedom. During many of his public addresses, Timofti highlighted
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how the state has made significant progress with implementing democratic reforms. The
Moldovan president would also note the extent to which democracy had taken root at all levels of
government. For example, speaking in July 2012 Timofti declared democracy was the country’s
only path and to fully realize the goal of Moldova joining with the “big family of the
democracies”524 in the West. His ideas on this concept continued through 2014 when during his
speech to mark the 20th anniversary of the country’s constitution, Timofti emphasized how the
country’s transition from totalitarian rule to one based on the principles of democracy had
markedly improved rule of law and bolstered the human rights and freedoms for all
Moldovans.525 Finally, the Moldovan president also viewed Moldova as one built on the value of
freedom. Speaking in 2014 during a national ceremony to commemorate Europe Day, Timofti
emphasized how freedom was a cornerstone for the Moldovan state and its membership in the
Western community.526
In summary, between 1997 and 2015, Presidents Lucinschi, Voronin, and Timofti framed the
state’s identity in political, cultural, and ideological terms. In all three cases, each president’s
state identity narratives were multi-faceted with each predominately viewing the state through a
political and/or ideological lens. As was seen in Azerbaijan with Heydar and Ilham Aliyev as
well as in Georgia with Eduard Shevardnadze, Moldovan presidents (Lucinschi and Voronin
(after 2003)), who primary viewed the state as independent tended to vary their respective levels
of verbal cooperation with the United States and Russia, which was associated with a great
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power bridging preference. When Western-European and/or democracy and freedom were
emphasized, as was the case with President Timofti, a higher level of verbal cooperation with the
United States was observed indicating a positive bandwagoning preference with Washington.
Ukraine
Prior to the downfall of the Soviet Union, political elites occupying the highest positions in
the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) espoused state identity narratives that mirrored the
political and ideological dictates of the Kremlin. It was once again Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies
of transparency and restructuring that became lightning rods for change in the Ukrainian SSR.
Here, Ukraine’s independence can be attributed to several key factors. First, in the Ukrainian
SSR there already existed political, cultural, and administrative structures inside the state
apparatus capable of affecting positive change within the limits of Gorbachev’s policies.527
Second, following the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident there emerged an ecological movement
inside society that would increasingly gain influence and power to challenge the ruling
government.
These two factors help set the conditions for the establishment of one of the country’s first
civil-political movements known as the People’s Movement of Ukraine for Reconstruction or
RUKH in 1989 and open parliamentary elections in 1990. As a pro-communist organization, the
RUKH did not necessarily seek independence, desiring to see a change in the state’s identity
whereby Ukraine was not simply a Soviet satellite but a republic best understood as Ukrainian
and of equal status with the center.528 Although the communists were still able to maintain a
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majority in the Rada (Ukraine’s parliament) following the March 1990 parliamentary elections,
the Democratic Bloc, consisting of the RUKH and various ecological groups were able to gain
approximately 88 seats.529 The Ukrainian SSR’s new legislative configuration would
subsequently pave the way for the Rada to issue a declaration of sovereignty in July 1990
followed by a declaration of independence on 24 August 1991, and the election of Leonid
Kravchuk as the country’s first president in December 1991.530
Leonid Kuchma’s State Identity Narratives and Ukraine’s Alignment
Leonid Kravchuk’s tenure as Ukraine’s first president would last until 1994 when the
country’s dire economic situation and high political opposition forced him to call an early
national election. Following a contested election, Leonid Kuchma became Ukraine’s second
president in July 1994 winning 52 percent of the vote with many Ukrainians from the country’s
east backing his political bid.531 From 1995 until the end of his presidential career, an analysis of
Kuchma’s foreign policy speeches, interviews, and press statements indicates he conceptualized
the state’s identity in three ways. Kuchma primarily viewed state as independent (political).
Supporting narratives included European (cultural) and democratic (ideological).
As depicted in Chart 25 below, President Kuchma’s level of verbal cooperation with
Washington and Moscow varied up and down during the ten years under examination.
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Chart 25: Leonid Kuchma’s Alignment
Preferences with the U.S. and Russia
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According to one regional expert, Kuchma’s state identity narratives were somewhat
unpredictable at times. On one hand, Kuchma would emphasize Ukraine’s identity as one in the
same with Russia based on their shared histories. On the other hand, Kuchma would seemingly
turn his back on Russia by embracing Western and European ideals centered on democracy,
freedom, and civil liberties.532 Kuchma’s vision of Ukraine with one foot in the West and the
other in the East contributed to his preference for great power bridging with the U.S. and Russia.
A primary state identity narrative for Kuchma was his tendency to view Ukraine as an
independent actor in the international arena. In 1996, Kuchma heavily emphasized the country’s
independent status in world affairs asserting, “as far as Ukraine’s independence is concerned, let
us proceed from the fact that we have an independent state and that it depends primarily on us
[and an]... independent and sovereign Ukraine... is a signpost on our road to Europe.”533
Kuchma’s strict adherence to the idea that Ukraine was an independent state was a point not
missed by academics or practitioners alike. For example, John Edwin Mroz and Oleksandr
Pavliuk find Kuchma was best viewed as an ardent defender of Ukraine’s independence and his
nationalist fervor represents a linchpin in the development of the state’s foreign policies.534
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Kuchma’s ideas and beliefs about the state have their origins, in part, from his time as a
leading figure in the Soviet Union’s rocket and space technologies industry. From these
experiences, Kuchma’s expert management skills served him well as a pragmatic leader, who
would pursue a strategy of great power bridging dealing with Russia and the United States in
ways beneficial to not only his ruling government but Ukraine as well. Ukraine’s sense of
independence under Kuchma was critical as he made every effort to establish a precedent for
making the country not a distinct part of the new Russian Federation in any way. In his book,
Ukraine is not Russia, Kuchma makes reference to the many divisions in the country, singling
out the differences between Ukrainians in the western part of the country, who wanted to align
with the West with those in the east, who preferred close foreign relations with Russia.
Additionally, Kuchma’s ideas and beliefs about the state’s identity and external threats were
based on his keen awareness of Russian and Ukrainian history. In this case, the centuries of
domination by the Russian empire and Soviet Union instilled a sense of urgency for Kuchma to
craft a set of foreign policies that made Ukraine an independent actor in the world arena. In his
1995 Independence Day speech, Kuchma stated, “the emergence of the Ukrainian independent
state on the political map of the world became one of the most outstanding events in the world
history of the second half of the 20th century and is a natural result of our people's centuries-long
aspiration to be masters in their own home.”535
As a secondary state identity narrative, President Kuchma also tended to view Ukraine in
European terms. During his first several years in office, Kuchma frequently highlighted
Ukraine’s placement in the world order as being a member of the group of European countries.
For example, in a 1996 interview with reporters from Radio Liberty, Kuchma noted how “...the

535

Kuchma, Leonid. 1995a. “President Kuchma Independence Day Speech.” Kiev Radio, 24 August 1995.

254

future of Ukraine lies in Europe, for our country is located in the very heart of Europe.”536
Kuchma’s European discourse continued at a steady rate throughout much of his presidency. In
April 2002, Kuchma stated, “Ukraine is a European country. Naturally, integration in the
European structure is one of our foreign policy priorities.537
Although President Kuchma may have given a secondary emphasis on categorizing Ukraine
as European, his discourse must be placed into its proper context. On one hand, the Ukrainian
president believed that by defining Ukraine as European, such actions would create a gateway
for a political and economic alignment with the United States. Speaking in 1998, Kuchma noted,
Our basic task in relations with the United States is to shape them in such a way so that when
Poland joins NATO they formally become relations between the allies and that they are special
within the area. Active political relations have fundamental significance. Besides efforts to
achieve a good result in the ratification of the accession protocol by the US Senate, we will be
trying to gain the support of our American partner and other members of the alliance in our wish
to ensure such a role in NATO for Poland which corresponds to our involvement and potential.
Poland has been a consistent supporter of a permanent and significant US presence in Europe and
of treating the US not just as a global superpower but also as a European one.538

However, President Kuchma’s European state identity narrative must be placed in its proper
context where the Ukrainian president’s conceptualization of this state identity is much more
inclusive than one might suspect. In this case, Kuchma also viewed Russia as part of the
European community along with other CIS countries and the United States. Speaking in 1998
after returning from a visit to Russia, Kuchma added clarity to his ideas about the state’s identity
and his alignment preferences.
And now I will try to answer the fundamental question, as far as Ukraine is concerned: who we
are and where are we moving? For us the main answer coincides with the re-establishment of
statehood and formation of a nationwide idea. Meanwhile, the tasks of elaborating a stable,
dynamically developing pattern of the economic and political systems are closely linked with the
specific features of the country which identifies itself as part of Central, Eastern and SouthEastern Europe simultaneously. The total of these three vectors -- the European choice of Ukraine
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-- nonetheless does not mean one-way orientation towards Europe. We are talking about a system
of Ukraine's relations in the following area: Russia, Europe, North America, the Black Sea
region and the CIS. Incidentally, within the global context, this forms a set of strategies and
prospects for Ukraine's way in the 21st century.539

Finally, in addition to Kuchma’s attentiveness to articulating an independent and European
state identity narratives for Ukraine, he also cultivated a democratic discourse in his foreign
policy speeches. For the years in office, Kuchma almost consistently touted the state’s
democratic leanings noting in 1997 how “Ukraine’s relevant norms and tenets are among the
most democratic in the world.”540 Kuchma’s narrative on the centrality of democracy in the
Ukrainian state continued through 2001. Following a series of meetings with the EU, Kuchma
stated, “...I am nevertheless convinced that Ukraine, as virtually the whole world, and first and
foremost Europe, will follow the democratic path.”541
Kuchma’s ideas about democracy represented a conduit for his alignment preferences with
the United States. However, once again Kuchma’s ideas about the Ukrainian state as democratic
must be qualified. While this study’s content analysis may identify democracy as a secondary
state identity narrative, the assessments of area experts and secondary sources do not completely
validate his ideas. On one hand, in 1994 U.S. President William Clinton commended President
Kuchma and his efforts to advance democratic reforms in Ukraine.
We congratulate you, Mr. President, and all Ukrainians on your remarkable achievements in the
almost 3 years since regaining your freedom. You held a historic referendum and began the hard
work of reform and building democratic institutions.542
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On the other hand, beginning in 1999 and continuing through to the end of his presidency,
democracy took a back seat to Kuchma’s desire to stay in power. During this time, the Ukrainian
president’s authoritarian tendencies became increasingly visible in the state organs and in
society. In 1999, Freedom House issued a negative report on Ukraine observing a democratic
retrenchment owing to, “...increased government pressure on the independent media, presidential
elections in October-November which were not free and fair, and attempts by the executive after
the elections to increase presidential powers at the expense of parliament.”543 The following
year, Ukraine’s Polity score also registered a setback moving from seven to six in 2000. As
specified in a 2010 Polity IV Report, Kiev began to feel “...the strains of post-communist
transition and [the state] began to unravel during the 1999 election campaign as Kuchma began
to assert his independence and attempted to consolidate power.”544 Taken together, Kuchma,
much like Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, sacrificed the state’s democratic transition
by relying on authoritarianism to stay in power.
Viktor Yushchenko’s State Identity Narratives and Ukraine’s Alignment
The last four years of Leonid’s Kuchma’s time in office witnessed growing opposition to his
presidency from various political parties and civil society. Although the Rada’s April 2001 ‘no
confidence’ vote against Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko dealt him a major political blow,
Yushchenko and his ‘Our Ukraine’ party did not back down. In 2002, ‘Our Ukraine’ made
significant gains in the 2002 parliamentary elections, which spurred an ‘Orange Revolution’ in
Ukraine and the election of Yushchenko to the presidency in December 2004 and his
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inauguration in January 2005.545 For the period 2005 until 2009, a content analysis of President
Yushchenko’s foreign policy speeches reveals he gave emphasis to the following state identity
narratives: European-Western, democracy, and market.
The chart below provides a visual illustration of President Yushchenko’s levels of verbal
cooperation with Russia and the United States from 2005 until 2009. During this time
Yushchenko consistently maintained a higher level of verbal cooperation with Washington over
Chart 26: Viktor Yushchenko’s Alignment
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Moscow.546 With Yushchenko’s ideas about the state defined as European and Western as well
as democratic and market-oriented, this pattern of verbal cooperation is best understood as a
preference for positive bandwagoning with the United States. Like Saakashvili in Georgia,
Yushchenko still believed a cooperative approach with the Kremlin was necessary. Interviews
with various regional experts and an analysis of the secondary literature validate this nonstatistical correlation. According to one area specialist, Yushchenko was an ardent pro-West
president, who viewed the country’s integration into Euro-Atlantic security and economic
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structures as essential. By becoming part of NATO and the EU, Yushchenko believed these
organizations could help ensure the country’s long-term security and economic prosperity.547
President Yushchenko’s ideas about Ukraine as a European state on the global chessboard
were brought to the fore during a 2006 visit to the College of Europe in Warsaw, Poland. During
his speech, Yushchenko averred how he had always believed Ukraine was part of Europe. In his
words, “I was born at Europe’s center. I am convinced that Ukraine is a European country. Our
values were and continue to be European values.”548 President Yushchenko’s efforts to frame
Ukraine as European was driven by a belief that the country’s path to stability resided in the
West with Europe and the United States. From this stability, Ukraine would achieve economic
success and a newfound sense of security from external threats.
President Yushchenko’s ideas about Ukraine as Western manifests itself in several narratives,
which highlight the state’s role as a productive member in the Euro-Atlantic economic and
security communities. For example, during his visit to Washington DC in 2005, President
Yushchenko delivered a speech to the U.S. Congress detailing his ideas of how Ukraine’s
placement in the world order is best understood as residing in the West.
The Orange Revolution gave evidence that Ukraine is an advanced European nation, sharing the
great values of the Euro- Atlantic civilization. I’m convinced that the European and Euro-Atlantic
aspirations of Ukraine may not be viewed as an additional hindrance. Ukraine's integration is not
a problem, but rather great new opportunities opening before our civilization.549

Given Ukraine had become a less important foreign policy agenda item in Washington,
Yushchenko hoped to convey the idea that ruling leaders in Kiev shared the same ideas and
values as political elites in Washington and in other European capitals.
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The ‘Orange Revolution’ and Viktor Yushchenko’s rise to the presidency was from the very
beginning equated with democracy’s return to Ukrainian politics. Based on this study’s content
analysis, from his first days in office Yushchenko consistently espoused a state identity narrative
that cast the state (and country) as democratic. For example, in his 2005 Council of Europe
speech, Yushchenko framed his ideas about the state and democracy in the following way:
I will take every effort to secure the irreversibility of democratic changes in my country. The
Ukrainian public authorities will do their utmost to secure the fundamental principles of the
Council of Europe—human rights protection, pluralist democracy and the rule of law.550

Yushchenko’s consistent focus on the central importance of democratic ideals were also reflected
in a December 2009 address on human rights where he noted, “we have today made our place as
a democratic state, we have eliminated any forms of political persecutions. Freedom of speech,
conscience and choice is already a standard... [in Ukraine].”551 Polity and Freedom House
analysts recognized Yushchenko’s commitment to democracy. From 2004 to 2009, Ukraine’s
Polity score rose from six to seven and Freedom House’s rating rose from 4 to 2.5.552
Finally, Viktor Yushchenko espoused an economic-based discourse viewing Ukraine as a
market economy. In 2005, Yushchenko’s ideas about this state identity were made clear in a
speech to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. According to Yushchenko, “our government and our
power is going to turn [Ukraine’s] market into a transparent market and a competitive market
without providing preferences to anybody...”553 The following year, Yushchenko raved about
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how major foreign powers had validated his ideas. Specifically, in 2005 he proclaimed, “over the
past eight months we have succeeded in having Ukraine and the Ukrainian economy, recognized
by the European Union and the United States as a market economy.”554 Yushchenko’s discourse
viewing Ukraine as a market economy reflects his beliefs about an alignment preference with the
United States over Russia. By fostering an economic alignment with the U.S., economic growth
would follow thus making Ukraine a key member in the global economy.
Viktor Yanukovych’s State Identity Narratives and Ukraine’s Alignment
The seeds of Viktor Yanukovych’s rise to power can be traced back to 2005 just after Viktor
Yushchenko became president. During this time, the ‘Orange Revolution’ began to unravel
owing to among many challenges, political infighting between the president and his first Prime
Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. For the time Tymoshenko was prime minister, she vehemently
opposed the president on many aspects of his ideas about foreign and domestic policy. This
political infighting helped Yanukovych’s Party of Regions win a majority in the 2006
parliamentary elections temporarily propelling him to the post of prime minister. In late 2007,
elections in the legislature saw Tymoshenko’s party and President Yushchenko’s ‘Our Ukraine’
party join together into a coalition that allowed Tymoshenko to again become prime minister.555
Although Yanukovych may have been sidelined by the concerted efforts of the president and
Tymoshenko, over the next two years he was able to skillfully use his political acumen to
accentuate the strength of his leadership. Simultaneously, Yanukovych shown a spotlight on the
shortcoming of the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko bloc and their failure to unite the country and
bring Ukraine to a position of international prominence. By 2008, Tymoshenko and her party
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even sided with the communists and the Party of Regions to limit the powers of the president.556
Taken together, in January 2010 Yanukovych won the presidency in a close race with
Tymoshenko. Once in office, President Yanukovych articulated three cultural state identity
narratives. His first two state identity narratives included Eastern and Eurasian and were given
the most emphasis. As a supporting conception, Yanukovych also viewed Ukraine as European.
As reflected in the chart below, President Yanukovych’s level of verbal cooperation was
consistently higher with the Russian Federation than the United States from 2010 until 2013.557
With Yanukovych’s ideas about the state defined as one that is an amalgamation of Eastern and
Eurasian, and to a lesser degree European, his pattern of verbal cooperation is best understood as
a preference for positive bandwagoning with Russia. Although Yanukovych gravitated towards
an alignment with Russia, he still viewed cooperation with the West, particularly Europe, as
important but not necessarily a vital part of his foreign policies. Interviews with various regional
experts and an analysis of the secondary literature validate this correlation. According to one
area expert, Yanukovych strived to reposition Ukraine into a closer geopolitical orbit with
Chart 27: Viktor Yanukovych’s Alignment
Preferences with the U.S. and Russia
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
2010

2011

2012

Russia Verbal Cooperation

2013

U.S. Verbal Cooperation

Olearychyk, Roman. 2008. “Yushchenko Stands Firm on Foreign Policy.” Financial Times Online, 04 September
2008. https://www.ft.com/content/e88c17ce-7aaf-11dd-adbe-000077b07658. Accessed, 03 June 2017.
557
Author’s analysis.
556

262

Russia; however, he also sought to maintain economic relations with countries in the West. From
one perspective, Yanukovych was pro-EU, not pro-NATO.558
The logic of this trifecta of narratives and its potential impact on the state’s foreign policies
was captured perfectly in President Yanukovych’s 2010 inaugural address.
As president, I have a clear understanding of what kind of foreign policy corresponds today with
the national interests of Ukraine. Being a bridge between East and West, an integral part of
Europe and the former Soviet Union at the same time, Ukraine will select the kind of foreign
policy that would allow our state to receive the maximum benefit from the development of equal
and mutually beneficial relations with the Russian Federation, the European Union and the United
States and other countries that influence the situation in the world.559

With respect to President Yanukovych’s articulation of a European narrative, shortly after
entering office and during a meeting with the president of the European Commission, the
Ukrainian president stated, “European integration is the key priority of our foreign policy, and
also a strategy for carrying out systemic social and economic reforms.”560 However, while
Yanukovych may have opted to first visit Brussels on 01 March 2010, by the time he got to
Russia, he was espousing the merits of Ukrainian-Russian brotherhood. Specifically, in his
meetings with President Medvedev on 05 March, Yanukovych proclaimed he was in adamant
agreement with the Kremlin's patriotic beliefs about the importance of Soviet history in modern
times. Yanukovych then suggested veterans from Ukraine and Russia should hold a joint
celebration to commemorate the 65th anniversary of their victory over Hitler and Fascism.561
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An Eastern and Eurasian discourse were also an integral part of President Yanukovych’s
repertoire of state identity narratives while in office. As a former governor in the Donetsk region,
Yanukovych frequently linked the identity of the Ukrainian state and the country to Russia. For
example, in 2010 Yanukovych noted how “the citizens of our countries... are linked by kinship
and by the history of our nations.”562 By 2013, there was little notable change in his ideas about
the state’s Eastern and Eurasian identities. Another example is in order here when in his annual
address to the Ukrainian parliament in 2013, Yanukovych stated,
European integration vector along with the consistent realization of national interests on the
Eurasian track, active employment of the CIS platform and intensification of bilateral relations
constitute the scope of Ukrainian national interests.563

Clearly, Europe may have retained some degree of importance for Yanukovych, by 2013 his
ideas about Ukraine and its relevancy in Eurasia had become increasing important in his public
addresses. The clearest indicator of Yanukovych’s ideas about the state’s Eastern identity came
in 2013 when decided to take a $15 billion Russian economic package in lieu of signing the EU
Association agreement. According to one area specialist, Yanukovych’s decision amounts to a
“civilizational choice.”564
Petro Poroshenko’s State Identity Narratives and Ukraine’s Alignment
Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to accept a Russian economic aid package was a key event
contributing to his removal from power and the state’s Western realignment. Following these
decisions, tens of thousands of Ukrainians poured into Maidan Square to show their disapproval
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for Yanukovych’s decisions. These protests, and a strong-armed response from security and
ministry of interior forces subsequently set the conditions for a revolution and the removal of
Yanukovych from power. By May 2014, Petro Poroshenko was Ukraine’s new president.565 For
the two years this study examines President Poroshenko’s foreign policy speeches, three
consistent state identity discourses emerge: democratic, freedom, and European.
The chart below provides a visual illustration of President Poroshenko’s alignment
preferences with Russia and the United States. Although limited in duration, during 2014 and
2015 President Poroshenko exhibited a higher level of verbal cooperation with the United States.
Chart 28: Petro Poroshenko’s Alignment
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With Poroshenko’s ideas about the state defined as democratic, free, and European, this pattern
of verbal cooperation is best understood as a preference for positive bandwagoning with the
United States. Like Yushchenko, Poroshenko still believed cooperation with the Kremlin was
necessary; however, a majority of this effort was directed towards re-establishing Ukraine’s
territorial integrity following Moscow’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its political,
economic, and military support for separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk. Interviews with area
experts and an analysis of the secondary literature validate this non-statistical correlation.
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According to one area specialist, the current strategic situation in the east demanded Poroshenko
pursue a cooperative diplomatic approach with Russia; however, his ideas about Ukraine as one
with the West was unequivocal. For Poroshenko, Ukraine’s accession into Euro-Atlantic
economic and security structures was his and the state’s number one priority.566
For the two years under examination, President Poroshenko advanced a democratic state
identity narrative for Ukraine. As viewed by Poroshenko, Yanukovych’s turn from democracy
towards an authoritarian-style government was a key factor that had incited mass political and
social unrest throughout the country. Only be reestablishing the hallmarks of democracy within
the state could Poroshenko and other like-minded elites hope to move the country forward.
Speaking in 2014, Poroshenko noted how “... democracy for me is the best form of government
invented by mankind.”567 By emphasizing the necessity to build-up the state’s democratic
institutions and a more accountable government, Poroshenko sought to cast Ukraine in a similar
light to other former Soviet states such as the Baltics, which had successfully made their
transition into the West by gaining membership in Euro-Atlantic economic and security
structures.
A content analysis of President Poroshenko’s speeches indicates ‘freedom’ was also one of
his primary discourses about the state’s identity. For example, Poroshenko’s ideas about the
freedom were made explicitly clear during his 2014 inauguration speech when he asserted, “the
whole Ukraine and all Ukrainians worldwide [are] united around the idea of ... freedom.”568
Russian-backed separatist efforts in Luhansk and Donetsk was likely a key factor spurring
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Poroshenko’s idea about the importance of freedom for Ukraine. Without a peaceful resolution to
this ongoing crisis in the Donbas, Ukraine would never truly be free.
Petro Poroshenko also emphasized the concepts of Europe and European during 2014 and
2015. A content analysis reveals the European discourse was espoused on an equal basis with
democracy and freedom.569 From out of the gate, Poroshenko’s ideas about Ukraine’s role in
world politics was undeniable. During his inaugural speech, President Poroshenko proclaimed,
We, Ukrainians, “are a living spark in the family of European nations and active members of
European civilizational work.” These are the words of Ivan Franko. “To stand with one’s feet and
heart in Ukraine and one’s head in Europe,” Mykhailo Drahomanov commanded. The return of
Ukraine to its natural, European state has been long-awaited by many generations.570

Poroshenko’s views about Ukraine as European continued into 2015. In a speech to the
Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council in September 2015, Poroshenko was adamant
about how, “Ukraine is the eastern outpost of Euro-Atlantic civilization. We have made a choice
towards European values and European civilizational development.”571 As viewed from Kiev,
Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and military and economic support for separatist elements
in the Donbas were the shape agents impacting President Poroshenko’s ideas about Ukraine and
its placement in the European civilization.
Like Yushchenko, Petro Poroshenko’s ideas about Ukraine as European was a causeway that
also led to the United States and his preference for an alignment with this regional great power.
Speaking in September 2017, Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze, the Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine
for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration commented on how her country’s Western trajectory
since 2014 can be compared to a long road that begins in Kiev with exits in Berlin, Paris, and
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London ending in Washington. The vice prime minister was also quite clear that as viewed from
Kiev, the leadership of the United States in European security remains a linchpin in her
government’s preference to align with the United States. For this reason, President Poroshenko
believes that a final solution to Russia’s interference in Ukraine can only be achieve through
close relations with the United States.572
In summary, between 1995 and 2015, the presidents of Ukraine conceptualized the state’s
identity in various political, cultural, and ideological terms. President Kuchma’s primary state
identity narrative centered on independence, which was associated with a preference for great
power bridging. Presidents Yushchenko and Poroshenko’s focus on defining the state as
democratic, free, and Western-European was associated with a tendency for positive
bandwagoning with the United States. Finally, President Yanukovych viewed the state in terms
of Eastern, Eurasian, and European which was associated with a positive bandwagoning
preference with Russia.
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to examine the relationship between a political leader’s
ideas about the state’s identity and his alignment preferences with the United States and Russia.
Using multiple methods and event data, this chapter found presidents would assign a wide array
of different political, cultural, ideological, and economic identities to the state. To discern the
alignment preferences for these presidents, state alignment was operationalized using ICWES
event data focusing on each leader’s level of verbal cooperation with the United States and
Russia. Those presidents emphasizing an independent state identity fluctuated their levels of
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verbal cooperation with both regional great powers indicating what this study defines as a great
power bridging preference.
Additionally, a majority of the presidents, who saw the state as defined by democracy and
freedom had higher levels of verbal cooperation with the United States, which can be understood
as a preference for positive bandwagoning alignment with this regional great power. Separately,
Ukraine’s Viktor Yanukovych was the only president to give emphasis to an Eastern-Eurasian
state identity narrative, which corresponded to higher levels of verbal cooperation with Russia
and a positive bandwagoning preference with this regional great power.
These findings help frame several important conclusions. First, this study concludes a
president’s ideas about the state’s identity are an important variable exerting influence on his
alignment preferences with the United States and/or Russia. Specifically, by using a president’s
level of verbal cooperation with both of these regional great powers allows one to infer a nonstatistical correlation between a president’s ideas about the state’s identity and his alignment
preferences. Second, as was seen with Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin, a political leader’s
ideas about the state have the potential to vary based on key systemic- and/or domestic-level
events. The point here is that while a political leader’s ideas and beliefs may be the most
important factor affecting his/her alignment preferences, systemic and/or domestic events may
also carry some degree of influence on a president’s ideational lens of world politics.
Another important conclusion centers on methodology whereby using just event data to
measure a president’s alignment preferences has its limits. Certainly, using a president’s level of
verbal cooperation may serve as one indicator of a president’s inclination to align with the U.S.
or Russia, it is plausible a head of state may give emphasis to a particular state identity narrative
in hopes of eliciting external support from a particular regional great power. For example, one
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president may continually emphasize the democratic nature of the state as a way to garner
political or economic support from the United States. From a methodological perspective, the use
of quantitative techniques and descriptive statistics may be too broad of an instrument to achieve
a higher level of fidelity on a small state’s alignment with a regional great power. As a result,
using qualitative techniques and expanding the analysis to consider others independent variables
(e.g. a political leader’s ideas about external threats and strategy) may be able to provide a more
nuanced understanding of a political leader’s alignment preferences and the state’s foreign
policies vis-à-vis Russia and the United States.
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“Often the central question for statesmen...[is] which state, if any, poses a threat so
severe that all other considerations must be subordinated to it.” – Robert Jervis, 1997. 573

Chapter Six: Threat Perceptions and Small State Alignment

Introduction
Robert Jervis reminds us that one of the most important tasks for political leaders in their
duties as caretakers of the state is the identification of would-be international challengers that
could threaten the country’s national security. But what makes one particular state a valid threat?
Janice Stein argues the first step in discerning whether one state represents a clear and present
danger is to focus on the verbal or physical threats of other states.574 But do the verbal
pronouncements of foreign leaders or the state’s diplomatic and military actions alone represent
a ‘true’ threat to a state’s national security? This study posits it does not. What is missing here is
how ruling elites in one state understand those verbal or physical acts. Put another way, it is a
political leader’s perceptions of these actions that matter most. As Stein reminds us, “threats do
not unambiguously speak for themselves. Understanding the meaning of threats is mediated by
the perception of the target. Perception is the process of apprehending by means of the senses
and recognizing and interpreting what is processed.”575
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The central purpose of this chapter is to examine the relationship between a political leader’s
ideas about external threats from different regional great powers and their alignment preferences.
The essence of my argument is that a political leader’s threat perceptions are an important factor
shaping his/her alignment preferences. Specifically, political leaders will perceive the hostile
actions of regional great powers in different ways based on their own distinctive belief system.
As a result, different presidents will assign different levels of threat to different regional great
powers, which in turn will be associated with different alignment preferences.
This chapter posits four research questions: How does each president in Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Moldova, and Ukraine view the nature of the political universe? To what extent, if any, did each
president’s beliefs about the political universe vary? Which regional great powers does each
president perceive to be the greatest threat to the state? What is the relationship between each
president’s threat perceptions and his/her alignment preferences with the United States and
Russian Federation?
In addressing these research questions in a systematic way, this chapter first conducts an
operational code analysis to discern each president’s philosophical beliefs. By understanding
how each president perceives the nature of the political universe can serve as a guide for a
qualitative analysis of a head of state’s threat perceptions of specific regional great powers. For
the research questions on threat perceptions, it is hypothesized that when a president perceives a
nearby regional great power as a high threat, a president will prefer a positive bandwagoning
alignment with a different regional great power. When a president perceives this nearby regional
great power as a moderate threat, the head of state will prefer great power bridging. Finally,
when a president perceives a nearby regional great power as a low threat, he will prefer a
positive bandwagoning alignment with that power.
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This chapter is organized into six sections. The first section highlights the key findings from
this chapter. In sections two through five, the cases are addressed in the following order:
Azerbaijan, Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine. Each of these sections begin with an analysis of a
president’s operational code, which is then followed by a qualitative analysis of a president’s
threat perceptions and his accompanying alignment preferences with Russia and the United
States. Section six provides a brief conclusion.
Findings
The major findings from this chapter are as follows. First, all of the presidents in Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine perceived Russia to be the greatest threat to the state’s national
security. The United States was consistently regarded as a low or moderately low threat.576
Second, although Russia represented the greatest threat, the intensity of each president’s
perception of this danger varied based on his interpretation of Moscow’s actions in the strategic
environment. Here, each president viewed the nature of the Russian threat in his own unique way
whether it be military, economic, informational, political or a combination thereof.
Third, contrary to realist expectations that small states will bandwagon with the most
powerful or threatening state, this study finds a majority of the presidents preferred great power
bridging. A president preferred to follow this alignment when his threat perceptions of Russia
were moderate. This was the case in Azerbaijan with Presidents Heydar and Ilham Aliyev; in
Moldova with Petru Lucinschi and Vladimir Voronin (after 2003); in Georgia with Eduard
Shevardnadze and Giorgi Margvelashvili (in 2013); and in Ukraine with Leonid Kuchma. Next,
when a president’s threat perceptions of Russia were high, presidents favored a positive
bandwagoning alignment with the United States. This was the case with Georgian Presidents

In general, presidents, who viewed the U.S. as a moderately low threat took offense to Washington’s support of
pro-democracy groups in their countries.
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Saakashvili and Margvelashvili from 2014-2015, Moldovan President Nicolae Timofti, and
Ukrainian Presidents Yushchenko and Poroshenko. When a president perceived Russia as a low
threat, a positive bandwagoning preference with Moscow was observed. This was the case with
Vladimir Voronin (2001-2002) and Viktor Yanukovych.
Azerbaijan: Findings and Analysis
Beginning in Azerbaijan, from 1995 to 2015 Azeri Presidents Heydar and Ilham Aliyev
maintained a moderately low threat perception of the Russian Federation, which was associated
with a preference for great power bridging.577 While Armenia represented a near-peer security
challenge to Azerbaijan, when it came to regional great powers, both presidents perceived Russia
as a latent threat given Moscow’s ability to influence Yerevan and use its military footing in the
Nagorno-Karabakh to keep Baku in line. Given the indirect manner in which the Russian
military power mattered to Azeri presidents, this study finds Russia’s military power exerted less
influence on the alignment preferences of Heydar and Ilham Aliyev than each president’s threat
perceptions owing to their beliefs about how Russia was a manageable challenge.
The Philosophical Beliefs of Azeri Presidents
An analysis of each president’s philosophical beliefs provides a baseline to understand their
general alignment preferences with external powers. Beginning with their master philosophical
beliefs (P-1), Heydar and Ilham Aliyev both viewed the nature of the political universe as
definitely friendly.578 This pattern continued with each president’s beliefs about realizing their
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fundamental values (P-2) where Ilham Aliyev retained a higher degree of optimism than his
father, who scored slightly lower on this index.
When examining the predictability of the political universe (P-3) category, both presidents
scored .10 indicating they generally viewed the international system with a high degree of
uncertainty and unpredictability. The presidents’ beliefs about their control over historical
developments (P-4) were also very similar registering a score of .30. These P-4 scores indicate
Table 11: The Philosophical Beliefs of Azeri Presidents

each president believed that control over the strategic situation resides with others in the political
universe. Finally, both presidents’ beliefs about the role of chance (P-5) in political outcomes
were extremely high. The high scores in this category are in line with each president’s lower P-3
and P-4 scores, where because Heydar and Ilham believed they have less control over strategic
events, the role of chance was an important factor shaping political outcomes.
The preceding analysis of Heydar and Ilham Aliyev’s philosophical beliefs represents a
starting point from which to better understand their threat perceptions about ‘others’ in the
international system. While it is known each president viewed the political universe as friendly,
what is not known is with which specific actors did these beliefs apply. In the next section,
interviews from area specialists, a content analysis of foreign policy speeches, and various
secondary sources provide a more nuanced understanding of each president’s threat perceptions
and alignment preferences with the United States and Russia.
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Azeri President Threat Perceptions and State Alignment
As a group, Azerbaijani presidents maintained the lowest threat perceptions of Russia as
compared to presidential group averages in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. During this time,
the combined average of the intensity of Heydar and Ilham’s threat perceptions of Russia was
moderately low.579 While Russia consistently maintained a favorable balance of power with
military forces stationed in Armenia, neither Heydar nor Ilham Aliyev believed such actions
represented an imminent threat to the state. On the contrary, both viewed the Russian threat as a
latent one that took on a diplomatic, informational or military nature. Based on their beliefs the
Russian threat was a manageable one, each president preferred to follow a great power bridging
alignment with Russia and the United States. In the paragraphs below, an analysis of the
relationship between each president’s threat perceptions and his alignment preferences with the
United States and Russian Federation are presented.
President Heydar Aliyev. From 1995 to 2003, President Heydar Aliyev’s moderately-low
threat perceptions of Russia and his low threat perceptions of the United States served to guide
his preferences for a bifurcated alignment with both regional great powers. Based on an analysis
of Aliyev’s foreign policy speeches, one can detect slight variations in his perceptions of a latent
military, economic, and informational threat emanating from the Moscow. The minute
differences in Heydar Aliyev’s threat perceptions, however, were never significant enough to
drive him to follow a positive bandwagoning alignment with Washington or kowtow to Moscow
as realists expect. Additionally, an analysis of ICEWS event data indicate Aliyev’s level of

Author’s analysis. As a reminder, to increase the analytical fidelity of these scores, averaged values are assessed
in the following way: 1-1.5 (high); 1.6-2.0 (moderately high); 2.1-2.5 (moderately low); 2.6-3 (low).
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verbal confrontation with the U.S. and Russia was almost equal during his presidency.580 For
Aliyev, an alignment with the United States and Russia could afford him maximum opportunity
to leverage the support capacities of each great power.
From 1994 through 1996, the latent Russian threat to Azerbaijan came in the form of
diplomatic pressure and informational campaigns designed to influence Heydar Aliyev’s
decision-making on the state’s energy policies with the United States and other Western
countries. For example, in December 1994 and January 1995, Moscow closed transportation
routes from Azerbaijan and implemented a series of new customs and control measures in
response to Baku’s purported material aid to Chechen terrorists. The Kremlin also embarked on a
mass media campaign portraying Azerbaijan as a supporter of international terrorism. These
actions, coupled with political pressure from Russian defense and foreign ministry officials, were
meant to force Aliyev’s hand into giving more emphasis to Kremlin interests in Chechnya and
the export of Azeri oil through Russian pipelines.581
Despite Russia’s provocative actions, there was little change in Aliyev’s beliefs about the
merits of an economic alignment with the United States. Speaking in late 1995, Aliyev lauded
how Azerbaijan’s strategic partnership with the U.S. represented a linchpin not only in the
country’s future economic development, but in the restoration of the country’s territorial

Author’s analysis. Of note, the total number of events on Heydar Aliyev’s level of verbal confrontation was much
less than what was observed with his level of verbal cooperation with the U.S. and Russia. This is to be expected
since Heydar Aliyev’s philosophical beliefs indicated he viewed the political universe as definitely friendly.
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integrity and state’s transition to democracy.582 For example, during a signing ceremony in April
1995 that brought Exxon into the Azeri energy consortium, Heydar Aliyev proclaimed,
When Exxon joined the oil contract signed in Baku the number of the companies of the United
States of America participating in the operation...rose to five. The cooperation of five great USA
oil companies with Azerbaijan and durability of these relations undoubtedly will assist to the
development of economic relations between two countries.583

Moscow’s actions did, however have some effect on Aliyev’s foreign policy actions and the
state’s economic alignment with Russia. By January 1996, Aliyev agreed to sign the BakuNovorossiysk Agreement, which would send Azeri oil through Russia with Moscow partially
opening border crossings later that year.
Russia’s military presence in Armenia was also a shape agent for Heydar Aliyev’s threat
perceptions of the country’s former imperial center and a catalyst for his political alignment with
both Washington and Moscow. The Azeri president was fully aware of how Russian troops in
Armenia represented a ‘sword of Damocles’ against his strategic movements on the international
stage. Despite this reality, Aliyev remained steadfast against this Russian military threat opting
not to partake in the CIS’ combined air defense system, which sought to provide monitoring,
early warning, and counter-air response options for member states.584 However, Russia’s latent
military threat was still not enough to affect Aliyev’s decision-making process to withdraw from
the CIS outright or increase Azerbaijan’s role in the U.S.-led NATO alliance.
Although Heydar Aliyev may have viewed Russia as the primary existential threat to
Azerbaijan, he was also somewhat wary of Washington’s actions and the potential threat this
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regional great power may pose to the state. For example, during the late 1990s Aliyev became
increasingly frustrated with the U.S. government’s deference to the Armenian lobby as well as
Washington’s lukewarm efforts to help Baku resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh stalemate. Aliyev
conveyed his ideas about American intransigence on these matters during a June 1996 visit to
America where he was highly critical of Congressional actions on the continuation of
Amendment 907 to the Freedom Support Act, which banned U.S. government support to
Azerbaijan over Baku’s blockade with Armenia. According to Aliyev, “we [Azerbaijan] consider
the U.S. an important economic partner, and that is confirmed by the oil contracts, but unjust
decisions of the Congress cause our indignation... The amendment of the congressman Porter is a
strike on Azerbaijan and undermines its territorial integrity.”585 Adding to Aliyev’s potential
discontent was the U.S. State Department’s continued poor human rights rating for Azerbaijan.
In November 1996, Aliyev censured the activities of human rights groups in Azerbaijan for what
he deemed as collusion with “foreign special services” from unnamed countries.586
It is from Aliyev’s perceptions about Washington’s lack of commitment to Azerbaijan one can
discern his proclivity to promote a stronger alignment with Russia. For example, in a 1996 visit
to Moscow, Aliyev underscored his commitment to bolstering a strong partnership with Russia.
In his verbal pronouncements during a press interview, Aliyev affirmed how...
Our countries are linked by a history of many centuries, which can neither be canceled out nor
rewritten. And this constitutes the basis for the existence of clean, honest, good, and friendly
between Russia and Azerbaijan. I, as head of state, consider that good relations with Russia-a
great country-are a very important factor for our republic's independence.587
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However, during the late 1990s, the Azeri president made clear there were limits to his alignment
with the Russian Federation. Although Aliyev continued to view Moscow as a primary conduit
for resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and a key economic partner, the Azeri president
would never allow Azerbaijan to be placed in a binding, long-term relationship with Russia.
Evidence to support this assertion was seen in August 1996 when Aliyev rendered skepticism
about the Russia-Belarus Union noting, “I do not really see the purpose of this agreement. I
cannot say we will follow the same path. I favor the development and strengthening of bilateral
relations between Russia and Azerbaijan on a mutually advantageous basis, on the basis of parity
and complete sovereignty, independence, and noninterference in one another's affairs.” 588
Separately, in 1997, Aliyev stated, “Azerbaijan will not participate in any attempt to achieve
greater integration within the CIS until a ‘just solution’ of the Karabakh conflict is reached.”589
Heydar Aliyev’s threat perceptions of Russia experienced a slight uptick from 1997 to 1999
based on a series of military and informational-related events. First, in 1997 Russian politicians
revealed the Kremlin had been providing Armenia with military arms worth over $1 billion
(U.S.) from 1994 through 1996.590 This was followed by the establishment of a RussianArmenian joint air defense system in February 1999 and the Kremlin’s transfer of heavy
weapons from Georgia to Armenia.591 For Aliyev, it appeared Russia was more interested in
militarizing the region and creating a frozen conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh than brokering a
peace settlement. Such actions were clearly indicative of an attempt by Moscow to gain leverage
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over Baku. Separately, Russian media outlets continued to heavily criticize Baku’s alleged
support for Chechen terrorists by allowing them safe harbor and/or passage through Azerbaijan.
The rising uncertainty with Moscow subsequently reinforced Aliyev’s ideas about the merits
of great power bridging with Washington. On one hand, the latent military and information threat
from Russia eroded the strength of Aliyev’s ideas about a political and military alignment with
Russia. For example, in 1999 Aliyev opted not to renew Azerbaijan’s membership in the CST
believing this alliance gave preference to select members at the expense of others. On the other
hand, Aliyev still believed the latent threat from Moscow was manageable and could be
overcome. Speaking in 1999 about the Russian threat, Aliyev noted,
There has recently been massive anti-Azerbaijani propaganda under way in Russia by the media,
which is worrying. The propaganda is based on distorted and false information and even with the
absence of any information at all. This is mainly connected with the events in Chechnya. Despite
everything, Azerbaijan will be in friendship with Russia and will develop friendship and
cooperation. I think that when Russia is able to ensure stability in the North Caucasus, there will
be more chances. Because the events in the North Caucasus are restricting our economic
cooperation and many other things. Fabrications cause discontent among our people, but I think
this will end as well. I am sure that Russia will ensure stability in the North Caucasus and defend
its state and territorial sovereignty and integrity.592

Russia’s actions also served as a catalyst for Aliyev’s ideas about strengthening his political
and military alignment with the United States. For example, following the establishment of the
Russian-Armenian joint air defense system, Baku made a direct request to the United States for
the deployment of American and NATO military forces and the potential establishment of a
permanent base.593 Although U.S. and NATO military forces never established permanent
facilities in Azerbaijan, Aliyev’s request demonstrates his willingness to leverage a stronger
military alignment with the West as one way to acquire political leverage over Russia.
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With the election of Vladimir Putin to the office of the presidency, Heydar Aliyev’s threat
perceptions of Russia decreased following the first-ever visit in the post-Soviet period by a
Russian president to Azerbaijan in January 2001. Speaking in June 2000, Aliyev was optimistic
about the prospect of strengthening his alignment with Russia noting, “as far as the new Russian
president is concerned, I think that following the transfer of power in Russia, there are great
opportunities for improving and developing relations between Azerbaijan and Russia.”594 By
2002 after several presidential visits by Presidents Putin and Aliyev to Baku and Moscow
respectively, Azerbaijan’s alignment with Russia was on a much stronger footing than what was
seen with the United States. The extent to which Heydar Aliyev gave higher value to his
alignment with Russia was made evident in early 2002 when the Azeri president espoused how
Russian-Azerbaijani relations were at a 10-year high and that further cooperation between both
countries must be expanded in all spheres.595
Heydar Aliyev’s inclination to follow a great power bridging strategy with the U.S. also
continued through his last several years in office. During this time, the Azeri president’s
alignment with Washington was primarily seen in the area of counter-terrorism following alQaida’s attacks in the U.S. homeland on 11 September 2001. Immediately following these terror
attacks, Heydar Aliyev was one of the first presidents from the newly independent states to offer
the United States verbal support in America’s war against al-Qaida and other transnational
terrorist groups.596 By 2003, Aliyev’s level of verbal cooperation with the U.S. hit an apex as the
Azeri president provided steadfast support for the United States and its war in Iraq. The intensity
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of Aliyev’s alignment with the United States eclipsed that of Russia in this year. To understand
Aliyev’s ideas here, one can turn to his April 2003 speech, where he asserts,
The United States of America declared the indispensable necessity to lead operations and take
military measures for the liquidation of the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. But
unfortunately, a lot of countries, including the members of NATO, were against it. As you know,
we immediately joined this coalition. It seems very strange that 21 days ago the USA completed
its operations in Iraq, now the countries opposing these operations want to be engaged in the
reconstruction works in Iraq. All this testifies that Azerbaijan has adopted the decision to join the
Euro-Atlantic Union, in order to be near to the USA even when the other members of the
organization ignored it.597

The preceding analysis of Heydar’s threat perceptions and their impact on his alignment
preferences reveal the Azeri president tended to prefer a strategy of great power bridging with
the United States and Russia. As has been argued, while the balance of power consistently
favored Russia, Aliyev’s ideas that Russia represented a moderate threat were an important
catalyst shaping his alignment preferences. Additionally, the extent to which the Russian threat
did make itself known in political, economic, informational, or military circles was not enough to
cause the Azeri president to positively bandwagon with the United States. For Aliyev, great
power bridging was preferred because “our republic wants to establish equal relations with all
the countries. Of course, we want to establish close relations with the United States of America.
At the same time, we have good relations with Russia, and we want to make them better.”598
President Ilham Aliyev. From 2004 to 2015, President Ilham Aliyev’s moderately-low threat
perceptions of Russia and the United States was associated with a proclivity to follow a great
power bridging alignment with both regional great powers. For Ilham Aliyev, the threat from
Russia was best understood to be long-term in nature with Kremlin pressure being applied across
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the diplomatic, information, and economic spectrums at different times. The Russian military
threat was again a latent one. Here, Ilham Aliyev realized that if he cut across Russian interests
too deeply, Moscow could direct proxies to stir up trouble in Dagestan or the Nagorno-Karabakh
as a way to foment political, economic, or social instability across Azerbaijan.599 From the
United States, the threat was best understood in terms of Washington’s support for democratic
opposition groups. At issue was how these actions could ignite a colored revolution similar to
what occurred in Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004.
As graphically illustrated in the preceding chapter, Aliyev’s alignment preferences indicate he
was more apt to pursue a strategy of great power bridging as his level of verbal cooperation
between the U.S. and Russia were almost equal, slightly oscillating back and forth over his
presidency. Additionally, an analysis of ICEWS event data also indicated Ilham Aliyev’s level of
verbal confrontation with the United States and Russia was almost equal during his time in office
providing a second indicator of his preferences for a great power bridging strategy.600 While the
latent military threat from Russia was omnipresent, it was not enough to drive Ilham Aliyev to
prefer a positive bandwagoning alignment with the United States. For Aliyev, a bifurcated
strategic alignment with Moscow and Washington would provide the necessary balance by
which Azerbaijan could prosper economically and more importantly, allow the Azeri president to
remain in power. The proceeding paragraphs detail the relationship between Ilham Aliyev’ threat
perceptions and his alignment preferences with the United States and Russia.
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As early as 2004, Ilham Aliyev’s low threat perceptions of Russia served as a catalyst for an
alignment preference with Moscow. The extent to which Aliyev viewed Russia as a low threat
was brought to the fore in February 2004 prior to his visit to Moscow. During an interview with
Russian media, Aliyev praised the progress Azerbaijan had made towards the establishment of a
strong strategic partnership with Russia. According to Aliyev...
It is no secret that during the initial period of independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
relations were complicated at times, there was a mass of problems, mutual complaints and
difficulties. Sharp changes happened exactly in 2000 when... under President Putin, Russia gave
up on its lopsided policy on settling the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict. So, our countries have
established neighborly relations. And now, I think, these relations can be an example of relations
between neighbors, as well as between a bigger and a smaller state.601

During a 2004 visit to Moscow, Aliyev conveyed a strident commitment to developing a
closer alignment with Moscow in the areas of economics, counter-terrorism, and science and
technology.602 These important meetings between Aliyev and Kremlin elites subsequently served
as an anchor for his great power bridging approach with Moscow on one side and Washington on
the other. In the years ahead, Aliyev routinely touted the high-value of a strategic partnership
with Russia; however, like his father, he would never go so far as to lock Azerbaijan into any
formal economic or military bloc. In a demonstration of Ilham Aliyev’s tendency to not
exclusively align with one regional great power over another, in 2011 Azerbaijan became a
member of the Non-Alignment Movement.603 This singular act served as a signal of Aliyev’s
preference to avoid entering into any formal alliance with any one regional great power.
An analysis of Ilham Aliyev’s foreign policy speeches indicates he also consistently touted
the high merits of aligning with the Russian Federation in the economic realm. Whether it was
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during CIS meetings, the Russia-Azerbaijan Economic Forum, Caspian Summits, or head of
state visits to Russia, Aliyev’s ideas about Russia as a non-threatening great power framed his
verbal pronouncements on a wide array of economic issues. For example, in 2004 during the
Russia-Azerbaijan Economic Forum, Aliyev highlighted how the presence of over 300 Russian
businesses in Azerbaijan had helped improve the country’s economic productivity.604 Aliyev
continued this trend through 2014 when during the 4th Caspian Summit, he noted the importance
of Moscow’s lead role in resolving Caspian Sea issues and how he would work more closely
with the Kremlin in the future as a way to build on past economic successes.605 The key
takeaway here is how Ilham Aliyev’s low threat perceptions of Russia served as a catalyst for his
preference for great power bridging. As one area specialist noted, under Ilham Aliyev
“Azerbaijan moved away from fearing an unpredictable and unstable Russia, which instead
began to acquire the image of a pragmatic and constructive partner.”606
In the diplomatic arena, Ilham Aliyev also demonstrated a preference to align with Russia on
various regional and international issues. In 2007, Aliyev responded positively to a Russian-led
counter proposal to a U.S. ballistic missile defense plan for Europe. According to Aliyev, the use
of the Qabala Russian radar facility in Azerbaijan as part of a European missile defense shield
would be in the state’s long-term security interests.607 In early 2008, Aliyev backed Russia by
also not recognizing Kosovo’s declaration of independence noting how Pristina’s move violated
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international law.608 Additionally, Aliyev believed such actions represented a bad precedent for
achieving a solution with the Nagorno-Karabakh. Finally, a lack of Kremlin criticism over
Azerbaijan’s less than stellar human rights record helped reinforce Aliyev’s preference for
aligning with Russia as part of his great power bridging strategy.
Finally, in the latter years of his presidency Ilham Aliyev’s preference for an alignment with
Russia was also evident in the domain of military affairs. Beginning in 2011, Aliyev believed a
tenuous military alignment with Russia, while limited in nature, may serve three purposes. First,
acquiring arms from Russia could help diversify the state’s list of arms suppliers and improve
Baku’s access to advance weaponry. Frustrated with Washington’s tit-for-tat foreign policies
with Azerbaijan, Aliyev proclaimed “the United States has a tendency to dictate terms to other
countries. Russia's position regarding the supply of arms has always been that Russia puts no
political pressure on its customers. It is Russia’s flexibility in arm deals and the effectiveness of
its military products that make it one of the leaders in the global arms market.”609
Second, beyond arms purchases, Aliyev also increased, albeit minimally, the number of
bilateral military exercises with Russia.610 Such actions had a net effect of improving the combat
proficiency of the country’s armed forces. Finally, and perhaps most important, a tepid military
alignment with Russia may help foment friction between Yerevan and Moscow that could erode
the strength of their alliance. Speaking in 2014, the director of the Armenian Institute for
International and Security Affairs stated, “whereas formerly, Yerevan officially said that it
trusted Moscow and that the Kremlin was maintaining the balance of power… now they don’t
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believe Moscow anymore.”611 Although Russian arms purchases served Aliyev’s interests, they
also served as a mechanism for bolstering Moscow’s influence in the South Caucasus.
The preceding paragraphs on Aliyev’s alignment preferences with Russia was not without
challenges. In several instances, Aliyev demonstrated a willingness to push back against Kremlin
elites. For example, beginning in 2006 Aliyev’s verbal confrontation spiked when he threatened
to stop importing Russian natural gas after Gazprom vowed to double its price. In 2007, Moscow
and Baku were again at odds over pricing for Azeri oil exports to Russia with Aliyev accusing
the Kremlin of energy blackmail. In response, Aliyev ordered the halt of all oil exports to
Russia.612 Despite these periods of tension, Aliyev’s low threat perceptions of Russia, coupled
with his ideas about the economic benefits of this deal and other projects facilitated a closer
alignment with Russia in the economic sphere.
In 2009 and 2010, Aliyev’s threat perceptions about Russia increased owing to his ideas about
Moscow’s long-term intentions in the South Caucasus. First, Russia’s invasion of Georgia likely
contributed to Aliyev’s ideas about Moscow’s willingness to intervene in the internal affairs of
former Soviet states; however, the extent to which the Azeri president actually viewed this as a
direct military threat to Azerbaijan remains unclear. During bilateral meetings in Turkey in late
August 2008, Aliyev did not speak of Russian military aggression in Georgia opting to focus
more on the negative impacts to the economies of all countries in the region.613
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Aliyev’s ideas about Russia as an economic threat were also visible in 2009 when Gazprom
attempted to purchase nearly all of the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic’s (SOCAR)
natural gas production. Realizing Moscow’s efforts to acquire leverage over the EU and its
dependence on energy supplies from external states Aliyev stated, “Azerbaijan makes decisions
itself on whom it will sell natural gas to. We try to separate the issue from politics, and this
stance has proved fruitful.”614 Although Azerbaijan would conclude a modest natural gas
agreement with Moscow, its actions reinforced Aliyev’s ideas about Russia as a latent threat and
the value of a great power bridging, which also included an alignment with the United States.
The Kremlin’s enduring political and economic support for Armenia as well as Moscow’s
direct military assistance to Yerevan in the Nagorno-Karabakh stalemate were two final
contributing factors shaping Ilham Aliyev’s threat perceptions of Russia. Additionally,
Armenia’s continued membership in the CSTO helped to amplify Aliyev’s threat perceptions
since Yerevan would most receive additional Russian military backing if the conflict in this
region were to escalate to all-out war. Finally, Yerevan’s continued willingness to host Russian
armed forces at the 102nd military base in Gyumri and a 2010 agreement to lease this base to
Russia until 2044 reinforced Aliyev’s ideas about the latent military threat from Russia.615
Beginning in 2011, Aliyev’s threat perceptions of Russia experienced a slight down-tick.
During a meeting with President Medvedev, Aliyev noted the existence of a series of positive
dynamics in their bilateral ties, which the Azeri president said needed to be expanded with more
‘practical acts’ of cooperation.616 During this time, Aliyev began to tout the importance of
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building-up the Azeri military with the implementation of a defense modernization program,
which he believed could best be realized with Russia’s assistance. As detailed above, starting in
2011 these practical acts came in the form of a series of negotiated arms agreements beginning
with Azerbaijan’s purchase of Russian attack helicopters.617
In near lock-step with his efforts to align with Russia, Ilham Aliyev simultaneously believed
an alignment with the United States across the economic and military lines of operation was in
the state’s best interests as well. President Aliyev’s ideas about aligning with the U.S. in these
key areas was on full display during his first visit to Washington in 2004. Speaking at Columbia
University, Ilham Aliyev heavily emphasized Azerbaijan’s commitment to developing strong
economic and security ties with Washington, citing a proven track record of cooperation in the
fields of energy and how Baku was the one of the first post-Soviet countries to join the U.S.
global campaign against terrorism.618 From the beginning of his presidency, Aliyev believed
continuing the state’s alignment with the U.S. would help ensure Washington would not curtail
its support for Azerbaijan’s energy projects. More importantly, an economic alignment with the
U.S. could potentially be used as a counter-balance to Russia if Moscow attempted to exert too
much political or economic pressure on Baku that jeopardized Azeri energy interests.
Aliyev’s inclination to align with the U.S. on an equal basis was most readily visible in the
economic sector where he continued to proclaim the merits of working closely with Washington
and American energy corporations to bring oil and natural gas to the West. For example, during
the Azeri president’s 2006 visit to Washington, Aliyev noted how Baku’s close ties with the U.S.
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has made Azerbaijan a key actor on the international stage. In his words, “we [Azerbaijan] are
much pleased to have high-level bilateral ties with our partner - USA and this is a very important
factor in our successful regional political and economic development.”619 While Aliyev was
steadfast in his ideas about the merits of an economic alignment with the United States, he also
realized the symbiotic nature of this strategic relationship. In the words of one area specialist,
“while Baku needed Washington, Aliyev knew that Washington, at times, needed him more”
given how Azerbaijan was destined to become a leading provider of energy for the West.620
Following in the footsteps of his father, Ilham Aliyev also espoused the merits of a narrowlydefined alignment with the United States in the military sphere. The frequency and intensity of
Aliyev’s preference for a military alignment with the U.S. occurred at a higher frequency and
intensity than what was seen with Russia owing to the Azeri president’s lower threat perceptions
about Washington and its long-term interests in Azerbaijan. While in office, Aliyev consistently
touted the importance of working with the U.S. in the areas of counter-terrorism, exercises, and
peacekeeping in vitally important regions of the world. One of the most visible signs of Aliyev’s
alignment with the United States was seen in late 2003 during a visit by Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, when the Azeri president expressed his unequivocal support for U.S.-led
military operations around the world. Aliyev also singled out the central importance of
Azerbaijan’s past military cooperation and the necessity for those ties to increase in the future. 621
Aliyev’s preference for a stronger military alignment with the United States persisted through
2015. For example, speaking in 2013 during the Azerbaijan-U.S. forum, Aliyev continued to tout
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his support for America’s global military operations noting how American and Azeri soldiers
were serving side-by-side as well as Azerbaijan’s role in facilitating the safe passage of over 40
percent of U.S. military supplies to Afghanistan.622 Clearly, Aliyev placed high importance in
developing a military alignment with the United States, which was also nested in a great power
bridging strategy with Russia.
Aliyev’s alignment with the United States was not without its own challenges however. In
this case, Washington’s criticisms over the Azeri president’s authoritarian tendencies, his
country’s poor human rights record, and the government’s suppression of the press created brief
demonstrations of noncooperation. For example, in April 2010 Baku canceled the U.S.-Azeri
military exercise “Computer Supported Headquarter Trainings,” which was to occur in May
2010. Although the Ministry of Defense did not provide a specific reason, Western analysts
speculated Aliyev was miffed by President Obama’s decision to not invite him to the Nuclear
Summit and for Washington’s renewed efforts to improve relations with Armenia.623
To sum up, for the period 2004 to 2015, Ilham Aliyev’s alignment preferences are best
understood in terms of great power bridging. A primary driver of Aliyev’s alignment preferences
was his low to moderate threat perceptions of Russia and the United States, which moved him to
prefer to an almost equal level of cooperation with the Washington and Moscow across various
political, economic, and military topics. Although there were periods of heightened tensions with
Russia and the U.S., Aliyev consistently maintained an oratory line that Azerbaijan would not
enter into any formal economic or military alliance. Second, Ilham Aliyev had come to believe
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the state would have to rely on its own tangible and intangible resources to realize his goals of
bringing increased levels of security and economic prosperity to the country. It was by aligning
with both the regional great powers Aliyev believed he could realize this strategic endstate.624
Georgia: Findings and Analysis
In Georgia, this study finds Walt’s prediction that small states in close proximity to a
threatening regional great power have no other option but to bandwagon with that state as a form
of appeasement does not hold water.625 Although the regional balance of power is an important
systemic consideration, a president’s threat perceptions were more important. Specifically,
moderate threat perceptions of Russia shaped Eduard Shevardnadze and Giorgi Margvelashvili’s
(2013 only) preferences for great power bridging. Separately, President Saakashvili’s high threat
perceptions of the Russian Federation was a key shape agent for a positive bandwagoning
preference with the United States.
The Philosophical Beliefs of Georgian Presidents
An examination of the operational codes of Georgian presidents from 1995 to 2015 indicate
that just because Russia is the most powerful state in the region, former Soviet satellites may not
necessary be inclined to wholeheartedly give-in and align with their former imperial center. As
depicted in the table below, a content analysis of speeches by Presidents Shevardnadze,
Saakashvili, and Margvelashvili indicate they viewed the political universe as friendly
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registering positive scores across all indices. From one perspective, this finding may fly in the
face of realist expectations that former Soviet states would view the strategic environment as
hostile given Russia’s superior military capabilities and Moscow’s historical proclivity to use
political coercion or military force against neighboring countries.
Table 12: The Philosophical Beliefs of Georgian Presidents

A review of the table above reveals several general insights about each president’s
philosophical beliefs. First, when focusing exclusively on the master beliefs category (P-1),
Presidents Shevardnadze and Margvelashvili both viewed the nature of the political universe as
definitely friendly with the latter registering the higher score of .60 in this category. On the other
hand, President Saakashvili only had a somewhat friendly view of the political universe across
the P-1 index.626 This pattern continued across the P-2 index where Margvelashvili outperformed
his predecessors retaining a higher degree of optimism (.4) about the prospects for realizing his
fundamental values as compared to Shevardnadze (.30) and Saakashvili (.10).
With respect to the predictability of the political universe (P-3), all three presidents scored .10
indicating they generally viewed the strategic environment with a high degree of uncertainty and
unpredictability. The presidents’ beliefs about their control over historical developments (P-4)
were also very similar with Margvelashvili, Saakashvili, and Shevardnadze receiving a score of
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.30, .30 and a .20 respectively. These scores indicate each president believed that control over the
strategic situation resides with others in the political universe. Finally, all three presidents’
beliefs about the role of chance (P-5) in political outcomes were extremely high. The high scores
of all three presidents in this category is not surprising, given their lower scores in the P-3 and P4 categories. Specifically, because Georgian presidents believe they have less control in an
unpredictable international system, the role of chance is pervasive in many political outcomes.
Validating Convergence and Divergence
The preceding analysis provides a baseline understanding of the philosophical beliefs about
world politics for the three Georgian Presidents. Still unanswered is to what extent are these
findings statistically significant. Based on the results of an ANOVA test, the null hypothesis that
there are no statistically significant differences in the philosophical beliefs of Georgian
presidents is invalidated. The alternative hypothesis that a statistically significant difference
exists is validated at the .001 level.
Table 13: ANOVA Results - Georgian Presidents Philosophical Beliefs
Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

Between
Groups

.262733

2

0.131366

Within
Groups

.053449

19

0. 002813

F

46.698 ***

P-1

***prob <.001
Although an ANOVA test allows us to understand there are differences between each
president’s belief system, what remains unclear is exactly where the points of divergence occur.
To discern these relationships requires a post-hoc test of the ANOVA results. For this study, a
Tukey’s HSD test provides a more nuanced analysis on the differences with each president’s
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operational code. For the purpose of this study, the focus of this chapter’s analysis will be on the
P-1 master belief category. Based on the findings from the table below, Presidents
Margvelashvili and Shevardnadze are the most similar in their beliefs about the nature of the
international system registering an adjusted P-value of 0.1367086.
Table 14: Georgia - Mean Comparisons of Tukey’s HSD Test Results (P-1)
Pair

Difference

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

Adjusted P-Value

SaakashviliMargvelashvili

-0.2680

-0.3566981

-0.17930192

0.0000009

ShevardnadzeMargvelashvili

-0.0711

-0.1609392

0.01871693

0.1367086

ShevardnadzeSaakashvili

0.1968

0.1349792

0.25879859

0.0000004

95% Family-wise Confidence Level
These findings appear logical for several reasons. First, with Russia’s invasion of Georgia in
2008, coupled with a tepid response from the West, Saakashvili’s image of international affairs is
more likely to reflect a less friendly view than Margvelashvili. Alternatively, while South
Ossetia and Abkhazia remain separated from Georgia proper, improving relations with the
Kremlin and higher levels of U.S.-European political and economic support may have added to
Margvelashvili’s more positive view of the political universe during his first several months in
office. However, as will be detailed below, Margvelashvili’s moderate threat perceptions and
associated great power bridging preference were short lived. When Moscow refused to
compromise on the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Margvelashvili perceived Russia as a
high threat and a preference for positive bandwagoning with the United States.
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Georgian President Threat Perceptions and State Alignment
Georgian presidents, more so than their counterparts in Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Ukraine,
perceived Russia to be the greatest threat to the state for the period 1995 to 2015. During this
time, Presidents Shevardnadze, Saakashvili, and Margvelashvili’s combined average of the
intensity of their threat perceptions of Russia was moderately-high.627 The specific nature of the
threats from Russia were primarily economic and to a lesser degree military under Shevardnadze.
With Saakashvili and Margvelashvili, Russian military and economic threats were dominant.
In the proceeding paragraphs, each president’s threat perceptions are analyzed in the context
of his alignment preferences with the United States and Russia from 1995-2015. The key
findings are as follows: First, when a president’s threat perceptions were in the moderate range, a
preference for great power bridging was observed. This was the case with Presidents
Shevardnadze and Margvelashvili during their first year in office. Second, when a president’s
threat perceptions of Russia were high, a president preferred a positive bandwagoning with the
United States. President Saakashvili’s alignment preference typifies this form of political
behavior as does President Margvelashvili’s from 2014-2015. Less President Margvelashvili,
each president’s threat perceptions of Russia remained stable during their time.
President Eduard Shevardnadze. From 1995 to 2003, President Shevardnadze perceived
Russia to be the greatest long-term threat to Georgia. The intensity of Shevardnadze’s threat
perceptions, as assessed by various area specialist was moderately-low, while the threat from the
United States was low.628 In his words, “we [Georgia] are a small country, but we are not
unimportant in strategic terms. Therefore, our foreign policy must be based on finding partners
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Author’s analysis. The average score of the three presidents was 1.7, which fell in the moderate high range.
Author’s analysis; Shevardnadze threat perception score is derived from interviews with area specialists.
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and friends everywhere -- close to home as well as far away.”629 It is these core beliefs that
would subsequently guide Shevardnadze’s preferences for a great power bridging alignment with
the United States and Russia. Such an approach would help facilitate the country’s transition
from Soviet rule, while also allowing him to retain power.
As graphically illustrated in the preceding chapter, Shevardnadze’s alignment preferences
indicated he preferred great power bridging as his level of verbal cooperation with the
Washington and Moscow oscillated back and forth while he was president. Additionally, an
analysis of ICEWS event data also indicated President Shevardnadze’s level of verbal
confrontation tended to be higher with Russia than the United States, which is in line with how
this president tended to view the former as the greatest long-term threat to Georgia.630
During his time in office, Shevardnadze’s ideas about the threat from Russia were primarily
economic in nature and to a lesser degree military given the continuing presence of Russian
military bases in Georgia, which was tempered somewhat by the overall weak standing of the
Russian armed forces. From 1995 to 1996, Shevardnadze’s threat perceptions of Russia were at
their lowest owing to his belief that aligning with Moscow could deliver an enduring resolution
to the separatist movements in South Ossetia and Abkhazia while at the same time providing
Tbilisi with the necessary economic and military support to help Georgia stand on its own.
Speaking in 1995, Shevardnadze stated, “we must establish Georgian armed forces, which is not
possible without Russia' help because we lack our own weapons and weapons technology. There
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is no other partner for this in the world. The second problem is regaining Abkhazia and settling
the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. Here, too, Russia will give the decisive word.”631
By the late 1990s however, Shevardnadze’s overall threat perceptions about Russia
experienced a slight up-tick as he became increasingly wary of the Kremlin’s long-term
intentions in Georgia. At issue was the Georgian president’s frustration with a lack of progress
on Moscow’s commitment to building-up Georgia’s armed forces and resolving the country’s
separatist challenges. Shevardnadze’s beliefs on these issues were made clear in 1998 when he
stated, “already in 1994 we had worked out an agreement with the Russians about the military
bases, which did not come into force. This agreement set down the condition that the Russian
Army helps in settling the Abkhazia conflict and in establishing our young Georgian Army. Both
have not been done.”632 Shevardnadze’s beliefs about Moscow’s unreliability on the separatist
issue was validated in May 1998 when Russian peacekeepers failed to prevent a surge in
violence causing the displacement of nearly 35,000 Georgians from Gali district.633
Additionally, Shevardnadze’s ideas about the growing irrelevance of Russian-led security and
economic structures were contributing factors to his de-emphasis on fostering a strategic
alignment with just Russia. For example, during the 1998 CIS summit in Moscow, Shevardnadze
expressed frustration over the inability of the Commonwealth to resolve the many internal
conflicts of member states. In Shevardnadze’s words, “...there is no need for an international
organization that is incapable of establishing peace in conflict zones. An organization like this is
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doomed to collapse eventually.”634 From Shevardnadze’s perspective, the CIS was a mechanism
designed to advance Russian interests at the expense of other members.
It was during this time Shevardnadze’s ideas about a stronger alignment with the United
States came to fruition and how America’s backing could help solidify Georgia’s economic and
political independence. For example, Shevardnadze’s inclination to align with Washington was
readily seen in the run-up to his five-day visit to the United States in July 1997. Prior to his
departure, Shevardnadze exclaimed, “we have found many friends and supporters all over the
world. Can you imagine what Georgia would have been without the great material, financial,
moral, and political support and help provided by the United States? We have to strengthen these
trends.”635 Subsequently during his meetings with President Clinton, the U.S. president and
Shevardnadze committed themselves to improving economic relations in the areas of trade and
investment. President Clinton also pledged support for Georgia’s accession into the World Trade
Organization and participation in NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.636 President
Clinton’s pronouncements were significant and help validate Shevardnadze’s ideas about the
centrality of a strategic alignment with the United States.
By 2000 and continuing through to the end of his presidency, Shevardnadze’s predisposition
to pursue a great power bridging alignment was on full display. With the election of President
George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin in 2000, Shevardnadze believed a bifurcated alignment with
both regional great powers could return maximum benefits to Georgia both internationally and
domestically. Furthermore, such an approach could translate into higher levels of economic and
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political stability for Georgia thus allowing him to remain in power. Evidence to support this
conclusion is found in an April 2000 interview where Shevardnadze is quoted as saying,
I consider the talk of Georgia's “pro-Russian” or “pro-Western” policy completely pointless. Our
main principle is state pragmatism, that is, defense of the legitimate interests of democratic
Georgia and its multiethnic people. We are prepared to cooperate with all countries that help us
resolve several fundamental problems of our state system and our democracy...637

As detailed above, Shevardnadze’s operational code analysis reflects his new approach to world
politics where there was a .10 tick upward in his views about the friendly nature of the political
universe from 2000 to 2001.
Key events highlighting Shevardnadze’s alignment preference with the United States began
with a 2001 visit to Washington. During this trip, Shevardnadze offered his support for U.S.-led
global counter-terrorism operations, while also making a commitment to advance the country’s
democratic course. According to Shevardnadze, “Georgian-American relations have proved to be
clear evidence of the possibility to build friendly relations between a small country and a great
state and base it on the principles of equality.”638 By 2002, Shevardnadze’s ideas about a strong
alignment with the U.S. began to move towards one of an alliance. Citing U.S. political and
military support under the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP), as well as the country’s
participation in the Partnership for Peace program, Shevardnadze aired his aspirations for
Georgia to become a future member of NATO.639
In near lock-step however, Georgia’s alignment with Russia continued along a positive
trajectory for several reasons. First, Shevardnadze fully understood how Georgia’s accession to
NATO would be a long and arduous process given the country’s poor economic standing and

Shevardnadze, Eduard. 2000a. “Reelected Shevardnadze Promises 'State Pragmatism.'” Kommersant, 11 April
2000, 110.
638
Shevardnadze, Eduard. 2001. “Georgia: Shevardnadze Says Relations with US Entering New Phase.” Tbilisi
Georgian Radio 1, 08 October 2001.
639
Shevardnadze, Eduard. 2002. “Statement by President of Georgia Eduard Shevardnadze at the EAPC Summit.”
NATO, 22 November 2002. https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021122h.htm. Accessed 20 July 2016.
637

301

continuing problems with secessionism. Second, Georgia’s entry into NATO would be subject to
the approval of all members of the alliance. Given this reality, continuing an alignment with
Russia was in Shevardnadze’s interests in the short and mid-terms. Finally, Shevardnadze likely
believed an alignment with Russia could still return Georgia political and economic dividends. In
this case, Shevardnadze’s threat perceptions about Russia were at an all-time low following
Moscow’s closure of the Vaziani Airbase in 2001 as outlined in the 1999 Istanbul Agreement.
Although Russia still retained three military bases in Georgia, the withdrawal of 1,500 Russian
personnel served as a catalyst for Shevardnadze to continue a closer alignment with Russia in
order to realize his long-term goals of a Georgian state free of a Russian military presence.640
President Mikheil Saakashvili. From 2004-2012, President Saakashvili perceived the Russian
threat to be high and because of that, he believed a positive bandwagoning strategy with the
United States and its Western European allies was the optimal approach for his ruling
government.641 In order, the nature of the Russian threat was: military (e.g. Russian military
bases in Georgia; fear of a direct armed attack), economic (e.g. trade ban, cut in energy supplies),
diplomatic (e.g. recalling diplomats), informational (verbal threats and criticisms). These threats
played a key role in shaping President Saakashvili’s alignment preference with the United States
and Russian Federation from 2004 to 2013.
For Saakashvili, the Russian military threat was of the highest concern representing both a
short-term and long-term strategic problem. In the short-term, the continuing presence of Russian
bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki embodied a clear and present danger to the Georgian state. The
short-term challenge of Russian bases was finally resolved in 2005 when Moscow and Tbilisi
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reached an agreement whereby Russia would close both bases by the end of 2007 in exchange
for a statement by President Saakashvili that Georgia would not allow any foreign military bases
on its soil.642 The removal of Russian military forces from Batumi and Akhalkalaki in late 2007
tempered Saakashvili’s short-term threat concerns of Russia; however, this was a fleeting
moment. Less than one year later in August 2008, Saakashvili’s high threat perceptions of Russia
were validated following Russia’s invasion of Georgia and the Kremlin’s political, economic,
and military support for South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Unlike his predecessor, Saakashvili threat perceptions of Russia had a major economic
component. When Saakashvili entered office in 2004, Georgia relied on Russia for 100 percent
of its natural gas supplies.643 With his ideas about the state as one aligned with the United States
and the West, Saakashvili knew very well his beliefs could elicit a Russian economic backlash. f
Moscow’s willingness to use its energy supplies as weapon was seen as early as 2005 when
Gazprom began raising the price of natural gas from $50 to as high as $235 per thousand cubic
meters by 2007.644 Saakashvili’s threat perceptions of Moscow were validated in January 2006
when a series of purported terrorist attacks in North Ossetia (southern Russia) severed Russian
gas supplies and cut approximately 25 percent of its imported electricity to Georgia.645 Several
months later, Russia banned Georgian wine and water citing quality and health concerns.646
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In political circles, Russia’s frequent use of coercive diplomacy served to reinforce President
Saakashvili’s Russian threat perceptions. For example, following the arrest of several Russian
spies by Georgian authorities in September 2006, Russia recalled its ambassador from Tbilisi
along with many Russian diplomats and their families from Georgia. Other Russian actions
during this time included the closure of key transportation links (rail and road) to Georgia and a
refusal to issue visas to Georgians traveling to Russia.647
Finally, the Russian threat also resided in the information realm where various Kremlin
officials and Russian government agencies frequently portrayed Saakashvili as an inept leader,
war monger, or fascist. For example, in August 2008 Russia’s Ambassador to NATO, Dmitry
Rogozin, referred to Saakashvili as a war criminal asserting the necessity for him to be punished
for starting the 2008 war with Russia.648 Separately, in late 2008 Russian Prime Minister
Vladimir Putin compared Saakashvili to Saddam Hussein and threatened to hang him by his
private parts.649 The Kremlin’s overarching goal with these efforts was to undermine
Saakashvili’s ideas about the utility of aligning with the United States and the consequences of
proceeding along a Western alignment trajectory.
Given the preceding, President Saakashvili almost consistently espoused the merits of a
strategic alignment with the United States. For example, during his time in office the Georgian
president demonstrated a consistent preference to align with the United States over Russia than
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what was seen with Shevardnadze or Margvelashvili. As noted in the previous chapter,
Saakashvili’s average intensity of verbal cooperation with the U.S. was always higher than what
was observed with Russia. An analysis of ICEWS event data on Saakashvili’s level of verbal
conflict with Russia also indicates the Georgian president’s level of verbal conflict with Moscow
was always significantly higher than what was observed with Washington.650
An analysis of Saakashvili’s speeches indicates the nature of his alignment preference with
the United States was most visible in the military and economic arenas. In the military sphere,
President Saakashvili consistently touted Georgia’s alignment with the U.S. noting how “... the
Americans are our natural allies.”651 Whether it was Saakashvili’s support for Washington’s
actions in Iraq or the ongoing presence of U.S. military trainers under the GTEP, he believed
Georgia represented an indispensable ally to America in Russia’s borderlands.
To recap, Saakashvili’s high threat perceptions of from Russia, both in the short-term and
long-term was a key factor affecting his preference to align with the United States and its
European allies. For Saakashvili, there was no other option. To have given in to Kremlin
demands for subservience would have violated his core beliefs about where Georgia belonged on
the world stage. In the end, Saakashvili saw the United States and Georgia as one. In his words,
“Georgia and the United States are partners. We are allies and we are friends....”652
President Giorgi Margvelashvili. President Giorgi Margvelashvili initially perceived the
Russian threat to be moderately high; however, after Kremlin intransigence on the status of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the Georgian president perceived Russia to be a high threat. During
Author’s analysis. For his time in office, Saakashvili’s levels of verbal conflict with Russia and the U.S. were 2.6 and -0.6 respectively. Like other presidents, there were fewer events detailing President Saakashvili’s level of
verbal conflict with the U.S. and Russia. Even though Saakashvili viewed the political universe as somewhat
friendly, it is not surprising that ICEWS would register fewer conflict events for this president.
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his time in office, Margvelashvili perceived the U.S. threat to be low.653 As detailed in the
previous chapter, Margvelashvili’s level of verbal cooperation with the United States was always
higher than what was observed with Russia. However, his levels of verbal conflict with Russia
and the U.S. were the same with the Georgian president initially tempering his criticisms of
Moscow’s armed aggression against Georgia. Specifically, for the fourth quarter of 2013
(October to December) when Margvelashvili was elected and entered office, his level of verbal
conflict with Russia and the U.S. registered a zero (neutral) on the CAMEO coding scheme for
this time period.654
Unlike Saakashvili, who consistently preferred positive bandwagoning with the United States,
Margvelashvili clearly understood the current strategic realities facing him when he entered
office. On one hand, political elites in the United States and Europe, while remaining supportive
of Margvelashvili’s opposition to Moscow’s interference in Georgian affairs, were not willing to
accord Tbilisi the necessary levels of political, economic, and military backing to resolve
decisively the situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. On the other hand, Margvelashvili
realized that given his country’s geographical location, a reset in Georgia’s political relations
with Russia was necessary at least in the short-term to re-establish the country’s territorial
integrity. As a result, Margvelashvili believed a tepid great power bridging strategy was an
optimal course of action in the short-term, but when there was no progress with Russia, positive
bandwagoning with the U.S. became his leading preference.

Author’s analysis; Margvelashvili threat perception score is derived from interviews with area specialists.
Author’s analysis. As a reminder, the intensity of an ICEWS event is measured on a cooperation-conflict
continuum that mirrors the Goldstein scale used in the WEIS dataset. This scale runs from +10 to -10 where positive
numbers from zero to 10 equal increasingly cooperative (verbal or material) events while observations on the
negative side equate to increasingly conflictual (verbal or material) events.
653
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Margvelashvili’s threat perceptions of Russia was an important shape agent leading him to
initially prefer a strategy of great power bridging in late 2013. During this time, the moderatelyhigh Russian threat was best understood in military terms where the continued stationing of
Russian Army units in South Ossetia and Abkhazia as well as the Kremlin’s military backing of
the separatist governments represented a sufficient danger to the Georgian state. Speaking in
2014, Margvelashvili threat perceptions were made clear when he stated...
The developments occur as follows: Global order is violated and the policy of the Russian
Federation indicates that there are special interest areas, which includes the former Soviet Union.
Naturally, this is a tension issue for us [and] we are carefully watching this and are vigilant. Is
there a direct and instant danger? I have previously stated that we have no such immediate threat
from the Russian Federation. However, this does not mean that there is no danger.655

President Margvelashvili also perceived an economic threat from Russia, but at a much lower
level than had been observed in previous years by his predecessor since Georgia had successfully
reestablished partial trade relations (e.g. export of Georgian wine and mineral water) with
Moscow in 2013. An increased economic alignment with Western Europe as well as a series of
energy agreements with Azerbaijan helped to temper his threat perceptions; however, a majority
of the Kremlin’s economic sanctions remained in place. When coupled with decreased
remittances by Georgians working in Russia and the country’s relatively high unemployment,
Margvelashvili realized that Georgia remained in a vulnerable position.656
With the Russian threat defined in these ways, Margvelashvili believed a strategy of great
power bridging was the optimal approach for Georgia going forward. A content analysis
indicates that Margvelashvili’s verbal pronouncements gave emphasis to a weak diplomatic
alignment with Russia as a way to reestablish Georgia’s territorial integrity. During his inaugural
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speech Margvelashvili proclaimed, “despite the difficult situation we are facing today and in
parallel with integrating into Euro-Atlantic structures, we reiterate our commitment to further
dialogue with Russia and build confidence to solve the problems existing today. This dialogue
will be built upon unequivocal respect for Georgia’s national interests. That is respect for our
internationally recognized borders and the principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty.”657
According to one Georgian journalist, “there isn’t more love for Putin and Russia. It’s just a
realization that we’re left face-to-face with Russia, and we have to deal with it.”658
An important point here is how because Margvelashvili perceived the Russian threat to be
less severe, diplomacy with Moscow represented the best way to achieve a peaceful solution to
the security and economic issues at hand. Although Margvelashvili and the politically powerful
Georgian Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili were able to affect an economic compromise that
saw the lifting of Russia’s trade ban on wine and other goods, no progress was made on
resolving the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia during 2013 and 2014.659
Despite these ‘olive branch’ efforts, Moscow continued to take a hardline approach to its
relations with Georgia when it came to the issue on the status of the separatist provinces.
Through 2014 Kremlin leaders consistently asserted South Ossetia and Abkhazia would remain
independent states, regardless of whether the international community did or did not recognize
this reality. For example, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated,
I can say that South Ossetia and Abkhazia are sovereign countries for Russia. We recognized
their sovereignty, signed friendship and reciprocal aid agreements with them, we ensure the
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safety of their borders and their military safety (our military bases are there on the basis of signed
agreements). These are new realities in the Transcaucasia, and we have to acknowledge them.660

Russia’s staunch position on the separatist provinces continued through 2014 as Moscow
bolstered its security and economic relations with Abkahzia and South Ossetia in an attempt to
solidify their independence and status as a Russian satellite. The Kremlin’s efforts to make this a
reality were advanced in November 2014 when Abkhaz political leaders signed a collective
defense agreement with the Russian Federation.661 These events taken together help shape
President Margvelashvili’s beliefs about how even the most tenuous alignment with Russia
would not result in the realization of his government’s strategic goals on Georgia’s sovereignty.
It is in early 2014 one can discern an increase in Margvelashvili’s threat perceptions of Russia
owing to a lack of progress on the security situation in the separatist provinces. During his
annual address to parliament, Margvelashvili noted how “the occupation and militarization of a
part of Georgian territory increases the threat of detribalization in the South Caucasus and Black
Sea regions, and therefore the Russian Federation poses a serious problem for our security.”662 It
is these changes in his threat perceptions that subsequently framed his tendency to align more
closely with the United States and countries in Western Europe.
For the remaining two years under examination, Margvelashvili’s alignment preferences were
best understood as positive bandwagoning with the United States. The nature of Margvelashvili’s
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alignment during this time gravitated toward one defined in military, political, and economic
terms. For example, during his annual speech to parliament in 2014, Margvelashvili stated...
In 2014, we should reinforce and strengthen the cooperation with the United States - our strategic
partner. In this regard, we act within the United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership,
that has not completely addressed its opportunities yet, moreover, it has even greater possibilities
and prospects for further development. The cooperation in the defense sector is noticeably
promoted. The U.S.-Georgia joint military trainings were conducted in Georgia several times in
2013. We also hope to enhance economic cooperation with the United States, which will open
new markets and attract new investments to Georgia.663

During this time, President Margvelashvili’s threat perceptions of Russia spiked to a high-level
owing to Russian intransigence on South Ossetia and Abkhazia and continued Kremlin military
threats if Tbilisi did not fall in line. Among the many factors shaping President Margvelashvili’s
ideas about the Russian threat were decisions by political elites in the breakaway provinces to
sign a military treaty with Russia. These treaties formalized Russia’s military presence in South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, created a new Russian-led combined force, and established protocols for
the provision of defense articles to Abkhaz and South Ossetian forces.664 These events, as well as
Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and support for separatists in the Donbas, would
solidify Margvelashvili’s high threat perceptions of Russia going forward.665
Despite aversions from NATO to bring Georgia fully into the alliance’s fold, President
Margvelashvili’s alignment preferences with the U.S. and its European allies persisted. For
Margvelashvili, while the door to NATO may be closed, a strategic alignment with United States
could still help him to at least maintain the status quo. For example, during a visit to Washington
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in 2015, Margvelashvili noted how, “...we have experienced and enjoyed United States
support..., but that does not exclude intensifying and improving and enhancing GeorgianAmerican relationships, which has to happen. And this could be in many areas, in many fields,
not only the areas that are linked with security or building the defensibility of our country.”666
To recap, this section found that when a Georgian president perceived Russia as a moderate
threat, he preferred great power bridging as was the case with Eduard Shevardnadze and Giorgi
Margvelashvili in late 2013 and early 2014. Second, when a president’s threat perceptions of
Russia were high as was the case with Mikheil Saakashvili and Giorgi Margvelashvili in 20142015, a preference for positive bandwagoning with the United States was observed.
Moldova: Findings and Discussion
In Moldova, there were no empirical observations to support realist predictions that Russia’s
decisive power advantages would drive senior foreign policy executives to prefer a
bandwagoning alignment with Moscow out of fear or because the state had no other strategic
options. This is not to say Russian military power was not an important consideration given the
continued stationing of Russian military units at bases in the Trans-Dniester. However, this
research project concludes this systemic condition was not the most important factor shaping the
alignment preferences of Moldovan presidents. More important was how each political leader
interpreted Russia’s regional actions.
An examination of the relationship between Moldovan presidents’ threat perceptions and their
alignment preferences yielded several findings. First, all three presidents viewed the nature of the
political universe in friendly terms. Second, statistical tests indicate Presidents Lucinschi and
Timofti were the most similar in their master philosophical beliefs, but this association did not
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convey to their threat perceptions and alignment preferences. Third, Presidents Lucinschi and
Voronin (after 2003) perceived Russia as a moderate threat, which was associated with a
preference for great power bridging. President Timofti perceived Russia as a high threat, which
was associated with his preference for positive bandwagoning with the United States. Vladimir
Voronin was the only president whose threat perceptions and alignment preferences varied.
During his first several years in office, Voronin perceived Russia as a low threat, which was
associated with a proclivity for positive bandwagoning with Moscow. After the Kozak
Memorandum debacle, Voronin’s moderate threat perceptions of the Russian Federation were
associated with great power bridging.
The Philosophical Beliefs of Moldovan Presidents
In the table below, an analysis of the output from Profiler Plus on the master philosophical
beliefs of Presidents Lucinschi, Voronin, and Timofti indicate these political leaders were
somewhat analogous in their operational codes about the nature of the political universe. First, all
three generally viewed the nature of international system as friendly with some minor variation.
Table 15: The Philosophical Beliefs of Moldovan Presidents

Beginning with the master belief category (P-1), Presidents Lucinschi and Timofti viewed the
nature of the political universe as definitely friendly with the latter registering the higher score of
.54 as compared to the former’s .51 score. On the other hand, President Voronin retained a
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somewhat friendly view of the political universe across the P-1 index (.44).667 This pattern
continued across the P-2 index where both Lucinschi (.27) and Timofti (.32) outperformed
Voronin (.23) by retaining a higher degree of optimism about the prospects for realizing their
fundamental values.
When examining each president’s beliefs about the predictability of the political universe (P3), all three generally viewed the strategic environment with a high degree of uncertainty and
unpredictability registering scores of .15 or less. Each presidents’ beliefs about control over
historical developments (P-4) were also similar with Lucinschi, Voronin, and Timofti scoring
.28, .27, and .33 respectively in this category. These similar scores suggest each of the Moldovan
presidents believed control over events in world politics resides with other states. Finally, all
three presidents believed the role of chance (P-5) was a very important factor in political
outcomes. The high scores of all three presidents in this category is logical, given their low
scores about the predictability of the world politics and their control over historical
developments. For these presidents, because they believe they have less control in an
unpredictable world, the role of chance in shaping political outcomes is higher.
Validating Convergence and Divergence
The preceding analysis helps establish a frame of reference about the philosophical beliefs for
Presidents Lucinschi, Voronin, and Timofti. From one perspective, there appears to be some
variation in their master philosophical beliefs; however, whether these differences are
statistically significant needs to be discerned. As depicted in the table below, an ANOVA test
invalidates the null hypothesis that there are no statistically significant differences in the

A political leader’s master philosophical beliefs (P-1) are measured in the following way: (-1 = very hostile; -.50
= definitely hostile; -.25 = somewhat hostile; 0.0 = mixed; +.25 = somewhat friendly; +.50 = definitely friendly;
+.75 = very friendly).
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philosophical beliefs of the three Moldovan presidents. The alternative hypothesis that a
statistically significant difference exists is validated at the .01 level.
The ANOVA test below demonstrated there are differences in the master beliefs of the
Moldovan presidents; however, where those differences exist is still not apparent. In Table 17,
the results of a Tukey’s HSD test reveal Presidents Lucinschi and Timofti retain the most similar
beliefs about the nature of the political universe with an adjusted P-value of 0.29.
Table 16: ANOVA Results – Moldovan Presidents Philosophical Beliefs
Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

Between
Groups

.069679

2

0.034840

Within
Groups

.060097

19

0.004293

F

8.1611**

P-1

**prob <.01
Table 17: Moldova - Mean Comparisons of Tukey’s HSD Test Results (P-1)
Pair

Difference

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

Adjusted P-Value

TimoftiLucinschi

0.07250000

-0.04875466

0.19375466

0.2925341

VoroninLucinschi

-0.08194444

-0.18499109

0.02110221

0.1298146

VoroninTimofti

-0.15444444

-0.25749109

-0.05139779

0.0040897

95% Family-wise Confidence Level

314

Moldovan President Threat Perceptions and State Alignment
For the period 1997-2015, the combined average of Presidents Lucinschi, Voronin, and
Timofti’s perceptions of the Russian threat were moderately low.668 Presidents Lucinschi and
Voronin (after 2003) perceived Russia as a moderate threat, while Timofti held ideas that Russia
was a high threat to Moldova. With respect to variation in threat perceptions, Lucinschi and
Timofti’s threat perceptions of Russia remained stable while in office; however, Vladimir
Voronin’s perceptions experienced some volatility. During his first several years in office,
Voronin perceived Russia as a low threat, but after Kremlin elites attempted to force an
unfavorable Trans-Dniester peace agreement on Chisinau, Voronin’s threat perceptions of Russia
increased to moderate. Separately, Presidents Lucinschi and Timofti’s threat perceptions of
Washington were low while President Voronin viewed the United States as a moderately low
threat. For each president, the Russian threat came in three forms: military, economic, and/or
political/diplomatic.
When examining the associations between threat and alignment preferences, Voronin’s low
threat perception of Russia was associated with a predilection for positive bandwagoning with
Moscow. When Voronin’s threat perceptions of Russia increased to moderately low, he saw
higher value in great power bridging. In a similar fashion, President Lucinschi’s moderately low
threat perceptions were also associated with a preference for great power bridging. Finally,
President Timofti’s high threat perception of Russia was associated with a preference for positive
bandwagoning with the United States. In the proceeding paragraphs, an analysis of the

Author’s analysis. The assessed scores from area experts were as follows: Lucinschi (2.4); Voronin (2.1); Timofti
(1.5); combined average was 2. As a reminder, the intensity of a president’s threat perceptions were measured in the
following way: 1-1.5 (high); 1.6-2.0 (moderately high); 2.1-2.5 (moderately low); 2.6-3 (low).
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relationship between Moldovan presidential threat perceptions and each president’s alignment
preferences are detailed.
President Petru Lucinschi. For his time in office, President Petru Lucinschi viewed Russia as
the primary external threat to the state and the country’s territorial security. During his four years
in office, President Lucinschi perceived Russia as a moderately-low threat. A qualitative analysis
of Lucinschi’s verbal pronouncements indicate his ideas about the Russian threat were associated
with a preference for great power bridging. Although the ICEWS event data set reveal
Lucinschi’s level of verbal conflict with Russia was higher than what was observed with the
United States, analyzing the data from speeches and area experts indicates he preferred to align
with both the U.S. and its European allies as well as Russia. By doing so would help him restore
Moldova’s territorial integrity and improve the country’s economy.669 Several key points support
these assertions.
First, upon entering office, Lucinschi’s moderately-low threat perceptions of Russia were
framed, in part, by his beliefs Russia had been and would remain the state’s most important
strategic partner. This was most readily seen in Lucinschi’s ideas about the state’s top security
priorities: achieving a peaceful resolution to the separatist movement in the Trans-Dniester and
the removal of Russian military forces in Moldova. In his January 1997 inaugural speech,
Lucinschi asserted,
Normalization of the situation in Dniester is one of first-priority tasks to fulfill. I count very much
on Russia's support in extinguishing this hotbed of tension in Europe. This may well serve an
example of how external policy should be conducted by a great state. Another important factor
for the conflict's final settlement would be the withdrawal of Russian troops from our territory in
accordance with the known bilateral agreement.670

Author’s analysis. As noted in Chapter Five, there is a gap in the ICEWS dataset for events related to President
Lucinschi’s verbal cooperation with the United States. There are also gaps with events detailing his verbal conflict
with the U.S. and Russia. As a result, increased weighting is given to the data collected from elite interviews and a
qualitative analysis of the Lucinschi’s speeches and secondary sources.
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With his extensive network of personal relations to political figures in the Kremlin stemming
from his time as Moldova’s ambassador to Moscow, Lucinschi likely believed a closer alignment
with Russia would help him to realize these foreign policy goals.671
Second, over the course of his presidency, Lucinschi’s frequently expressed a preference for
developing a closer economic and political alignment with countries in the West, to include the
United States. For Lucinschi, such alignments would help Chisinau to implement economic and
democratic reforms.672 However, Lucinschi’s ideas about a military alignment with the United
States was much less emphasized. While Lucinschi was open to routine military activities with
the U.S. via NATO, Chisinau only worked with both actors via the Partnership for Peace
Program. A key factor shaping his alignment actions in this case was Moldova’s constitution,
which stipulated the country would remain neutral in world affairs. By highlighting the country’s
neutrality, Lucinschi sought to avoid a potential Russian backlash that could exacerbate tensions
in the Trans-Dniester or elicit negative political or economic pressure on his government.673
Through the end of presidency, Lucinschi’s great power bridging preference came into clearer
perspective where an analysis of Lucinschi’s verbal statements during these years indicate his
tendency to align with the U.S. and Russia on an almost equal basis. Beginning in 1999,
Lucinschi appeared to give some emphasis to fostering a strong alignment with the United
States. Now in his third year of office, Lucinschi had grown frustrated with Moscow and the lack
of progress on a resolution of the Trans-Dniester issue. While Russian leaders continued to talk
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about achieving a balanced compromise, Lucinschi began to realize the Kremlin’s preference for
maintaining the status quo in the Trans-Dniester as a way to keep Moldova in Russia’s orbit. For
example, during a meeting with Lucinschi, Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized how
“Russia is interested that Moldova be a sovereign, independent and territorially integral state...”
the status of Trans-Dniester cannot be fully realized “...without counting the interests of all
groups in society, including Transdnistria’s residents.”674 This strategic reality helped shape
Lucinschi’s ideas about aligning with other regional great powers in order to help manage the
Trans-Dniester issue.
Second, following the collapse of the Russian economy in 1998, Kremlin leaders began to
focus more on internal political-economic priorities giving less emphasis to foreign policy issues.
During this window of Moscow’s inattentiveness, Lucinschi believed bolstering a political and
economic alignment with the United States could return several short-term gains for Moldova. In
the political sphere, a closer alignment with the United States would help Lucinschi manage the
challenges in the Trans-Dniester. On the economic front, the Moldovan leader still believed a
closer alignment with Washington could help the country’s struggling economy, which was hit
particularly hard by the Russian economic crisis. Lucinschi’s efforts to foster a closer alignment
with the United States subsequently equated to an increase in economic assistance. Specifically,
U.S. foreign assistance to Moldova increased from $33 million in 1998 to $45 million in 1999
and $50 million in 2000.675 It is on this point that one can begin to see how systemic conditions
(e.g. collapse of Russia’s economy) can impact a president’s ideas and beliefs. While events in
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the international system are important, what is more important is how individual political leaders
perceive these happenings and the subsequent actions they take to realize their goals.
In the military sphere, Russia’s stubbornness on facilitating a Trans-Dniester resolution shaped
Lucinschi ideas about Washington’s potential role on this issue. For example, as a lead agent in
the OSCE, the United States, in concert with other OSCE members, facilitated an agreement
requiring Russia to withdraw all of its military forces from Moldova by 2002.676 As part of this
effort, in May 1999 the Washington offered Chisinau a $30 million grant as part of a Russian-led
effort to remove weapons stockpiles and military equipment in Trans-Dniester.677
Coinciding with Lucinschi’s preferences to align with the United States and Kremlin footdragging on the Trans-Dniester issue, as well as the removal of arms from this region, the
Moldovan president’s threat perceptions of Russia remained stable. Furthermore, President
Lucinschi continued to espouse the necessity for the state to continue an alignment with Russia.
For example, in 2000 during President Putin’s visit to Chisinau, the Moldovan president
emphasized the high value of Russia to the Moldovan state. In his words... “Russia is our
strategic partner – it is our biggest trade and economic partner and many of our people have
personal ties with Russia.”678 Lucinschi subsequently highlighted Russia’s central role as “the
guarantor and intermediary in the solution of the Trans-Dniester conflict and a host of other
problems, including the set of economic problems.” 679 Taken together, while Lucinschi may
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have given increased emphasis to aligning with the United States and Europe, Russia would
continue to remain of central importance to him and the realization of his strategic objectives.
President Vladimir Voronin. From 2001 to 2009, President Voronin viewed Russia as the
primary external threat to the state and the country’s territorial security. For his two terms in
office, Voronin perceived Russia as a moderately-low threat.680 When considering variation,
during his first two and half years in office (April 2001- November 2003) the Moldovan
president perceived the Russian threat as low moving to moderately low from 2004 to 2009.
Separately, Voronin perceived the United States to be a moderately low threat during his
presidency. Unlike other research endeavors, which have concluded Voronin’s alignment
trajectory was either pro-Russian or pro-West, this study finds Voronin first preferred positive
bandwagoning with Russia, which then gave way to one of great power bridging with the
Washington and Moscow. The paragraphs below provide evidence to support this conclusion.
After entering office, the extent to which Voronin did not view Russia as a threat was made
clear when he and his communist party sought a closer political and economic alignment with
Russia. For example, within days of taking office, Voronin was in Moscow meeting with senior
Kremlin leaders. During his visit with President Putin, Voronin signed a new Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation going so far as to entertain the idea of joining the Belarus-Russia
economic union. According to Voronin, “our first steps will be towards economic integration not
only with the Russia-Belarus Union but with the Eurasian community of the CIS memberstates.”681 For Voronin, establishing an alignment with Russia was based, in part, on his beliefs

Interviews on file with author. Voronin’s threat perceptions of Russia averaged 2.0 making this regional great
power a moderately low threat.
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that Moscow was the key to resolving the separatist movement in the Trans-Dniester and for
improving Moldova’s economy.
In 2002, President Voronin’s low threat perceptions of Russia and preference for positive
bandwagoning with Russia continued unabated. An analysis of his verbal pronouncements
indicated the Moldovan president’s top foreign policy priority was a strategic alignment with
Moscow. In November 2002, Voronin touted how a close political alignment with Russia had
elicited strong support from Kremlin elites on upholding Moldova’s territorial sovereignty
resulting in progress to bring about an enduring solution to the Trans-Dniester stalemate. In the
economic sphere, Voronin even made several public statements that he would consider the merits
of Moldova joining the Eurasian Economic Union as a way to further align the state with Russia
and improve the country’s economy.682 According to Voronin, “a strategic partnership with
Russia is necessary, above all, to promote the welfare of the Moldovan people.”683
President Voronin’s low threat perceptions of Russia continued throughout much of 2003. In
July, Voronin declared Moldova’s alignment with Russia had resulted in significant
improvement in all areas ranging from trade and investment to cultural and humanitarian
topics.684 His preference for a positive bandwagoning alignment with Russia intensified in the
late summer as Chisinau and Moscow hashed out a political compromise for Moldova’s
separatist regions. By mid-November, Voronin himself had verbally agreed to a Russian political
compromise developed by Russia’s special envoy Dmitri Kozak. Known as the ‘Kozak
Memorandum,” this agreement allowed Russia to continue its stationing of military forces in
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Moldova for 30 years. Voronin’s support for this agreement was based on a condition that
“extending the Russian peacekeeping mission [would occur] if stabilization forces involved units
from European Union, the OSCE in Europe, and Ukraine”685 were also involved.
November 2003 represented a critical juncture that would witness a marked increase in
Voronin’s threat perceptions of Russia and a transition in his alignment preferences from
positive bandwagoning to great power bridging. Specifically, as conditions of the Kozak
Memorandum continued to change and as these updates yielded more political power to leaders
in Transnistria and Gagauzia, President Voronin ultimately rejected the agreement. For example,
one of the last versions of the memorandum allowed Transnistria and Gagauzia to retain their
independent governments, veto international treaties, receive disproportionate representation in
the upper house, and secede if Moldova joined the EU.686 As will be detailed in the next chapter,
domestic politics was certainly an important component in Voronin’s rejection; however, he too
realized the Kremlin’s ill-intentions. Speaking in December 2003, he claimed...
The rules of the game were changed at the last moment. New formulations on which the Dniester
region insisted appeared. Initially, they were in none of these documents. We keep 18 different
versions of the memorandum for the record. But new points appeared. You know, it is impossible
in high-level politics to build a house on sand or on such a principle as mistrust. And when
absolutely new cards started to be pulled out of sleeves during the last days, the last evening or
the last night, of course we could not sign such a document. This was the most dangerous,
therefore I could not accept this despite anything.687

Beginning in 2004 and continuing through 2006, Voronin’s threat perceptions of Russia
became moderately high as the Kremlin increased its political and economic pressure against
Chisinau. Voronin’s higher threat perceptions of Russia during this time are best characterized in
military and economic terms. First, Moscow’s continued military presence in the Trans-Dniester
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represented a source of friction and instability in Moldova. In May 2004 at the NATO summit in
Istanbul, Voronin for the first time publicly called for the removal of Russian forces from
Moldova in accordance with the 1999 Istanbul Agreement.688 Later that year, Voronin was
highly critical of the Kremlin on this issue asserting, “what could be the reason for preserving
Russia's presence in Moldova, especially taking into account its symbolic scale? Are we capable
of being friends with Moscow only under the threat of a thousand Russian gunmen? Or maybe
these soldiers are resolving Russia's global strategic tasks in the Balkans?”689 At issue was how
Russia’s military forces in Moldova served to embolden political leaders in the Trans-Dniester to
continue along the road of separatism.
Second, in early 2005 MPs in the Russian Duma tabled a discussion on implementing
economic sanctions against Chisinau, which included cuts in energy supplies and a ban on
certain imports from Moldova. By early 2006, the Kremlin took action enacting a series of
economic sanctions on Moldova, which included a ban on wine imports, various meats, fruits
and vegetables. The Kremlin’s decision was significant given how 80 percent of Moldovan wine
was sold to Russia, which made up nearly 30 percent of the country’s GDP.690 Although
Moscow lifted its sanctions in 2007, this event served as a lasting example of how the economic
threat from Russia would remain front and center in the years ahead.
Voronin’s growing mistrust of Moscow and its long-term strategic intentions in Moldova,
coupled with his ideas about how Euro-Atlantic countries could help him realize his foreign
policy goals, caused the Moldovan president’s alignment preferences to gravitate toward great
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power bridging. From 2004 forward, Voronin frequently espoused the merits of a strategic
alignment with the United States as well. For example, in 2004 Voronin sent a message to
President George W. Bush’s Voronin stating, “...the development and deepening of partnership,
and cooperation and friendly relations with the United States will continue to remain a priority
for my country in future. We would also like to express our deep gratitude for... the technical
assistance offered to Moldova to implement social and economic reforms. The United States will
remain a leader in building a fairer, more prosperous and stable world, a world based on
democratic values and equality between states.”691
Voronin also preferred a closer military alignment with the United States. For example,
Voronin’s verbal pronouncements helped characterize him as a strong proponent of U.S. military
and/or NATO operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Separately, Voronin expressed how Chisinau’s
military alignment with Washington via Moldova’s participation in U.S. and NATO military
exercises would strengthen the country’s security.692 But Voronin’s military alignment with the
United States and NATO had its limits, where at no time was there a vision of Moldova
becoming a member of NATO. Speaking in 2006, Voronin’s ideas about a military alignment
with NATO and its relationship with Russia brought clarity to his alignment preferences.
As far as the present authority and ruling majority are concerned, we do not have any phobias
with respect to NATO. Our level of cooperation with NATO is not as great as that of Russia, of
course. Yet it enables us to resolve a whole host of purely civilian problems, from scientific
projects to programs for the elimination of missile fuel and anti-personnel mines remaining from
Soviet times. But we do not intend to join NATO.693
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As noted in the quote above, although Voronin had given increased emphasis to his
alignment preferences with the United States and other Western countries, Russia was still a part
of his alignment equation albeit at a lesser intensity than what was seen during his first years in
office. For example, in 2004 and 2005 President Voronin frequently made public statements
noting how Chisinau’s relations with Moscow remained in good standing, despite the suspension
of negotiations on the status of Trans-Dniester following his refusal to sign the Kozak
Memorandum. In 2004, Voronin stated, “friendly relations with Russia are a historical factor and
a tradition of our nations spanning many centuries.”694 The following year, Voronin then
proclaimed it was not necessary to restore Moldova’s alignment with Russia because “...they
were not interrupted... We have no problems with Russia.695” The point here is that Voronin still
believed the state’s political and economic alignment with Russia remained strong and in good
order despite several minor setbacks.
By 2007 and continuing through the end of his presidency, Voronin’s perceptions of the
Russian threat appeared to temper gravitating towards moderately low. It is during this time one
can still discern his preference for a great power bridging alignment with Russia and the United
States with the former being given increased preference. With respect to the Trans-Dniester,
Voronin’s frustration with the inability of the United States and EU to spur the five primary
actors towards a meaningful solution served to reinvigorate the Moldovan president’s ideas that
Russia remained the most important participant on this issue. Additionally, Voronin began to
exhibit a high degree of disappointment over U.S. and EU investment in Moldova.696
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One of the most significant events helping validate Voronin’s lower threat perceptions of
Russia and the state’s closer alignment with Moscow occurred in 2008. After a series of highlevel meetings in the early part of that year, Chisinau agreed to maintain its policy of neutrality
and eschew any ideas of joining NATO in exchange for a stronger political commitment by
Kremlin leaders to resolve the Trans-Dniester deadlock. Although Russia’s invasion of Georgia
in August may have been a cause of concern for Voronin, it does not appear they were decisive.
Capping his commitment to a strong alignment with the Russian Federation across various
issues, Voronin during his last year in office declared,
A friend in need is a friend indeed. We are particularly grateful for the personal position of the
Russian president and the Russian Foreign Ministry who so actively supported our statehood in
one of the most critical moments in its history. I am talking about their support for the statehood
rather than to any separate political force.697

In 2009, a minor downtick in Voronin’s alignment with the United States was also noted. One
potential explanation stems from Moldova’s political crisis whereby Voronin likely believed
Moscow, more so than Washington, would be able to provide the necessary backing for him and
his communist party to stay in power. Evidence to support this assertion was seen in a May 2009
interview where, when queried about his relations with Moscow after the April 2009 elections,
Voronin “...wished to thank Russian President Dmitri Medvedev for the attention and concern he
personally showed during those tense days. He [Medvedev] fully supported and understood the
measures we undertook during those days. I believe that only such attitude and interest prove that
our relations are very stable, solid and have great prospects.”698
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In sum, over the course of his presidency, Vladimir Voronin exhibited both forms of
alignment as conceptualized by this study. During his first 30 months in office, Voronin’s low
threat perceptions of Russia was associated with a positive bandwagoning preference with this
regional great power. In the wake of the Kozak Memorandum debacle, beginning in 2004
Voronin perceived Russia as a moderately low threat, which was associated with a preference for
great power bridging.
President Nicolae Timofti. From 2012 to 2015, President Timofti viewed Russia as the
primary short- and long-term threat to the state and country. During the four years under
examination, Timofti perceived Russia to be a high threat to Moldova. From Timofti’s
perspective, the nature of this threat was primarily economic (e.g. sanctions) and military (e.g.
Russia’s armed forces in the Trans-Dniester). With the United States, Timofti’s threat
perceptions were low owing to his beliefs Washington and its influence in Western Europe could
play an important role in the country’s economic development and the resolution of the ongoing
Trans-Dniester problem.699
As graphically illustrated in the preceding chapter, Timofti’s alignment preferences indicated
he preferred a positive bandwagoning alignment with the United States as his level of verbal
cooperation with Washington was consistently higher than what was observed with Moscow. An
analysis of ICEWS event data indicated President Timofti consistently espoused a higher level of
verbal conflict with Russia over the United States.700 Timofti’s high threat perceptions of Russia
remained stable during his time in office, which was associated with a positive bandwagoning
preference with the United States.

Author’s analysis; interviews on file with author.
Author’s analysis. The total number of events detailing President Timofti level of verbal conflict were, in general,
few in number. The ICEWS event data set registered conflictual verbal events with Russia but none with the U.S.
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In examining Nicolae Timofti’s foreign policy speeches, it initially appeared the Moldovan
president believed the threat from Russia was a moderate one and that a great power bridging
alignment was in order. For example, in a speech prior to the March 2012 presidential elections,
Timofti’s foreign policy discourse appear to reflect a preference for aligning Moldova with
multiple great power powers. According to Timofti, because Moldova is a small country...
...it is doomed to make a wise policy. Our country should continue to build good relations with of
strategic partnership with Russia, the USA, Germany and other states for the benefit of people.
Moldova should efficiently use its strategic geographical position, all the opportunities provided
by regional cooperation mechanisms to get maximum benefits.701

Although Timofti may have initially viewed political relations with Moscow in an optimistic
way, his ideas about charting an alignment with the countries in the West, to include the United
States became a centerpiece of his foreign policy agenda. Although Timofti still sought to
maintain good relations with Russia, especially on resolving the Trans-Dniester issue, such
relations appeared to be of secondary importance. Speaking several months after his
inauguration, one can gather how Timofti’s threat perceptions may have influenced this
Moldovan president’s alignment preferences.
We [Moldova] will maintain and continue to develop our relations with Russia, for the benefit of
both parties, not just for the benefit of one side. I regret to say we give in a lot in our relations
with Russia. Very often, this happens under the pretext they will stop the gas supply. However,
we do not get gas for free. We pay the highest price for it. This is Russia's policy in the case of
countries that have no alternative. This is why we are analyzing and exploring other directions,
trying to find an alternative solution to energy problems.702

Moscow’s potential to employ punitive economic and military actions would help solidify
Timofti’s beliefs about the high threat from Russia and the necessity to align with the West. For
example, in late 2013 Moscow imposed an import ban on the Moldovan wines in what some
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analysts concluded was a response to Chisinau’s ongoing collaboration with the EU under the
Eastern Partnership Program. In response to Russia’s actions, Timofti stated,
The Russian side’s actions represent an unfriendly, non-Christian, disloyal act. I do not know the
true reason of this decision – it is either about wine quality or a coincidence with the nearing of
the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius. If Russia resorts to such levers for Moldova to be with
the Russian Federation, it is their business. Therefore, we will take actions to have alternative
sources of gas, as well as other sales markets. We cannot depend on one single partner.703

The economic threat from Russia intensified after Moldova signed an EU Association
Agreement in June 2014. This time, the Kremlin’s economic backlash included a ban on
Moldovan wine, processed pork, canned vegetables, and fruits. Additionally, Russia also revoked
a provision of the 2011 Russia-Moldova Trade Agreement that provided Chisinau an exemption
on trade duties for commodities in 19 different categories.704 Timofti attempted to temper
Russian concerns over his preference for an economic alignment with the West noting how “the
signing of the Moldova-EU free trade agreement does not hamper relations with CIS countries.
On the contrary, these two economic spaces, the EU and the CIS, complement each other.”705
However, his words did little to change Moscow’s approach. On a positive note, the overall
economic threat from Russia appeared to diminish somewhat for Timofti, given the ability of
Moldovan companies to find alternate markets for its goods.706 In light of these developments,
Chisinau still conducted routine economic activities with Russia in other areas not affected by
Moscow’s trade ban.
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With the West, Timofti entered office with a clear agenda to move Moldova in that direction.
Although his primary focus was on fostering an economic alignment with the EU, the Moldovan
president also placed high value on a diplomatic, economic, and even a military alignment (via
NATO) with the United States. An analysis of Timofti’s verbal pronouncements from 2012 to
2015 validate this assertion. Beginning in 2012, Timofti’s ideas about a strategic alignment with
the United States were made clear in a letter to President Barrack Obama. In Timofti’s words,
The USA has always been an important partner and friend of Moldova as regards its democratic
course, market economy and social progress, and contributes to the promotion of my country's
European integration and territorial reintegration. We value the USA's support and we voice our
wish to expand and enhance bilateral cooperation in sectors of mutual interest.707

In 2013, Timofti continued to espouse the necessity of a close alignment with Washington.
During a visit by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, Timofti stressed how Moldova would
continue to look to America as a source of stability and security for his country.708 Here, Timofti
continued to view how an alignment with Washington could provide Chisinau some leverage
over Moscow on the Trans-Dniester problem set. By 2015, Timofti continued to maintain his
higher level of verbal cooperation with the United States and verbal conflict with Russia. For
example, in 2015 Timofti praised the state’s relationship with Washington noting how there had
been an upward development in diplomatic and economic cooperation. Timofti also committed
to building on this trend.709 With Russia, Timofti was highly critical of Moscow’s actions noting
how, “all states of the world, including neutral ones, must get united and act as a solid front
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against terror actions encroaching on the most important values of the mankind. Russia has never
respected the Republic of Moldova's neutrality.”710
Finally, in the military sphere, although Moldova is a neutral state according to the country’s
constitution, President Timofti almost consistently espoused the advantages of aligning closer
with the United States via NATO. In 2012 after assuming the presidency, Timofti gave high
praise to Chisinau’s growing military partnership with Washington specifically calling out the
high value of being a member of the U.S.-funded Global Peace Operations Initiative.
Membership in this program provided Moldova a $1.6 million grant to improve the army’s
peacekeeping training facilities.711 Next, speaking in 2014 on U.S. military assistance to
Moldova, President Timofti concluded, “the support of Western partners, firstly, from the United
States gives us confidence that we will manage to face the challenges of regional security.”712
Perhaps the most vivid example demonstrating Timofti’s preference to align with the United
States came in the form of his verbal pronouncements on the possibility of Moldova joining
NATO in late 2014 and early 2015. Following Moscow’s annexation of Crimea, the movement
of Russian military forces into the Donbas, and Kremlin support for pro-Russian rebels,
Timofti’s threat perceptions of Russia spiked. According to the Moldovan president, given the
current strategic setting in the region, the country’s constitutional provision on neutrality should
be revised espousing critical words for Moldovan political leaders, who wrote the country’s 1994
constitution. At issue was how Moldovan territory then and now remained under Russian
occupation and how the naivety of the framers of the constitution may have encouraged the
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Kremlin’s military adventurism in the post-Soviet space. In Timofti’s words, “the constitution
should be adjusted to reality. The presence, despite Chisinau's will, of the Russian 14th Army on
Moldova's territory is a violation of our neutrality status...and that there are serious risks and
threats to Moldova's security that could be overcome and prevented by cooperation with
NATO.”713 Timofti’s position in this case helps to explain his preference for a positive
bandwagoning alignment with the United States.
In sum, this study finds realist expectations about Moldovan presidents did not come to
fruition. Rather than preferring to simply kowtow to Russia and align with their former imperial
center, Moldovan presidents perceived the Russian threat in their own unique way. Presidents
Lucinschi and Voronin (after 2004) perceived Russia as a moderate threat, which was associated
with a great power bridging preference. Prior to 2004, Voronin regarded Russia as a low threat
and preferred a positive bandwagoning with Moscow. Separately, President Timofti perceived
Russia as a high threat, preferring a positive bandwagoning alignment with the United States.
Finally, Presidents Lucinschi and Timofti were the most similar in their philosophical beliefs;
however, they had different alignment preferences. As a result, while an operational code
analysis may be a useful tool for discerning a president’s beliefs about world politics, qualitative
techniques are needed to achieve a more precise understanding of his/her alignment preferences.
Ukraine: Findings and Discussion
In Ukraine, realist predictions about the balance of power or threat and state alignment did not
ring true. Although Russia’s military prowess was an important factor, especially as it applied to
Ukraine’s strategic situation in 2014 and 2015, each Ukrainian president viewed the Russian
threat in his own distinct way. As detailed below, there are statistically significant differences in
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the philosophical beliefs of Ukrainian presidents with all viewing Russia as the primary threat to
the state; however, variation in the intensity of their threat perceptions was associated with
different alignment preferences for each president. Viktor Yanukovych’s low threat perceptions
of Russia were associated with a preference for positive bandwagoning with Moscow, while
Viktor Yushchenko and Petro Poroshenko’s high threat perceptions of Russia were linked to a
positive bandwagoning preference with Washington. Finally, Leonid Kuchma’s moderately low
threat perceptions of Russia were associated with a predilection for great power bridging.
The Philosophical Beliefs of Ukrainian Presidents
The side-by-side results of the content analysis from Profiler Plus for Ukrainian presidents
returned mixed results. First, from 1995 to 2015 Presidents Kuchma, Yushchenko, Yanukovych,
and Poroshenko viewed the political universe as friendly registering positive scores across all
indices. From a realist perspective, these findings are in conflict with an expectation that small
states, like those on Russia’s periphery, should view the strategic environment as extremely
hostile given Russia superior military capabilities, and Moscow’s historical track record of using
political coercion or military force against countries Kremlin elites believe reside in Russia’s
zone of influence. From another perspective, given Ukraine is a small, transitioning state in the
international system, it is not unrealistic to think Ukrainian presidents may prefer to take a
cooperative approach to world politics in order to garner the necessary economic and military
support of other countries. This is especially true with regional great powers, which are better
positioned to help Ukrainian leaders ensure the long-term security of the state and country.
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Table 5: The Philosophical Beliefs of Ukrainian Presidents

A closer examination of the data above indicates Presidents Kuchma and Yushchenko both
viewed the political universe as somewhat friendly (.45 and .48 respectively) while Viktor
Yanukovych perceived international politics as definitely friendly with a score of .54 in the P-1
(master beliefs) category. President Poroshenko’s score of .23 indicates his beliefs about other
actors in world politics is mixed. Poroshenko’s lower score is perhaps reflective of the current
strategic environment with Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and direct support for
Donbas rebels in eastern Ukraine. This pattern continued in the P-2 index as Kuchma (.24),
Yushchenko (.27) and Yanukovych (.32) demonstrated higher levels of optimism in achieving
their goals, while Poroshenko was less optimistic (.12). In the P-3 and P-4 categories the same
similarities and differences between each president are observed. Here Presidents Kuchma,
Yushchenko, and Yanukovych all registered higher scores than Petro Poroshenko about the
predictability of their political future and control over historical developments. There was one
exception in the P-4 category where Poroshenko registered a slightly higher score (.27) over
Kuchma (.25). Again, the role of chance (P-5) was high for all four presidents (Kuchma and
Yushchenko = .97; Yanukovych = .96; and Poroshenko .98).
Validating Convergence and Divergence
The output from Profiler Plus provides a set of quantitative measures of the philosophical
beliefs for the four Ukrainian presidents. While there appears to be some differences in how each
political leader views the nature of world politics, the results of an ANOVA test detailed below
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invalidate the null hypothesis that there are no statistically significant differences in the
philosophical beliefs of Ukrainian presidents. The alternative hypothesis that there is a
statistically significant difference is validated at the .001 level.
Table 19: ANOVA Results - Ukrainian Presidents Philosophical Beliefs
Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

Between
Groups

.183347

3

.061157

Within
Groups

.12676

18

.007042

F

8.684***

P-1

***prob <.001
As noted in the preceding sections, the ANOVA test above does not tell us exactly where
those differences exist between each president. Based on a Tukey’s HSD test detailed in the table
below, this study finds Presidents Kuchma and Yushchenko were more similar in their beliefs
about the nature of the international system registering an adjusted P-value of 0.8705892.
Although Kuchma and Yushchenko may exhibit the same beliefs about the nature of the political
universe, they did not share the same alignment preferences. As will be discussed in detail
below, President Kuchma preferred great power bridging, but Yushchenko gravitated toward a
positive bandwagoning alignment with the United States. This is important for two reasons. First,
while a quantitative analysis of a president’s foreign policy speeches can help us to understand a
president’s beliefs systems about world politics, the findings are of a general nature and should
be regarded as a starting point for an examination of different political phenomena. On this point,
in then becomes necessary to use qualitative techniques to acquire increased specificity on the
relationship between a president’s threat perceptions and his alignment preferences.
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Table 20: Ukraine - Mean Comparisons of Tukey’s HSD Test Results (P-1)
Pair

Difference

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

Adjusted P-Value

PoroshenkoKuchma

-0.2170

-0.37313174

-0.06086826

0.0049636

YanukovychKuchma

0.0955

-0.04481825

0.23581825

0.2534253

YushchenkoKuchma

0.0350

-0.09490946

0.16490946

0.8705892

YanukovychPoroshenko

0.3125

0.13134991

0.49365009

0.0006430

YushchenkoPoroshenko

0.2520

0.07878739

0.42521261

0.0033369

YushchenkoYanukovych

-0.0605

-0.21960595

0.09860595

0.0708799

95% Family-wise Confidence Level
Ukrainian President Threat Perceptions and State Alignment
Following their counterparts in Georgia, Ukrainian presidents perceived Russia as the greatest
threat to the state. From 1995 to 2015, the combined average of the four Ukrainian presidents’
threat perceptions of Russia was moderately-high.714 The specific nature of the threats from
Russia were economic and military under all four presidents with the latter being emphasized
during Petro Poroshenko’s tenure as president.
The key findings from this section are as follows: First, when the threat perceptions of
Ukrainian presidents were high as was the case with Viktor Yushchenko and Petro Poroshenko,
these heads of state preferred a positive bandwagoning with the United States. Second, when
threat perceptions were low as was the case with President Yanukovych, a preference for
positive bandwagoning with Russia was observed. Next, President Kuchma’s moderately low

714

Author’s analysis. The assessed average registered a score of 1.9, which fell into the moderately-high category.
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threat perceptions of Russia was associated with a great power bridging alignment preference. Of
particular relevance for Kuchma is how he believed maintaining friendly relations with both the
United States and Russia would help him to stay in power.715 Presidents Kuchma, Yushchenko,
and Poroshenko perceived the United States to be a low threat, while President Yanukovych
perceived Washington to be a moderately-low threat. In the paragraphs below, an analysis of the
relationship between each president’s threat perceptions and his alignment preferences with the
United States and Russian Federation are presented.
President Leonid Kuchma. From 1995 to 2004, President Kuchma viewed Russia as a latent
external threat. Kuchma’s Soviet experiences and Moscow’s refusal to treat Ukraine as an equal
partner reinforced his ideas that Russia would remain the primary external threat.716 During his
time in office, Kuchma perceived Russia as a moderately low threat. With respect to variation,
Kuchma’s perception of the Russian threat generally remained stable; however, there were some
minor fluctuations, during which he may have temporarily viewed the Kremlin as a moderately
high threat. Kuchma’s overall threat perceptions were associated with a great power bridging
preference.
As graphically illustrated in Chapter 5, President Kuchma’s alignment preferences indicated
he preferred great power bridging as his level of verbal cooperation with the United States and
Russia oscillated back and forth while in office. Additionally, an analysis of ICEWS event data
also indicated President Kuchma’s level of verbal confrontation with Russia and the United
States was almost equal, frequently fluctuating between both regional great powers.717
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Interview on file with author.
Interview on file with author.
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Author’s analysis. The total number of events on President Kuchma’s level of verbal confrontation was much less
than what was observed with his level of verbal cooperation with the U.S. and Russia. As previously noted, this is to
be expected since Kuchma’s philosophical beliefs indicated he viewed the political universe as somewhat friendly.
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President Kuchma’s moderately low threat perceptions of Moscow were visible in his ideas
about the economic and military dangers emanating from Russia. First, Kuchma was well aware
of Ukraine’s dependence on Russia for its energy supplies and trade; however, the Ukrainian
president also understood Russia needed Ukraine as well. Speaking in 1995, Kuchma was quick
to discount the economic threat from Russia. In his words,
No, there is no such [economic] threat... and here is why. First, there is a mutual dependence. For
Russia, Ukraine is not only, and not so much, a supplier of important commodities. Ukraine for
Russia is primarily one of the essential markets for Russian commodities, first and foremost,
basic Russian exports: gas, oil, oil products, and nonferrous metals. Second, we must not forget
about interdependence in the production cooperation between many thousands of Ukrainian and
Russian enterprises working in single production cycles. Third, it is necessary to take into account
the fact that a huge quantity of goods, amounting to a large percentage of Russian foreign trade
turnover, is transported by motor vehicles, railways, pipelines, or energy supply lines across
Ukrainian territory. I could continue fourth, fifth, but the point is not in this. The point is in the
fact that both we and our Russian colleagues realize such interdependence. Therefore, we are
resolutely seeking to create equal and mutually beneficial mechanisms in our trade relations.718

Kuchma’s ideas about the Russian economic threat appear to have some validity when looking at
the import/export data for each country from 1996 to 2004 in the chart below. Although Russia
maintained an overall advantage in terms of trade vis-à-vis Ukraine, Kiev’s trade relations with
the U.S. and EU likely helped mitigate the long-term economic threat from Russia. Still, Kuchma
Chart 29: Ukraine Trade Trends (1996-2004; in 1000 USD)
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believed that by maintaining amiable relations with Moscow, he could stave off any potential
short-term threat that may jeopardize the country’s fragile economy.
Additionally, Kuchma’s threat perceptions of Russia were somewhat tempered following
positive statements from the Kremlin. For example, in 1997 during his trip to Kiev, Boris Yeltsin
proclaimed, “Ukraine is an independent country, and we hold this promise sacred...[Russia] does
not lay claim on any part of Ukraine or any of its cities.”719 Perhaps the most important aspect in
Yeltsin’s characterization of Russia-Ukraine relations was how for the very first time, Moscow
had come to view Ukraine as an independent state. Kuchma’s low threat perceptions continued
into 1998 when after returning from a trip to Russia, the Ukrainian president hailed Kiev’s
relations with Moscow noting progress on many fronts. In the words of Kuchma, “good
neighborly relations with the Russian Federation and the strategic partnership with Ukraine are
[now] permanent elements of our approach to Eastern Europe.”720 The Duma’s subsequent
ratification of the 1997 treaty in 1999 further reinforced Kuchma’s generally low threat
perceptions of Russia.
The overall stability of Kuchma’s threat perceptions of Russia remained relatively stable
through his presidency. From 2000 to 2002, Kuchma’s threat perceptions of Russia were at their
best with the arrival of Vladimir Putin. During this time, Kremlin leaders, including Putin
himself, espoused how Ukraine had a right to chart its own path in international affairs. In a June
2002 interview, President Kuchma was very forthcoming about the low threat from Moscow.
According to Kuchma, “today, Russia is demonstrating that it is not a threat to peace as the
USSR was before. Russia is not creating problems; on the contrary, it is striving for economic

Yeltsin, Boris. 1997. “1997 Year in Review.” Ukrainian Weekly 52 (65). http://www.ukrweekly.com/old/archive/
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cooperation...”721 It is from this change in Russian leadership Kuchma would continue to view
Moscow as a moderately low threat through the end of his presidency.
Kuchma’s moderately low threat perceptions of Russia can also be attributed to the state of
disarray in the Russian armed forces. Although Moscow still maintained a favorable balance of
power, much of the Russian armed forces were in disarray owing to Kremlin budget cuts, poor
leadership in the senior ranks, antiquated equipment, and low troop morale. Separately, in 1997
the military threat from Russia was minimized when Ukrainian Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko
and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin signed an agreement on the status of the Black
Sea Fleet, which saw both country’s splitting equally the military assets at the Sevastopol
military complex. Although Russia was granted a military lease of the port facilities, it was only
for a 20-year period with Crimea receiving a designation as the sovereign territory of Ukraine. 722
Kuchma’s moderately low threat perceptions of Russia subsequently became a touchstone by
which he would prefer a great power bridging alignment with Moscow and Washington during
his presidency. In describing the state’s optimal alignment trajectory, Kuchma characterized
Ukraine’s foreign policies as multi-vector with one azimuth pointed towards Russia, a second to
the United States, and a third toward Western Europe. For example, in a speech to his
government’s heads of diplomatic missions, Kuchma stated,
Our European future is indivisible from a strategic partnership with Russia. This is indisputable.
Additionally, the role and significance of the strategic partnership between Ukraine and the USA
will further increase as a significant factor of Euro-Atlantic stability and an important component
of the security architecture of the 21st century.723
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With the United States, Kuchma also espoused the merits of a political and economic
alignment during his time in office. The primary venues through which Kuchma would articulate
his alignment preferences with Washington was seen during meetings of the Gore-Kuchma
Commission, the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation, or the Central and East European Coalition. For
example, in 1998 Kuchma stated, “special mention should be made of the dynamism in the
development of our strategic partnership with the United States. One of the latest examples of
such cooperation was the conference of donor countries in New York under our joint
chairmanship with Vice President Al Gore.”724 Kuchma’s alignment preferences endured through
2004 when he stated,
I have always consistently advocated the idea that the establishment of a strong partnership with
the USA, especially in the military and political field, is of strategic importance to us, in
particular in view of Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic strategy and common views on the fight against
terrorism and strengthening the security in Eastern Europe, and Black Sea and Caspian regions.725

With these verbal pronouncements and others related to democratic and market-based reforms,
his actions subsequently paved the way for the allocation of over $1.5 billion in U.S. foreign
assistance between 1995 and 2001.726
Kuchma’s alignment preference with the U.S. was not without its own set of challenges. At
issue was Washington’s growing frustration with Kuchma’s leadership and the Ukrainian
president’s inability to enact ‘true’ democratic reforms and reduce corruption, as well as his
censorship of the media. Furthermore, Kuchma’s alignment preference with the U.S. were
strained when Washington elites began viewing Kuchma unfavorably after his purported
involvement in the murder of journalist Georgiy Gongadze and the sale of an advance military
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radar system to Iraq in 2000. In response, NATO officials did not issue Kuchma an invite to
attend the alliance’s summit in Prague, which was followed by the first-ever cancellation of the
U.S.-Ukraine Presidential summit.727 Taras Kuzio characterizes the years 2000 to 2004 as a
period of Western disillusionment where the foreign relations between Ukraine and the United
States deteriorated.728 Although Kuzio’s characterization of U.S. foreign policy with Ukraine is
perhaps fitting, it does not necessarily convey to Kuchma, who continued to still view positively
an alignment with Washington and its allies in Western Europe. In his last year in office,
Kuchma still proclaimed the U.S.-Ukraine partnership, particularly in the military and political
spheres, has been and will remain strategic priority for Kiev.729
Given the preceding analysis, one can conclude President Kuchma’s alignment preferences
gravitated toward great power bridging. For Kuchma, an alignment with the U.S. and Russia was
a strategic imperative that would help him acquire the necessary political and economic support
for Ukraine’s transition from Soviet rule and for him to stay in power. A key theme supporting
his verbal discourse about great power bridging was Ukraine’s non-aligned status. For example,
as early as 1996, President Kuchma asserted...
We believe that Ukraine's nonaligned status does not prevent it from full-fledged participation in
European programs in the sphere of security, military and political aspects included. While
integrating with Europe, we naturally are going to develop equal, mutually beneficial cooperation
with the post-Soviet states, primarily with Russia.730
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Through 2002 President Kuchma continued to emphasize the central importance of Ukraine’s
non-aligned status noting how Kiev would seek to establish strategic alignments with the United
States, Russia, and other major European and CIS powers.731
President Viktor Yushchenko. Following his electoral victory over Viktor Yanukovych,
President Viktor Yushchenko, from 2005 to 2009 viewed Russia as a clear and present danger to
the security of the state, the Ukrainian people, and the territorial integrity of Ukraine. For the five
years in office, President Yushchenko perceived Russia as a high threat.732 Yushchenko’s ideas
about the Russian threat were primarily economic and military in nature. His threat perceptions
of the Russia also generally remained stable spiking in 2009 following the Kremlin’s decision to
invade Georgia. Here, Russia’s military actions against a former Soviet republic reinforced
Yushchenko’s beliefs of the future high danger its northern neighbor posed to Ukraine. With the
U.S., Yushchenko maintained a low threat perception.
Yushchenko’s alignment preferences with the United States and the Euro-Atlantic community
was a primary lens from which Yushchenko viewed international affairs and from which he
came to view Russia as a direct threat to the Ukrainian state. Although Yushchenko’s first
foreign visit was to Russia on 25 January 2005, just several days earlier in his inaugural address
he indirectly referenced the Kremlin’s ill-intentions in the post-Soviet space stating, “Ukrainians
will find their rightful place in the community of nations. Ukraine will be neither a buffer, nor a
field on which others will compete. We are ready to respect the interests of other countries. But
for me, as well as for you, the national interests of Ukraine will be paramount!”733 By February,
Yushchenko made clear his beliefs about the strategic priority of an alignment with the United
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State and the NATO alliance. During a meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council, Yushchenko
proclaimed, “we believe that Ukraine's participation and engagement in the North Atlantic
community of democratic peoples will strengthen peace and security on the European continent.
We are ready to make all necessary efforts to achieve this noble goal.”734
From the beginning of his presidency, Yushchenko exhibited high disdain for Russia and
Moscow’s interference in Ukraine’s internal domestic political affairs. Furthermore, although
never unambiguously proven, Yushchenko believed Kremlin elites were behind an attempted
assassination that involved the use of a poisonous dioxin. Taken together, these events reinforced
his threat perceptions of Russia and rather than kowtowing to Russia, Yushchenko preferred to
follow a positive bandwagoning alignment with the United States, even without guarantees
Ukraine would be admitted to NATO and/or the EU.
The economic threat emanating from Russia was nearly pervasive during Yushchenko’s
tenure. Beginning in early 2005, Russia’s Gazprom began a series of meetings with Ukrainian
energy officials on raising the cost of natural gas. When negotiations stalled in December 2005,
Gazprom threatened to cut off energy supplies to Ukraine if Yushchenko’s ruling government
did not agree to pay market price (approximately $230 per 1,000 cubic meters) for Russian
natural gas instead of its previously subsidized rate of $50 per 1,000 cubic meters. When Kiev
balked, Gazprom followed through with its threat on 01 January 2006 by reducing the flow of
gas to Ukraine. In the process, Kiev reportedly used some of the gas intended for European
customers, which subsequently elicited direct involvement from major European powers. With
the involvement of political leaders from Germany, Italy, and France, Russia and Ukraine were
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able to come to an agreement by 04 January 2006 that saw the restoration of gas flows to
Western Europe.735
President Yushchenko’s ideas about the extent to which Russia represented an economic
threat to Ukraine persisted into 2008. In early February of that year, Gazprom again threatened to
cut natural gas supplies to Ukraine unless Kiev paid the company approximately $1.5 billion it
back debt. When both sides failed to achieve a compromise, Gazprom halted natural gas flows to
Ukraine and Western Europe on 01 January 2009. Only after several weeks did Ukrainian Prime
Minister Yulia Tymoshenko successfully negotiate a new deal in Moscow.736 For Yushchenko,
Gazprom’s actions validated his ideas about the enduring nature of the Russian threat and the
Kremlin’s neo-imperialistic attempts to steer Ukraine away from the West.
Beyond Moscow’s use of the energy lever against Ukraine, Yushchenko’s Western lens also
brought into perspective how Russia could use its military capabilities to force former Soviet
states to fall in line. For example, during a meeting of the Russian-Ukrainian Intergovernmental
Commission in February 2008, President Yushchenko was given a stark reminder of Moscow’s
proclivity to use military force as a leading instrument in the state’s foreign policies. In this case,
during a joint press conference with Yushchenko, a reporter queried Vladimir Putin about his
thoughts on a proposed U.S. missile defense shield in Europe. Although Ukraine was not even a
country of consideration for the U.S. missile defense system, the Russian President stated, “it is
horrible to say and even horrible to think that, in response to the deployment of such facilities in
Ukrainian territory, which cannot theoretically be ruled out, Russia could target its missile
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systems at Ukraine.”737 Putin’s bombastic pronouncement in the context of a high-level
diplomatic served as a key event reinforcing Yushchenko’s ideas about the enduring military
threat from Russia and how crossing a ‘redline’ may elicit an armed backlash.
The negative consequences of crossing a Kremlin ‘redline’ was subsequently demonstrated in
August 2008 when Russian military forces invaded Georgia following an escalation of hostilities
in South Ossetia. In the weeks after the Russia-Georgia War, Yushchenko characterize Russia’s
actions as a direct threat to Ukraine and all of Europe. In his words...
The military conflict between Russia and Georgia is a rigorous challenge to the Caucasus region
and to Europe and the entire civilized world. The decision made by the Russian leadership is a
threat to peace and stability in our region and in Europe, it undermines the current international
order, violates the integrity of the principles sealed by the UN Charter and other international
acts, is an instance of illegitimate redrawing of the state borders and a manifestation of pressure
and interference with the use of force.738

Russia’s brazen actions in Georgia served only to reinforce Yushchenko’s preference for a
positive bandwagoning alignment with the United States and its Western European allies.
Finally, the threat from Russia took on a political facet. Two points support this assertion.
First, during the hotly contested presidential election in 2004, Russian political elites provided
full backing for Viktor Yanukovych in his bid to defeat Yushchenko for the presidency.
According to Taras Kuzio, Russian political experts with ties to Putin himself were hired to
showcase Yanukovych’s strengths and to undermine the credibility and legitimacy of
Yushchenko.739 For Yushchenko, Moscow’s political influence in the 2004 election would be a
harbinger for future meddling in Ukrainian politics that could threaten his hold on power.
Second, in 2009 President Medvedev published a scathing letter criticizing Yushchenko’s ill-
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conceived anti-Russia foreign policies and his continued adherence to align with the West by
attempting to join NATO. In response, Medvedev decided he would not assign Russia’s new
ambassador to Kiev until the political climate in Ukraine changed.740
Despite Yushchenko’s preferences to align with the United States and the West, NATO did
not offer Ukraine an invitation to join the alliance in 2008 owing to reservations from Germany
and France about the country’s qualifications and Kiev’s tense relations with Russia. Alliance
officials did however convey optimistic assertions that Ukraine would eventually become a
member. Although NATO did not offer Ukraine a Membership Action Plan (MAP),
Yushchenko’s ideas about joining NATO remained steadfast. Speaking after NATO’s decision
the Ukrainian president proclaimed, “this can only be seen as a victory, and I will explain why. It
is because in today's document, for the first time, the 26 NATO member states formulated the
basic principle that [Ukraine] will become members of NATO. I would say this even exceeded
our expectations regarding this document.”741 Yushchenko’s commitment to stay the course with
a positive bandwagoning preference returned dividends in 2009 when Ukraine and NATO signed
a Declaration to Complement the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership.742
In the shadow of Ukraine’s alignment with the U.S. under Yushchenko’s rule, Kiev continued
to engage in routine diplomatic or economic activities with Russia. For example, in early 2008
during a visit to Moscow for the biannual meeting of the Russian-Ukrainian Intergovernmental
Commission, President Yushchenko signed a Russian-Ukrainian Action Plan, which sketched
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out trade and economic cooperation between the two countries over the next year. Specific areas
of emphasis included the aircraft manufacturing, agriculture, communications, energy, machinebuilding, and transport sectors.743
President Viktor Yanukovych. In 2010, Ukraine’s tendency to positively bandwagon with the
U.S. took a U-turn with the arrival of Viktor Yanukovych as president. For the four years he was
in office (2010-2014), President Yanukovych viewed Russia as a very low threat.744 With the
United States, Yanukovych’s threat perceptions were moderately low owing to fears about
Washington’s support for pro-democracy groups in Ukraine. President Yanukovych’s threat
perceptions of Russia remained stable through early 2014 as the social-political situation in the
country degenerated into chaos following his decision to accept a Russian economic package in
lieu of signing an EU Association Agreement. During this tense period, Yanukovych purportedly
requested military assistance from the Kremlin as a way to restore peace.745 Yanukovych’s
verbal pronouncements indicated that with his low threat perceptions of Russia, he preferred a
positive bandwagoning alignment with Russia.
Even before assuming the presidency, as early as 2008 Viktor Yanukovych’s ideas about the
nature of the Russian threat were made clear in several public speeches. In the aftermath of
Russia’s invasion of Georgia, Yanukovych, as the leader of the Party of Regions, explicitly
stated Ukrainians should not feel threatened by Russia in any way. Following Moscow’s
recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia’s declarations of independence, Yanukovych’s Party
of Regions then attempted to pass a parliamentary resolution recognizing both of the breakaway
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provinces. Speaking on the matter, Yanukovych argued his party’s support for Russia and the
Georgian provinces was comparable to U.S. support for Kosovo’s independence. Although
political opposition in the Rada blocked the resolution, Yanukovych’s words illuminated his
ideas about how Russia did not represent a threat to Ukraine.746
Once installed as president in 2010, Yanukovych’s ideas about the historical and cultural ties
between both countries were key concepts contributing to his lower threat perceptions of Russia
and a preference for a positive bandwagoning alignment with Moscow. For example, during his
trip to Moscow in early March 2010 Yanukovych informed President Medvedev, “we are all
linked by immense and closely intertwined historical roots. I see my task as being to bring about
a turnaround in relations between Ukraine and Russia and set them on the right track so
as to work together to reach the goals to which both of our peoples aspire.”747 For Yanukovych,
believing Ukraine and Russia are connected by shared cultures was a powerful factor shaping his
ideas that Moscow was not a threat in any way.
President Yanukovych’s tendency to not view Russia as a threat was also visible in the
military sphere. Several points support this assertion. First, during a British press interview in
February 2010almost 2 months prior to his first trip to MoscowYanukovych indicated he
was prepared to extend the Russian Navy’s lease in Sevastopol beyond 2017 and give the
Russian language equal status in Ukraine.748 Second, after Yanukovych was in office, he made it
known Ukraine would halt its bid to join NATO giving emphasis to the country’s non-aligned

Yanukovych, Viktor. 2008. Cited in Kuzio, Taras. 2009. “Strident, Ambiguous and Duplicitous: Ukraine and the
2008 Russia-Georgia War.” Demokratizatsiya 17 (4), 365.
747
Yanukovych, Viktor. 2010. “Beginning of Meeting with President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych.” President of
Russia Website, 05 March 2010. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/7040. Accessed 12 January 2017.
748
Yanukovych, Viktor. 2010e. “Yanukovych Says Ukraine Turned ‘New Page,’ West Has ‘Nothing to Fear.’”
Telegraph, 15 February 2010. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/7236642/Yanukovychsays-West-has-nothing-to-fear-from-Ukraine.html. Accessed 12 January 2017.
746

349

status. For Yanukovych, working with NATO was acceptable; however, there was no benefit to
joining the alliance. According to one area specialist, “it is definitely not the policy of
Yanukovych to join NATO.”749
The preceding discussion about Yanukovych’s threat perceptions of Russia did not
necessarily mean he was oblivious to how Russia may represent a military and/or economic
threat to Ukraine. Certainly, the Ukrainian president realized that in numbers alone, Russian
armed forces had a decisive quantitative and qualitative advantage over Ukraine.750 In the
economic sphere, Yanukovych also realized Russia represented a potential economic threat. For
example, during a 2010 interview Yanukovych noted, “there is such a threat as absorption of the
Ukrainian economy by Russia. It does exist.”751 However, Yanukovych played down this
potential threat noting how Ukraine’s continuing integration into the global economy would help
the country to prosper. Finally, although Yanukovych preferred to align with Russia over the
United States, the Ukrainian president did not completely discount the benefits of close
cooperation with the EU. In this case, Yanukovych saw some utility with developing closer
economic relations with Western Europe, but on his terms.752
In concert with Yanukovych’s low threat perceptions of Russia, he increasingly perceived the
West, to include the United States and leading powers in Europe as a moderately low threat to
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the state. At issue was how Yanukovych believed Washington was responsible for the Orange
Revolution and his political defeat in the years prior. Now as president, he sought to minimize
this external threat by constraining the activities of Western NGOs and their efforts to promote
democracy in Ukraine. For example, in late 2010 the George Soros foundation came under
scrutiny from the Security Service of Ukraine and Yanukovych’s Party of Regions. During this
time, Oleksandr Yefremov, a Party of Regions political leader claimed the Soros organization
had given monies to train Ukrainian activists so they could develop similar programs that were
used in North Africa to bring around democratic reforms.753 By 2013, Yanukovych’s ideas about
the nature of the threat from the West was made clear when he stated, “I am categorically against
others coming to our country and teaching us how to live. It is very important that other countries
stay out of our home issues, that they don't think it’s OK to do here as they please...”754
Yanukovych’s ideas about Russia represented a death knell for realists, who argue the balance
of military power is one of the most important factors shaping the actions of states in the
international system. In Yanukovych’s case, Russia’s military superiority and demonstrated
willingness to use armed force against former Soviet states were minor factors in his strategic
alignment calculations. What mattered more was Yanukovych’s ideas about the nature of the
Russian threat, which when filtered through his belief system produced a low threat perception
of his northern neighbor and a preference for positive bandwagoning with Moscow.
President Petro Poroshenko. In late February 2014 the Ukrainian parliament voted to remove
Yanukovych from power and hold early presidential elections. By May 2014, Petro Poroshenko
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had become the president of Ukraine. President Poroshenko entered office with the highest threat
perceptions of all presidents under examination in this study.755 With Russia’s violation of
Ukraine’s territorial integrity and continued political meddling in the state’s internal affairs,
Poroshenko’s threat perceptions of Russia remained stable for the two years under examination.
Separately, Poroshenko’s threat perceptions of the U.S. were low. Given these conditions, rather
than give-in to Russian military and economic pressure, Poroshenko’s beliefs about aligning
Ukraine with the West remained unwavering.
The nature of the Russian threat took on two forms during President Poroshenko’s first two
years in office: military and economic. In the military domain, the extent to which Russia
represented a high threat was first demonstrated in March 2014 when Moscow annexed Crimea
following a referendum to join the Russian Federation. By May 2014, with political and
economic backing from Russia, separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk issued referendums for selfrule.756 By August, Russian military forces had crossed the border into eastern Ukraine as part of
a conventional operation to support pro-Russian forces and to seize key terrain in the Donbass in
order to establish a tactically advantageous line of control for the separatists.757 In his address to
the U.S. Congress in September 2014, Poroshenko placed into context his ideas about the nature
of the Russian threat stating, “the war that... [Ukraine] is fighting is not only Ukraine’s war. It is
Europe’s, and it is America’s war, too. It is a war of the free world and for a free world.”758
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Poroshenko’s threat perceptions of Russia also had an economic facet. Like his predecessors,
he fully realized Ukraine’s economic vitality was closely intertwined with Russia, especially in
the areas of trade, energy, and industry. This realization, coupled with Moscow’s previous track
record with Ukraine on the emplacement of sanctions or cutting energy supplies contributed
significantly to Poroshenko’s perceptions of Russia as the most threatening regional great power.
The Ukrainian president’s ideas about the Russian threat were validated in June 2014 when, in
the shadow of an escalating conflict in eastern Ukraine between pro-Russia rebels and
government forces, the Kremlin cut natural gas supplies following a disagreement over price.759
Although the EU’s intervention and financial support would see gas flowing by December,
Moscow cut supplies again in November 2015 when Kiev refused to provide advanced payments
for Russian natural gas. This time Ukraine was able to diversify its energy imports from Hungary
and Slovakia, which helped partially mitigate the country’s vulnerability of relying on Russian
energy supplies.760
From 2014 to 2015, President Poroshenko tended to prefer a positive bandwagoning
alignment with the United States over Russia consistently registering higher levels of verbal
cooperation with the former. The first indicator of Poroshenko’s alignment preference was made
visible during a meeting with President Barrack Obama in Warsaw, Poland just several days
after his election as president. According to Ukraine’s former Ambassador to the U.S. Oleh
Shamshur, Poroshenko’s proclivity to align with the United States was driven by two key ideas.
First, by seeking out the U.S. president, Poroshenko hoped to establish an informal political and
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personal relationship with President Obama as a way to help foment future formal cooperation.
Second, Poroshenko’s alignment preferences with the United States could help spur much
needed political and military support from Washington that would allow Kiev to counter Russian
military and political interference in Ukraine.761 For Poroshenko, a strategic alignment with the
United States was the top foreign policy priority for his government. Realizing this goal would
set conditions for him to better advance his domestic and foreign policy agendas.
A second indicator of Poroshenko’s inclination to align with the United States was seen in the
military sphere. Prior to his election, Poroshenko foreshadowed his alignment preference with
Washington asserting, “we basically need a new security alliance with the United States and
Europe to protect the Ukraine militarily. As president, I will fight for this alliance and undertake
talks immediately.”762 After his election, Poroshenko followed through on this promise by
seeking to expand the U.S. military footprint and that of NATO’s in Ukraine. During his first trip
to Washington in September 2014, Poroshenko made a direct request to the U.S. Congress for
military assistance to deal with the Russian threat and separatists in the Donbas. Poroshenko’s
efforts were successful with the U.S. allocating $53 million in support, of which $46 million was
for non-lethal military items including counter-artillery radars, body armor, and general
supplies.763 Although Poroshenko failed to secure lethal military aid, his demonstrated
willingness to align with the United States was made explicitly clear.
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Poroshenko’s preference for a military alignment with the United States was also visible in
his pronouncements on the country’s accession into NATO; however, the Ukrainian president’s
comments were not necessarily the most optimistic given the ongoing crisis in the east and
Moscow’s attempt to create a frozen conflict. For example, in April 2014 a reporter queried
Poroshenko about his ideas of Ukraine joining NATO. Poroshenko stated...
No! That decision is not for us, but for NATO. We have the feeling that the members of NATO
are too divided for this to happen. We have previously seen these problems back in 2008, when
Georgia was initially promised membership, and then it failed to come about after all. As
president, I’d like to talk to our neighboring countries about new alliances, about extra scope for
protection.764

However, following Moscow’s decision to send Russian troops into Ukraine, Poroshenko was
moved to introduce a bill to overturn 2010 legislation prohibiting the country from joining any
military alliance. Although Poroshenko signed this bill into law in December 2014, he realized it
would take five to six years to implement the necessary reforms. Furthermore, he acknowledged
Ukraine’s accession to NATO would also likely require a national referendum.765
Poroshenko’s ideas about NATO may have also had a secondary purpose whereby after
entering office, his level of verbal cooperation with the Russian Federation was almost as high as
the level with the United States. An analysis of Poroshenko’s foreign policy speeches in 2014
indicated the Ukrainian president retained some degree of optimism that negotiations with Russia
could yield a compromise on Crimea and the Donbass.766 For example, Poroshenko initially did
not believe Moscow would deploy Russian Army units into Ukraine to conduct offensive
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military operations in 2014. In his words, “I think an open war in the form of Russian ground
troops crossing the Ukrainian-Russian border will not happen. This is dangerous for Russia
because it would be a real war and people in Russia will not support that.”767 Poroshenko’s
beliefs were subsequently reflected in his level of verbal cooperation with Russia but should be
considered as diplomatic engagement, not an effort to align with Russia. Following a brief
meeting in June 2014 to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the Normandy invasion, Putin
appeared open to diplomatic talks; however, by August Russian ground units were in Ukraine
thereby solidifying Poroshenko’s high threat perceptions of Russia.
In sum, this section finds Ukrainian presidents viewed Russia as the greatest external threat to
the state. A quantitative analysis revealed there is statistically significant differences in each of
the presidents’ philosophical beliefs; however, those presidents (Kuchma and Yushchenko) with
the most similar beliefs did not retain the same alignment preferences. In this case, Presidents
Yushchenko and Poroshenko’s high threat perceptions were associated with a preference for
positive bandwagoning with the United States. Leonid Kuchma exhibited moderately low threat
perceptions and preferred great power bridging. Although an operational code analysis is a useful
econometric tool for discerning a president’s beliefs about world politics, qualitative techniques
are needed to achieve a more precise understanding of their alignment preferences. Finally,
President Yanukovych viewed Russia as a low threat opting for a positive bandwagoning
alignment with Moscow.
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Conclusion
This chapter examined the relationship between a president’s perceptions of external threats
and his accompanying alignment preferences with the United States and Russia between 1995
and 2015. The results of this endeavor returned several key findings. First, while the regional
balance of power is an important factor shaping a president’s threat perceptions, it is not the most
important one. For the cases under examination, Russia consistently maintained a favorable
balance of power; however, each of the twelve president’s perceptions about this threat varied
and were subsequently associated with a particular alignment preference. A majority of the
presidents (Heydar and Ilham Aliyev, Petru Lucinschi, Vladimir Voronin, Eduard Shevardnadze,
Giorgi Margvelashvili (in late 2013), and Leonid Kuchma) perceived Russia as a moderate
threat, which was associated with a preference for great power bridging. Those presidents with
high threat perceptions of Russia (Mikheil Saakashvili, Giorgi Margvelashvili (2014-2015),
Nicolae Timofti, Viktor Yushchenko, and Petro Poroshenko) preferred a positive bandwagoning
alignment with the United States. Viktor Yanukovych and Vladimir Voronin (before 2003)
perceived Russia as a low threat, which was associated with a positive bandwagoning alignment
preference with Moscow.
This chapter also found a quantitative analysis of each president’s philosophical beliefs was a
generally useful endeavor to understand a political leader’s beliefs about world politics and the
fundamental character of other state actors in the international system. Here, an operational code
analysis of each president’s master philosophical beliefs provided a baseline from which to
understand how all presidents generally viewed the nature of the political universe in friendly
terms. A qualitative analysis subsequently gave specificity to their threat perceptions and
alignment preferences.
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An operational code analysis had it limits however. In this case, ANOVA and Tukey HSD
test results identifying which presidents were the most similar in their master philosophical
beliefs did not convey consistently to their ideas about the external threats and preferences for
alignment. For example, Presidents Kuchma and Yushchenko were the most similar in their
philosophical beliefs; however, Kuchma preferred great power bridging, while Yushchenko
gravitated toward positive bandwagoning with the United States. Taken together, this study
concludes using multiple methods can potentially garner a more holistic understanding of small
state alignment in the post-Soviet space.
Finally, this study concludes a president’s threat perceptions should not be regarded as a
unitary causal factor in the state’s foreign policy decision-making to align with one regional
great power over another. More appropriate, a president’s threat perceptions are best understood
as important variable subject to changes in his/her ideas about the state’s alignment, which in
turn are affected by changes in the international system. This was particularly the case with
Moldovan president Vladimir Voronin and Georgian President Giorgi Margvelashvili. Voronin
initially preferred a positive bandwagoning alignment with Russia but then changed to great
power bridging after the Kozak Memorandum fiasco. Margvelashvili initially preferred great
power bridging but then opted for a positive bandwagoning alignment with the United States.
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We can on occasion make charming speeches. We can claim our foreign policy is idealistic...
Actions speak louder than words – Hiram Bingham, 1914.768
Chapter Seven: Foreign Policy Orientation, Domestic Politics & Small State Alignment

Introduction
Speaking in the months prior to the outbreak of the First World War, Hiram Bingham’s
poignant remark reminds us of the potential limits of the eloquent words of statesmen, who are
charged with developing and implementing a state’s foreign policies. As demonstrated in the
previous chapter, one can discern how a president’s philosophical beliefs may serve as a point of
departure for a qualitative analysis on their threat perceptions and alignment preferences with the
United States and Russia. However, a political leader’s words and preferences, while very
important, do not on their own bring about a desired policy outcome. Put another way, words are
important, but actions speak louder. This is particularly true with ruling elites, who must be able
to translate their alignment preferences into viable foreign policies, while operating in a
competitive domestic political environment.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the relationship between a president’s ideas about
strategy (i.e. his/her foreign policy orientation) and the state’s alignment trajectory as
conditioned by domestic politics. The essence of my argument is that ruling elites come to the
foreign policy table with different ideas about strategy and how to align the state with different
regional great powers. These different strategic approaches are based on a political leader’s
beliefs on the optimal tactics, which will help them realize their international and/or domestic
goals. However, because ruling elites do not operate in a political vacuum, domestic politics can
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either constrain or enable a ruling leader’s ability to translate his/her alignment preferences into
material action.
This chapter posits four research questions. First, what are each president’s instrumental
beliefs about the best approaches to realize their foreign policy goals? Do presidents tend to see a
strategy of cooperation or confrontation as the most optimal approach in international affairs?
Answering these questions establishes a baseline from which to ask a more poignant question:
What are the foreign policy orientations for the presidents in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and
Ukraine with respect to the United States and the Russia? Third, how did each president’s beliefs
about strategy and their corresponding foreign policy orientations translate into tangible or
intangible actions with these regional great powers? Fourth, to what extent does domestic politics
matter in a president’s ability to translate his/her alignment preferences into action?
By addressing these questions in a systematic way, this chapter posits a corresponding set of
supporting hypotheses. For the research questions on each president’s instrumental beliefs, the
null hypothesis is as follows: Within each country, there are no differences in the operational
code (instrumental beliefs) of the presidents. The alternate hypothesis is: Within each country,
there are differences in the operational code (instrumental beliefs) of the presidents. For the
second and third research questions, it is anticipated that presidents with an accommodative
foreign policy orientation with a particular regional great power will be more apt to follow a
positive bandwagoning alignment while pragmatic presidents will steer towards a strategy of
great power bridging. As a corollary, presidents with a confrontational foreign policy orientation
with one regional great power are more likely to follow a positive bandwagoning alignment with
a different regional great power. For the research question on domestic politics, it is
hypothesized higher or lower levels of government fragmentation and issue polarization will
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constrain or enable respectively a president’s ability to implement policies to realize his/her
preferred alignment with the United States and/or Russia.
This chapter is organized into six sections. Section one highlights the key findings from this
chapter. In sections two through five, the four cases are addressed: Azerbaijan, Moldova,
Georgia, and Ukraine. Each of these sections begin with an examination of a president’s
instrumental beliefs (I-1) and the results from the ANOVA and Tukey’s HSD tests when
applicable. This is followed by a qualitative analysis of each president’s ability to translate his
alignment preferences into material action. As part of this effort, this study highlights the key
events and policies associated with either positive bandwagoning or great power bridging. The
last section provides a brief conclusion.
Findings
This investigation finds presidents in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine believed a
strategy of cooperation was the best approach to achieve their foreign policy goals. As detailed in
the table below, pragmatism was the dominant foreign policy orientation held by ruling
presidents, while great power bridging was the most frequently enacted alignment strategy.
Those presidents retaining an accommodative foreign policy orientation tended to implement a
positive bandwagoning alignment with pragmatic presidents opting for a great power bridging
strategy. The role of domestic politics was mixed where great power bridging and positive
bandwagoning occurred regardless of the levels of government fragmentation or issue
polarization. When fragmentation and polarization were higher, presidents were able to use their
constitutional powers or political acumen to build consensus or a coalition that allowed them to
translate their alignment preferences into action.
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Table 21: Summary of Chapter Seven Findings
Political
Fragmentation
Low
Low
Low
Low

Issue
Polarization
Low
Low
Low
Low

Pragmatic (2013) / Accomodative
(U.S.; 2014-15)

Moderate

Moderate

Petru Lucinschi

Pragmatic

High

Moderate

Great Power Bridging

Moldova

Vladimir Voronin

Accommodative (Russia; 2001-03) /
Pragmatic (2004-09)

Moderate

Moderate

Positive Bandwagonning (Russia; 2001-03) /
Great Power Bridging (2004-09)

Moldova
Ukraine
Ukraine
Ukraine
Ukraine

Nicolae Timofti
Leonid Kuchma
Viktor Yushchenko
Viktor Yanukovych
Petro Poroshenko

Accommodative (U.S.)
Pragmatic
Accommodative (U.S.)
Accommodative (Russia)
Accommodative (U.S.)

Moderate
Low
Moderate
Low
Moderate

Low
Low
Moderate
Moderate
Low

Positive Bandwagonning (U.S.)
Great Power Bridging
Positive Bandwagonning (U.S.)
Positive Bandwagonning (Russia)
Positive Bandwagonning (U.S.)

Country

President

Foreign Policy Orientation

Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Georgia

Heydar Aliyev
Ilham Aliyev
Eduard Shevardnadze
Mikheil Saakashvili

Pragmatic
Pragmatic
Pragmatic
Accommodative (U.S.)

Georgia

Giorgi Margvelashvili

Moldova

Alignment Strategy
Great Power Bridging
Great Power Bridging
Great Power Bridging
Positive Bandwagonning (U.S.)
Great Power Bridging (2013) / Positive
Bandwagonning (U.S.; 2014-2015)

Azerbaijan: Findings and Discussion
In Azerbaijan, this study finds Presidents Heydar and Ilham Aliyev maintained a pragmatic
foreign policy orientation while in office.769 In general, the pragmatism of both Azeri presidents
was grounded in their ideas on how an alignment with Russia was a strategic necessity in order
to achieve a resolution in the Nagorno-Karabakh. Separately, their respective alignment policies
with the United States were driven by their beliefs of how Washington could act as a vanguard
element paving the way for the development of Azerbaijan’s energy infrastructure, which would
send oil and natural gas to the West.
The Instrumental Beliefs of Azeri Presidents
In analyzing the results of Heydar and Ilham’s instrumental beliefs, the output from Profiler
Plus indicates that for their master beliefs on strategy (I-1) both presidents believed cooperation
with external states was ‘definitely’ the best approach to achieve their foreign policy goals
registering an intensity of .74 each. This positive trend continued on the ‘intensity of tactics’ (I-

All area experts responded pragmatic to the following interview question: “How would you best categorize the
foreign policy orientation of President Heydar Aliyev towards Russia, the United States, and Western European
powers? Would you characterize their foreign policy orientation as accommodative, pragmatic, confrontational, or
something else?”
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2) index with both presidents believing cooperative tactics were ‘definitely’ of higher utility than
conflictual tactics. In this index, Heydar Aliyev had a slightly lower score (.36) than Ilham, who
registered a score of .43. When viewing the specific ‘utility of means’ index (I-5), of the three
cooperative tactics (appeal, promise, reward), Heydar and Ilham Aliyev found the highest value
with making appeals to external states (.60 and .48 respectively) with their tendency to focus on
rewards coming in second (.20 and .30 respectively). With respect to the timing of their actions,
Heydar and Ilham’s lower I-4a scores (.26 each) indicate they preferred to employ a lower
diversity of tactics, which is in line with their tendency to give precedence to the appeal tactic
and to a lesser degree, reward. Both presidents also exhibited a higher propensity to shift
between their words and actions (I-4b: Heydar Aliyev=.52; Ilham Aliyev=.71). Finally, both
presidents, on average tended to be less acceptant of risk with Heydar Aliyev being somewhat
risk averse (.29) and Ilham Aliyev being very risk averse (.21).770
Table 22: The Instrumental Beliefs of Azeri Presidents

As a reminder, this measurement for a political leader’s master instrumental beliefs (I-1) are as follows: -1 = very
conflictual; -.50 = definitely conflictual; -.25 = somewhat conflictual; 0.0 = mixed; +.25 = somewhat cooperative;
+.50 = definitely cooperative; +.75 = very cooperative. The coding for I-3 (Risk) is as follows: 0 to .24=very risk
averse; .25 to .49=somewhat risk averse; .50 to .74=somewhat risk acceptant; .75 to 1=very risk acceptant.
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Azeri President Alignment
In the previous two chapters, this study found Heydar and Ilham Aliyev preferred a great
power bridging strategy, exhibiting a tendency to verbally cooperate on an almost equal basis
with the United States and Russia. In this chapter, both Azeri presidents were able to
successfully translate their preferences into action with very little political opposition. Given the
semi-authoritarian nature of the ruling government, the level of government fragmentation and
polarization were low thus allowing Heydar and Ilham Aliyev an enhanced ability to realize their
ideas about the state’s alignment with the United States and Russia.
Heydar Aliyev. For his time in office, Heydar Aliyev exhibited a pragmatic foreign policy
orientation believing it was of high importance to align Azerbaijan with the United States and
Russia on an almost equal basis. For Aliyev, his ideas about developing the country’s energy
infrastructure and reaching a solution on the Nagorno-Karabakh were two important catalysts
moving him to conclude agreements, but only in a way that did not lock Azerbaijan into a fixed
geostrategic orbit around either of the regional great powers.
Low levels of government fragmentation and the absence of issue polarization over Aliyev’s
alignment preferences were enablers of the Azeri president’s great power bridging strategy with
the United States and Russia. The genesis of this empirical reality stems, in part, from
Azerbaijan’s 1995 constitution. This official document granted the president far-reaching powers
to unilaterally develop and implement the state’s foreign policies. Additionally, the constitution
established a unicameral legislature (the Milli Mejlis), which acted as a rubber stamp for
Aliyev’s policies. For example, during deliberations on the state’s foreign policies, Aliyev’s New
Azerbaijan Party (NAP) routinely encountered little parliamentary resistance given the absence
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of viable political opposition parties. Additionally, the prime minister, Artur Rasizade, was an
Aliyev appointee from the NAP, who routinely conceded to Aliyev’s policy preferences.771
Even when Washington and Western European governments would pressure Aliyev to allow
the formation of opposition parties, the Azeri president was able to exert enough political control
to ensure they did not gain a political footing in parliament. For example, in 2000 approximately
16 opposition parties were placed on the parliamentary ballot list; however, none of the most
prominent opposition parties (e.g. National Independence, Democratic, Popular Front, and
Musavat (Equality) parties)) received the minimum six percent of the vote to run thus continuing
the trend of no domestic political opposition to Aliyev’s alignment preferences.772
With respect to issue polarization, there was a consensus among leading political elites within
Aliyev’s party that a bifurcated alignment with the United States and Russia was the optimal
strategy for Azerbaijan. Heydar Aliyev’s willingness to use political repression and coercion to
temper dissent within the ruling government was a major contributing factor to the low levels of
issue polarization. According to Polity and Freedom House, Azerbaijan was categorized as a
partly free autocracy under Heydar Aliyev.773 Throughout much of late 1990s and early 2000s,
when political dissent did rear its head, the state’s security services would harass, arrest, or
torture leading opposition figures, occupy their party’s headquarters, or censor the media to
prevent wide-scale public demonstrations in opposition to Aliyev’s foreign policies.774
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Operating under conditions of low government fragmentation and issue polarization, domestic
politics served as an enabler of Heydar Aliyev’s preferred alignment strategy of great power
bridging. A key point here is Aliyev was able to more effectively and efficiently translate his
verbal proclamations into material actions to realize this particular foreign policy objective. In
the paragraphs below, key instances of material cooperation with the United States and Russia
are detailed to support this assertion.
In the economic sphere, Heydar Aliyev’s ideas about the central importance of aligning with
Russia and the United States was on full display from 1995 to 2003 following the signing of the
“contract of the century,” in 1994 where the oil companies from the United States and Russia
were included in a 30-year agreement to develop Azerbaijan’s energy sector.775 Beyond this
landmark agreement, Aliyev was able to conclude other mutually beneficial agreements with the
Washington and Moscow. For example, in 1996 Aliyev signed commercial-economic and
scientific-technological agreements with Russia to bolster trade and economic development
between Azerbaijan and the Republic of Tatarstan.776 With the United States, two important
events included Aliyev’s signing of the 1995 Trade Relations agreement and 1997 U.S.Azerbaijan bilateral investment treaty.777 These material actions were subsequently followed by
other agreements including the opening of the American Chamber of Commerce Office in Baku
and the creation of the Caspian-American telecom.778
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In the political realm, Aliyev’s alignment with Russia was strengthened in 1997 when he
signed a 29-article Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Security with Russia and a series of
intergovernmental agreements designed to promote a closer economic and political alignment
between both states. Speaking on the significance of the Friendship Treaty, Aliyev asserted,
By signing this document, we... realize our responsibility for implementing the document and we
understand very well its very great significance. They are creating a good treaty base and legal
foundation to further develop and deepen our cooperation in all spheres. Moreover, we have a
joint historical destiny. Our historical links and what the Azerbaijani people gained from Russia,
Russian culture and science is invaluable. We value all this, and this is a basis for our cooperation
today and for our more successful cooperation in the future.779

Aliyev continued his political alignment with Russia into 2002 when during a visit to Moscow he
signed over 70 intergovernmental agreements, including an official agreement demarcating each
country’s boundaries in the Caspian Sea. It was during this event Aliyev stressed how Russia,
more than any other country, was Azerbaijan’s most important strategic partner.780
With the United States, Aliyev’s consistent political alignment resulted in numerous foreign
visits and meetings with U.S. political leaders. This led to various diplomatic initiatives
including the Baku-Houston Sister City Association, which has a mission of promoting greater
understanding, mutual appreciation, and greater cooperation between citizens in the United
States and Azerbaijan.781 Perhaps one of the most important tangible outcomes from Aliyev’s
concerted efforts with the United States was to reduce the influence of the Armenian lobby in
Washington leading to the lifting of a ban on U.S. foreign aid in 2001 and arms sales in 2002.782
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Finally, Aliyev’s great power bridging alignment was visible in the state’s military and
security-related actions. With Russia, in January 2002 Aliyev signed seven bilateral agreements
with Russia, the most important of which was a document extending Russia’s lease of the Qabala
Radar station for 10 years. Key events demonstrating Aliyev’s equal alignment with the U.S.
centered on his support for Washington’s global counter-terrorism operations. Specifically,
Aliyev allowed U.S. military forces to use the country’s airspace to deliver supplies to
Afghanistan in 2001 and the Azeri president committed a small contingent of troops to the
International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul. Following a decision by President
Bush to lift the ban on U.S. support as stipulated under the Freedom Support Act and to grant
Azerbaijan ‘most favored nation’ status, Aliyev’s strategic alignment with Washington was made
even more pronounced with the deployment of 250 Azeri soldiers to the U.S.-led war in Iraq.783
Ilham Aliyev. As president, Ilham Aliyev was also a pragmatic leader, who believed
Azerbaijan should develop a strategic partnership with the United States and Russia. In response
to critics, who attempted to brand this Azeri president as pro-Russian or pro-U.S., he stated, “we
[Azerbaijan] have no orientation, although there are attempts to interpret it in this way
sometimes. Our orientation is to establish normal relations with our neighbors and international
organizations in order for Azerbaijan to take a major place in the world.”784 According to one
area specialist, Aliyev’s pragmatism was characterized by both accommodation and
confrontation. When there were tensions with the United States, Aliyev assumed a more
accommodative strategy with Russia and vice versa. For example, during the initial years of
President Obama’s administration, Aliyev took a confrontational approach with the U.S. owing
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to Washington’s criticisms of Baku’s human rights record and attempts to foster peaceful ties
between Armenia and Turkey.785 During this time, the Azeri president was more accommodative
with Moscow.
With little change in the political architecture of the Azeri state, Ilham Aliyev faced little
domestic opposition as he pursued a great power bridging alignment with the United States and
Russia. Once again, low government fragmentation was a key enabler allowing Aliyev to bring
to fruition a wide array of material actions with Moscow and Washington. Operating under the
1995 Constitution, Ilham Aliyev consistently prevented the emergence of any major political
opposition groups. To help maintain this low degree of government fragmentation, Aliyev
implemented a new tactic in 2005 by artificially increasing the number of pro-Aliyev
independent candidates during parliamentary elections.786 This move helped to minimize
government fragmentation by keeping the number of opposition parties to an absolute minimum.
Additionally, in 2009 changes to the electoral code reduced candidate access to public campaign
funding and shortened the campaign window from 28 to 22 days.787 Taken together, the level of
government fragmentation in the Azeri state has remained low if not non-existent.
Issue polarization was also of no consequence under Ilham Aliyev as there was little
opposition to his bifurcated alignment with the United States and Russia. As before, the Azeri
state under Ilham continued to use political repression as a way to stave off issue polarization
with the country’s Polity (autocratic) and Freedom House (partly free) scores remaining the
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same.788 For example, in the wake of the 2003 national election that brought Ilham Aliyev to
power, violent demonstrations by various political opposition groups were met with an armed
force resulting in the detention of over 700 oppositionists, of which 100 were convicted with
many group leaders receiving prison sentences.789 Taken together, low levels of government
fragmentation and issue polarization became an enabler for Ilham Aliyev’s ideas about the merits
of a great power bridging alignment strategy. In the proceeding paragraphs, the major political
and military events supporting this conclusion are detailed.
Beginning with Russia, there were two major political events demonstrating Aliyev’s
alignment with Russia. The first occurred in February 2004 when the Azeri president signed “the
Moscow Declaration.” This document reaffirmed Azerbaijan’s previous agreements with Russia
and gave new emphasis for Baku and Moscow to develop stronger security and economic ties in
the decade ahead.790 The second transpired in July 2008 when Aliyev signed a Declaration of
Friendship and Strategic Partnership. Both events served as benchmarks guiding Azerbaijan’s
alignment with Russia while Aliyev was in office.791
Aliyev’s visits to Moscow also served as opportunities for him to emphasize his ideas about
achieving a resolution on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue; however, while Aliyev would frequently
call out Russia’s key role, he was also quick to note the central importance of the United States.
For example, during his visit to Moscow in 2004 Aliyev stated, “the United States and Russia...
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should join together in elaborating an acceptable solution to this issue. They must facilitate the
settlement of the problem so as to recover Azerbaijan's captured territory.”792
Perhaps the most visible indicator of Aliyev’s pragmatic foreign policy orientation was seen
in the area of economics where the Azeri president continued with or established new
agreements or mutually beneficial projects with the United States and Russia. With the
Washington, Aliyev continued to strengthen the state’s alignment in the energy sector when in
2006 the U.S.-backed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline began sending oil to customers in the
West. Aliyev’s beliefs about the central role of the United States were made explicit during his
speech at the opening of the BTC pipeline when he noted Azerbaijan has... “always felt
America’s support, relied on it, and in some cases that support played a key role.”793 Separately,
in 2007, both governments established the U.S.-Azerbaijan Economic Partnership Commission,
which facilitated closer economic cooperation in finance, investment, trade, and energy.794
In parallel to these efforts, Aliyev also brought to fruition new initiatives with Russia. In the
decade after Aliyev’s 2004 visit to Moscow, trade between Russia and Azerbaijan increased
significantly. In 2004, Azerbaijan exports to Russia totaled $210 million while imports from
Russia came in at $570 million (in U.S. dollars). By 2013, exports to and imports from Russia
totaled $1.08 billion and $1.5 billion respectively.795 Beyond higher levels of trade, one of the
most visible examples of Azerbaijan’s alignment with Russia occurred in 2009 when
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Azerbaijan’s SOCAR signed an agreement on the sale of Azeri gas to Russia as a way for
Moscow to maintain a higher degree of influence in the European energy market.796
Finally, in the military sphere, Aliyev’s pragmatism served as a catalyst for his alignment
with both regional great powers. With the United States, the Azeri president continued his
predecessor’s commitment to a military alignment signing a security cooperation agreement in
2004. Speaking in 2006 about his country’s close alignment with the U.S., he emphasized how...
We are a member of antiterror coalition from the very start. We have the militaries in Kosovo and
Afghanistan. Immediately after operation started in Iraq we sent there our soldiers. We work very
actively with United States and our partners towards integration to NATO. We firmly cooperate
with Union of Europe and integration to Euro-Atlantic place is our strategic choice.797

Beyond his military support for the U.S. and its missions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq,
Aliyev’s s ideas about a military alignment with Washington represented a key component of his
great power bridging strategy. In light of these key actions, there were limits to Aliyev’s military
alignment with the United States. For example, in response to U.S. support for Kosovo’s
declaration of independence, Aliyev order the withdrawal of Azeri military forces participating
in the NATO-led peacekeeping mission in the newly-established country as a sign of protest.798
Finally, Aliyev’s preference for an alignment with Russia was also evident, to a lesser degree,
in the domain of military affairs. For example, a series of arms sales agreements in 2011
provided Baku with billions of dollars in high-tech Russian weapons and equipment, including
T-90 tanks, MI-24 attack helicopters, and S-300 air defense systems. Separately, in 2014 Baku
agreed to enter into a system of collective security for the Caspian region that would include
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emergency response exercises between the Russia and Azerbaijan beginning in 2016.799
Although Russia’s military presence in Armenia and its continuing military support for Yerevan
had not changed, Aliyev still believed a tepid military alignment with Russia was possible.
To recap, Heydar and Ilham Aliyev exhibited a pragmatic foreign policy orientation vis-à-vis
the United States and Russia. This pragmatism served to guide their great power bridging
alignment resulting in a wide array of economic, military, diplomatic agreements and projects
with both regional great powers. Constitutional mandates and the Azeri presidents’ authoritarian
tactics created low levels of government fragmentation and issue polarization allowing them to
more easily translate their alignment preferences into action.
Georgia: Findings and Discussion
In Georgia, this study finds President Eduard Shevardnadze maintained a pragmatic foreign
policy orientation, which was associated with a great power bridging strategy. With low levels of
government fragmentation and issue polarization, Shevardnadze was generally successful in
turning his verbal pronouncement into action. President Margvelashvili’s pragmatism was
limited in scope and duration where during his first several months in office he sought to
establish a tepid political alignment with Russia as a way to reestablish Georgia’s pre-2008
borders. In 2014 when Kremlin elites refused to compromise on issues related to South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, Margvelashvili took on a confrontational approach with Moscow and a more
accommodative one with the United States, which was associated with positive bandwagoning
with this regional great power. With higher levels of government fragmentation, Margvelashvili
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faced some challenges in turning his words into material actions. Finally, Mikheil Saakashvili
exhibited an accommodative foreign policy orientation vis-à-vis the United States and a
confrontational orientation with Russia, which was associated with a positive bandwagoning
alignment with the former.800 Low levels of government fragmentation and issue polarization
were key enablers allowing the Georgian president to more easily translate his ideas about a
positive bandwagoning alignment with the United States into action.
The Instrumental Beliefs of Georgian Presidents
An analysis of the instrumental beliefs of Georgian presidents in the table below indicate they
tended to view cooperation as a more optimal strategy than one grounded in confrontation.
Table 23: The Instrumental Beliefs of Georgian Presidents

Based on their I-1 scores, Presidents Shevardnadze, Saakashvili, and Margvelashvili believed a
cooperative strategy with external states was definitely necessary to achieve their goals.801 When
examining the intensity of tactics index (I-2) for each president, all three believed there was more
utility in using cooperative tactics to achieve their goals with Presidents Margvelashvili (.33) and
Shevardnadze (.29) registering higher scores than President Saakashvili (.24). When examining
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the ‘means’ each president employed in his strategic approach, all three gave priority to ‘Appeal’
scoring .50 or higher (Margvelashvili, .58; Shevardnadze, .58; and Saakashvili, .50). ‘Reward’
was the second most used tool for each of the presidents, albeit at a much lesser intensity
(Saakashvili, .18; Margvelashvili, .17; Shevardnadze, .16). Based on these scores and a tendency
to primarily focus on one cooperative tactic, Margvelashvili, Shevardnadze, and Saakashvili all
retained a more risk-averse orientation scoring .26, .26, and .18 respectively.
Validating Convergence and Divergence
The preceding analysis provides a baseline understanding of Presidents Shevardnadze,
Saakashvili, and Margvelashvili’s instrumental beliefs about strategy and tactics. The results of
an ANOVA and Tukey’s HSD tests are below.
Table 24: ANOVA Results - Georgian Presidents Instrumental Beliefs
Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

Between
Groups

0.100625

2

0. 050313

Within
Groups

0. 058307

19

0. 003069

F

16.395 ***

I-1

***prob <.001
Table 25: Mean Comparisons Tukey’s HSD Test Results for Direction of Strategy (I-1)
Pair

Difference

Lower Bound

Saakashvili Margvelashvili

0.181

-0.27330783

-0.08802550

0.0002486

ShevardnadzeMargvelashvili

0.070

-0.16382135

0.02382135

0.167260

ShevardnadzeSaakashvili

0.111

0.04600476

0.17532857

0.0009646

95% Family-wise Confidence Level
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Upper Bound

Adjusted P-Value

As detailed above, there are statistically significant differences at the .001 level between the
three presidents. Additionally, Presidents Margvelashvili and Shevardnadze have the most
similar beliefs registering an adjusted P-value of 0.167260.
Georgian President Alignment
In Georgia from 1995 through 2015, domestic politics generally played a mixed role with
respect to each president’s foreign policy orientation and accompanying alignment trajectories
with the United States and Russian Federation. A qualitative analysis of the material actions of
all three presidents validate the findings from the Tukey’s HSD test above that Presidents
Shevardnadze and Margvelashvili’s initial ideas about strategy are the most similar; however, the
role of domestic politics was different for each head of state. For Shevardnadze, the country’s
1995 constitution established a strong presidential system, which minimized government
fragmentation and issue polarization allowing him to more easily translate his alignment ideas
about great power bridging into action. By 2013, constitutional amendments dispersed power
from the president to parliament thus creating a moderate level of government fragmentation,
which then served as a check on President Margvelashvili’s initial great power bridging actions
and follow-on positive bandwagoning strategy with the United States. Finally, operating under
what some analysts called ‘super-presidentialism’, government fragmentation and issue
polarization were very low under President Saakashvili, which enabled him to follow a strategy
of positive bandwagoning with the United States.
Eduard Shevardnadze. From 1995 to 2003, President Shevardnadze exhibited a pragmatic
foreign policy orientation viewing the state’s alignment with the United States as a strategic
imperative, but not to the extent that it would undermine Georgia’s alignment with Russia.
Shevardnadze’s pragmatism was a byproduct of his ideas that U.S. political and economic
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support could help Georgia’s transition to democracy while allowing him to remain in power.
With Russia, a pragmatic foreign policy orientation would help facilitate a solution to the state’s
separatist problems and the eventual removal of Russian military forces from the country.
The ability of President Shevardnadze to advance his ideas about the merits of a great power
bridging strategy was derived, in part, from the country’s 1995 constitution, which he had a
direct hand in crafting beginning in 1993. As outlined in this document, the president is the
country’s head of state, who is not only the commander and chief, but also the individual
responsible for planning and executing the state’s foreign policies. By creating a strong
presidency, Shevardnadze, along with his closest advisors, hoped to avoid the political gridlock
that had plagued the state during the country’s first several years of independence. According to
one area specialist, following the 1992 parliamentary elections, there were over 24 different
political parties in parliament. With so many political groups advancing their own agendas,
making substantive progress on the country’s pressing domestic and foreign policy issues had
become too daunting.802 As a result, the presidential powers given to Shevardnadze via the
constitution reduced government fragmentation and issue polarization allowing him increased
latitude to implement his preferred foreign policies.
Rampant corruption in Shevardnadze’s government was a second factor affecting lower levels
of government fragmentation and issue polarization. Upon entering office, Shevardnadze
purportedly sold various positions within his government as a way to generate revenue and to
place like-minded individuals in positions to support his domestic and foreign agendas. In other
instances, Shevardnadze diverted foreign assistance meant for improving the country’s economy
or advancing democratic reforms to the bank accounts of government officials in his
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administration. When political opposition parties or society would voice opposition about
government corruption, Shevardnadze skillfully responded with empty promises of enacting new
policies or appointing a special government commission to curtail these illicit activities.803
The preceding two factors helped bring about lower levels of government fragmentation and
issue polarization in Georgia while Eduard Shevardnadze was in office. As a result, domestic
politics did not represent a major constraint on the Georgian president’s efforts to translate his
verbal pronouncements about aligning with the U.S. and Russia into material actions. In the
proceeding paragraphs, the most important key events demonstrating Shevardnadze’s alignment
with the U.S. and Russia are presented.
In the military sphere, Shevardnadze pursued a compartmentalized great power bridging
strategy with Russia and the United States opting to align more so with Moscow in the early
years (1995-1997) and then with Washington (1997-2003). The most important material action
of Shevardnadze’s alignment with the Russian Federation during the 1990s emanated from his
February 1994 decision to sign a treaty of friendship with Moscow along with a series of military
agreements on developing mutual security and defense relations between both countries. Of
significance, the Russia-Georgia Treaty of Friendship informally obligated both parties to not
enter into any formal military alliance that may be targeted against either country. More
importantly, Shevardnadze agreed to become a member of the Russian-led CIS and to allow the
stationing of Russian military forces in Georgia.804
While Georgian nationalist parties were adamantly against the ratification of the 1994
Friendship Treaty, Shevardnadze was able to minimize issue polarization by arguing the Kremlin

803

Interview on file with author; Rayfield 2013, 387-389.
Vashakmadze, Mindia. 2005. “Foreign Forces in Georgia: Status, Legitimacy, Prospects.” In Eden Cole and
Phillip Fluri (eds.) From Revolution to Reform: Georgia's Struggle with Democratic Institution Building and
Security Sector Reform. Vienna: GKS, 153-154.
804

378

had committed to ensuring the territorial integrity of Georgia and, by extension, this meant
Abkhazia and South Ossetia were part of Georgia’s sovereign territory.805 This event paved the
way for Shevardnadze to subsequently sign the Stationing Treaty with Russia in September
1995. In return for a commitment by Moscow to train and equip Georgia’s armed forces, the
treaty legalized Russia’ military presence at four military bases in Georgia for 25 years. Citing a
violation of the 1995 constitution, parliament strongly opposed Shevardnadze’s unilateral action;
however, by touting the benefits of Russia as a guarantor of peace and stability in Georgia
Shevardnadze was able to minimize this political opposition.806
In concert with these key events, as Georgia’s command-in-chief Shevardnadze also
undertook an effort to increasingly align Georgia with the United States with little opposition
from parliament. Shevardnadze’s point of departure began in 1997 when Georgia joined the
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. The following year, Tbilisi established formal relations with
NATO and by 1999 the Shevardnadze had committed Georgian military forces to the NATO-led
Kosovo Force Mission.807 Shevardnadze’s commitment to working with the United States
subsequently facilitated his approval of the NATO exercise ‘Best Effort’ on Georgian soil in
2002.808 Giving emphasis to Georgia’s alignment with the U.S., Shevardnadze stated...
Our small country [Georgia] is developing partnership relations with the greatest and the most
powerful democracy in the world. This means that our course is right, the course towards building
a democratic and independent state which is oriented towards universal values. That is why we
are being helped and a helping hand is being reached out to us.809
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By the early 2000s, Shevardnadze’s military alignment with Washington came into closer
focus after the terrorist attacks in the United States. For example, in 2002 the Georgian president
approved the stationing of U.S. military personnel, equipment, and funding to build-up Georgia’s
armed forces under the GTEP. This program was specifically designed to bolster the army’s
counter-terrorism capabilities.810 Finally, after U.S.-led military operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, Shevardnadze approved the deployment of Georgian military forces to support
ongoing stabilization missions in both countries in 2003 and 2004 respectively.811
In the economic and political spheres, Shevardnadze also pursued a great power bridging
strategy with United States and Russia. With Washington, Shevardnadze’s major action was to
sign a bilateral investment treaty in 1994, which came into force when the Georgian president
exchanged the instruments of ratification with President Clinton in 1999.812 This treaty set the
conditions for increased levels of U.S. investment in Georgia and vice versa for not only
Shevardnadze’s time in office but for his successors as well. Separately, under Shevardnadze
Georgia’s level of trade with the U.S. increased from $111 million in 1995 to $185 million by
2003.813 From a political standpoint, Shevardnadze’s continued engagement with senior U.S.
government leaders and his diplomatic backing for Washington’s war in Afghanistan and Iraq
translated into over one billion dollars in U.S. economic assistance to Georgia.814 Speaking in
1999, Shevardnadze highlighted the critical importance of an alignment with the United States.
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First of all, on behalf of my people, I would like to thank sincerely the leadership of the United
States of America, the American people, and their envoy to Georgia, Mr. Kenneth Yalowitz.
Thanks to this assistance, we have the right to say that the formation of one of the most important
state institutions, the border guard forces, has been generally completed. These are no longer
symbolic forces. They are equipped appropriately and are provided with everything needed to
carry out their function.815

Separately, Shevardnadze’s tendency to also align with Russia was driven in part by his ideas
about how Georgia’s economy could not stand on its own without Kremlin assistance. For
Shevardnadze, Georgia’s location in the South Caucasus and reliance on Russia for energy and
trade demanded the utmost attention. The strongest indicator of Shevardnadze’s alignment with
its former imperial center was seen with the country’s continued participation as a member of the
CIS. Although frustrated with this organization’s inability to resolve various regional security
issues, Shevardnadze still regarded the CIS as an important conduit for economic cooperation
with Russia and other former Soviet states. For example, in 1999 Shevardnadze signed a series
of documents for Georgia’s participation in a CIS free trade zone. According to Shevardnadze,
“...we are not inclined to leave the CIS. We are for a strengthening of that organization, and it is
precisely from those positions that I spoke at the Chisinau CIS summit and proposed bringing
into the foreground problems of economic cooperation and the creation of free trade zones.”816
Beyond Shevardnadze’s alignment with Russia inside the CIS, the Georgian President signed
a double taxation avoidance treaty with Russia in 1999. This treaty met with little opposition
from parliament and was ratified in 2000.817 In terms of trade, under Shevardnadze Georgia’s
level of trade with Russia increased from $148 million in 1996 to $213 million in 2003.818
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However, while Shevardnadze believed an economic alignment with Russia via Tbilisi’s
participation in the CIS and higher levels of trade could return some tangible benefits to Georgia,
his ideas about entering into a formal economic alliance were unwavering till the end of his
presidency. For example, in 2003 during a series of meetings in Saint Petersburg, Russian
President Vladimir Putin tabled the topic of economic integration between Russia, Ukraine,
Georgia, and Kazakhstan. Following these meetings Shevardnadze made it clear Georgia would
not enter into any alliance that would undermine the country’s economic ties with the West.819
Shevardnadze’s pragmatic ideas with respect to Russia continued during his last years in
office. In March 2003, Shevardnadze met with President Putin in Sochi where numerous
agreements were made on a variety of economic and security topics. During this meeting,
Shevardnadze agreed to allow Russian peacekeepers to remain in Abkhazia for an indefinite
amount of time. Additionally, Shevardnadze committed Georgia to participating in Moscow’s
effort to create a new Eurasian economic zone of cooperation. Shevardnadze also consented to
allowing Russia to operate the Inguri hydroelectric station.820 Taken together, operating under
conditions of low government fragmentation and issue polarization, Shevardnadze was able to
effectively translate his ideas about great power bridging into action.
Mikheil Saakashvili. From 2004 to 2012, President Saakashvili consistently exhibited a
confrontational foreign policy orientation with Moscow and an accommodative orientation with
Washington viewing the state’s alignment with the United States as the single most important
goal for Georgia. For Saakashvili, a strategic alignment with the United States in the military and
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economic areas would help ensure Georgia’s accession into Euro-Atlantic structures with a
primary focus on NATO and the EU.
During Saakashvili’s presidency, there existed low levels of government fragmentation and
issue polarization on aligning Georgia with the United States. There are three contributing
factors here. First, after entering office Saakashvili skillfully worked with parliament to pass a
series of constitutional amendments further strengthening the powers of the president. In addition
to being the head of state, the commander-in-chief, the head of the executive branch, and the
leading political figure responsible for planning and executing the state’s foreign policies,
Saakashvili was also given the power to appoint the prime minister and dissolve parliament.821
The establishment of a semi-presidential republic subsequently gave Saakashvili an enhanced
ability to put into action his ideas about a U.S. alignment with little to no interference from other
political groups or ruling elites in the state’s bureaucratic organizations.
Beyond the 2004 constitutional amendments, political backing from other leading political
figures was an enabler of Saakashvili’s ideas about a strategic alignment with Washington. For
example, two of the most important political figures behind the Rose Revolution, Nino
Burjanadze (leader in the Democratic Movement party) and Zurab Zhvania (leader in the United
Democrats party) fully supported Saakashvilli and his United National Movement party prior to
and after the January 2004 national election. Furthermore, with Shevardnadze’s removal from
power, many of his appointees resigned clearing the way for the arrival of new political elites,
who had similar ideas about aligning Georgia with the United States and Europe.822 With these
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conditions in place, it becomes clear as to how domestic politics was an enabler for Saakashvili
and his efforts to translate his positive bandwagoning ideas with the U.S. into action.
Finally, although Saakashvili began his presidency with high expectations of stamping out
corruption and completing Georgia’s transition to democracy, when political or societal
opposition to his ideas did make their presence known, the Georgian president sometimes used
repressive techniques to put an end to such challenges. For example, in 2007 Saakashvili
authorized the use of armed force to disperse mass protests against his policies. His actions were
accompanied by a crackdown on political opposition parties, which eventually saw him step
down as president in November 2007 before being re-elected again in January 2008.823 With
power almost exclusively centered on the presidency, Saakashvili was able to effectively and
efficiently translate his ideas about an alignment with the United States and Western Europe into
material action. In the following paragraphs, key events surrounding Saakashvili’s ability to
realize a positive bandwagoning strategy with the United States from 2004 to 2012 are discussed.
The number of examples demonstrating Saakashvili’s ability to translate his word to deeds on
an alignment with the United States span his entire presidency with the strongest evidence
surfacing in military affairs. First, Saakashvili’s ideas about an alignment with Washington were
formalized in the publication of his 2005 and 2012 National Security Concepts of Georgia,
which explicitly defines the state’s primary foreign policy objective as a strategic partnership
with the United States.824 Low levels of government fragmentation and issue polarization over
the state’s alignment were two key enablers in this matter. For example, in 2011 the Georgian
parliament overwhelmingly approved Saakashvili’s foreign policy ideas voting 111 to 3 in favor
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of this 2012 strategic document.825 Despite whatever domestic political issues Saakashvili may
have been contending with, at this late point in his presidency, he still retained ample support
from his party and other political opposition groups to move his alignment agenda forward.
Second, in early 2009 President Saakashvili signed the United States-Georgia Strategic
Partnership, which elevated Tbilisi’s alignment with Washington to a historical high.826
According to Saakashvili, “never before has this term, strategic partnership, been used in our
relationships and of course this is very important step made towards the strengthening of
Georgia's position, its security and people's welfare. With this document, we not only codified
what has been happening until now, but also what will happen from now on in our bilateral
relationship.”827 While Saakashvili and members of his ruling government perceived this charter
as a U.S. security guarantee, various area specialists have noted how this document is a nonbinding agreement.828 Regardless, the manifestation of this key strategic document and
Saakashvili’s national security concepts added significant weight to the Georgian president’s
efforts to advance a positive bandwagoning strategy with the United States.
Although Saakashvili hotly pursued Georgia’s economic integration into the EU, he also gave
high emphasis to an economic alignment with the United States. Two examples support this
assertion. First, in 2007 Georgia signed the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement with
the United States.829 This agreement served as a key venue for leading political leaders in
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Georgia and the U.S. to develop new ways to increase trade and investment in both countries.
This agreement was followed by the establishment of a High-Level Dialogue on Trade and
Investment. This bilateral working group had the primary mission of developing and
implementing new measures to further bolster bilateral trade and investment.830 Both actions
subsequently doubled trade levels between Georgia and the United States. Specifically, Georgian
exports to the U.S. rose from $58 million in 2006 to $134 million in 2013. Similarly, U.S.
imports to Georgia doubled, rising from $129 million in 2006 to $253 million in 2013.831
In lock step with Saakashvili’s actions to align Georgia with the United States, he also took
actions to steer the country out of Russia’s orbit. For example, with full backing from parliament
and the international community, Saakashvili made some progress on the removal of Russian
forces from Georgia. In 2007, Moscow exited its last military base; however, Russian
peacekeeping forces still remained in South Ossetia.832 Separately, in the days after the August
2008 Russia invasion, Saakashvili declared Georgia would leave the CIS. Saakashvili’s verbal
proclamation was made material with overwhelming support from parliament, which voted
unanimously to leave this Russian-led organization.833 From Saakashvili’s perspective, “the CIS
totally failed as an international organization. It is some kind of post-Soviet kind of thing, that
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basically could not do anything to prevent this tragedy from happening. And, you know, by
leaving the CIS, we are giving final [goodbyes] to the Soviet Union.”834
In sum, during his time in office, President Saakashvili effectively translated his ideas about
an exclusive alignment with the United States into action. Domestic politics was a key enabler of
the Georgian president’s foreign policy initiatives, where low levels of government
fragmentation and issue polarization helped the president realize his goals.
Giorgi Margvelashvili. During late 2013 and early 2014, President Margvelashvili, like
Eduard Shevardnadze, exhibited a pragmatic foreign policy orientation within the framework of
a great power bridging strategy vis-à-vis the United States and Russia. This short-lived foreign
policy orientation was quickly replaced by a more accommodative one with the U.S. following
Russian obstinacy on the status of South Ossetia and Abkahzia. Unlike Shevardnadze,
Margvelashvili’s foreign policy orientations were shaped, in part, by domestic political
constraints. Specifically, the Georgian government under Margvelashvili experienced higher
levels of government fragmentation and issue polarization owing to changes in the constitution
and conflicting political personalities.
First, the strong presidential systems that existed during Presidents Shevardnadze and
Saakashvili’s time in office was cast aside in 2013 for a parliamentary form of governance. One
area specialist notes the significance and how the constitutional changes “awkwardly split the
executive power between the president and the prime minister... that created fertile ground for
constant bickering between the head of state and the head of the government.”835 Additionally,
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constitutional amendments from 2010, which came into effect in 2013 gave the prime minister
increased political power. These actions contributed greatly to higher levels of government
fragmentation and issue polarization in the Georgian government. At issue was how President
Margvelashvili, unlike his predecessors, was no longer the lead actor in the state’s foreign policy
executive thereby making it more difficult to translate his words into action.
Clashing political personalities between members of the state’s foreign policy executive was a
second factor contributing to the higher level of government fragmentation and issue polarization
during Margvelashvili’s time in office. Specifically, Margvelashvili was almost consistently at
odds with former Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili over Georgia’s domestic and foreign
policies. For example, in the run-up to Georgia signing the EU Association Agreement,
Margvelashvili and Garibashvili clashed over who would be the one to sign this agreement. The
Georgian president finally conceded to the prime minister by issuing a special decree authorizing
Garibashvili to sign this document; however, many political groups and non-governmental
organizations viewed the president’s decision as unconstitutional.836 Regardless, this event
illuminates the extent to which Georgia’s leading political figures quarreled over the political
power to lead the country in international affairs.
Despite higher levels of government fragmentation and issue polarization, President
Margvelashvili was still able to advance his initial ideas about a limited form of great power
bridging and later, positive bandwagoning with the United States. One point of departure for
Margvelashvili’s early tendency to follow a great power bridging strategy begins with Russia,
which must be understood as a superficial effort to politically align Tbilisi with Moscow. In this
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case, the Georgian president’s foreign policy actions were done based on his ideas about
engaging Moscow to achieve a favorable resolution with South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Key to the
Georgian president’s success was his ability to separate economic and social issues from the
pressing security and military challenges. In the following paragraphs, several examples provide
evidence about Margvelashvili’s early pragmatic foreign policy orientation vis-à-vis Russia.
First, in 2013 Margvelashvili appointed several foreign policy figures, who did not hold
strident beliefs about the necessity to align exclusively with the United States and Europe. These
individuals included the Secretary of the National Security Council, Irina Imerlishvili and
presidential foreign policy advisor Vano Machavariani, who, according to one area specialist,
had consistently argued for “...a more measured and careful approach to relations with the United
States...”837 In concert with these appointments, Margvelashvili also suspended the television
broadcasts from the Georgia’s Russian-language PIK channel and decided to not boycott the
2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, Russia.838 The Georgian president’s initial expectations
of how a low-key diplomatic alignment with the Russia could produce positive returns were
validated when in February 2013 Moscow lifted a trade ban on wine, fruit, and mineral water
that had been in place since 2006.
Beginning in mid 2014 and continuing through 2015, Margvelashvili’s foreign policy
orientation tilted from pragmatism to one of confrontation with Russia and more accommodation
with the United States. The genesis of this change stems from two key events: Moscow’s
unwillingness to recant is recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia’s declarations of
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independence and to cease support for the separatists; Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support
for separatists in eastern Ukraine. Speaking in 2014, one can begin to discern a change in
Margvelashvili’s foreign policy orientation. In his words,
Last year, we opened a new format of dialogue with Russia, within which we have started discussions
on economic, trade, cultural and humanitarian issues. We think that there was some progress in this
process, but the construction of barbwires and expansion of the 11 kilometers so-called border line in
the depth of our territory, has seriously and harmfully affected this progress.839

Separately, Russia’s annexation of Crimea reinforced Margvelashvili’s threat perceptions of
Russia moving him to realize there would be no changing Moscow’s foreign policy actions to
reestablish its influence in the post-Soviet space by creating and maintaining frozen conflicts in
Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, and now Georgia.
Beginning in 2014, Margvelashvili’s accommodative orientation and positive bandwagoning
with the United States were readily observed. The strength of his alignment with Washington
was the most pronounced in the area of military affairs given his leading role as the commanderin-chief and because much of Georgia’s economic efforts were directed towards the EU. For the
period 2014-2015, Margvelashvili aggressively pursued a strong military alignment with the
United States along several lines of operations. First, the Georgian president continued to
ardently support U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan by increasing the number of Georgian
troops, which rose to 1,500 making Georgia the largest non-NATO contributor. Margvelashvili’s
commitment to NATO subsequently earned Georgia an upgraded status as a NATO enhancedopportunities partner in 2014.840 This enhanced status was significant because Georgia became
eligible for additional NATO funding and training that would help set the stage for the country’s
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future accession into the alliance. Finally, Margvelashvili remained very open to a U.S. and
NATO presence in the country resulting in the establishment of the NATO-Georgia Joint
Training and Evaluation Center outside Tbilisi in 2015. This facility helped Georgian military
leaders modernize the armed forces and improve their interoperability with NATO units.841
President Margvelashvili’s success was not without challenges as he struggled at times to
implement his ideas about foreign policies on a closer alignment with the United States in 2014
and 2015. The locus of resistance during this time came from Prime Minister Irakly Garibashvili,
who appeared on several levels to favor a great power bridging alignment with the U.S. and
Russia, even though Kremlin leaders remained steadfast in their foreign policies. Specifically, in
2014 Garibashvili fired the country’s defense minister, who like Margvelashvili advocated a
positive bandwagoning alignment with the United States. Additionally, Garibashvili was reticent
in his remarks on Russia’s actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.842 Despite these political and
constitutional challenges however, President Margvelashvili was not an inconsequential figure as
he remained a prominent voice representing Georgia on the international stage. Additionally, the
Georgian President was still the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and was responsible for
appointing ambassadors and negotiating international treaties and agreements with other
states.843
Despite Margvelashvili’s successful effort to align Georgia with the United States, some
routine interstate activities with Russia continued. For example, in late 2014 the Georgian
president, while condemning Russia’s actions in Ukraine as a threat to regional stability, did not
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see the necessity to impose economic sanctions to mirror what the U.S. and Western Europe
actions less one; a ban on imports from Crimea and Sevastopol. His ideas on Georgia’s actions
mirrored the position of parliament and must be taken in their proper context. For
Margvelashvili, the re-establishment of trade on certain items with Russia was an event of the
past that should not be connected to Moscow’s current actions.844
The preceding analysis of the foreign policy orientations of Georgian presidents reveal
several takeaways. First, Presidents Shevardnadze and Margvelashvili (in late 2013 and early
2014) pursued a strategy of great power bridging by attempting to align Georgia with the U.S.
and Russia by implementing a unique set of political, economic, or military-related foreign
policy actions. The role of domestic politics in both cases was noticeable different. For
Shevardnadze, government fragmentation and issue polarization were low owing to
constitutional guidelines, political corruption, and his ability to place like-mined political figures
in positions of power. As such, Shevardnadze was able to more easily translate many of his ideas
about the state’s alignment with both regional great powers into action. For Margvelashvili
however, changes to the constitution created government fragmentation thereby limiting what he
could accomplish during the time under examination. Despite these challenges, Margvelashvili
was still able to bring some of alignment ideas to fruition. Finally, domestic politics was a key
enabler of President Saakashvili’s positive bandwagoning strategy with Washington. In this case,
a strong executive, coupled with a like-minded parliament allowed Saakashvili to put into action
a majority of his ideas about a strategic alignment with the United States.
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Moldova: Findings and Discussion
In Moldova, this study finds Presidents Petru Lucinschi and Vladimir Voronin (after 2003)
maintained a pragmatic foreign policy orientation during their years in office. Each president’s
pragmatism was subsequently associated with a great power bridging alignment with the United
States and Russian Federation. Of note, prior to 2004 President Voronin exhibited a highly
accommodative foreign policy orientation with Moscow, which was associated with efforts to
foment a positive bandwagoning alignment with Russia. Separately, President Nicolae Timofti
took a limited confrontational approach with Russia and a more accommodative one with the
United States. Despite differing levels of government fragmentation and issue polarization each
president was still able to put into action his verbal pronouncements about an alignment with
either the United States, Russia, or both.
The Instrumental Beliefs of Moldovan Presidents
The instrumental beliefs of each of the three Moldovan presidents are on the next page. An
examination of the master instrumental beliefs (I-1) of Presidents Petru Lucinschi, Vladimir
Voronin, and Nicolae Timofti indicate they tended to view a cooperative strategy as an optimal
approach to foreign affairs scoring .68, .60 and .70 respectively. With respect to tactics (I-2), all
three of the Moldovan leaders believed there was more utility in using cooperative methods to
achieve their goals with Lucinschi, Voronin, and Timofti scoring .36, .31, and .32 respectively.
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Table 26: The Instrumental Beliefs of Moldovan Presidents

The most frequently employed tactic for all three was ‘appeal’ with ‘reward’ being the second
most used tool. Based on these scores and a tendency by each president to emphasize one
cooperative tactic (i.e. appeal), they have a more risk-averse orientation scoring .26, .20, and, .30
respectively.
Validating Convergence and Divergence
As depicted in the table below, an ANOVA test validates the null hypothesis that there are no
statistically significant differences in the instrumental beliefs of the three Moldovan presidents.
The alternative hypothesis that a statistically significant difference exists is not validated thus
indicating all three presidents tended to exhibit similar beliefs about strategy. As will be
discussed below however, just because all three presidents had the same beliefs about strategy
Presidents Lucinschi and Voronin (after 2003) retained pragmatic foreign policy orientation,
which was associated with a great power bridging strategy. Before 2004, President Voronin’s
accommodative orientation with Russia was associated with positive bandwagoning actions with
this regional great power. Finally, President Timofti had a more confrontational orientation with
Russia, which was correlated with a positive bandwagoning alignment with the United States.
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Table 27: ANOVA Results – Moldovan Presidents Instrumental Beliefs
Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

F

1.2627

Between
Groups

.034714

2

0.017357

Within
Groups

.192439

14

0.013746

I-1

Moldovan President Alignment
In Moldova from 1997 through 2015, a qualitative analysis of the material actions of all three
presidents find Petru Lucinschi and Vladimir Voronin (after 2003) pursued a pragmatic foreign
policy orientation as part of a great power bridging alignment with the United States and Russian
Federation. Nicolae Timofti’s foreign policy orientation took on a more accommodative
characterization with the United States and a limited confrontational approach with Russia.
During the tenure of each of the presidents under examination, domestic politics was an
important shape agent that served as an enabler and/or constraint on his respective actions to
implement policies to align with the United States and/or Russia. To begin, the country’s 1994
constitution, which defines Moldova as a neutral state in world affairs is perhaps the
quintessential factor shaping each president’s alignment strategy.845 Although the constitution
prevented Moldova from joining the CSTO or NATO, each president was free to develop an
alignment with the United States and/or Russia in his own distinct way.
Beyond the constitution, government fragmentation and issue polarization were major factors
impacting the alignment trajectories of each president. Since its independence, Moldova’s
domestic political landscape remained extremely fragmented owing to the existence of over 100

Republic of Moldova. 2006. “Constitution of the Republic of Moldova.” ConstituteProject.org. https://www.
constituteproject.org/constitution/Moldova_2006.pdf?lang=en. Accessed 12 August 2017, 9.
845

395

different political parties with competing visions about the priorities for state’s domestic and
foreign policy agendas.846 For example, contested political rivalries and the ever-changing
composition of different coalitions served as a major check on a president’s ability to implement
his foreign policies. According to one area expert, “the legislature consistently constrained
presidential authority to a degree not seen in Moldova’s post-Soviet neighbors.”847 In July 2000,
parliament passed a series of constitutional amendments that gave Moldova a parliamentary form
of governance.848 These changes contributed to the state’s government fragmentation and issue
polarization during the terms of Presidents Voronin and Timofti.
Petru Lucinschi. From 1997 to 2000, President Lucinschi maintained a pragmatic foreign
policy orientation owing to high levels of government fragmentation and moderate levels of
issue polarization, which impeded his ability to translate his verbal pronouncements on a
strategic alignment with the United States and Russia into action.849 With respect to government
fragmentation, because Lucinschi entered the presidency as an independent he did not possess
the necessary political capital to more easily advance his foreign policy agenda. Although he was
able to develop a working coalition of independents in parliament (the Bloc for a Democratic and
Prosperous Moldova), the fluid nature of their changing loyalties made it extremely difficult for
Lucinschi to advance his ideas about aligning with multiple regional great powers. The 1998
parliamentary elections contributed further to the level of government fragmentation with many
independents expressing disagreement with Lucinschi’s ideas about how to improve the
country’s economy, which focused on a closer economic alignment with Russia. As a result,
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Lucinschi was forced to either compromise or expend political capital in order to translate his
ideas into action.850
Issue polarization over Lucinschi’s ideas about an alignment with Russia was particularly
high during his time in office. Campaigning on a platform to improve Moldova’s alignment with
Russia, once in office Lucinschi was met with stiff opposition from nationalist and right-wing
groups, who were highly critical of his pro-Russian foreign policy approach. As noted above,
this was particularly true with respect to Chisinau’s economic alignment with Moscow. For
example, political leaders from Liberal Party of Moldova and the Christian Democratic Popular
Front of Moldova (FPCDM) consistently argued Lucinschi was attempting to politically and
economically subjugate Moldova to Russia. In the words of Iurie Rosca, the Chairman of the
FPCDM, “Lucinschi is an exponent of Russian neo-colonialism, of Russian capital... [and that]
Moldova's return to Moscow's orbit is being achieved not by force of weapons, but through the
interference of the Russian capital into the key sectors of our economy.”851
On the other side of the aisle, political leaders from the communist party were consistently at
odds with Lucinschi over his ideas to foment an alignment with the United States and Europe
concluding he had ‘sold out’ Moldova to the West. Vladimir Voronin and leading communist
party officials were highly critical of Lucinschi for not doing more to improve Moldova’s
economic ties to Russia and the CIS as a way to improve the country’s economy.852 For example,
during the 1997 CIS summit in Chisinau, not one official document or agreement was signed by
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Lucinschi or any other head of state with economic agenda items being directed back to each
member state.853
Despite the high level of government fragmentation and issue polarization, Lucinschi was
able to translate some of his ideas about an alignment with Russia into action. For example,
President Lucinschi’s political alignment with Moscow in bilateral and multilateral forums (CIS,
OSCE, etc.) facilitated the signing of the “Moscow Memorandum” that normalized relations
between Chisinau and Tiraspol in 1997 and reduced Russia’s military footprint in Moldova to
approximately 3,000 troops.854 In the run-up to this key event, President Lucinschi went so far as
to note how Russia’s military presence in the Trans-Dniester was a stabilizing factor in the peace
process.855 Moldova’s improving alignment with Russia subsequently set the conditions in
November 1999 for Russian President Boris Yeltsin to sign the Istanbul Declaration, which
required Moscow to withdraw all Russian military forces from the Trans-Dniester by 2002.856
Taken together, these events demonstrate how an internal challenge can shape a president’s ideas
about an alignment with key regional great powers.
In the economic and military spheres, Lucinschi continued to advance Moldova’s economic
alignment with Moscow albeit at a slower rate owing to issue polarization among leading
political figures over how to best address the country’s poverty, high unemployment, and low
economic productivity. For example, in late 1998 Chisinau signed the ‘Program on Economic
Cooperation, 1999-2008’ with Moscow.857 This agreement established a framework for
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improving bilateral trade and investment. The 10-year treaty had an immediate impact with
Moldovan exports to Russia rising from $187 million in 1999 to $347 million in 2004.858
President Lucinschi’s alignment with the United States was less pronounced during this time;
however, he was still able to set in motion a few alignment initiatives. With a majority of his
efforts devoted to developing stronger economic ties with countries in Western Europe,859
Lucinschi’s diplomatic efforts with the United States resulted in numerous trips to Washington
by officials in his administration to showcase Chisinau’s commitment to democratic reforms. By
1999, President Clinton recognized Lucinschi’s efforts, characterizing Moldova as a model for
democracy in Eastern Europe.860 President Lucinschi’s political alignment with the U.S.
subsequently paved the way for Washington to allocate funding in support of the Moldovan
president’s domestic agenda. For example, with USAID funding Lucinschi was able to launch
his 1998 National Land Program to privatize the country’s remaining collective farms. 861
President Lucinschi’s political maneuvering with the United States also generated support
from Washington for Chisinau’s efforts to resolve the Trans-Dniester problem. For example, in
March 2000 U.S. special envoy Carey Cavanaugh stated Washington was prepared to support
Moldova in the resolution of the Trans-Dniester conflict. This pronouncement was followed by a
commitment by Washington to provide Lucinschi political and economic support towards the
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withdrawal of Russian military forces from Moldovan territory.862 Once again, internal
challenges appear to be a driver shaping Lucinschi’s ideas about the benefits of a strategic
alignment with the United States. While Washington would have only a minimal impact on
finding an enduring solution, Lucinschi found that with the United States having a seat at the
table, he could potentially garner some leverage over Russia to support Moldovan interests.
Finally, President Lucinschi attempted to develop an indirect military alignment with the
United States. Beginning in 1997, the Moldovan president sought out ways to bolster the
country’s participation in NATO’s PFP program. According to Lucinschi, “Moldova regards the
North Atlantic Cooperation Council as an element of both the all-European security and the
republic's own security and is ready to enter into a dialogue with interested parties.” 863
Subsequently Moldova would come to participate in a wide variety of PFP activities, which
included sending military forces to the United States for exercises and training.864 From one
perspective, Lucinschi’s efforts to develop a tenuous alignment with Western military forces
could at least help him improve the technical and tactical proficiency of Moldovan armed forces.
Vladimir Voronin. From 2001 through 2009, President Vladimir Voronin exhibited two
distinct foreign policy orientations and alignment trajectories. From 2001 to early 2003, Voronin
exhibited a highly accommodative orientation with Russia and a somewhat confrontational
orientation with the United States and its allies in Europe. During this time Voronin pursued a
positive bandwagoning alignment strategy with Russia. From 2004 till the end of his presidency,
Voronin exhibited a pragmatic foreign policy orientation, which was followed by a great power
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bridging strategy with the United States and Russia. According to one area specialist, after 2003,
“Moldova’s foreign policy under Voronin actually showed an element of continuity with the
various “post-communist” administrations... in that it was balanced and pragmatic in pursuit of
its national interest, seeking an equilibrium between its East and West interests...”865 While in
office, moderate levels of government fragmentation and issue polarization enabled and
constrained the Moldovan president’s alignment strategies.
Upon entering office in 2001, government fragmentation and issue polarization were
moderately low for Voronin even though Moldova had transitioned from a semi-presidential to a
parliamentary form of governance following the PCRM’s (Communists for the Republic of
Moldova) victory in the 2001 parliamentary election. During this election, the PCRM secured 71
of the 101 seats with the center-left Braghis Alliance acquiring 19 seats and the Christian
Democratic People’s Party (CDPP) taking 11 seats.866 With a clear majority in parliament, the
PCRM elected Voronin as president.
Once in office in 2001, Voronin was able to more easily advance his ideas about the necessity
to align Moldova first and foremost with the Russian Federation. For example, in June 2001
Voronin set the conditions for a positive bandwagoning strategy with Russia when after his visit
to Moscow, he stated “I paid my first visit to Russia of all the countries because it is our strategic
ally. And, incidentally, the agreement we signed with Russian President Putin bears this very
nameon strategic cooperation. A similar document had never been signed between Russia and
Moldova.”867
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The nature of Voronin’s alignment with Russia is best understood in political and economic
terms. Several examples illuminate Voronin’s ability to translate his verbal pronouncements into
action. First, in November 2001 Voronin signed a new Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
with Russia, which outlined areas from which both countries would strengthen economic and
political relations. Of particular importance, Russia recognized Moldova’s territorial integrity
and committed to withdrawing its remaining military forces from the Trans-Dniester by 2002. In
December 2002, the Moldovan parliament quickly ratified this treaty.868
In 2002, Voronin and his communist party disseminated an updated foreign policy concept
replacing the previously published version from 1995. In this strategic document, Moldova’s
eastern orientations with Russia and other CIS members were heavily emphasized. Of
significance, this foreign policy concept explicitly identified Russia as Moldova’s long-term
strategic partner.869 Simultaneously, Voronin also began to deemphasize the country’s
participation in GUUAM noting the redundant nature of this regional grouping with the larger
efforts of the Russian-led CIS. Speaking in 2002 Voronin noted how, “...[Moldova’s] position is
that the entire set of economic, social and cultural problems facing GUUAM today have already
received effective solutions under CIS programs.”870 With Uzbekistan withdrawing from GUAM
in 2002, Voronin also believed this regional bloc was on the cusp of falling apart.
From 2001 through mid 2003, President Voronin was also able to bring to fruition his ideas
about a closer economic alignment with Russia. Speaking in 2002, Voronin noted that since
taking the presidency, Moldova had implemented a plethora of economic initiatives with Russia.
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As a result, Moldova by the end of 2002 was the number one country in the CIS receiving
foreign investment from Russia. These projects included, but were not limited to, the
construction of a cargo and passenger port in Giurgiulesti and the creation of a joint enterprise
between Russia’s United Power Systems Company and Moldovan power companies.871
Reflecting on these accomplishments, President Voronin concluded, a “strategic partnership with
Russia is necessary, above all, to promote the welfare of the Moldovan people.”872
Although Russia was the primary focus of President Voronin’s alignment strategy during the
early years of his presidency, the Moldovan president still sought to develop amicable ties with
the United States and countries in Western Europe. For example, during a trip to the United
States in 2002, Voronin conveyed his appreciation for Washington’s efforts on the TransDniester problem set. In Voronin’s words, “I am sincerely grateful to the U.S. government for
the support they have shown to the process of Moldova's reintegration... [and] it is namely the
United States that gave a new face to the talks... [and] to the discussions over the legal
framework of post-conflict resolution in Moldova.”873 Irrespective of these comments, Voronin
believed Russia was the most important actor in this process. According to Voronin, “Russia is
the strongest player in Dniester settlement, and nobody will ever be able to solve this problem
without it.”874 President Voronin also espoused the possibility of closer economic ties with the
European Union; however, he realized the country’s poor economic standing made this a longterm goal.
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As a point of emphasis, Voronin’s political and economic actions with the United States and
EU during his first several years in office must be put into proper perspective as some analysts
may attempt to categorize Voronin as a pragmatist following a great power bridging strategy
during his entire presidency. Certainly, Voronin’s engagement with Washington was meant to
improve interstate relations; however, they were not meant to signal a change in his
accommodative orientation and positive bandwagoning actions with Russia. For example, after
visiting the United States in 2002, Voronin was quick to dispel his trip to Washington as an
indicator of a change in Moldova’s alignment away from Russia. In Voronin’s words...
The goal of his visit to the U.S. was to showcase Moldova as an independent state to Americans and
others, to make Moldova recognizable abroad, and to enable other countries understand its foreign
policy. Traditionally, we have had ties with Russia, Ukraine, other countries of the CIS, and we plan to
develop those decade-old ties in future. Those ties are very valuable for Moldovan economy and it
would be totally irrational to bury them in oblivion.875

Voronin’s alignment with Russia and engagement with the United States, coupled with
support from the OSCE, began to produce tangible results for an enduring resolution to
Moldovan separatism. By 2003, proposals from Moscow and Washington for federalization
gained traction with leading Moldovan political figures; however, what remained to be answered
was how political power would be distributed between the central government, Transnistria, and
Gagauzia. Although various parties had advocated for different options, Voronin publicly
gravitated towards a Russian proposal developed by Dmitri Kozak. As noted in the previous
chapter, the ‘Kozak Memorandum’ allocated substantial power to Transnistria and Gagauzia
allowing each province to retain their independent governments, veto international treaties, and
secede if Moldova joined the EU. The memorandum also included a provision for the continued
stationing of Russian military forces in Moldova for 30 years.
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In mid-2003, Voronin’s willingness to sign the Kozak memorandum became a lightning rod
for issue polarization that would prevent him from translating his ideas about an alignment with
Russia into action. In parliament, the Braghis Alliance and CDPP formed the National
Committee to Defend Moldova’s Independence and Constitution. Political leaders on this
committee were adamant that if Voronin signed the Kozak Memorandum, it would cause the
“Transnistriazation” of Moldova or the country becoming a de facto Russian satellite. In concert
with the formation of this committee, CDPP leaders also spurred Moldovans, who already
opposed federalization, to hold public demonstrations protesting Voronin’s pending action.876
Parliament’s actions, backed by a public backlash became a key constraint that prevented
Voronin from signing the Kozak Memorandum with Russia. This key event also represented a
turning point moving Voronin to take on a pragmatic foreign policy orientation and a great
power bridging strategy.
Following the Kozak Memorandum debacle, Voronin’s pragmatism set the conditions by
which the United States and Russia were both given consideration in the state’s foreign policies.
Because political power within Moldova’s bureaucratic structures remained fragmented,
Voronin’s missteps with Russia helped political opposition groups to gain ground in the 2005
parliamentary elections. Although the PCRM won 56 seats with 46 percent of the popular vote,
the newly-formed Democratic Moldova Bloc secured 34 seats, while the CDPP acquired the
remaining 11 positions. Additionally, PCRM parliamentarians began to support opposition party
ideas about the merits of an alignment with the West thus serving as an enabler for Voronin’s
great power bridging strategy with the Moscow and Washington.877
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An analysis of Voronin’s foreign policies from 2004 forward indicate he was able to bring to
fruition alignment actions with the United States and its European allies. For example, Voronin’s
vocal calls in 2004 for increased U.S. involvement in the Trans-Dniester issue were realized in
2005 with the adoption of the Five (Moldova, Transnistria, Russia, Ukraine the OSCE) plus two
(the United States and EU) program (or 5+2 program). Although the U.S. and EU were only
granted observer status, Voronin clearly believed their presence could help advance negotiations
leading to a final resolution on the Trans-Dniester.
Voronin’s alignment with the United States was also seen in the military sphere where the
Moldovan president fully supported the Bush Administration and its military operations in Iraq.
Specifically, from 2003 to 2008 Voronin approved the deployment of Moldovan military forces
to conduct demining operations in Iraq.878 Perhaps the most important event occurred in 2006
when Moldova signed an Individual Partnership Action Plan with the U.S.-led NATO alliance.879
In the 2004 and 2005, material cooperation between the United States and Moldova increased.
For example, U.S. security assistance for Moldova’s participation in the PFP increased during
this time. Specifically, the U.S. provided Moldova excess defense articles and approximately $2
million in funding through the Foreign Military Financing and International Military and
Education Training programs.880 It was through these monies and materiel, Moldova was able to
bolster its alignment with the United States and other NATO countries by improving the
interoperability and peacekeeping capabilities of the country’s armed forces.
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Relatedly, Voronin’s tendency to align itself with the West was also seen in 2004 with
Moldova’s inclusion in the EU’s European Neighborhood Policy. The following year, Moldova
and the EU signed an action plan designed to improve economic ties. Speaking at the signing
ceremony in 2005, Voronin proclaimed, “European integration is an irreversible and priority
option..., which is manifested first of all by the process of implementation of the Moldova-EU
Action Plan. Integration of Moldova is a proof of the consensus among Moldovan political class
concerning the vector of development of the country.”881
In lockstep with President Voronin’s alignment with the United States, he also continued the
state’s strategic partnership with Russia. For example, despite the higher level of tensions with
Moscow, Voronin remained steadfast in his country’s membership in the Russian-led CIS.
According to Voronin, “you don't have to convince our population of how important it is to be in
the CIS. Our people support membership of the CIS and close relations with Russia.”882
Separately, the fact that between 2001 and 2006, Moldova also concluded approximately 26
different agreements with Russia represents a strong indicator of Voronin’s ability to translate
his verbal pronouncements about an alignment with Russia into action.883
Voronin’s alignment with the Russian Federation and the United States remained positive for
his last several years in office. With Russia, Voronin continued to call on the state to follow a
pragmatic alignment with its former imperial center. In 2007, Voronin asserted Chisinau must
build the best possible relations with Moscow again reemphasizing his ideas that Moldova’s
alignment with Russia would help solve the problem of separatism in the country.884 The
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following year, Voronin published a new national security strategy reaffirming Moldova’s
neutrality, which was backed by Voronin’s commitment that Moldova would never join NATO.
On the Trans-Dniester issue, Voronin signed a new joint declaration with Russia in March 2008.
This declaration acknowledged the stabilizing role played by Russian peacekeepers while calling
on members of the 5+2 group to resume work on finding a solution.885
With the United States, Moldovan military personnel continued to support U.S. operations in
Iraq through 2008. Voronin was also successful in eliciting additional political support from
Washington on the Trans-Dniester issue. Voronin’s continued diplomatic efforts produced
several notable results. In May 2007, the U.S. House of Representatives introduced a resolution
calling for the replacement of the Russian military forces in the Trans-Dniester with an OSCEled multinational force. Several months later, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution calling on
Moscow to ‘move speedily’ in removing its military personnel and equipment from Moldova.886
In sum, moderate to high levels of government fragmentation and issue polarization were
important shape agents on President Voronin’s ideas about a positive bandwagoning strategy
with Russia and later great power bridging. When Voronin would step too far to the right or left,
as was the case with the Kozak Memorandum, political opposition groups would band together
with public support to constrain the Moldovan president’s actions. By emphasizing the country’s
neutrality, Voronin sought to formalize his great power bridging strategy by eschewing
membership in NATO or the CSTO. Because of this he achieved the strategic maneuver room to
align with the U.S. and Russia in different areas and at varying intensities over his presidency.
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Nicolae Timofti. From 2012 through 2015, an analysis of Nicolae Timofti’s foreign policy
orientation reveals a higher degree of complexity. For the period under examination, Timofti
took on a rather accommodative approach with the United States. In this case, Timofti was able
to translate some of his ideas about aligning with the United States (and Europe) into action.
With the Russians, Timofti attempted to advance a non-confrontation approach backed by verbal
reassurances on how his efforts to align with the West did not represent a direct threat to
Moscow.
As was the case with Lucinschi and Voronin, domestic politics stemming from the country’s
constitution remained a key shape agent for Timofti’s alignment trajectories with the great
powers once he arrived in office. First, the continuation of Moldova’s parliamentary form of
government helped ensure moderate levels of government fragmentation would remain where
some of the foreign policy decision-making authority resided with leading figures in the
legislature, including Prime Minister Vlad Filat. Second, multi-party ruling coalitions also
amplified the levels of government fragmentation in Moldova during Timofti’s time in office.
For example, while Filat was the leader of the Democratic Liberal Party and prime minister, his
actions, and those of the president were either constrained or enabled by the ideas put forward by
influential political elites in the Democratic Party of Moldova and the Liberal Party.887
Issue polarization was less of a challenge under Timofti because the AEI, and successive
ruling coalitions, were almost consistently in synch about the merits of a political and economic
alignment with the West. Given Moldova’s location, it is not surprising the first order of business
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for Timofti was to foster a closer economic alignment with the EU, which was realized in June
2014 when Chisinau signed an Association Agreement in Brussels. As an example of the low
levels of government fragmentation and issue polarization on this topic, the Moldovan
parliament ratified the EU agreement in a record five days after the document was signed.888
Taken together, domestic politics served as an enabler of Timofti’s ability to enact policies to
align Moldova more decisively with the United States. Several examples support this conclusion.
First, the number of diplomatic visits to and from the United States serve as one indicator of
Timofti’s tendency to foster a stronger political and economic alignment with Washington from
2012 to 2015. During this time, Moldovan officials made 16 high-level visits to the United States
as compared to only eight under President Voronin’s two terms in office. Separately, U.S.
officials visited Moldova at a higher rate registering 19 visits for the years Timofti was in office
as compared to 18 under Voronin.889 As noted in chapter four, although diplomatic visits may
count as one indicator of a state’s alignment with a regional great power, what matters more is
the extent to which one can discern substantive progress in this endeavor.
Second, the high number of diplomatic exchanges resulted in the formation of several key
bilateral arrangements. With respect to the U.S., Moldova’s alignment with Washington was
bolstered in June 2012 with the establishment of the Congressional Moldova Caucus. This
bilateral organization served as a platform for Chisinau’s Euro-Atlantic integration. Separately,
in December of this year, the U.S. Congress then voted to establish Normal Trade Relations
status for Moldova.890 Timofti’s tendency to align with the U.S. continued in 2014 with the
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creation of the U.S.-Moldova Strategic Dialogue and the U.S.-Moldova Energy Working Group.
The U.S.-Moldova Strategic Dialogue has a mandate to promote democracy and good
governance in Moldova, energy independence, security cooperation and economic development.
Separately, Moldova also became party to the U.S.-Moldova Energy Working Group, which has
a primary goal of increasing the country’s access to EU energy supplies via Romania.
In military affairs, Timofti was able to successfully seek out new ways to align Chisinau with
the United States via Euro-Atlantic security structures such as NATO and other initiatives.
Several points support this assertion. First, besides Moldova’s participation in NATO’s PFP, in
2013 Timofti authorized, and parliament approved, the deployment of 40 soldiers to support the
NATO peacekeeping mission in Kosovo beginning in 2014.891 In 2014, Moldova inched closer
to NATO and the United States. Beginning with NATO, during the Wales Summit in September
in Brussels, Moldova became a member of the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building
Initiative. As a participant in this program, Timofti’s government NATO provided technical and
material assistance to Chisinau to enhance the state’s defense and security institutions and
improve the military capabilities of the country’s armed forces.892
Finally, as pointed out in Chapter 4, Moldova continued to participate in more military
exercises with the United States than Russia. Additionally, in 2014 the United States donated
military equipment to Moldova. According to Timofti, “this event is perfectly fitted into the
practice of good cooperation between Moldova and the United States in terms of international
security and peace, stability and democratic development of our state. I am firmly convinced that
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the friendship and cooperation relations between Moldova and the United States will continue to
develop dynamically for the benefit of both countries and nations.”893
With Russia, unlike other presidents, who assumed a more confrontational approach with
Russia (e.g. Georgia’s Mikheil Saakashvili or Ukraine’s Viktor Yushchenko), Timofti deviated
from this pattern somewhat opting to frame his alignment actions with the West in a nonconfrontational manner. For example, President Timofti attempted to convey how Moldova’s
association agreement with the EU and the country’s alignment with the United States did not
represent a threat to other states, particularly Russia. By taking such an approach, Timofti hoped
it would help to temper Moscow’s security concerns leading to renewed efforts to solve the
Trans-Dniester issue, which never occurred.
In sum, this section found that when Moldovan presidents exhibited a pragmatic foreign
policy orientation as was the case with Petru Lucinschi and Vladimir Voronin (after 2003) they
followed a great power bridging strategy. Prior to 2004, Vladimir Voronin retained a very
accommodative orientation with Russia, which was associated with a positive bandwagoning
strategy with Moscow. Finally, President Timofti’s accommodative orientation with the United
States and Europe was associated with a positive bandwagoning strategy with Washington.
Ukraine: Findings and Discussion
Like their counterparts in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova, Ukrainian presidents believed
cooperation not confrontation with external actors was the best strategy to achieve their foreign
policy goals. Although their ideas about strategy represent an important starting point for
understanding their alignment preferences, equally important was each president’s foreign policy
orientation and their ability to translate those ideas into action within a competitive domestic
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political environment. Here, President Leonid Kuchma exhibited a pragmatic foreign policy
orientation, which was associated with a strategy of great power bridging. Presidents
Yushchenko and Poroshenko retained an accommodative foreign policy orientation with the
United States, which corresponded to a positive bandwagoning alignment with Washington.
Simultaneously, both presidents also exhibited a more confrontational orientation with Russia.
Finally, Viktor Yanukovych exhibited an accommodative foreign policy orientation and a
positive bandwagoning alignment strategy with Moscow. The role of domestic politics was
mixed as government fragmentation and issue polarization in some instances constrained and/or
enabled each presidents’ alignment strategies.
The Instrumental Beliefs of Ukrainian Presidents
An analysis of each president’s instrumental beliefs indicates Viktor Yanukovych exhibited a
‘very’ cooperative approach (.82) with external actors while Presidents Kuchma and Yushchenko
believed cooperation with external states was ‘definitely’ the best approach to achieve their goals
registering an intensity of .61 and .52 respectively. Petro Poroshenko had the lowest I-1 score
(.47) regarding cooperation with external actors as ‘somewhat’ beneficial.894 This positive trend
in their beliefs about cooperation continued in the I-2 index (‘intensity of tactics’), but with some
notable differences. Both Kuchma (.27) and Yanukovych (.39) believed cooperative tactics were
‘definitely’ of higher utility while Yushchenko (.23) and Poroshenko (.20) believed cooperative
tactics were ‘somewhat’ useful.
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Table 28: ANOVA Results – Moldovan Presidents Instrumental Beliefs

A reading of the I-5 index (utility of means) indicates all four presidents found the highest value
with making ‘appeals’ to external states with their tendency to focus on ‘rewards’ coming in
second. Of note, President Yanukovych also believed ‘promise’ carried some importance with his
strategy. Although cooperative tactics were given the primary focus, interestingly Presidents
Yushchenko and Poroshenko found some value in conflictual tactics by invoking their authority
to “oppose” the actions of other states (.14 and .13 respectively). Additionally, Poroshenko also
viewed ‘punishment’ as a potential tactic scoring a .11 in this category.
With respect to the timing of their actions, Presidents Kuchma (.40), Yushchenko (.48), and
Poroshenko’s (.54) I-4a scores indicate a tendency for diversity in their tactics. An outlier in this
category is Yanukovych, who had a .19 score, but this mirrored his predecessors and successor.
In the 1-4b category, all four presidents also exhibited a propensity to shift between their words
and actions (I-4b: Kuchma=.44; Yushchenko=.41; Yanukovych=.45; Poroshenko=.54). Finally,
all four of the Ukrainian presidents were inclined to be less acceptant of risk.895
Validating Convergence and Divergence
An ANOVA test invalidates the null hypothesis that there are no statistically significant

The measurement for a political leader’s master instrumental beliefs (I-1) is as follows: -1 = very conflictual; -.50
= definitely conflictual; -.25 = somewhat conflictual; 0.0 = mixed; +.25 = somewhat cooperative; +.50 = definitely
cooperative; +.75 = very cooperative.
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differences in the instrumental beliefs of the four presidents. The alternative hypothesis that a
statistically significant difference exists is validated at the .01 level. A Tukey’s HSD test
indicates Presidents Yushchenko and Poroshenko were the most similar in their I-1 beliefs.
Table 29: ANOVA Results – Ukrainian Presidents Instrumental Beliefs
Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

F

7.7494**

Between
Groups

.024337

3

0.081123

Within
Groups

.18843

18

0.010468

I-1

**prob <.01
Table 30: Ukraine - Mean Comparisons of Tukey’s HSD Test Results (I-1)
Pair

Difference

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

Adjusted P-Value

PoroshenkoKuchma

-0.105

-0.29535599

0.08535599

0.4253421

YanukovychKuchma

0.210

0.03892383

0.38107617

0.0132682

YushchenkoKuchma

-0.083

-0.24138576

0.07538576

0.4685766

YanukovychPoroshenko

0.315

0.09414161

0.53585839

0.0039745

YushchenkoPoroshenko

0.022

-0.18918101

0.23318101

0.9908094

YushchenkoYanukovych

-0.293

-0.48698214

-0.09901786

0.0023753

95% Family-wise Confidence Level
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Ukrainian President Alignment
From 1995 through 2015, Ukrainian presidents exhibited the full gamut of foreign policy
orientations vis-à-vis the United States and Russian Federation. A qualitative analysis of the
material actions of all four presidents validate the findings from the Tukey’s HSD test above that
Presidents Yushchenko and Poroshenko’s ideas about strategy and a strategic alignment with
United States are the most similar. In both cases, Yushchenko and Poroshenko were able to
translate their ideas and verbal pronouncements into action as part of a positive bandwagoning
strategy with the United States. President Kuchma, on the other hand, retained a pragmatic
foreign policy orientation, which subsequently served as a basis from which he would align with
the United States and Russia via a strategy of great power bridging. Finally, in marked contrast
to these three presidents, Viktor Yanukovych gravitated toward an accommodative orientation
with Moscow leading to his positive bandwagoning alignment with Russia. Although each
president retained a particular foreign policy orientation, varying levels of government
fragmentation and/or issue polarization shaped the state’s alignment trajectories.
Leonid Kuchma. From 1995 to 2004, President Kuchma retained a pragmatic foreign policy
orientation believing an alignment with Russia and the United States was critically important to
the country’s transition from Soviet rule and for his ability to remain in power. Speaking in 1995,
Kuchma openly stated, “I am a pragmatist”896 noting how Ukraine must advance a strategic
partnership with Russia, the United States, and Western Europe. Low levels of government
fragmentation did not constrain Kuchma’s pragmatism and his ability to translate his words into
action.
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The source of Kuchma’s political prowess was based on the 1996 constitution, which
established a strong presidential system that centralized a majority of the power in the office of
the president. According to one area expert, “Ukraine's 1996 constitutional arrangements
contributed to giving the president so much power that he had little incentive to collaborate with
parliament. Moreover, the legislative power given to the president reduced the likelihood that
parliament would form a stable governing coalition.”897 As was seen in Georgia under President
Saakashvili, the presidency under Kuchma could be categorized as one of hyper-presidentialism.
With power centralized in the executive branch, issue polarization in Ukraine was also
generally low for Kuchma despite the highly eclectic nature of the Rada. During the 1994, 1998,
and 2002 parliamentary elections, a myriad of candidates and political parties vied for seats in
the 450-member Rada in order to advance their respective domestic and/or international agendas.
For example, after the first two rounds of the 1994 parliamentary elections, Ukrainians elected
168 deputies from 14 different parties and 170 independents to fill the 450-seat legislature. By
1995, the largest block of deputies (164 MPs) were from the ‘left’ and the Communist, Socialist,
and Peasant parties. Deputies from the right secured 120 seats, while Centrist parties acquired
118 positions.898 With such a diversity in parliament, deputies and parties were more at odds
with one another, rather than the president.
President Kuchma was also able to check any opposition to his ideas over aligning with the
United States and/or Russia by employing a variety of different tactics, including political
coercion, blackmail, and the appointment of like-minded political officials at all levels of
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government. Contributing to lower levels of government fragmentation was Kuchma’s ability to
control key government agencies, including the interior ministry and those offices responsible
for collecting intelligence and taxes. For example, during the 2002 parliamentary elections,
although former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko’s ‘Our Ukraine’ party won the largest
number of seats (110 MPs), it was not enough to form a majority since the Communist Party won
66 seats and Kuchma’s “For a United Ukraine’ bloc, acquired 101 seats. Independents and a
handful of minor parties filled-in the remaining positions.899 Despite this setback, Kuchma used
material incentives and political pressure to form a coalition that allowed him to advance his
foreign policy agenda.900 Taken together, Kuchma’s political cunning, coupled with his ability to
foment factionalism and induce inter-personal rivalries within various opposition parties,
allowed the Ukrainian president to more easily implement his great power bridging alignment
preferences.
Kuchma’s tendency to align with Russia as part of his great power bridging strategy was
reflected in a series of key events during his time in office. Beginning with Russia, the first, and
perhaps one of the most important events occurred in 1997 when President Kuchma and his
Russian counterpart, Boris Yeltsin, signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Taking
nearly two years to sign, this treaty became the backbone of Ukraine’s alignment with Russia
laying a foundation for Kiev’s strategic partnership with Russia (and vice versa) in the realm of
politics, economic development, energy supplies, military-technical cooperation, and culture.
According to Kuchma, this treaty “...will enable us to advance our relations to a qualitatively
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new level. The results... have enabled the leaders of Ukraine and the Russian Federation to
express confidence in the fact that continued friendly relations between the two states based on
equal rights will become further intensified...901
The 1997 Friendship Treaty with Russia was immediately followed in 1998 with a 10-year
comprehensive economic cooperation agreement. Signed in February, “the high parties signing
the agreement, ...recognize the necessity to gradually shape and develop a joint economic space
[and ...create favorable conditions for the harmonization of basic directions of social and
economic change; [and] structural reconstruction; alignment of the normative and legislative
foundations of economic co-operation with abroad, customs tariff policy, tax policy and
antimonopoly legislation.”902 However, the collapse of Russia’s economy a few months later
stymied this bilateral effort with economic progress first taking effect in 2000 when Ukraine’s
exports and imports to and from Russia went from $2.4 billion and $5.6 billion to 3.5 billion and
5.8 billion respectively.903
Kuchma’s alignment with Russia was also made evident in his decision to replace his foreign
minister, Boris Tarasyuk, who advocated for Ukraine’s exclusive alignment with the West. In his
place, Kuchma installed Anatolii Zlenko, who viewed Russia as the state’s most important
strategic partner. Although Zlenko was a strident supporter of Kuchma’s beliefs about aligning
Ukraine with Russia, he also believed the state’s foreign policies must be multi-vector in nature
where an alignment with other regional great powers such as the United States was in the state’s
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best interests. According to Zlenko, developing a strategic partnership with Russia and the
United States would be the “key guarantee of our [Ukraine’s] security.”904
With the United States, once in office Kuchma’s tendency to align with this regional great
power as part of his great power bridging strategy was also almost immediately seen. In 1996,
Kuchma entered Ukraine into a strategic partnership with the United States through the
establishment of the Kuchma-Gore Commission. This bilateral arrangement served as a
foundational mechanism by which Kiev’s alignment with Washington would develop across
various lines of operation including trade, investment, and national security. The high relevance
of the Kuchma-Gore commission to the Ukrainian president was made clear when he stated how,
“the strategic axis “Washington-Kiev” has become a significant factor of global peace and
stability.”905 Kuchma’s emphasis on the centrality of this bilateral arrangement was two-fold.
First, Kuchma believed an alignment with the U.S. via this commission could help him acquire
external funding to help the country’s struggling economy. Second, an improving economy
would then translate into political capital, which would help him to be re-elected in 1999.
Kuchma’s support for NATO is another facet of his tendency to align with the United States.
For example, Ukraine was the first CIS state to join the alliance’s PFP program in 1994.
Beginning in 1996, Kuchma fully supported U.S.-led military activities in the Balkans
authorizing the deployment of Ukrainian military forces for NATO operations in Bosnia and
Kosovo. In 1997, Kiev then signed NATO’s Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, which
subsequently facilitated the opening of a NATO Liaison Office in Kiev in 1999.906 In 2002,
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Course.” Kiyevskiye Vedomosti, 29 January 2001.
905
Kuchma, Leonid. 1998. “President Kuchma and Vice President Gore Open 2nd Plenary Session of Ukraine-US
Binational Commission.” Embassy of Ukraine to the United States of America, 23 July 1998. http://www.brama.
com/ukraine-embassy/pre0723.html. Accessed 20 December 2016.
906
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2002. “NATO and Ukraine: Distinctive Partners.” NATO Update, 09 July
2002. https://www.nato.int/ docu/update/2002/07-july/e0709a1.htm. Accessed 19 December 2016.
904

420

Kiev’s alignment with the United States continued along a positive trajectory when Kuchma
announced his intention for Ukraine to join NATO leading to the establishment of the NATOUkraine Action Plan. By 2004, Kiev had signed the Ukraine-NATO Memorandums on Host
Nation Support and Strategic Airlift. The memorandum on Host Nation Support established
protocols for the conduct of joint military exercises in Ukraine, while the Strategic Airlift memo
detailed how NATO would be able to use the Ukrainian Air Force’s transport planes for
operations in Afghanistan.907 In 2003, Kuchma then supported U.S.-led military operations in
Iraq by approving the deployment of approximately 2,000 soldiers for various missions in the
theater of operations.908
Viktor Yushchenko. From 2005-2009, President Yushchenko maintained an accommodative
foreign policy orientation with the United States seeking develop a strong political, economic,
and military alignment with Washington. Concurrently, the Ukrainian president took on a more
confrontational orientation with Russia owing to Moscow’s continued meddling in the country’s
internal affairs. Domestic politics, in terms of government fragmentation and issue polarization
were important shape agents, but not decisive factors constraining Yushchenko’s ability to
translate his ideas about a strategic alignment with the United States and its European allies into
action.
For his first year in office, government fragmentation remained generally low for Yushchenko
since his presidential powers were based on the 1996 constitution. However, in the political wake
of the ‘Orange Revolution’ that brought Yushchenko to power, the 2004 constitutional
amendments, which went into effect in 2006 changed Ukraine’s form of government to a

Socor, Vladmir. 2004. “NATO Summit Takes Stock of Ukraine’s Performance.” Eurasia Daily Monitor 1 (45).
https://jamestown.org/program/nato-summit-takes-stock-of-ukraines-performance/. Accessed 19 December 2016.
908
Carney 2012, 116.
907

421

parliamentary-presidential republic. Under this system, President Yushchenko was still the
commander-in-chief and the lead actor charged with developing the state’s foreign policies;
however, some power was transferred to the Rada and the prime minister. Specifically, the prime
minister was given the authority to make government appointments, less the foreign and defense
ministers, which still needed Rada approval.909
Issue polarization over Yushchenko’s ideas on an alignment with the United States was
moderate during his first two years in office. Beginning in 2006, there was a notable uptick in
domestic political opposition to the Ukrainian president and his ‘Our Ukraine’ party on a myriad
of domestic and foreign policy issues. As a result, Yushchenko’s party was forced to enter into a
coalition with his former political rival, Viktor Yanukovych. Following the 2006 parliamentary
elections, Yanukovych’s ‘Party of Regions’ won 30 percent of the vote giving the opposition 186
seats in the legislature. Yulia Tymoshenko’s bloc came in second with 129 seats and
Yushchenko’s ‘Our Ukraine’ a distant third with 81 seats.910 This was significant because it
forced Yushchenko to band together with Yanukovych, who would become prime minister and
who would also seek to constrain the president’s ideas about a positive bandwagoning alignment
with the United States.
Despite higher levels of government fragmentation and issue polarization, Yushchenko’s
political acumen and ability to make full use of his presidential powers allowed him to bring to
fruition some of his ideas about a strategic alignment with the United States. A hallmark example
of Yushchenko’s alignment with the United States occurred in 2005 when the Ukrainian
president visited Washington D.C. where he was granted a rare privilege to address a joint
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session of Congress. Prior to this time, the only other former Soviet state leader to address
Congress was Boris Yeltsin in 1992.911 During this singular event, President Yushchenko also
signed a joint statement with President Bush on establishing a new strategic partnership with the
United States. Formalized in 2008 as the U.S.-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership, this
agreement sought to expand security cooperation between both countries with the long-term goal
of Ukraine’s accession into NATO.912
President Yushchenko also pursued a strong alignment with the United States in the economic
arena by consistently touting his commitment to open market principles and integrating
Ukraine’s economy into the global economy. His efforts paid off when beginning in 2006, the
U.S. government began providing higher levels of political and economic support. From 2005
through 2007, U.S. assistance to Ukraine for its accession to the WTO included the allocation of
technical advisors, $50 million for economic reform programs, and the repeal of 1974 JacksonVanik amendment. Enhancing these activities, President Yushchenko opened six public
information centers across Ukraine to help inform the public on his aspirations to join the WTO
as well as other Euro-Atlantic organizations such as the EU and NATO.913 Separately, in April
2008 Ukraine signed the Trade and Investment Cooperation Agreement with the United States.
This agreement created a bilateral Trade and Investment Council, which authorized economic
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officials to discuss ways of bolstering economic ties between both countries.914 Taken together,
these efforts significantly helped Yushchenko to realize his goal of WTO membership in 2008.
Although opposed by Yanukovych and his Party of Regions, Yushchenko was able to
strengthen Ukraine’s alignment with the United States via NATO. The most significant step
forward for Yushchenko occurred in April 2005 when during the NATO-Ukraine Commission
meeting in Vilnius, alliance leaders invited Kiev to begin an Intensified Dialogue on
Membership. The Intensive Dialogue program is a pivotal precursor step prior to the issuance of
a MAP. In February 2006, during a meeting in Brussels, the Ukrainian president told NATO
officials his country was ready for a MAP, proceeding to establish an interagency commission,
which would oversee the country’s accession into the alliance.915 President Yushchenko’s
continued commitment to align Ukraine with the United States and produced positive results
when President Bush signed into law the 2007 NATO Freedom Consolidation Act, which
provided Ukraine with $30 million of U.S. military assistance from 2008-2012.916
Viktor Yanukovych. From 2010 through the end of his presidency, Viktor Yanukovych
exhibited an accommodative foreign policy orientation with the Russian Federation, which
framed his positive bandwagoning alignment with Moscow. Even prior to his election,
Yanukovych signaled his intentions to domestic and international audiences about how one of
his first actions, if elected president, would be to re-establish Ukraine’s strategic partnership with
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Russia.917 With the United States however, the Ukrainian president’s orientation was best
understood as cordial. For Yanukovych, good relations with America was important; however,
he firmly believed Washington’s meddling in Ukraine’s internal affairs was the primary catalyst
for the 2004 Orange Revolution. As a result, Yanukovych sought to maintain routine interstate
activities with the United States in order to stave off any social and political instability that could
threaten his hold on power.918
Yanukovych’s ability to enact his ideas about a strong alignment with Russia were partially
enabled by low levels of government fragmentation, which was brought into being by his own
hand. After being elected president, Yanukovych appointed a commission to review the legality
of the 2004 constitutional amendments that relegated some of the president’s power to
parliament. The country’s constitutional court subsequently found the 2004 amendments illegal
and proceeded to return those powers to Yanukovych, thus moving the country back to a
presidential system of governance.919 Specifically, the court’s ruling gave Yanukovych strong
executive powers over the cabinet and the legislature empowering him to make government
appointments and take foreign policy actions independent of other branches of the government.
President Yanukovych’s presidency was also marked by increasing levels of issue
polarization over his foreign policy actions to solidify Ukraine’s alignment with Russia. During
the period 2010-2012, issue polarization was moderate as leading political figures such as Yulia
Tymoshenko and various opposition parties (e.g. Our Ukraine, United Opposition, etc.) resisted
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Yanukovych’s Russian orientation. For example, political leaders from the ‘Our Ukraine’ party
strongly opposed Yanukovych’s renunciation of Ukraine’s goal to join NATO and the
introduction of a bill formalizing this proposal. According to one official from the ‘Our Ukraine’
party, “those who are campaigning against NATO are allies of terrorists, pirates and illegal
regimes that possess weapons of mass destruction and engage in nuclear blackmail against those
who NATO is acting.”920
Despite these political challenges to his alignment strategy, President Yanukovych was able
to check this opposition by aligning his Party of Regions with the Communist Party and the
Lytvyn Bloc. Through the use of divide-and-rule tactics, Yanukovych kept the opposition at odds
with one another, thereby curtailing the effectiveness of their actions to counter his foreign
policies. Additionally, President Yanukovych used political threats and bribery to either remove
oppositionists or change their minds about aligning the state with Russia. For example, following
his election Yanukovych’s administration initiated a series of criminal investigations resulting in
the incarceration of the president’s major political rivals. Political figures incarcerated for
abusing government funds and misusing their authority included former interior minister Yuriy
Lutsenko and former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko.921
Taken together, these actions allowed Yanukovych to more easily translate his ideas about an
alignment with Russia into action up until 2013. After his decision to take the Kremlin’s
economic aid package in lieu of an economic association with the EU, political oppositionists in
the Rada were able to unify and block Yanukovych’s alignment with Russia. The strength of
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their unity was bolstered with the backing of popular support from Ukrainians across the western
and central parts of the country. Clearly, domestic political opposition and issue polarization was
an important factor in bringing about Yanukovych’s removal from power; however, it was not
decisive. In the proceeding paragraphs, I detail the significant events associated with
Yanukovych’s positive bandwagoning with Russia up until his fall from power.
Yanukovych’s tendency to align with Russia over the United States and its allies in Western
Europe was most visible in his leadership actions on military, economic, and socio-political
issues. One of his first actions to align with Russia occurred in April 2010 when Yanukovych
signed an agreement to extend Moscow’s lease for the Russian Navy’s Black Sea Fleet in
Sevastopol until 2042. In exchange for Yanukovych’s commitment to foster a stronger alignment
with Russia, President Medvedev announced Moscow would lower the price of Russian natural
gas to Ukraine by 30 percent bringing the cost down to approximately $230 per 1,000 cubic
meters.922 This act alone indicated that when given a choice between aligning with Russia or any
other regional great power or collective (e.g. the EU), Yanukovych preferred to place Ukraine in
Russia’s orbit.
In another sign of Ukraine’s military alignment with Moscow, Yanukovych authorized the
country’s armed forces to partake in the Russian-led ‘Union Shield’ exercises albeit at a lowlevel of participation.923 Interestingly however, in concert with these actions, Yanukovych still
allowed U.S. military forces to exercise in Ukraine; however, this was done under a new law that
prevented Kiev from joining NATO. Introduced by President Yanukovych as a bill in April
2010, by July parliament had made it a law that Ukraine would be henceforth defined as a
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militarily non-aligned country.924 In essence, this law helped Yanukovych squelch issue
polarization brought on by political elites, who advocated for Ukraine’s accession into the U.S.led NATO alliance.
A series of socio-political events also demonstrated how President Yanukovych was able to
translate his verbal pronouncements about an alignment with Russia into action. In this area,
Yanukovych was quick to articulate conciliatory words about Russia and the country’s
importance for all Ukrainians. For example, in April 2010 during a speech in front of the
OSCE’s parliamentary assembly, Yanukovych brought the government’s position about Stalin’s
artificial famine on Soviet Ukraine in line with Moscow’s view that such actions should not be
categorized as genocide. According to Yanukovych, “recognizing the Holodomor as an act of
genocide, we think, will be incorrect, and unjust. It was a tragedy, a common tragedy of the
states that made up the united Soviet Union.”925 Yanukovych’s remarks stand in marked contrast
to former President Yushchenko’s position on this topic, which was designed to signal
international audiences of his desire to align the state with Russia.
In the field of economics, Viktor Yanukovych was able to foster an alignment with Russia by
quickly concluding a series of new security and economic agreements with Moscow. For
example, in May 2010 during a visit by Russian President Dimitry Medvedev to Ukraine,
Yanukovych signed agreements on intelligence sharing, border demarcation, as well as interbank and science and technical cooperation.926 Beyond these agreements, Yanukovych’s meeting
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with Medvedev also helped frame his alignment with Russia, given this was the seventh time
both presidents had met in approximately three months.927
Perhaps the most prevalent indicator of Yanukovych’s positive bandwagoning with the
Russian Federation occurred in late 2013 when the Ukrainian president opted to take a Russian
economic assistance package in lieu of continuing the state’s efforts to integrate into the EU.
Specifically, Yanukovych accepted the Kremlin’s offer of a $15 billion bailout for Ukraine’s
debt and a significant cut in the price Kiev would pay for Russian natural gas from $400 to $268
per 1,000 cubic meters.928 For Yanukovych, his decision to align with Russia by accepting
Moscow’s financial package was driven by his ideas that pursuing an accommodative foreign
policy relationship with Russia would return him and the state maximum benefits. Additionally,
eschewing the EU partnership agreement would mean Yanukovych was free to continue his
semi-authoritarian methods of governance as a way to stay in power. Finally, by aligning with
Kremlin elites, who tended to use similar semi-authoritarian methods of governance,
Yanukovych could quickly acquire the necessary economic and political backing to bolster
Ukraine’s struggling economy and his ability to stay in power.
Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to accept Moscow’s economic package became his Waterloo.
Following the announcement of his decision to not sign the EU agreement in November 2013,
issue polarization in the ruling government skyrocketed as Ukrainians took to the streets in a
series of large-scale and frequently violent demonstrations against Yanukovych’s actions.
Yanukovych’s attempts to control the situation using force did little to temper the volatile
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situation as protests escalated through the end of January. By February 2014 parliament finally
voted 380-0 to remove Yanukovych from office.929 The legislature then appointed interim
ministers and political leaders in the run-up to presidential and parliamentary elections, which
would witness a volte-face of the state’s alignment trajectory.
Petro Poroshenko. From 2014 to 2015 Petro Poroshenko exhibited an accommodative
foreign policy orientation with the United States. This same accommodative orientation also
conveyed to major European powers such as France, Great Britain, and the United Kingdom.
With the Russian Federation, Poroshenko clearly exhibited a confrontational orientation owing to
Moscow’s annexation of Crimea and the Kremlin’s ongoing support for separatist in Donetsk
and Luhansk.930 His accommodative orientation with Washington and a confrontational one
toward Moscow would become a basis for his positive bandwagoning alignment with the United
States.
For the two years under examination, domestic politics was an important factor, but not
necessarily the most critical element in Poroshenko’s alignment with the United States. Two
points support this assertion. First, in the days prior to Yanukovych’s removal from office,
parliament voted to restore the 2004 constitution as part of an agreement to reestablish political
and social order in the government and throughout country. Although rejected by Yanukovych
during his final days in office, President Poroshenko’s alignment actions were framed by the
2004 constitution.931 Under Article 106, the president retained a significant amount of power. In
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his duties as a foreign policy executive, Poroshenko was the commander-in-chief, who had the
authority to appoint the ministers of defense and foreign affairs. The president was also the
state’s lead agent in international relations responsible for negotiations, concluding treaties, and
administering the foreign political activity of Ukraine. The Rada was the lead organization
responsible for developing the principles of foreign policy as stipulated in Article 85.932
President Poroshenko’s ability to transform his words into action were enabled by lower
levels of issue polarization on the country’s alignment with the United States and Western
Europe. A contributing factor to these low levels of issue polarization over the state’s alignment
was derived, in part, from the outcome of the October 2014 parliamentary election. Here, many
of the political parties acquiring seats in the Rada were already predisposed towards an
alignment with the United States and Western Europe. This allowed President Poroshenko to
more easily establish a coalition government consisting of the Poroshenko Block (133 seats), the
People's Front (81 seats), the Fatherland Party (19 seats), the Self Reliance Party (33 seats), and
the Radical Party (22 seats). The extent to which Poroshenko’s ideas were in synch with the
parliamentary coalition were reflected in Arseniy Yatsenyuk’s (leader of the People’s Front)
comments prior to his appointment as prime minister. Speaking to U.S. Vice-President Joe
Biden, Yatsenyuk stated,
Mr. Vice President, between our two countries there is an agreement about strategic
partnership. And this agreement is not only on the paper. This agreement is in action. The goal of
this agreement is the development of free democratic and stable Ukrainian society and
government. The goal of this agreement and objective of it is our joint work and cooperation in
providing stability and peace on the continent. The goal of this agreement is to support the
strategic relations between the United States and Ukraine.933
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After becoming prime minister, Yatsenyuk’s ideas about a Western alignment were made
visible in his appointment of a former U.S. State Department officer as Ukraine’s finance
minister and former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili as the Governor of Odessa. These
moves were meant to signal to international and domestic audiences of the new government’s
intent of aligning Ukraine with the United States and Western Europe. Finally, the communist
party failed to acquire any seats in parliament, while representatives from Party of Regions
formed an ‘Opposition Bloc’ receiving only 29 seats.
Poroshenko’s strategic alignment with the United States was made visible in his level of
material cooperation with Washington across three lines of operation: political, military, and
economic. The first indicator affirming Poroshenko’s foreign policy orientation with the United
States was seen in the political sphere and his proclivity to view the country’s security based on
the actions of Washington. According to Poroshenko, “if we have the support of the United
States and other countries to protect Ukraine in case of a Russian invasion, then Russia will not
dare to cross this line.”934 To achieve this long-term goal, President Poroshenko introduced a
legislative amendment in 2014 to overturn the law designating Ukraine a neutral country.
Parliament overwhelmingly passed Poroshenko’s proposal with 303 ‘yes’ votes thereby paving
the way for the country’s future accession into Euro-Atlantic economic and security structures.935
Relatedly, Poroshenko also fostered a political alignment with the United States with the number
of diplomatic visits to America. For the two years under examination, Poroshenko and leading
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political figures from Ukraine made 233 visits to the United States as compared to 122 to the
Russian Federation.936
President Poroshenko also introduced several new military initiatives as part of his positive
bandwagoning alignment with the United States. First, in March 2014 Poroshenko made a direct
request for U.S. military assistance, which resulted in a decision by Washington to allocate over
$50 million in non-lethal aid to Ukraine.937 Second, in June 2014 Poroshenko welcomed a team
of U.S. military and defense advisors to Ukraine for an in-depth assessment of the status of the
country’s armed forces and the material requirements of each branch of service.938 The
expansion of Ukraine’s military exercise regimen with the United States outside NATO channels
was a second key indicator of Poroshenko’s alignment with Washington. Beginning in 2015,
Poroshenko approved “Operation Fearless Guardian,” a bilateral peacekeeping command post
exercise with U.S. military forces in Lviv. According to Poroshenko,
It is completely natural that strategic partnership between Ukraine and United States acquires new
meanings and quantitative parameters. It is shown at various levels — from Presidents to soldiers.
It is the first Ukrainian-American event of such level, which indicates the transition of bilateral
military cooperation to a new practical dimension.939

Beyond political and military affairs, Poroshenko sought out an economic alignment with the
United States; however, for this line of operation, such an effort took a backseat to his efforts to
establish strong economic relations with the EU. The central importance of Poroshenko’s
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economic alignment with the EU was almost immediately demonstrated when he signed an EU
Association Agreement in June 2014. This agreement was perhaps the single most important
economic event for Ukraine since its independence. According to one area expert,
The association agreement can be a game-changer for Ukraine. It includes a deep and
comprehensive free trade arrangement (DCFTA) that will open much of the European market to
Ukrainian exports. Implementation of the agreement will not only bring Ukraine’s trade and
customs rules into conformity with EU standards, it will help the country draw closer to EU
democratic norms and “Europeanize” other Ukrainian regulatory regimes.940

So, what is the significance here? In marked contrast to Viktor Yanukovych, Poroshenko firmly
believed the EU Agreement represented a key political and economic enabler to move the
country out of Russia’s geopolitical orbit and into the West where leading countries such as
Germany, Great Britain, and the United States could serve as a bastion of support.
Although the preceding examples help demonstrate Poroshenko’s inclination to positively
bandwagon with the United States, one cannot discount Washington’s enabling actions during
this time. With Moscow’s brazen actions in Crimea and the Donbass, the Obama
administration’s attempted ‘reset’ with Russia was officially squelched. For Washington,
Russia’s military aggression in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 represented a threat to
regional stability in Europe that if left unchecked could encourage future hostile actions from
Moscow. To counter the Kremlin’s moves, economic sanctions and the building-up of Ukraine’s
military capabilities and economic capacity became an important interest for the United States.
To realize its goals in the region, from 2013 to 2015 the United States committed over $867
million in foreign assistance to Ukraine. This financial backing helped Poroshenko and his ruling
government promote democratic reforms, foster economic growth, and bolster civil society.941
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Although U.S. political leaders may have taken an increased interest in supporting Kiev,
ultimately it was Poroshenko, who decided the manner in which this support would be employed
in Ukraine.
In concert with Poroshenko’s accommodative foreign policy orientation with the United
States, the Ukrainian president assumed a more confrontational approach with Russia. For
example, in 2014 Poroshenko prohibited Ukrainian defense companies from cooperating with
Russia, despite the negative impact such a decision would have on the country’s economy.
According to one estimate, Poroshenko’s decision reduced Ukrainian-produced military exports
to Russia by as much as 70 percent equating to over $15 billion across all contracts.942 In light of
this and other similar events, Poroshenko continued to engage in routine state-level activities
with Moscow, which almost exclusively focused on finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict
in the Donbass. For example, in late 2014 and early 2015 President Poroshenko, with backing
from France and Germany, signed two ceasefires (Minsk I and Minsk II) leading to a cessation
of hostilities that would ultimately create a frozen conflict in the east.
The preceding analysis on the relationship between Ukrainian presidential foreign policy
orientations and the state’s alignment trajectory as conditioned by domestic politics yields
several conclusions. First, Ukrainian presidents believed a strategy grounded in cooperation with
external states was the optimal approach to achieve their respective foreign policy goals. Second,
all four presidents displayed the full range of foreign policy orientations. Here, Presidents
Yushchenko and Poroshenko exhibited an accommodative foreign policy orientation with the
United States, which was correlated with a positive bandwagoning alignment with Washington.
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President Yanukovych exhibited an accommodative foreign policy orientation with Russia,
which was associated with his positive bandwagoning alignment with Moscow. Meanwhile
Leonid Kuchma’s pragmatism was followed by his effort to implement a great power bridging
strategy. Finally, the relevance of domestic politics was mixed. Although each president operated
under different levels of government fragmentation and issue polarization, they were still able to
bring to fruition some of their ideas about great power bridging or positive bandwagoning with
the United States and/or Russia.
Conclusion
This chapter examined the relationship between a president’s instrumental beliefs and the
state’s alignment trajectories with the United States and Russia from 1995-2015. The output
from Profiler Plus reveals all 12 presidents believed a cooperative strategy was the best approach
to realize their foreign policy goals. While this finding orients us to each president’s ideas about
strategy, they do not necessarily tell how those beliefs may have applied to specific state actors.
Through a qualitative analysis, a majority of presidents under examination exhibited a pragmatic
foreign policy orientation and a great power bridging alignment. This was the case with Heydar
Aliyev, Ilham Aliyev, Eduard Shevardnadze, Giorgi Margvelashvili (2013), Petru Lucinschi,
Vladimir Voronin (after 2003), and Leonid Kuchma.
Presidents who had an accommodative orientation with the United States routinely followed a
positive bandwagoning alignment with this regional great power. Mikheil Saakashvili, Giorgi
Margvelashvili (after 2013), Nicolae Timofti, Viktor Yushchenko, and Petro Poroshenko fell into
this category. In concert with this accommodative orientation, these presidents also exhibited a
confrontational orientation towards Moscow, less President Timofti, who attempted to not poke
the ‘bear’ in the eye by explaining his country’s aspirations to join the EU did not represent a
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threat to Russia. Vladimir Voronin (before 2003) and Viktor Yanukovych had an
accommodative foreign policy orientation vis-à-vis Moscow, which was associated with a
positive bandwagoning alignment this regional great power.
The role of domestic politics and its conditioning of a president’s ability to translate his
alignment preferences into policy action was an important factor, but not necessarily a decisive
one. Of the seven presidents with a pragmatic orientation, all of them were able to see to fruition
some of their ideas about great power bridging under different combinations of government
fragmentation and issue polarization. Presidents who followed a positive bandwagoning
alignment with either the United States or Russia were also able to bring to affect material
actions in line with their alignment preferences despite differing levels of government
fragmentation and issue polarization.
With only a few exceptionsVladimir Voronin after the Kozak Memorandum and Viktor
Yanukovych after the 2013 Russian economic dealthis study concludes domestic politics was
an important factor, but not necessarily a decisive one with respect to the ability of a president to
realize his alignment preferences. Several key points support this conclusion. First, even though
a head of state may face moderate or high levels of government fragmentation and/or issue
polarization, one cannot discount a president’s strategic leadership skills and his/her ability to
build a supporting coalition across the state’s bureaucratic organizations. For example, Leonid
Kuchma, Petru Lucinschi, and Eduard Shevardnadze had the necessary political acumen and
consensus building skills to minimize the impacts from government fragmentation and issue
polarization over their alignment preferences. The appointment of key political figures in key
government positions also minimized the impact from domestic politics.
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Second, in some cases, domestic politics became an enabler of the president’s alignment
agenda. In Georgia and Ukraine, parliamentary elections brought to power like-minded political
figures, who supported Mikheil Saakashvili and Petro Poroshenko’s positive bandwagoning with
the United States. Third, in some instances presidents used coercive measures, bribery, or their
executive powers to overcome domestic political opposition on their alignment preferences. This
was especially true in Azerbaijan where one cannot discount the semi-authoritarian nature of the
ruling government and the ability of Heydar and Ilham Aliyev to use the state’s security services
to minimize political fragmentation and issue polarization.
There were two instances where issue polarization took on a higher level of importance. First
in Moldova after Moscow attempted to force President Voronin to sign the Kozak Memorandum,
MPs in parliament united against any political settlement that yielded too much power to
Tiraspol and undermined the government’s attempts to reestablish territorial sovereignty.
Second, in Ukraine issue polarization over Viktor Yanukovych’s positive bandwagoning with
Russia spiked after the Ukrainian president decided not to sign the EU Association Agreement
opting to take an economic assistance package from the Kremlin. Beyond domestic political
opposition, the ensuing civil backlash and the “Maidan” revolution contributed to Yanukovych’s
removal from power. To recap, domestic politics is certainly an important factor in the state’s
foreign policy processes; however, this consideration remains secondary to a president’s ideas
about the state’s alignment and his ability to generate favorable foreign policy outcomes in line
with those ideas.
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion

The Puzzle
The empirical puzzle driving this research endeavor centered on explaining why former
Soviet states have pursued different strategic alignments with the Russian Federation since the
end of the Cold War. In some instances, ruling governments in Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have formalized their alignment with Moscow by becoming an
alliance member in the Russian-led CSTO or the EEU. Meanwhile, other countries such as
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have formalized their alignment with the West becoming a
member of the U.S.-led NATO alliance or the EU. With the post-Soviet space becoming an arena
of strategic competition between Russia and the West, discerning the key factors affecting the
alignment trajectories of countries along Russia’s geographical periphery can add to our
cumulative knowledge on this political phenomenon and improve U.S. foreign policy.
A survey of the IR literature revealed that the dominant alignment theories, to date, have not
been able to consistently explain small state alignment with many scholars focusing their
analyses on the great powers or incorrectly categorizing alignment and alliance as one in the
same. On one hand, balance of power theories, which posit secondary states should align with
weaker powers fall short given how the Baltics have entered into an alliance with the most
powerful country in the world, the United States. In line with William Wohlforth and his
conclusions on post-Soviet alignment, this study also finds balance of power theory, “...is of little
utility in explaining much of the variation in local responses to Russia.”943 Separately, Stephen
Walt’s balance of threat theory also fails to hold water in the post-Soviet space. For example, in
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Georgia, political elites consistently regarded Russia as the most threatening regional great
power; however, rather than kowtowing to Moscow, ruling governments have sought out
alignments with the United States, despite being denied accession into NATO. At issue is Walt’s
overemphasis on material factors and his under specified concept of ‘aggressive intentions’ that
prevented a more robust explanation of small state alignment.
Looking beyond Walt’s balance of threat theory, this study took a leader-centric approach as a
new way to conceptualize small state alignment in the post-Soviet space. In marked contrast to
those who have attempted to categorize a political leader’s alignment tendencies as pro-West or
pro-Russian, this study conceptualizes the dependent variable (alignment) in two ways: positive
bandwagoning and great power bridging. Positive bandwagoning occurs when lead actors in the
state’s foreign policy executive prefer and are able to implement foreign policies that produce
higher levels of political/diplomatic, economic, and/or military cooperation with one regional
great power over another. Alternatively, great power bridging occurs when political leader
preferences and foreign policy actions are, on average, equal with two or more regional great
powers.
The independent variables for this study took their cue from Margaret Hermann and her
colleagues in a study, which finds “who leads matters.” With these words in mind, this study
posited the ideas and beliefs of political leaders, more so than the balance of power or threat, are
the key factors shaping a ruling government’s alignment with different regional great powers.
Using aspects of social identity theory and self-categorization theory, it was argued political elite
ideas about the state’s identity and external state-based threats, as well as his/her accompanying
foreign policy orientation, as conditioned by domestic politics, are the primary variables
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independently shaping Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine’s alignment trajectory from
1995-2015.
Major Empirical Findings
In Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, multiple methods were used to examine the relationship
between a president’s ideas about the state’s identity, threat perceptions, and foreign policy
orientation as conditioned by domestic politics. The concept of domestic politics was
operationalized in terms of government fragmentation and issue polarization. This research
endeavor revealed a series of overarching conclusions and specific findings.
This study identified two overarching conclusions. First, a president’s ideas about state
identity, his threat perceptions, and foreign policy orientation, as conditioned by domestic
politics, more so than the balance of power or threat, played an important role in shaping his
alignment preferences and foreign policy actions with the United States and Russia in the postCold War era. This is not to say systemic and other domestic-level factors were unimportant. On
the contrary, conditions in the systemic and domestic environment were relevant to the extent
that they shaped a political leader’s ideas and belief systems and ultimately their strategic
choices. Following Suny, this dissertation found that...
[Small] states act on the basis of their perceived interests, but conceptions of the kind of state
(e.g. empire, nation-state) its historical purposes, and its operative belief systems, as well as the
discursive universe in which it operates, are all fundamental to construction of those interest.944

Second, a majority of presidents in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine preferred
great power bridging. Presidents pursing this alignment included Heydar Aliyev, Ilham Aliyev,
Eduard Shevardnadze, Giorgi Margvelashvili (2013), Petru Lucinschi, Vladimir Voronin (after
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2003), and Leonid Kuchma. The second most preferred alignment was positive bandwagoning
with the United States. Mikheil Saakashvili, Giorgi Margvelashvili (2014-2015), Nicolae
Timofti, Viktor Yushchenko, and Petro Poroshenko fell into this category. The least preferred
alignment option was positive bandwagoning with Russia. Only Viktor Yanukovych and
Vladimir Voronin (2001-2003) followed this alignment course.
There was also little variation in each president’s alignment trajectory with the exception of
two presidents. First, Vladimir Voronin initially pursued a positive bandwagoning alignment
with Russia from 2001-2003, but then transitioned to great power bridging following the Kozak
Memorandum debacle. Second, Giorgi Margvelashvili initially followed a great power bridging
alignment as a way to reestablish the country’s territorial integrity during his first year in office.
By 2014, Russian obstinacy on this issue reinforced his ideas about the merits of a positive
bandwagoning with the United States, even if accession to NATO was not in the cards.
This dissertation also identified several key findings based on an investigation into the
relationship between each of the independent variables and the dependent variable. In Chapter
Five, this study uncovered three key findings in an examination of the relationship between a
president’s ideas about the state’s identity and his alignment preferences. First, each of the 12
presidents from Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine displayed a unique array of different
political, cultural, ideological, and economic conceptions of their state’s identity. Second, the
verbal discourse of six of the 12 presidents indicated they primary viewed the state as
independent, which was subsequently associated with a preference for great power bridging.
These presidents included Azeri Presidents Heydar and Ilham Aliyev, Georgian President Eduard
Shevardnadze, Moldovan Presidents Petru Lucinschi and Vladimir Voronin (after 2003), and
Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma. Third, Georgia’s Mikheil Saakashvili and Giorgi
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Margvelashvili, Moldova’s Nicolae Timofti and Ukraine’s Viktor Yushchenko and Petro
Poroshenko primarily conceptualized the state as European-Western, free, and democratic. These
narratives were associated with a preference for positive bandwagoning with the United States.
Only two instances of positive bandwagoning alignment with Russia was uncovered. The first
was in Moldova under Vladimir Voronin from 2001-2002. During this time the Moldovan
president primarily viewed the state as Eastern and Eurasian. Second, in Ukraine Viktor
Yanukovych viewed the state as European, Eastern, and Eurasian.
In Chapter Six, this study conducted a multi-stage examination on the relationship between a
president’s threat perceptions and his accompanying alignment preferences with the United
States and Russia. The first step in this investigation involved a by-country operational code
analysis of Azeri, Georgian, Moldovan, and Ukrainian presidents. Unlike other studies that
simply use qualitative techniques to assess a political leader’s belief system, Profiler Plusa
computerized content analysis software programallowed for an unbiased assessment of each
president’s operational code. This step established a by-country baseline of how each political
leader viewed world politics, political conflict, and the nature of the international system. These
findings then served as a point of reference a qualitative analysis of each president’s threat
perceptions and their alignment preferences with the United States and/or Russia.
This multi-stage analysis produced several important findings. First, based on a quantitative
analysis of each president’s master philosophical beliefs (P-1), all 12 presidents viewed the
political universe in friendly terms. In Azerbaijan, Heydar and Ilham Aliyev viewed the political
universe as definitely friendly. In Georgia, Presidents Shevardnadze and Margvelashvili viewed
the international system as definitely friendly, while Mikheil Saakashvili regarded world politics
as somewhat friendly. In Moldova, Presidents Lucinschi and Timofti believed the nature of the
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international system was definitely friendly; however, Vladimir Voronin retained a somewhat
friendly view of the political universe. Finally, in Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma and Viktor
Yushchenko viewed the political universe as somewhat friendly, while Viktor Yanukovych
regarded the international system as definitely friendly. President Poroshenko’s operational code
score indicated the Ukrainian president had mixed beliefs viewing world politics as the least
friendly as compared to his predecessors.
Second, all of the presidents from Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine viewed Russia
as the primary external threat; however, each political leader maintained differing perceptions
about the nature (political/diplomatic, economic, and/or military) and intensity of the Russian
threat. With respect to intensity, eight of the twelve presidents (Heydar and Ilham Aliyev, Petru
Lucinschi, Vladimir Voronin (after 2003), Eduard Shevardnadze, Giorgi Margvelashvili, and
Leonid Kuchma) perceived Russia as a moderate threat, believing some form of military or
economic conflict was somewhat likely. Four presidents, Georgian President Mikheil
Saakashvili, Moldovan President Nicolae Timofti, and Ukrainian Presidents Viktor Yushchenko
and Petro Poroshenko perceived Russia as a high threat, believing some form of military and/or
economic conflict was very likely during his time in office. Moldovan President Vladimir
Voronin (before 2003) and Ukraine’s Viktor Yanukovych were the only presidents to view
Russia as a low threat, believing some form of military or economic conflict was very unlikely.
All presidents viewed the United States as a low threat.
Third, using the ICEWS output from Chapter Five, a qualitative analysis of each president’s
verbal pronouncements identified three different relationships. Those presidents with a moderate
threat perception of Russia tended to prefer a great power bridging alignment. Next, those
presidents with a high threat perception of Russia gravitated toward a positive bandwagoning
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preference with the United States. Finally, when a president had a low threat perception of
Russia, he preferred a positive bandwagoning alignment with Moscow.
Fourth, there was minimal variation in president’s threat perceptions and his accompanying
alignment preferences less two instances. In Moldova, President Vladimir Voronin initially
viewed the threat from Russia as low, which was associated with a preference for a positive
bandwagoning alignment with Moscow. Voronin’s threat perceptions of Russia increased from
low to moderate following an attempt by the Kremlin to force the Moldovan president to sign the
Kozak Memorandum. Afterwards, Voronin preferred great power bridging with both the United
States and Russia. Separately, Giorgi Margvelashvili initially perceived Russia as a moderately
high threat believing a tenuous political and economic alignment with Moscow could restore
Georgia’s territorial integrity. When Moscow refused to compromise on South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, Margvelashvili’s threat perceptions of Russia spiked moving him from a preference
for great power bridging to positive bandwagoning with the United States.
The fifth finding from this chapter centers on methodology where statistical tests designed to
identify similarities and differences in each president’s master philosophical beliefs do not
necessarily convey to their alignment preferences. For example, ANOVA and Tukey’s HSD tests
found Leonid Kuchma and Viktor Yushchenko were the most similar in their philosophical
beliefs; however, a qualitative analysis revealed the former preferred great power bridging and
the latter positive bandwagoning with the United States. In Moldova and Georgia, statistical tests
indicated Presidents Lucinschi and Timofti and Presidents Shevardnadze and Margvelashvili
exhibited the most similar beliefs, but qualitative analyses revealed Lucinschi and Shevardnadze
preferred great power bridging whereas Timofti and Margvelashvili gravitated toward a positive
bandwagoning alignment with the United States. These findings serve as a reminder to
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academics and practitioners on how using multiple methods in any research effort can potentially
yield a more comprehensive understanding of small state alignment.
In Chapter Seven, multiple methods were again employed as part of a multi-step investigation
that examined the relationship between a president’s foreign policy orientation and his
accompanying alignment tendencies with the United States and Russia. The first step in this
effort focused on a by-country operational code analysis of the master instrumental beliefs (I-1)
of all 12 presidents. Just like in Chapter 6, an analysis of the output from Profiler Plus
established a baseline for each president’s beliefs about the optimal ways to realize their foreign
policy objectives. From this check, ANOVA and Tukey’s HSD tests were applied to assess the
similarities and differences between a president’s master instrumental beliefs within each
country. Next, these findings were then used as an analytical touchstone in a qualitative analysis
of each president’s foreign policy orientation (accommodative, confrontational, or pragmatic)
vis-à-vis the U.S. or Russia and how government fragmentation and issue polarization
constrained or enable the state’s material cooperation with both regional great powers.
Given the preceding, five key findings were uncovered. First, an analysis of the output from
Profiler Plus indicated all 12 presidents believed a cooperative strategy was the best approach to
realize their foreign policy goals. Ten of the 12 presidents (Heydar and Ilham Aliyev, Eduard
Shevardnadze, Mikheil Saakashvilli, Giorgi Margvelashvili, Petru Lucinschi, Vladimir Voronin,
Nicolae Timofti, Leonid Kuchma, and Viktor Yushchenko) ‘definitely’ believed a cooperative
strategy with other state actors was the best approach to achieve their goals. In Ukraine, Viktor
Yanukovych believed a ‘very’ cooperative strategy was necessary, while Petro Poroshenko
believed a somewhat cooperative strategy could achieve his political goals.
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Second, ANOVA and Tukey’s HSD tests provided some increased specificity as to which
presidents within each country were the most similar in their beliefs about strategy. In Georgia,
Presidents Shevardnadze and Margvelashvili had the most similar beliefs while in Moldova there
were no statistically significant differences in the instrumental beliefs of Presidents Lucinschi,
Voronin, and Timofti. Finally, in Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko and Petro Poroshenko were the
most similar in their master instrumental beliefs about strategy and the tactics with other states in
the international system. As will be detailed below, just because two presidents are the most
similar in their instrumental beliefs, does not mean they will follow the same alignment strategy.
Third, the results of a qualitative analysis revealed a majority of presidents exhibited a
pragmatic foreign policy orientation and an associated great power bridging alignment with the
United States and Russia. The pragmatic-great power bridging relationship was associated with
Heydar Aliyev, Ilham Aliyev, Eduard Shevardnadze, Giorgi Margvelashvili (before 2014), Petru
Lucinschi, Vladimir Voronin (after 2003), and Leonid Kuchma. Separately, Georgian Presidents
Giorgi Margvelashvili (2014-2015) and Mikheil Saakashvili, Moldovan President Nicolae
Timofti, and Ukrainian presidents Viktor Yushchenko and Petro Poroshenko displayed a
confrontational orientation with Moscow. At the same time, these presidents exhibited an
accommodative orientation with Washington, which was associated with a positive
bandwagoning alignment with the United States. Finally, Vladimir Voronin (before 2003) and
Viktor Yanukovych demonstrated an accommodative foreign policy orientation with Moscow,
which was related to a positive bandwagoning alignment with Russia.
Fourth, an examination of the relevance of domestic politics as a constraint or enabler on the
state’s alignment returned mixed results. On one hand, pragmatic presidents were able to pursue
a great power bridging alignment despite differing levels of government fragmentation and issue
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polarization within each government. For example, in Azerbaijan Heydar and Ilham Aliyev
operated under low levels of government fragmentation and issue polarization owing to the semiauthoritarian nature of the government. In Moldova and Ukraine, the political acumen of
Vladimir Voronin and Leonid Kuchma helped minimize issue polarization over an alignment
with the United States and Russia. Separately, low levels of government fragmentation and issue
polarization served as an enabler for Georgian President Saakashvili’s positive bandwagoning
alignment with the United States. Taken together, this study finds domestic politics is an
important factor but not necessarily a decisive one in alignment politics. The preceding finding
on domestic politics is in line with a conclusion put forward by Robert Putnam in the late 1980s.
To quote Putnam...
Domestic politics and international relations are often somehow entangled, but our theories have not
yet sorted out the puzzling tangle. It is fruitless to debate whether domestic politics really determine
international relations, or the reverse. The answer to that question is clearly “Both, sometimes.”945

Fifth, the use of multiple methods provided a more holistic understanding of small state
alignment. While there is high value in conducting an operational code analysis of each
president’s instrumental beliefs, the results of the econometric tests identifying which presidents
are the most similar in their beliefs about strategy should not be taken at face value when
attempting to understand a ruling government’s alignment with a regional great power. For
example, a Tukey’s HSD test indicated there were no statistically significant differences in the
belief systems of Moldovan presidents; however, a qualitative analysis indicated Presidents
Lucinschi and Voronin followed a great power bridging alignment, while President Timofti
opted for a positive bandwagoning alignment with the United States.
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State Identity, Threat Perceptions, Foreign Policy Orientation and Alignment
Chapters Five through Seven independently examined the relationship between the three
independent variables (state identity, threat perceptions, and foreign policy orientation as
conditioned by domestic politics) and the dependent variable (alignment). Chapter 5 focused on
the relationship between a president’s ideas about the state’s identity and his alignment
preferences with the United States and Russia. Chapter 6 concentrated on a president’s threat
perceptions and his alignment preferences. Chapter 7 then examined the relationships between a
political leader’s foreign policy orientation and the state’s alignment strategy as conditioned by
domestic politics. Each of these independent research endeavors produced a set of findings
specific to the variables under consideration.
With these findings in mind and recalling the model from Chapter 1 (Figure 1 – Small State
Alignment), what has not yet been examined is how potentially the three independent variables
may indirectly influence the dependent variable and how each of the explanatory variables may
influence one another. Beginning with a president’s ideas about the state’s identity, a variable
sequencing was posited whereby when a president’s primary conceptions about the state’s
identity coincide with a regional great power, it is possible this political leader may be more apt
to view this target state as a low threat. Barnett and Suny do well to help us understand the
potential relationship between identity and threat perceptions.
Threat is a matter of perceptions…[which] depends on how identities and interests are
constructed... “National histories” may be investigated, not so much to discover the “real” story
behind the Serb-Albanian conflict in Kosovo or the Armenian-Azerbaijani hostility in
Karabakh—as if one side's claims could convincingly outweigh the others—but rather how to
assess particular conceptualizations of nationhood contribute to notions of national interest and
threats to national security.946

Continuing in the variable sequence, it is also plausible that when a president perceives a
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regional great power as a low threat, he may then exhibit an accommodative foreign policy
orientation and a tendency for positive bandwagoning with the target state. Simultaneously,
when a president’s ideas about the state’s identity are not as similar with a particular regional
great power, it is possible he may view this state as more of a threat. As his/her threat
perceptions rise, one can expect to see a pragmatic orientation and great power bridging. In some
cases, when a president’s threat perceptions become high, he may even adopt a confrontational
foreign policy orientation with a regional great power. This may then spur a president to prefer a
positive bandwagoning alignment with a different regional great power. In the paragraphs below,
a comparison of the findings for each independent variable is made to establish a foundation for
future research.
From Chapter Five, Georgian Presidents Mikheil Saakashvili and Giorgi Margvelashvili (after
2013), Moldovan President Nicolae Timofti, and Ukrainian Presidents Viktor Yushchenko and
Petro Poroshenko primarily conceptualized the state’s identity as Western and/or one based on
democracy or freedom. The findings from Chapters Six and Seven revealed these presidents also
perceived Russia as a high threatless President Margvelashvili during the first several months
in officeand gravitated towards a confrontational foreign policy orientation with Moscow and
a more accommodative one with Washington and its European allies. These findings were
correlated with a president’s tendency to exhibit an accommodative foreign policy orientation
with the U.S. and a positive bandwagoning alignment with this regional great power.
Next, the findings from Chapter 5 revealed Azeri presidents Heydar and Ilham Aliyev,
Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, Moldovan Presidents Petru Lucinschi and Vladimir
Voronin (after 2003), and Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma primarily viewed the state as
independent. These presidents also tended to perceive Russia as a moderate threat as outlined in
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Chapter 6. From Chapter 7, these presidents displayed a pragmatic foreign policy orientation,
which was associated with a great power bridging strategy. Finally, in Chapter 5 this study found
Ukraine’s Viktor Yanukovych and Vladimir Voronin (before 2004) primarily viewed the state in
Eastern and Eurasian terms with the latter also giving emphasis to communist ideals. As detailed
in Chapter 6, both presidents regarded Russia as a low threat, which was correlated with an
accommodative foreign policy orientation. While never outright displaying a confrontational
orientation with the United States, Voronin during his early years in office and Yanukovych
preferred and implemented a positive bandwagoning alignment with Russia.
In summary, although future research is certainly in order, a comparison of the findings from
each of the substantive chapters of this dissertation appear to validate the existence of a potential
relationship between the independent variables. As expected by SIT/SCT, a shared sense of state
identity decreases threat perceptions spurring an accommodative foreign policy orientation
leading to positive bandwagoning behavior. However, when state identities diverge, threat
perceptions of a particular regional great power increased leading first to a pragmatic orientation
and, in some cases, a confrontational one. Pragmatic presidents followed a great power bridging
alignment while those with a confrontational orientation towards a target regional power
followed a positive bandwagoning alignment with a different regional great power.
Implications for Theory and Methods
The findings in this dissertation point to several important implications for theorizing about
small state alignment and the accompanying methods to examine this political phenomenon. The
first theoretical implication is that small state alignment cannot simply be explained by focusing
on one independent variable. As was demonstrated in this study, there is no strong empirical
evidence to support a conclusion that a president’s ideas about the state’s identity more so than
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his/her threat perceptions of external states or foreign policy orientation have a strong causal
relationship on the state’s alignment trajectory. To the extent possible, various statistical methods
and qualitative analyses did establish a series of associations between each of the independent
variables and the dependent variable. A key takeaway here is that simply focusing on one
variable to explain small state alignment is folly because multiple factors can exert varying levels
of direct or indirect influence.
A second theoretical implication centers on variable sequencing. In examining the three
explanatory variables in this study, one can discern a basic temporal sequence where a
president’s ideas about the state’s identity and threat perceptions precede his/her foreign policy
orientation. Specifically, an argument can be made that a president enters into office with a preestablished set of ideas about the state’s identity and the major state-based external threats. Once
in office, these cognitive factors, while being influenced by changes in the strategic environment,
become shape agents for his/her ideas about strategy and how best to move the state forward by
aligning with one or more great powers. This conclusion and the preceding one mirror Timothy
Colton’s research on post-Communist voting in Russia. In his work, Colton finds there are
multiple factors directly and indirectly influencing the decision-making process of Russian
citizens during an election. Additionally, an individual’s background and social characteristics
precede his/her assessments of their environment before making a choice.947
With respect to methodology, the findings from this study demonstrate the utility of using
multiple methods to understand small state alignment in the post-Soviet space and its potential
application to other political phenomena. As was previously shown, large-n data sets and
econometric analyses can provide us a baseline understanding of a president’s ideas about the
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state’s identity and his/her general alignment tendencies or his/her beliefs about the nature of the
political universe and optimal strategies. However, qualitative techniques are required to provide
a more holistic understanding of these relationships. For example, in Ukraine statistical findings
indicated Presidents Leonid Kuchma and Viktor Yushchenko were the most similar in their
philosophical beliefs; however, a qualitative analysis revealed they preferred to follow two
different alignment strategies.
Implications for U.S. Policy
The implosion of the Soviet Union over twenty-seven years ago brought an end to a decadeslong rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union. While the early 1990s may have seen a
warming of relations between Moscow and Washington, by 1995 a new round of strategic
competition was underway with each regional super power vying for influence in the 14 newlyindependent states. For some academics and policy analysts, Russia and the West are now
engaged in a new Cold War with NATO and the EU continuing its eastward expansion and
Russia responding with military force in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. As argued by the
highly renowned political scientist Robert Legvold,
... the new Cold War began the moment we [the West] went over the cliff, and that happened with
the Ukraine crisis. I trace this qualitative shift to be a result of what happened in Ukraine, with the
Russian annexation of Crimea and Russia’s direct support for separatism in the Donbas. Going
over the cliff did not happen suddenly though, it happened as a result of a series of steps that
cover most of the post-Cold War period. I see it as a phased process, in which no one, including
the leadership of Washington, Moscow and Berlin recognized the phases we were in.948

With tensions between Washington and Moscow at a new all-time high, the empirical findings
from this dissertation could assist U.S. intelligence analysts, strategists, and policymakers in
several important ways. First, this study highlights the potential usefulness of employing an
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operational code analysis to understand a political leader’s belief system. As demonstrated in the
preceding chapters, while a president’s operational code can by no means predict a foreign
leader’s actions, this analytical tool can be used as an econometric point of reference from which
to focus a more nuanced qualitative assessment about a president’s foreign policy tendencies.
Second, this dissertation indirectly reinforces the necessity for the U.S. Intelligence Community
to conduct an in-depth leadership profile of foreign political leaders in Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Moldova and Ukraine, particularly those who may become president or a member of the state’s
foreign policy executive. Policymakers can then use these leadership profiles to better
understand and interact with foreign leaders and develop a viable set of foreign policies to
advance U.S. interests in the region.
Third, this research project elucidates the complexity of interstate relations and how even the
smallest of states can still have a voice in world politics, particularly when they are of high
interest to different regional great powers. From one perspective, it can be argued “small powers
can and do initiate policies which evoke all manner of reactions from other nations. Small
powers are sought after, and they seek; they may act to enhance peace, or they may promote
conflict and chaos. They may be overawed, overpowered, or simply dominated, but they cannot
be ignored.”949 The takeaway for Washington political elites is that in the 21st Century, political
leaders in the borderlands of Russia have an independent voice, which may allow them some
degree of strategic maneuverability and influence on the world stage. Furthermore, when one
factors in Russia’s geographical proximity and historical ties with these countries, discerning the
alignment tendencies of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine becomes a very challenging
endeavor. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall provides egocentric U.S. policymakers with some sage
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advice about the necessity to seriously consider the perspectives of Russia and those in each of
the newly-independent states in the formulation of U.S. foreign policies for Southeastern Europe
and the South Caucasus. In her words...
To understand the complex relationships between and among the United States, Russia and the
new states, it is useful to think of a post-Soviet triangle. The United States, Russia and the group
of new states each occupies one of the three points on the conceptual triangle. In this
configuration, we cannot and should not think of any one of the three sides of the triangle in
isolation from the other two.950

Next, this dissertation reminds strategists and policymaker alike of how non-material factors
may be equally, if not more important than material considerations in shaping the actions of
small states in the international arena. By giving increased emphasis to the ideas and beliefs of
the leading actors in the state’s foreign policy executive, U.S. policymakers can begin to see how
simple balance of power or threat calculations do not necessarily translate into predictable state
behavior. For example, despite Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 as well
as Moscow’s continued backing of Armenia, Azeri President Ilham Aliyev remains committed to
great power bridging. Despite NATO’s refusal to offer Ukraine and Georgia a guaranteed path to
membership, Presidents Margvelashvili and Poroshenko continue to follow a positive
bandwagoning alignment with the United States. The key point here is that while material factors
are important, it is the ideas of the presidents that likely matter more.
Similarly, U.S. intelligence analysts can do well by heeding the call to focus more on
ideational factors and their impact on the alignment tendencies of leading political elites. Here,
analysts can potentially improve their ability to warn U.S. policymakers of potential changes in
the alignment trajectories of countries along Russia’s border. By scrutinizing the foreign policy
speeches of rising political figures, analysts can provide timely analysis about the rise of the next
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Viktor Yanukovych or Vladimir Voronin. This information can subsequently help the current
administration to craft pro-active policies that promote U.S. national interests.
Finally, with this study’s focus on threat perceptions and state identity, intelligence
professionals can potentially acquire new insights into the creation and longevity of modern-day
security alliances and regional economic unions. For example, this study can be used as a
springboard to further investigate the relationship between identity politics and national security
matters. This study and subsequent similar endeavors may then be able to provide intelligence
officials critical information that allow them to better support the strategy formulation process at
the highest levels of the U.S. government.
Future Research
In the preceding chapters, this dissertation demonstrated how ideational factors can play an
important role in shaping the alignment trajectories of former Soviet states. The findings from
this study have added to our cumulative knowledge on small state alignment; however, there
remains ample opportunity for additional research on this topic. First, the application of the
analytical framework in this dissertation to countries in Central Asia may yield additional
insights about the generalizability of the conclusions found in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova,
and Ukraine. Recalling the rigorous case selection process from Chapter Four, investigating the
state identity narratives, threat perceptions, and foreign policy orientation of Uzbek president
Islam Karimov may yield insight into his alignment trajectory with the United States and Russia
over the course of his presidency.
Future research could also expand the operationalization of the dependent variable
(alignment). Rather than just using ICEWS event data on a president’s level of verbal
cooperation and confrontation, expanding the data set to include material cooperation and
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confrontation can provide a more detailed analysis of the alignment tendencies of Azeri,
Georgian, Moldovan, and Ukrainian presidents with Russia and the United States. Such an effort
would require the collection of new event data and a subsequent automated or manual
assignment of a value on the cooperation-conflict continuum (+10 to -10) in line with the
Goldstein scale used in the WEIS dataset. Of note, manually assigning an event’s intensity may
carry varying levels of risk. Specifically, event selection bias and a subjective assessment of an
event’s intensity could skew the research findings.
Third, future research could more closely examine each of the president’s ideas about the
state’s identity, threat perceptions, and foreign policy orientations. This study took a broad-brush
approach by detailing a president’s beliefs system on an annual basis, which returned some
generally consistent findings on the relationships between the independent and dependent
variables. As such, a deep dive on a single case with measurements on a monthly or quarterly
basis could provide a better assessment of a president’s ideas and the state’s alignment with
different regional great powers. Furthermore, employing other quantitative techniques like OLS
regression could help discern statistically significant relationship between different variables.
Next, in the preceding section of this chapter, an analytical comparison of the findings from
an examination of each of the three independent variables and the dependent variable was
undertaken. This comparison was done in order to gauge how potentially the three explanatory
variables may sequentially influence one another. This comparison should serve as a point of
departure for future research on the relationship between a president’s ideas about the state’s
identity and his/her threat perceptions of different regional great powers. As part of this effort,
future studies could use role theory to frame an in-depth analysis of the alignment tendencies of
ruling governments in the post-Soviet space.
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Congruently, a separate research effort could be undertaken to examine how a political
leader’s threat perceptions may shape his/her ideas about strategy and what the state foreign
policies actually are with different regional great powers. Recalling Harvey Starr, sometimes a
political leader’s threat perceptions do not consistently reflect the foreign policies of the state. In
Starr’s work, he found this situation existed during the Cold War when Henry Kissinger was one
of the leading figures crafting U.S. foreign policies with the Soviet Union and China. According
to Starr, “...Kissinger’s images are not congruent with American foreign-policy behavior.
Although Kissinger was the dominant foreign-policy decision maker during the period under
investigation, his words and the evaluative assertions they containeddid not simply and
directly reflect American behavior toward the Soviet Union and China.”951
Finally, the role of public opinion as a driver of a president’s state identity narratives deserves
a closer examination. Because most political leaders want to stay in power as long as possible,
ruling elites are highly sensitive to public opinion. Given this reality, incorporating public
opinion as another variable could yield additional insight into the alignment tendencies of the
lead actors in the state’s foreign policy executive. This is particularly true with foreign policy
elites, who may sometimes say something to gauge the reaction from other states. In other cases,
politicians will tailor their messages to a particular audience. For example, in speeches to
domestic constituents, politicians may exaggerate the threat from a particular foreign country but
when speaking at an international venue may then temper their remarks.
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APPENDIX A – Scenario-Based Surveys952
Scenario Overview:
Scenario 1 - Similar State Identity; Favorable Military Balance; Democratic Government
Scenario 2 - Similar State Identity; Unfavorable Military Balance; Democratic Government
Scenario 3 - Dissimilar State Identity; Favorable Military Balance; Authoritarian Government
Scenario 4 - Dissimilar State Identity; Unfavorable Military Balance; Authoritarian Government
Scenario Instructions:
As part of my dissertation research, I am interested in understanding how you would personally
respond to a hypothetical scenario from the field of international relations. In this scenario, you
will be asked to play the role of a senior national security advisor to the president of the country
on a long-standing unresolved foreign policy issue with a neighboring country. You will be
presented with a particular situation and asked how you would respond if the president asked for
your input on the options being discussed. Please take the time to carefully read the scenario and
think about how you would respond to the survey questions if confronted with the situation.
Scenario 1 Narrative
You are the chief national security advisor for your country’s president, who was elected six
months ago. In the national election, he received 53% of the popular vote while the leading
opposition candidate received 46% of the vote. The election also triggered a change in control of
the legislature as your political party took control of the upper house by a three-vote margin. The
political opposition controls the lower house by a ten-vote margin. Your country has a long
history of peaceful and fair democratic elections.
Your job is to advise the president on all security and foreign policy matters. The most pressing
foreign policy that the new president wants to resolve centers on a long-standing border dispute
with your country’s southern neighbor over ownership of a 950-square mile stretch of land. This
territory includes a very fertile agricultural region and a mountainous region with large mining
operations. A sparsely populated area centuries ago, it is now home to over 500,000 people. In
1913, both countries agreed to have King Alfonso XIII of Spain (1886-1931) resolve the dispute.
When the King ruled in favor of your country, your southern neighbor rejected the decision and
refused to give up its portion of the territory. In response, your country's army occupied the
remaining half of the disputed territory. Although there have been numerous rounds of
diplomatic negotiations to resolve this dispute, an enduring settlement remains elusive.
At the time of the 1913 decision, both countries had armed forces of approximately 30,000
troops, the majority of which were stationed along the disputed territory. Since that time, the size
of your country’s population and military has experienced tremendous growth as compared to
your southern neighbor. Currently, there are a total of 300,000 active duty troops and 500,000
reservists in your country’s armed forces. Your country’s military also possesses the most
modern equipment and weapon platforms. The army has 500 main battle tanks, 250 artillery
pieces, and 1,000 armored personnel carriers (APCs) and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs). The
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air force has 300 combat aircraft, while the navy has ten frigates, six corvettes and four
submarines. Your southern neighbor’s military is half the size with older generation equipment
and weapons. The army has 150,000 active duty troops and 250,000 reservists. Their army has
250 older main battle tanks, 125 artillery pieces, and 500 APCs and IFVs. The air force has 150
combat aircraft while the navy possesses five frigates, three corvettes, and only two submarines.
Your country’s level of readiness is high while your southern neighbor’s is low.
During the Cold War, your southern neighbor was ruled by military leaders in an authoritarian
government. After the demise of the Soviet Union, democracy flourished in the south with the
civilians taking full control over the military and political leaders coming to power under free
and fair elections in every national election. National political leaders in the south have also
publically described their country in the same way political leaders have characterized your
country. That is, Northern and Southern political leaders alike frequently espouse the same state
identity narratives such as Western, independent, democratic, modernizing, and liberal. The next
Parliamentary elections are scheduled for May 2018 and the next presidential elections are
scheduled for May 2020.
Scenario 2 Narrative
You are the chief national security advisor for your country’s president, who was elected six
months ago. In the national election, he received 53% of the popular vote while the leading
opposition candidate received 46% of the vote. The election also triggered a change in control of
the legislature as your political party took control of the upper house by a three-vote margin. The
political opposition controls the lower house by a ten-vote margin. Your country has a long
history of peaceful and fair democratic elections.
Your job is to advise the president on all security and foreign policy matters. The most pressing
foreign policy that the new president wants to resolve centers on a long-standing border dispute
with your country’s southern neighbor over ownership of a 950-square mile stretch of land. This
territory includes a very fertile agricultural region and a mountainous region with large mining
operations. A sparsely populated area centuries ago, it is now home to over 500,000 people. In
1913, both countries agreed to have King Alfonso XIII of Spain (1886-1931) resolve the dispute.
When the King ruled in favor of your country, your southern neighbor rejected the decision and
refused to give up its portion of the territory. In response, your country's army occupied the
remaining half of the disputed territory. Although there have been numerous rounds of
diplomatic negotiations to resolve this dispute, an enduring settlement remains elusive.
At the time of the 1913 decision, both countries had armed forces of approximately 30,000
troops, the majority of which were stationed along the disputed territory. Since that time, the size
of your southern neighbor’s population and military has experienced tremendous growth as
compared to your country. Currently, your southern neighbor has a total of 300,000 active duty
troops and 500,000 reservists in the armed forces. Your neighbor’s military also possesses the
most modern equipment and weapon platforms. The army has 500 main battle tanks, 250
artillery pieces, and 1,000 armored personnel carriers (APCs) and infantry fighting vehicles
(IFVs). The air force has 300 combat aircraft, while the navy has ten frigates, six corvettes and
four submarines. Your country’s military is half the size with older generation equipment and
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weapons. The army has 150,000 active duty troops and 250,000 reservists. Your country’s army
has 250 older main battle tanks, 125 artillery pieces, and 500 APCs and IFVs. The air force has
150 combat aircraft while the navy possesses five frigates, three corvettes, and only two
submarines. Your country’s level of readiness is low while your southern neighbor’s is high.
During the Cold War, your southern neighbor was ruled by military leaders in an authoritarian
government. After the demise of the Soviet Union, democracy flourished in the south with the
civilians taking full control over the military and political leaders coming to power under free
and fair elections in every national election. National political leaders in the south have also
publically described their country in the same way political leaders have characterized your
country. That is, Northern and Southern political leaders alike frequently espouse the same state
identity narratives such as Western, independent, democratic, modernizing, and liberal. The next
Parliamentary elections are scheduled for May 2018 and the next presidential elections are
scheduled for May 2020.
Scenario 3 Narrative
You are the chief national security advisor for your country’s president, who was elected six
months ago. In the national election, he received 53% of the popular vote while the leading
opposition candidate received 46% of the vote. The election also triggered a change in control of
the legislature as your political party took control of the upper house by a three-vote margin. The
political opposition controls the lower house by a ten-vote margin. Your country has a long
history of peaceful and fair democratic elections.
Your job is to advise the president on all security and foreign policy matters. The most pressing
foreign policy that the new president wants to resolve centers on a long-standing border dispute
with your country’s southern neighbor over ownership of a 950-square mile stretch of land. This
territory includes a very fertile agricultural region and a mountainous region with large mining
operations. A sparsely populated area centuries ago, it is now home to over 500,000 people. In
1913, both countries agreed to have King Alfonso XIII of Spain (1886-1931) resolve the dispute.
When the King ruled in favor of your country, your southern neighbor rejected the decision and
refused to give up its portion of the territory. In response, your country's army occupied the
remaining half of the disputed territory. Although there have been numerous rounds of
diplomatic negotiations to resolve this dispute, an enduring settlement remains elusive.
At the time of the 1913 decision, both countries had armed forces of approximately 30,000
troops, the majority of which were stationed along the disputed territory. Since that time, the size
of your country’s population and military has experienced tremendous growth as compared to
your southern neighbor. Currently, there are a total of 300,000 active duty troops and 500,000
reservists in your country’s armed forces. Your country’s military also possesses the most
modern equipment and weapon platforms. The army has 500 main battle tanks, 250 artillery
pieces, and 1,000 armored personnel carriers (APCs) and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs). The
air force has 300 combat aircraft, while the navy has ten frigates, six corvettes and four
submarines. Your southern neighbor’s military is half the size with older generation equipment
and weapons. The army has 150,000 active duty troops and 250,000 reservists. Their army has
250 older main battle tanks, 125 artillery pieces, and 500 APCs and IFVs. The air force has 150
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combat aircraft while the navy possesses five frigates, three corvettes, and only two submarines.
Your country’s level of readiness is high while your southern neighbor’s is low.
During the Cold War, military dictators ruled over the people in the country to your south. After
the demise of the Soviet Union, although a small group of reformers attempted to transition the
country to a democracy hardliners were able to maintain the upper hand. As a result, democracy
failed to flourish thus allowing former military elites to establish an authoritarian system of
government (autocracy). National elections are held every five years, but they are neither fair nor
open. While political leaders in your country have consistently espoused state identity narratives
such as Western-liberal, independent, and democratic, political leaders in the south use words
such as a “managed democracy,” a "market-socialist" republic, and an aspiring great power in
their public characterizations of the state’s identity.
Scenario 4 Narrative
You are the chief national security advisor for your country’s president, who was elected six
months ago. In the national election, he received 53% of the popular vote while the leading
opposition candidate received 46% of the vote. The election also triggered a change in control of
the legislature as your political party took control of the upper house by a three-vote margin. The
political opposition controls the lower house by a ten-vote margin. Your country has a long
history of peaceful and fair democratic elections.
Your job is to advise the president on all security and foreign policy matters. The most pressing
foreign policy that the new president wants to resolve centers on a long-standing border dispute
with your country’s southern neighbor over ownership of a 950-square mile stretch of land. This
territory includes a very fertile agricultural region and a mountainous region with large mining
operations. A sparsely populated area centuries ago, it is now home to over 500,000 people. In
1913, both countries agreed to have King Alfonso XIII of Spain (1886-1931) resolve the dispute.
When the King ruled in favor of your country, your southern neighbor rejected the decision and
refused to give up its portion of the territory. In response, your country's army occupied the
remaining half of the disputed territory. Although there have been numerous rounds of
diplomatic negotiations to resolve this dispute, an enduring settlement remains elusive.
At the time of the 1913 decision, both countries had armed forces of approximately 30,000
troops, the majority of which were stationed along the disputed territory. Since that time, the size
of your southern neighbor’s population and military has experienced tremendous growth as
compared to your country. Currently, your southern neighbor has a total of 300,000 active duty
troops and 500,000 reservists in the armed forces. Your neighbor’s military also possesses the
most modern equipment and weapon platforms. The army has 500 main battle tanks, 250
artillery pieces, and 1,000 armored personnel carriers (APCs) and infantry fighting vehicles
(IFVs). The air force has 300 combat aircraft, while the navy has ten frigates, six corvettes and
four submarines. Your country’s military is half the size with older generation equipment and
weapons. The army has 150,000 active duty troops and 250,000 reservists. Your country’s army
has 250 older main battle tanks, 125 artillery pieces, and 500 APCs and IFVs. The air force has
150 combat aircraft while the navy possesses five frigates, three corvettes, and only two
submarines. Your country’s level of readiness is low while your southern neighbor’s is high.
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During the Cold War, military dictators ruled over the people in the country to your south. After
the demise of the Soviet Union, although a small group of reformers attempted to transition the
country to a democracy hardliners were able to maintain the upper hand. As a result, democracy
failed to flourish thus allowing former military elites to establish an authoritarian system of
government (autocracy). National elections are held every five years, but they are neither fair nor
open. While political leaders in your country have consistently espoused state identity narratives
such as Western-liberal, European, independent, and democratic, political leaders in the south
use words such as a “managed democracy,” a "market-socialist" republic, and an aspiring great
power in their public characterizations of the state’s identity.
Post Scenario Survey: [Questions 2-3 are Manipulation Checks]
1. At the Army War College, you are a
[ ] U.S. Military Officer
[ ] International Officer
[ ] Federal Civilian Employee
[ ] U.S. Government Contractor
2. In the scenario you just read, your southern neighbor is a ___________________.
[ ] autocracy
[ ] democracy
[ ] theocracy
[ ] not sure
3. In the scenario, which country has a larger army, air force, and navy?
[ ] your country
[ ] your southern neighbor
[ ] not sure
4. Please respond to the following statement: "If my southern neighbor refuses to resolve the
dispute through diplomatic negotiation, my country should use its military forces to take back the
land."
[ ] Strongly Agree
[ ] Somewhat Agree
[ ] Neither Agree Nor Disagree
[ ] Somewhat Disagree
[ ] Strongly Disagree
[ ] Not Sure
5. In one sentence, why do you support or oppose the FIRST use of military force?
[text box: code rationale as either realist, institutionalist, norms, mixed, other, or not sure]
6. Suppose another advisor in the administration suggests secretly funneling military arms,
equipment, supplies, and training to opposition groups in the disputed territory. If you could be
virtually guaranteed (i.e., 99% chance) that information about this secret program would not be
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leaked to the either the legislature or the public at large, would you support the FIRST use of
clandestine military assistance to opposition groups as a way to retake the territory?
[ ] Strongly Support First Use of Clandestine Military Assistance
[ ] Somewhat Support First Use of Clandestine Military Assistance
[ ] Neutral
[ ] Somewhat Oppose First Use of Clandestine Military Assistance
[ ] Strongly Oppose First Use of Clandestine Military Assistance
[ ] Not Sure
7. In one sentence, why do you support or oppose the FIRST use of Clandestine Military
Assistance?
[text box: code rationale as either realist, institutionalist, norms, mixed, other, or not sure]
8. Now let's alter the situation. Suppose your southern neighbor was the first to use military
force, such as seizing a border outpost with ground troops or bombing border positions with
aircraft. Should your country respond with military force?
[ ] Definitely Respond with Military Force
[ ] Probably Respond with Military Force
[ ] Neutral
[ ] Probably NOT Respond with Military Force
[ ] Definitely NOT Respond with Military Force
[ ] Not Sure
9. Suppose your southern neighbor was the first to use military force AND the leadership of your
political opposition at home called for a military response. Would you be more or less likely to
respond with military force after the opposition party's demand?
[ ] Much More Likely to Respond with Military Force
[ ] Somewhat More Likely to Respond with Military Force
[ ] About the Same
[ ] Somewhat Less Likely to Respond Military Force
[ ] Much Less Likely to Respond with Military Force
[ ] Not Sure
10. Suppose your southern neighbor was the first to use military force AND the United Nations
Security Council condemned the attack and authorized your country to use "all means
appropriate for defending the territory." Would you be more or less likely to respond with
military force after United Nations approval?
[ ] Much More Likely to Respond with Force
[ ] Somewhat More Likely to Respond with Force
[ ] About the Same
[ ] Somewhat Less Likely to Respond Force
[ ] Much Less Likely to Respond with Force
[ ] Not Sure
11. In general, do you think democracies or autocracies are more likely to be the FIRST to use
military force to resolve an international dispute?
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[
[
[
[
[
[

] Democracies are MUCH more likely to use force
] Democracies are SOMEWHAT more likely to use force
] No Difference
] Autocracies are SOMEWHAT more likely to use force
] Autocracies are MUCH more likely to use force
] Not Sure

12. In one sentence, if you believe democracies are less (or more) likely to use force, why might
this be the case?
[text box: code rationale as either realist, institutionalist, norms, mixed, other, or not sure]
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APPENDIX B – Interview Questions

NOTE: As part of my data collection effort for my dissertation, I will conduct a series of semistructured interviews with area specialists, foreign government officials, and policy analysts. If
needed, I am prepared to provide interviewees amplifying details on the definitions of key
concepts used in this study.
1. (Primary) In this study, state identity is defined as the public articulation of a ruling group’s
ideas about the country’s purpose in international affairs. From your perspective, what are the
dominant state identities (e.g. democratic, European, Western, liberal, modernizing, independent,
Slavic, etc.) espoused by each ruling group in Ukraine (or Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova)
since the end of the Cold War? Why do think these are the dominant state identities?
1a. (Secondary) During the tenure of each ruling group, to what extent did state identity
narratives vary, if at all? If there was variation, can you describe the nature of this change
and its underlying causes?
1b. (Secondary) In each ruling group, which political figure(s) (e.g. president, prime
minister, foreign minister, defense minister, etc.) do you believe were the most influential
in developing the country’s state identity narratives?
2. (Primary) Which foreign country (or countries) did each ruling group perceive to be the
primary national security threat?
2a. (Secondary) How would you describe the nature of this national security threat? Was
it military (armed attack; the provision of arms or money to other state/non-state actors,
etc.), economic (sanctions, trade embargoes, cut in energy supplies, etc.), political
(coercive diplomacy, UN voting, etc.), or informational (propaganda, disinformation
campaign, cyberattacks, etc.) or a combination of the four?
3. (Primary) How would you best categorize the intensity of each ruling group’s threat
perceptions of the country identified as the primary external threat? Would you say those threat
perceptions were high, moderate, or low? High-the ruling group perceive some form of military
and/or economic conflict is very likely during their time in office; moderate-political leaders
perceive some form of military or economic conflict is somewhat likely; or low-political leaders
perceive some form of military or economic conflict is very unlikely. Please provide a brief
explanation for your ranking.
3a. (Secondary) Did the ruling group’s threat perceptions remain stable or vary while in
office? If there was variation, can you describe the nature of this change and its causes?
4. (Primary) In those countries identified as the primary external national security threat, what
were the dominant state identities espoused by each ruling group from 1991 to present?
5. (Primary) To what extent do you believe dissimilar state identities between countries may
influence political leader threat perceptions? Would you say they are not at all influential,
slightly influential, somewhat influential, very influential, or extremely influential?
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6. (Primary) In this study, a political leader’s foreign policy orientation is defined as his/her basic
beliefs about the nature of international affairs and political conflict as they relate to other
countries and their respective state’s national priorities. To what extent do you believe a political
leader’s threat perceptions influence his/her general foreign policy orientation towards Russia,
and the United States? Would you say they are not at all influential, slightly influential,
somewhat influential, very influential, or extremely influential?
7. (Primary) How would you best categorize the foreign policy orientation of the key political
leaders in each of Ukraine’s (or Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova) ruling groups towards Russia,
the United States, and Western European powers? Would you characterize their foreign policy
orientation as accommodative, pragmatic, confrontational, or something else? In this study, an
accommodative, pragmatic, or confrontational foreign policy orientation are defined as follows:
Accommodative - A ruling group with an accommodative foreign policy orientation does not
regard a regional great power as fundamentally hostile or directly threatening to the state’s
national security. Accommodative ruling groups tend to see a wide array of important strategic
issues in the international system that requires constructive engagement and cooperation in order
to find mutually beneficial resolutions.
Pragmatic - A ruling group with a pragmatic foreign policy orientation perceives a regional
great power to be a potential national security threat; however, this threat is manageable and does
not require immediate consideration. Pragmatic ruling groups generally maintain restrained
foreign policies vis-à-vis a regional great power since this country is viewed as having limited
goals that are frequently materially constrained thus making it difficult to exert excessive,
consistent pressure. While confrontation is still possible, because this regional great power does
not pose an immediate threat, pragmatic leaders have time to exercise diplomacy and engage in
bargaining and mutually beneficial cooperation.
Confrontational - A ruling group with a confrontational foreign policy orientation perceives a
regional great power to be inherently dangerous where strategic interactions represent a zero-sum
game. Ruling groups with a confrontational foreign policy orientation believe a particular
regional great power has unlimited objectives with access to adequate material resources,
political support, and public backing to realize those goals. This regional great power represents
an unambiguous and immediate threat to the state’s national security and territorial sovereignty.
8. (Primary) For the purposes of this study, alignment is defined as a formal or informal set of
expectations about defense, economic, and diplomatic cooperation between a small state and one
or more regional great powers that political leaders believe will enhance the country’s national
security and allow them to remain in power. When thinking about each ruling group’s foreign
policy decision-making process to align with a particular regional power(s), how important (not
at all important, low importance, slightly important, neutral, moderately important, very
important, or extremely important) are the following factors? Please provide a brief explanation
for your ranking of each factor?
a. Public opinion.
b. Political leader beliefs and perceptions.
c. Domestic political opposition to the ruling government’s foreign policies.
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d. The regional balance of power with Russia.
8a. (Secondary) Beyond public opinion, political leader beliefs, etc., are there any other
domestic and/or international factors you believe are important drivers moving a small
state to align with a particular regional great power? How important (not at all important,
low importance, slightly important, neutral, moderately important, very important, or
extremely important) are those factors? Please provide a brief explanation for your
ranking of each factor.
8b. (Secondary) What are the key domestic or international factors driving these political
leaders to align with a particular regional power?
8c. (Secondary) What are the key domestic or international factors driving these political
leaders to align against a particular regional power?
9. (Primary) How would you describe the priority (not a priority, low priority, medium priority,
high priority, essential) assigned by each ruling group to align with the United States, Russia, or
major powers in Western Europe?
9a. (Secondary) In those instances where equal priority was assigned to aligning with
different regional powers, why do you think that occurred?
10. (Primary) From your perspective, how successful was each ruling group in implementing
various foreign policies to align with a preferred regional great power? Would you say they were
quite unsuccessful, somewhat unsuccessful, somewhat successful, or quite successful?
10a. (Secondary) In those instances where a ruling government was either quite or
somewhat unsuccessful in advancing foreign policies to align with a regional great
power, what were the primary obstacles preventing the realization of this foreign policy
goal?
10b. (Secondary) In those instances where a ruling government was either quite or
somewhat successful in advancing foreign policies to align with a regional great power,
what were the primary enablers facilitating the realization of this foreign policy goal?
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APPENDIX C – The Relevancy of Ideational Factors

How important are the ideas and beliefs of political leaders in the development and execution
of the state’s foreign policies? Are they more important than other domestic and systemic-level
variables? Recognizing the limits of this study and how time and space do not allow for the
presentation of all the major arguments supporting one domestic and/or systemic-level variable
over another, this study considers the potential relevancy of public opinion, domestic politics,
and the balance of military power as three factors shaping the foreign policies of post-Soviet
states. In the proceeding paragraphs, a brief discussion of the potential relevance of these
alternative variables are examined. This is followed by an empirical probe that concludes
ideational factors should be given increased emphasis in explaining foreign policy outcomes.
Public Opinion. Although there is a mountain of scholarly articles on public opinion and
foreign policy in the United States and other developed countries, the literature covering public
opinion in the post-Soviet space is not as robust owing to perhaps a lack of data availability, low
academic interest, or how many of these countries have only recently gained their independence.
Additionally, the scholarly literature returns mixed results with some scholars finding public
opinion matters little, while others concluding it is a relevant factor in the foreign policy decision
making process.
Several scholars confirm the validity of the Almond-Lipmann consensus in their analysis of
the post-Soviet space. For example, Robert Dorff finds mixed support in Hungary, Czech
Republic, and Poland during 1997 for NATO accession even though the ruling governments in
each country were aggressively pursuing a Western foreign policy course. Using polling data
from 1997, Dorf notes how many citizens were more concerned about domestic economic

469

issues.953 Several years later, Chudowsky and Kuzio found similar trends in Ukraine concluding
Ukrainian public opinion is of little relevance to foreign policy issues.954 For most of the 1990s,
the authors also find the Ukrainian public is generally passive and atomized across various
foreign policy issues thereby reducing its impact on political elite decisions.
Other scholars have concluded that public opinion in the post-Soviet space is a relevant factor
in foreign policy elite decision making. For example, Nathaniel Copsey, using archival public
opinion data and focus groups, concludes that the business communities in Poland and Ukraine
exert considerable influence on the foreign policy decision making process in both states.955 Like
Copsey, Martin Muller finds public opinion matters in Georgia as well. Using regression analysis
and data derived from a 2009 national representative survey (n=1,886), Muller concludes that, in
line with the ruling government’s foreign policy trajectory, there is high public support for
accession into NATO and the EU. Interestingly, Muller uncovers a divergence where, unlike the
Saakashvili government, there is broad public support for improved foreign policy relations with
Moscow. As Muller notes, many citizens believe a prolonged antagonistic relationship with
Russia is detrimental to the country’s long-term stability.956
Domestic Politics. Domestic politics is a second key factor that carries a potential high
relevance in the state’s foreign policy processes. The IR literature on the relationship between
domestic politics and the state’s foreign policies is legion. Highlighting the breadth and depth of
this body of literature, James Fearon found that between 1987 and 1996, over 30 percent (n=193)
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of articles in International Organization used domestic-political variables to explain various
political outcomes.957 Two examples help use to understand the potential relevance of domestic
politics. First, in his book Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambitions, Jack
Snyder argues foreign policies (e.g. a decision to go to war) are derived from “the justification
for the policies of domestic political coalitions formed among groups having parochial interests
in imperial expansion, military preparations, or economic autarky. These groups, which included
leading figures in the country’s economic sectors and state bureaucracies, log rolled their various
imperialist or military interests, using arguments about security through expansion to justify their
self-serving policies in terms of a broader public interest in national survival.”958 It from these
points one can begin to better understand the foreign policies of Britain during the Crimean War
(1853-1856), Imperial Germany’s decisions during World War I, and Imperial Japan’s actions in
the run-up to World War II.
Second, Robert Putnam also provides insight into how domestic politics can affect the state’s
actions on the world stage. For Putnam, political leaders play a two-level game. On the
international stage (Level I), the chief executive (e.g. president or prime minister), is constrained
in his/her actions by a plethora of domestic actors (Level II), with their own interests and
capacity to exert influence on the chief negotiator in terms of what will or will not come to
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fruition during international negotiations. These domestic actors include special interest groups,
big business, a state’s bureaucracy, and electorate, who all want to protect or advance their
interests by pressuring the government to enact policies favorable to their respective position.959
For example, while President Bill Clinton signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the Senate failed to
ratify the agreement due to the interests and strong influence of large companies, which
expressed concern over the exorbitant costs to comply with the agreement.960
Balance of Military Power. Beyond public opinion and domestic politics, conditions and
events in the international system can influence a state’s foreign policies. The necessity to give
precedence to a systemic approach is derived, in part, from Waltz and his criticisms of
reductionism. According to Waltz, a reductionist approach seeks to explain state behavior by
analyzing the plethora of domestic factors internal to the state that are in line with what he calls
first- and second-image explanations.961 Waltz sees a reductionist approach as extremely
problematic arguing, “it is not possible to understand world politics simply by looking inside of
states… every time we think that we see something different or new, we will have to designate
another unit-level ‘variable’ for its cause… leading to the infinite proliferation of variables.”962
It is from this shortfall, realists attempt to explain state actions by taking a systemic approach
that is based on two key assumptions. First, systemic, and not domestic-level factors best explain
small state foreign policies. The underlying logic here is that regional great powers, owing to
their respective military and/or economic capabilities, worry less about survival and are therefore
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more susceptible to domestic influences as they relate to foreign policy choices. On the contrary,
unlike the great powers, small states are continuously worried about their survival in an anarchic,
self-help system and will base their foreign policy decisions on material factors, specifically the
balance of military power, from a would-be adversarial state.963 This study’s selection of the
balance of military power as the most important systemic variable takes its cue from John
Mearsheimer. In developing his theory of offensive realism, a state’s military forces, particularly
its land forces are the most important, “because they are the principal instrument for conquering
and controlling territory—the paramount political objective in a world of territorial states.”964
An Empirical Probe. In an effort to tease out the level of importance of a political leader’s
ideas and beliefs, public opinion, domestic politics, and the balance of military power in the
foreign policy calculations of the presidents in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine this
study interviewed over 25 area specialists and regional experts. The question asked of these
individuals were as follows: Lots of factors can affect a country’s foreign policies and its
tendency to align with a regional great power. On a scale of 1 to 7 (1 - extremely important; 2 very important; 3 - moderately important; 4 - neutral; 5 - slightly important; 6 - low importance;
7 - not at all important), when thinking about the presidency of [insert Azerbaijani, Georgian,
Moldovan or Ukrainian president’s name], how important do you assess the following factors
were in their foreign policy decision-making: public opinion, the beliefs and perceptions of the
president, domestic political opposition to the ruling government’s foreign policies, and the
regional balance of power with Russia? A summary of the respondent’s professional assessments

See Handel 1990, 3; Skidmore, David. 1994. “Explaining States Responses to International Change: The
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reveals that on average a president’s ideas and beliefs were very important. Domestic political
opposition and public opinion were moderately important with the regional balance of power
regarded as slightly important.
In addition to interviews with area specialists, a scenario-based experiment helped discern the
extent to which identity matters in the foreign policy calculations of political elites. For this
empirical probe, a scenario-based experiment was given to senior military and civilian leaders
from the United States and 80 foreign countries, who were assigned to the U.S. Army War
College in 2017.965 Specifically, four different hypothetical scenarios were randomly
disseminated to approximately 1,000 senior U.S. and foreign civilian and military officers using
Survey Monkey with a response rate of 35 percent (n=350). The four scenarios involve two
neighboring countries at odds with one another over a territorial dispute. The questions in the
survey measured three dichotomous dimensions: state identity as either similar or dissimilar,
balance of military power as favorable or unfavorable, and government type as democratic or
authoritarian. The two primary hypotheses for this experiment were:
H1: A favorable balance of military power increases an individual’s willingness to use
armed force.
H2: Similar state identities reduces an individual’s willingness to use armed force.
The results from the table below support, by the thinnest of margins, realist claims that a
favorable balance of military power increases an actor’s proclivity to use armed force. When one
state has a 2 to 1 military advantage over another country, only eight percent of the respondents
either somewhat agreed or strongly agreed that the state should use armed force first if a
neighboring country refuses to resolve a dispute through diplomacy. This finding is only slightly
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higher than the two percent of the respondents, who either somewhat agreed or strongly agreed
that military force should be a first option even when the country is at a military disadvantage.
This finding indicates other factors may be exerting an influence on an individual’s strategic
calculations.966
Table 6: Support for “First Use” of Armed Force by the Balance of Power

Support
Do Not Support
Totals

Weak Military
Position (n=160)
2%
98%
100%

Strong Military
Position (n=163)
8%
92%
100%

Totals
(n=323)
5%
95%
100%

When considering the identity of the state as articulated by ruling political leaders, the results
in the table below also minimally support constructivist claims that similar identities reduce an
individual’s willingness to use armed force. When political leaders in a neighboring country
espouse a similar state identity narrative, 96 percent of the respondents believe that armed force
should not be used first as compared to 94 percent when state identities diverge. According to
one respondent, “regional relationships with fellow democracies are valued greater than whether
we have dominion over a small plot of disputed territory” while another noted how,
“Democracies don't go to war with each other; we negotiate and resolve our differences.”967
Although it appears similar state identities are also a potential factor affecting an individual’s
willingness to use armed force, more empirical support is required to strengthen this argument.

Respondents were asked the following question: “If my southern neighbor refuses to resolve the dispute through
diplomatic negotiation, my country should use military force FIRST to take back the land.”
967
Survey responses on file with the author.
966
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Table 32: Support for “First Use” of Armed Force by Opponent’s State Identity

Support
Do Not Support
Totals

Similar State Identity
(n=156)
4%
96%
100%

Dissimilar State Identity
(n=167)
6%
94%
100%

Totals
(n=323)
5%
95%
100%

In order to better understand the potential relevance of identity on a political leader’s foreign
policy decision-making, Army War College participants were also asked to provide a response
about providing clandestine military assistance to opposition groups in the neighboring
country.968 In the table below, the constructivist argument that identity is an important variable in
international relations gains strength. Specifically, 82 percent of senior leaders were less willing
to use clandestine military assistance when state identities converged as compared to those with
dissimilar state identities, which came in at 73 percent. Commentary from respondents help to
provide a sharper qualitative edge to this finding. One respondent stated, “Fraught with risk not
the least of which is compromising the integrity of the system we espouse” while another noted,
“I oppose it... [because] the southern country is a Western democracy.”969
Table 33: Support for “First Use” of Clandestine Assistance by Opponent’s State

Support
Do Not Support
Totals

Similar State Identity
(n=158)
18%
82%
100%

Dissimilar State Identity
(n=161)
27%
73%
100%

Totals
(n=319)
23%
77%
100%

Respondents were asked the following question: “Suppose another advisor in the administration suggests secretly
funneling military arms, equipment, supplies, and training to opposition groups in the disputed territory. If you could
be virtually guaranteed (i.e., 99% chance) that information about this secret program would not be leaked to either
the legislature or the public at large, would you support the FIRST use of clandestine military assistance to
opposition groups as a way to retake the territory?”
969
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The relevance of the military balance of power is also brought into clearer perspective when
applied to the provision of clandestine military assistance. In the table below, individuals were
willing to provide lethal aid to opposition groups in the neighboring country at a much higher
rate (94 percent) when their country has a marked military advantage. When the balance of
military power favored the adversary, 78 percent of the respondents believed this course of
action was optimal. Given the preceding analyses, an argument can be made that both material
and ideational factors should be considered important factors influencing an individual’s actions
in international relations.
Table 34: Support for “First Use” of Clandestine Assistance by the Balance of Power

Support
Do Not Support
Totals

Weak Military
Position (n=160)
78%
22%
100%

Strong Military
Position (n=163)
94%
6%
100%

Totals
(n=313)
87%
13%
100%

The preceding analyses serve to guide this study’s focus on three ideational variables: a
political leader’s ideas about the state’s identity, his/her threat perceptions, and accompanying
foreign policy orientation as conditioned by domestic politics. As a reminder, this research
project acknowledges how small state alignment with a regional great power or set of regional
great powers is a complex political phenomenon where multiple variables can and will exert
varying levels of influence on the strategic calculus of political leaders charged with determining
the state’s foreign policies.
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